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This dissertation explores how German radio journalists shaped political culture 
in the two postwar Germanys.  Specifically, it examines the development of broadcast 
news reporting in Berlin during the first sixteen years of the Cold War, focusing on the 
reporters attached to the American sponsored station RIAS1 Berlin and the radio stations 
of the German Democratic Republic.  During this period, radio stations on both sides of 
the Iron Curtain waged a media war in which they fought to define the major events of 
the early Cold War.  The tension between objectivity and partisanship in both East and 
West Berlin came to define this radio war.  Radio stations constantly negotiated this 
tension in an attempt to encourage listeners to adopt a specific political worldview and 
forge a bond between broadcaster and listener.  Whereas East German broadcasters 
ultimately eschewed objectivity in favor of partisan news reporting defined by Marxist-
Leninist ideology, RIAS attempted to combine factual reporting with concerted efforts to 
undermine the legitimacy of the German Democratic Republic. 
The study contributes to a number of fields of study.  First, I contribute to 
scholarship that has examined the nature, development, and influence of political culture.  
                                                 





Related to this, the study considers how political ideas were received and understood by 
listeners.  This work also adds to a growing field of scholarship that goes beyond 
examining the institutional histories of Germany’s broadcasters and analyzes how 
German broadcasters influenced society itself.  Related to this, the dissertation adds to the 
historiography on how the United States used media outlets as a means of fighting the 
Cold War.  The dissertation is based on archival research done in Germany and the 
United States.  It draws on files from the Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv in Babelsberg, the 
Bundesarchv in Berlin and Koblenz, the Landesarchiv in Berlin, the archive of the former 
East German Ministry for State Security in Berlin, and the National Archives and 
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This dissertation explores how German radio journalists shaped political culture 
in the two postwar Germanys.  Specifically, it examines the development of broadcast 
news reporting in Berlin during the first sixteen years of the Cold War, focusing on the 
reporters attached to the American sponsored station RIAS1 Berlin and the radio stations 
of the German Democratic Republic.  During this period, radio stations on both sides of 
the Iron Curtain waged a media war in which they fought to define the major events of 
the early Cold War.  The tension between objectivity and partisanship in both East and 
West Berlin came to define this radio war.  Radio stations constantly negotiated this 
tension in an attempt to encourage listeners to adopt a specific political worldview and 
forge a bond between broadcaster and listener.  Whereas East German broadcasters 
ultimately eschewed objectivity in favor of partisan news reporting defined by Marxist-
Leninist ideology, RIAS attempted to combine factual reporting with concerted efforts to 
undermine the legitimacy of the German Democratic Republic.  RIAS’s approach proved 
to be the most effective and popular with East German listeners, and RIAS broadcasts 
would play a critical role in events such as the June 17, 1953 popular uprising in East 
Germany. 
This study engages two broad themes.  First, I examine the development and 
transmission of political cultures through the use of radio broadcasting.  Second, I 
analyze how these different political cultures were understood and received by listeners, 
specifically the citizens of the German Democratic Republic.  In examining these two 
                                                 





themes, I consider a number of interrelated questions.  First, why did RIAS become the 
preferred source for news and information amongst East German listeners and why did 
the broadcasters of the GDR fail to offer an alternative capable of matching RIAS’s 
popularity?  Second, how did journalists negotiate the balance between partisanship and 
reporting?  Third, how did the specific historical circumstances of postwar Germany 
come to define the nature of broadcast commentary and reporting?  Finally, did the 
legacies of the Third Reich and the challenges of the Cold War shape the standards and 
principles guiding broadcast journalism in divided Berlin?   
This is the first study to closely examine the development of broadcast journalism 
in Berlin during the Cold War.  Examining radio in Cold War Berlin gives historians an 
excellent opportunity to investigate the relationship between the diffusion and reception 
of political culture.  This work is thus a contribution to the study of the reception of 
ideas.2  As a city officially under joint occupation yet in actuality divided between the 
two German states, Berlin was an important arena in which the two Germanys and the 
Cold War superpowers came together.  At the same time, officials on both sides of the 
Cold War conflict undertook considerable efforts to understand the impact of broadcasts 
upon listeners through the use of surveys and listener assemblies.  The fact that the border 
between East and West Berlin remained open until 1961 gave western observers the 
opportunity to survey East Germans about listening preferences.  These surveys provide 
historians with a window into listening habits and attitudes that allows us to investigate 
                                                 
2 Some of the theoretical contributions to the field of “rezeptionsgeschichte” are Gunter Grimm ed. Literatur und Leser  
(Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1975), Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), and Martyn P Thompson, “Reception Theory and the Interpretation of 
Historical Meaning,” History and Theory 32 (1993): 248-272.  For examples of works that examine the reception of 
ideas in German history, see Steven E. Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890-1990 (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1992) and Wulf Kansteiner, In Pursuit of German Memory: History, Television, and 





questions regarding political preferences and understanding.  Thanks to the diverse 
number of polls, listener meetings, and letters available to scholars, historians of radio in 
Germany can examine many of the characteristics shaping the symbiotic relationship 
between broadcaster and listener.  Listeners often saw radio stations as both repositories 
of information and conduits to the governments that stood behind these broadcasters.  
While the sources used (surveys, letters, assembly minutes) cannot give us a 
comprehensive picture of how all East Germans thought, they nevertheless give us 
valuable insight into how many individuals in East German interpreted and understood 
radio broadcasts.  Furthermore, they reveal that listeners were not passive subjects, but 
active participants in the Berlin radio war who paid close attention to the style, content, 
and language of radio programs.  Losing listeners was evidence that one side was losing 
the overall ideological struggle.  Consequently, audience decisions played an important 
role in radio programming.  
As Thomas Lindenberger notes, studying broadcasting in Cold War Germany also 
gives historians an excellent opportunity to examine the dynamics of the West German-
East German relationship. While the stations came from different sides of the Cold War, 
they nevertheless addressed the same German audience.3  The fact that the two German 
states developed along different lines: one a liberal, multi-party democracy and the other 
a communist, single-party dictatorship, also allows us to compare and contrast the 
development of broadcasting in both types of societies.  Drawing on Lindenberger’s 
assertion that the binary opposition between ideologies helped to shape and define the 
Cold War media conflict, I argue that we can only fully understand the development of 
                                                 
3 Thomas Lindenberger, “Geteilte Welt, geteilter Himmel?,” in Zwischen Pop und Propaganda: Radio in der DDR, ed. 





broadcast journalism in Berlin if we examine the broadcasts within the context of a radio 
war between RIAS Berlin and the GDR’s stations.4  
A critical point of difference between the two sides of the radio war was the level 
to which reports needed to be accurate.  A critical part of this dissertation will be to 
examine how both RIAS and the stations of East Germany confronted, assessed, and 
negotiated basic assumptions about objectivity when reporting the major events of the 
early Cold War.  Throughout this period, radio officials and journalists on both sides of 
the Iron Curtain cast the conflict between RIAS and the GDR’s broadcasters as a rivalry 
between “objective” and “subjective” reporting.  In its simplest sense, RIAS was 
“objective,” presenting factual, straight news broadcasts as opposed to the GDR’s 
stations, which pursued overtly propagandistic broadcasts promoting communism.  This 
picture is much too simple and fails to acknowledge RIAS’s primarily political mission 
of undermining the GDR’s government.  It also does not acknowledge the periodic 
debates that emerged within the GDR’s broadcasting institutions concerning the balance 
between propaganda and journalism.  Yet, it would be wrong to characterize both RIAS 
and Berliner Rundfunk as simply propaganda stations that focused on refuting what the 
other has said.  When the East German diarist Victor Klemperer wrote in 1950 that RIAS: 
“says the same about the SU [Soviet Union] as we say about the USA [United States].  
Exactly the same,”5 he failed to acknowledge fundamental differences between the two 
sides of the radio war when it came to news reporting. 
For both sides of the radio war, “objectivity” was neither an ideal nor a principle 
of ethical journalism.  It was an approach to journalism loaded with political significance.  
                                                 
4 Ibid., 28. 
5 Victor Klemperer, The Diaries of Victor Klemperer 1945-1959, trans. and ed. Martin Chalmers (London: Phoenix 





For East Germany’s information chiefs, “objectivity” was a bourgeois construct designed 
to mask true class interests.  Thus, to claim to be objective was a political stance.  
Furthermore, East German leaders believed radio journalists needed to agitate the masses 
and help establish socialism in Germany.  Nevertheless many news reporters in the GDR 
felt that, despite its bourgeois implications, professional, factual reporting was a tactical 
necessity.  Many East German reporters knew that the propagandistic tone and character 
of the GDR’s news broadcasts were sending East German listeners to RIAS.  
Sporadically, as will be seen in my analysis of broadcasting during the Berlin airlift 
(Chapter Two) and the June 17, 1953 Uprising (Chapter Four), GDR reporters 
intermittently tried to downplay the overtly political nature of their broadcasts in order to 
attract listeners.  Yet, these efforts were always met with a crackdown from the ruling 
Socialist Unity Party (SED) and a reassertion of state control over broadcasting. 
 For RIAS, the relationship between objectivity and politics required much more 
negotiation and compromise.  RIAS’s staff argued that objective reporting was 
synonymous with “accurate” and “straight” news reporting.  When RIAS was created in 
1946, its founders in the US Occupation Government hoped that the station would 
represent and promote traditional standards of objective reporting that stressed not only 
accuracy, but also impartiality.  Along with newspapers and institutions of education, 
American authorities believed radio could be an effective means of promoting the liberal-
democratic reconstruction of Germany.6  However, with the outbreak of the Cold War in 
1947, the US authorities in Germany conscripted RIAS into a multimedia campaign 
                                                 
6 Larry Hartenian, Controlling Information in U.S. Occupied Germany, 1945-1949: Media Manipulation and 
Propaganda (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2003).  See also Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, Transmission 
Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany 1945-1955 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1999), Norbert Frei, Amerikanische Lizenzpolitik und deutsche Pressetradition: Die Geschichte 
der Nachkriegszeitung Südost-Kurier (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1986), and James F. Tent, Mission on the Rhine: 





aimed at confronting the Soviet Union and the communists in Germany.  While reporters 
continued to adhere to the principles of accuracy and independence, news broadcasts 
were rarely unbiased or neutral.  RIAS’s reporters frankly admitted their opposition to 
communism and the GDR, citing it as their moral and ethical responsibilities to report on 
the injustices committed by the GDR government and promote German reunification.  By 
1949, RIAS’s primary mission was to provide an alternative news source for East 
German listeners and undermine and destabilize the GDR.  However, despite this overtly 
political aim, the station’s news staff nevertheless strictly adhered to the principle that 
news needed to be accurate and presented with little editorial coloration.  However, this 
had as much to do with providing East Germans with a clear, distinct alternative to the 
GDR’s broadcast as it did with promoting liberal-democratic broadcast journalism.  Thus, 
for RIAS’s reporters, “objective” reporting was neither neutral nor unbiased reporting.  It 
was factual reporting designed to achieve a political end. 
Consequently, the reporters at RIAS and Berlin Rundunk acted not only as 
journalists, but also as public intellectuals and political actors.  Some of the more notable 
commentators whose broadcasts I examine include Egon Bahr, Victor Klages, and Heinz 
Frentzel at RIAS, and Marcus Wolf, Gerhart Eisler, and Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler at 
the GDR stations.  They not only presented information, but also used their commentaries 
to explain why events happened and why they were important, using prevailing symbols 
and narratives to provide context and meaning to their stories.   
The dissertation focuses on the broadcasts of RIAS and the East German station 
Berliner Rundfunk.  As a German station under US sponsorship, RIAS was one of many 





viewpoints to those living behind the Iron Curtain.  Created by the United States Military 
Government in 1946, the station remained under US control after the founding of the 
Federal Republic of Germany in 1949.  In 1953 it became an outlet of the United States 
Information Agency.  Nevertheless, RIAS was a German broadcaster and perceived by 
Germans in West and East alike as the Berlin station.  With the exception of four 
American control officers, RIAS’s staff was made up entirely of Germans.  Its editors, 
program directors, and reporters were all Germans, many of whom were born in Berlin 
and regions that were in the German Democratic Republic.  An examination of RIAS 
allows us to examine the complex relationship between the United States and West 
Germany during the early Cold War, consider US efforts at denazification and Cold War 
alliance building, and investigate the development of a liberal political culture in West 
Germany and West Berlin.  It also demonstrates the autonomous role played by Germans 
in the context of the superpower struggle. 
Throughout the time period examined in this dissertation East Berlin was served 
by a number of stations.  The station Berliner Rundfunk stood as the primary broadcaster 
for the city between 1945-52.  In 1952, all broadcasting in the GDR was centralized 
under the control of three Berlin based broadcasters (called respectively I, II, and III).  By 
the late 1950s, the GDR’s State Radio Committee once again reorganized East 
Germany’s broadcasting institutes, with Berliner Rundfunk again standing as the 
broadcaster for the GDR capital.  However, due to the centralized nature of East 
Germany’s media institutions, the GDR’s broadcasters freely shared stories and presented 
unified political broadcasts.  Furthermore, they shared the same personnel.  Thus, while I 





especially Deutschlandsender, the GDR broadcaster designed specifically for West 
Germany.   
I also consider the West Berlin public broadcaster Sender Freies Berlin.  Founded 
in 1954, the West Berlin government promoted and sponsored the construction of SFB as 
a means of representing the interests of West Berlin.  Although independent, SFB 
nevertheless remained closely aligned with RIAS in terms of programming and 
personnel.  Before 1961, it also did not enjoy the same popularity as a source for news as 
RIAS amongst East German listeners.  Thus, while I pay close attention to SFB 
broadcasts, especially during the Hungarian Uprising of 1956, my primary focus remains 
on RIAS.  For similar reasons, I do not focus on either the British Broadcasting 
Corporation or the Armed Forces Network, both of which had a broadcasting presence in 
Berlin during the Cold War. 
The timeframe for the study is from the founding of Berliner Rundfunk in 1945 
until the resolution of the Berlin Crisis in 1961.  1961 marks an important caesura in the 
history of Cold War Berlin.  The new status quo created by the building of the Berlin 
Wall was a regrettable, but tolerable, resolution to the Berlin Crisis of 1958-1961 for the 
US and Soviets.  Over the course of the 1960s, the confrontational rhetoric would 
subside, and Berlin would no longer be the primary battleground of the Cold War.  With 
the beginning of “Ostpolitik” in the late 1960s, a new state of affairs would be created as 
diplomatic relations were forged between the two German states.  Thus, an analysis of 
RIAS after the Berlin Crisis would need to examine the changes brought about by the 
new political situation, and consequently require research beyond the scope of a single 





mass communication and information before it was quickly supplanted by television 
during the 1960s in both Germanys.7   
By examining radio stations on both sides of the Iron Curtain, it seeks to provide a 
comparative analysis as a means of stressing those elements of each station that were 
both common and unique.  I examine and compare the personnel and programming 
decisions that were made by the directors of RIAS and the GDR’s stations.  However, I 
will also consider the close link between RIAS and the stations of the GDR and argue 
that one cannot fully understand broadcasting in West Berlin without also considering the 
important influence played by broadcasts from the GDR (and vice versa).  Despite being 
a Western station backed by the US, the image of RIAS constituted an important 
component of East German political broadcasting and programming decisions.  I also aim 
to situate the story of Berlin radio within the broader context of post-war German 
political and intellectual history.  As a result, this work is as much an examination of the 
intellectual movements of the Cold War in Germany as it is an examination of mass 
media.  I argue that, as much as they were media outlets, the radio stations of Berlin were 
also political and intellectual actors.   
 
Political Culture, Public Opinion, and the Question of Objectivity 
 
This is a study of the relationship between political culture and public opinion.  
Throughout, I argue that these two concepts shaped and influenced each other.  I further 
argue that one of the reasons listeners turned to a particular radio station (and hence, the 
                                                 
7 Axel Schildt, “Hegemon der häuslichen Freizeit: Rundfunk in den 50er Jahren,” in Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: 






political ideologies that station represented) was the level to which that station accurately 
presented news and information.  It is therefore necessary to consider these concepts in 
more detail.  My definition of “political culture” stems from two broad fields of 
scholarship.  First, drawing on scholarship by historians such as George Mosse, Keith 
Michael Baker, and Lynn Hunt, I define political culture as the language, rituals, and 
symbols of political discourses.8  While these scholars have examined different time 
periods and countries, their work focuses on the transformative power of ideas and their 
role in shaping historical events.  In this regard, they belong to a methodological tradition 
begun by Alexis de Tocqueville, who first noted that the development of revolutionary 
language and rhetoric during the French Revolution was a historically significant event 
unto itself.9  The field of German history has also seen the publication of a number of 
excellent works on political ideologies and culture.  Over the past forty years, historians 
such as George Mosse, Fritz Stern, and Karl Dietrich Bracher have published important 
works examining the ideological origins of National Socialism.10  Historians such as 
Norbert Frei, Jeffrey Herf, Robert Moeller, and Anson Rabinbach have also paid close 
attention to the development of German political culture after the events of World War II.  
Much of this work has focused on the important role memory has played in politics in 
both Germanys, focusing on the intersection between events and how statesmen 
                                                 
8 For examples of this tradition, see H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society: the Reorientation of European 
Social Thought 1890-1930 (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), Francois Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, 
trans. Elborg Forster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Keith Michael Baker, Inventing the French 
Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French 
Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), and Jerry Z. Muller, The Mind and the Market: Capitalism 
in Modern European Thought (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002). 
9 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution, ed. Francois Furet and Francois Melonio, trans. Alan S. 
Kahan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
10 George Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: The Universal 
Library, 1964), Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology (New York: 
Doubleday, 1965), Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, and effects of National 
Socialism, trans. Jean Steinberg (New York: Praeger Productions, 1970), and Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: 





remembered and confronted the German past.  These works also address the influence of 
the Cold War upon German political culture11   
While the formulation of political language and rhetoric constitutes an important 
theme of this study, I am also interested in the impact and reception of the political 
ideologies transmitted by Berlin’s radio stations upon listeners.  Consequently, my 
examination of political culture also draws upon the work of political scientists such as 
Sidney Verba and Gabriel Almond.12  For both of these scholars, the nature and character 
of political culture was linked to the level and character of political participation and 
political awareness.  As noted before, radio broadcasting affords us an excellent 
opportunity to consider the intersection between both these approaches to political 
culture.  The existence of broadcast transcripts, listener surveys, and listeners located in 
American and German archives allows historians to bring together and investigate these 
two interpretations. On the one hand, the broadcasts themselves allow us to see how 
journalists crafted political rhetoric and ideologies in their reports.  On the other, the 
desire of both stations and governments to monitor the effectiveness of radio broadcasts 
allows us to use surveys and polls to assess the level of popular response amongst 
audiences to particular political ideologies and interpretations.    
Both the United States and East Germany sought to use broadcast journalism as a 
means of building political consensus and publis opinion.  As the journalist Walter 
                                                 
11Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 2001), Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1997), Norbert Frei, Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and 
Integration, translated by Joel Golb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), Helmut Dubiel, Niemand ist frei 
von der Geschichte: Die nationalsozialistische Herrschaft in den Debatten des Deutschen Bundestages (Munich: Carl 
Hanser Verlag, 1999), Jan-Werner Müller, Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), and Catherine Epstein, The Last Revolutionaries: The German 
Communists and their Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). 
12 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations 





Lippmann noted in his study Public Opinion, the mass media plays a critical role in 
shaping and defining the stereotypes, symbols, and interpretations that build a public 
consensus.13  The dynamics of this phenomenon have been analyzed in further detail by 
the sociologist Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, who noted that individuals’ fear of isolation 
leads them to keep minority opinions private and affirm the majority opinion.  The 
ensuing “spiral of silence” contributes to forming of mass consensus.14  Radio stations in 
both halves of Berlin operated under this assumption, utilizing rhetoric, imagery, and 
stereotypes to try and define the Cold War world.  Each side of the radio war drew upon a 
distinct interpretive framework with which to analyze and explain major events.  In East 
Germany, the master narrative of antifascism, developed by German Communists in the 
1920s and 1930s, informed news broadcasting.  GDR broadcasts cast the world into two 
antagonistic camps led by the Soviet Union and United States respectively: peaceful, 
progressive socialism and belligerent, imperialist capitalism.  In the context of divided 
Berlin, East German broadcasters argued that the United States and the resurgent fascist 
West Germany were attempting to destroy the GDR from within.  Thus, GDR news 
broadcasts were dominated by a siege mentality.  In West Berlin, RIAS promoted the 
concept of anti-totalitarianism.  The Marxist-Leninist elements of East German 
communism were subsumed beneath a totalitarian paradigm that downplayed distinctions 
between the GDR and Nazi Germany.  Thus, just as East German radio claimed West 
Germany was the successor to the Third Reich, RIAS claimed the GDR was simply a 
renewal of Nazi totalitarianism.  Berlin’s radio stations participated in a broader process 
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pursued by organs of the mass media throughout Germany, by which they sought to 
conceptualize and define the defeat and division of Germany.15 
 As noted, the question of objectivity played a prominent role in how radio 
journalists on both sides of the Iron Curtain approached major events and how listeners 
subsequently responded.  Furthermore, it strongly influenced listener choices and 
preferences.  The term “objective” is a loaded one, and it carries with it a large number of 
connotations.  In one sense, it refers to principles of empirical research, rational 
deduction, and impartiality developed during the scientific revolution, enlightenment, and 
nineteenth century.16   By the mid twentieth century, a growing number of intellectuals 
began to criticize these principles, questioning the principle that one could ever analyze 
and observe in an impartial, truly “objective” manner.  Critics from radical movements 
such as National Socialism and Stalinist Communism alike characterized objectivity as a 
naïve vestige of liberalism and impossible to pursue.17  Following the Second World 
War, intellectuals from a variety of fields in the liberal arts and social sciences vigorously 
interrogated the limits of objectivity, questioning the individual’s ability to truly 
investigate and test hypotheses in a truly unbiased, neutral manner.18  For example, Peter 
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Novick characterized the objective writing of history as a “noble dream” and Hayden 
White argued that the utilization of literary tropes made a truly objective investigation of 
the past impossible.19 
Journalists also developed professional and ethical standards that addressed the 
concept of objectivity.  However, although journalists and newspapers had existed in 
Europe since the sixteenth century, it was not until the 1920s that North American 
reporters formulated a doctrine of journalistic objectivity.20  In contrast to European 
journalists, who frequently expressed opinions in their reporting, American journalists 
considered objectivity fundamental to professional reporting in a democratic society.  The 
mid-twentieth century ideal of objectivity was a strict and methodical set of principles.  
Journalists believed that a strict distinction needed to exist between opinion and news, 
thus requiring a high level of empirical research and investigation.  Objective journalists 
preached restraint, systematic testing of sources, and balance.21  However, just as scholars 
began to question objectivity in studying the social sciences, many intellectuals and 
journalists began to question whether or not journalists could truly be objective.  Was it 
possible to be truly objective?  Were journalists not allowing their own judgments shape 
their reporting when they selected and edited stories?  Journalists were political actors, 
not neutral observers.  Consequently, by claiming that they were reporting objectively, 
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reporters ignored the realities of corporate, commercial, and political pressures that 
existed in the journalism business.22   
 Reporters in East and West Berlin all confronted these questions.  However, the 
fact that these reporters operated in the context of Cold War Berlin often meant that the 
answers to these questions were inextricably linked to that conflict.  Consequently, the 
issue for RIAS and the GDR broadcasters was not choosing between factual reporting or 
partisanship, but how to combine and balance the two in order to win the ideological 
struggle over Berlin and Germany.  Tactical necessities and journalistic ethics coexisted 
side-by-side as journalists used commentaries to achieve political goals. 
 
Historiography and Sources 
 
This work contributes to a growing field of literature by scholars such as Inge 
Marszolek, Adelhaid von Saldern, Christoph Classen, and Klaus Arnold that has sought 
to go beyond presenting the institutional and programming history of German radio 
stations, and instead focuses on the impact radio broadcasts have had on their political 
and social environment.23  The last ten years has seen the publication of a number of 
excellent works examining the development of political broadcasting and its relationship 
to political culture in Germany.  Historians such as Christoph Classen, Thomas 
Lindenberger, Ingrid Pietrzynski, and Bernd Stöver have all made important 
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contributions examining the ideological and institutional developments of radio 
broadcasting in Germany after World War II.24   
The work on radio in Berlin is diverse, although there has yet to be a work 
examining journalistic practices at all three of the city’s major stations during the Cold 
War era.  The earliest complete study to focus on RIAS is a dissertation from 1961 by 
Donald Roger Browne.  While an extensive survey, thoroughly examining many of 
RIAS’s programs and its organizations, it is not a critical work.25  There is also an 
interesting, illustrated general history by former RIAS journalist Herbert Kundler that, 
while comprehensive, is not a scholarly monograph.26  Bryan van Sweringen’s 1995 
study of the RIAS cabaret performer Gunter Neumann is one of the first critical studies of 
the station.  However, its focus on Neumann means that most of it is devoted to cultural 
programming, with little on RIAS’s journalistic practices.27  Recently, three scholarly 
works have been published exploring stations based in Berlin.  The first, a study by Maral 
Herbst, examines the institutional development and programming of Berliner Rundfunk 
and Sender Freies Berlin.28  Schanett Riller has produced an excellent study of the 
Eisenhower administration’s psychological warfare programs against the Soviets, 
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focusing on RIAS’s political broadcasts.29  Most recently, Petra Galle has published a 
thoroughly researched study of the institutional development of RIAS and Berliner 
Rundfunk from 1945-1949.30  Along with these works, there have also been a number of 
excellent essays examining both RIAS and the GDR’s broadcasters by Wolfgang 
Schivelbusch, Markus Wackett, Christian Ostermann, and Berndt Stöver.31   
There is also a large historiography that has explored how each side of the Cold 
War conflict utilized the mass media for political goals by scholars such as Kenneth 
Osgood, Walter Hixon, and Volker Berghahn.32  Most of these are works of diplomatic 
history and have focused on US efforts to use radio as a means of shaping politics in 
Europe and confronting the Soviet Union.  Focusing on Germany, there has also been a 
number of works examining the role of US media institutions in Germany, with most 
focusing on the occupation period from 1945-1949 and on the issue of democratisation.33   
 The source base for my dissertation is diverse and extensive and includes the files 
of the radio stations themselves, files of the US, West German, and East German 
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governments, the documents of the East German Ministry for State Security, the files of 
the Socialist Unity Party, and the personal papers of prominent individuals such as RIAS 
journalists Egon Bahr and Victor Klages, SFB commentator Richard Löwenthal, and 
RIAS’s director Gordon Ewing.  The stations themselves have left behind substantial, if 
uneven archival resources currently housed at the Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv in 
Babelsberg.  The largest sources for news broadcasts are editorial commentary 
manuscripts.  Running between five to ten minutes, these usually followed news 
broadcasts and focused on a particular topic or theme.  These sources are important due 
to the fact that we have substantial collections of them from all of the stations examined 
in this study.  Along with these manuscripts, I have also examined internal memos, 
meeting minutes, and news guidelines from these same collections.  Within the files of 
the GDR’s radio stations are the documents from the GDR’s radio schools in Grünau and 
Weimar.  Founded in the early 1950s, the GDR created these schools to train journalists 
for a socialist society.  The lesson plans, examinations, student meeting minutes, and 
applications are a valuable means for investigation the type of reporter the GDR wanted 
to work for its broadcasters.  Another valuable source, found in both the files of the GDR 
stations and RIAS are letters sent from listeners to the stations.  While neither 
representative nor comprehensive, the letters nevertheless give us a picture of how 
individuals perceived the stations they were listening to and what kind of impact these 
broadcasts had. 34  I also draw upon files from the archive of RIAS’s successor station, 
Deutchlandradio Kultur in Berlin.  While most of RIAS’s documents are now housed at 
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the DRA, Deutschlandradio nevertheless has a diverse collection of archival material, 
ranging from official reports, press clippings, and sound documents.  The sound archive 
is especially helpful, in that it afforded me the opportunity to hear many of the RIAS 
broadcasts that I discuss in this dissertation. 
 Along with the files of the radio stations themselves, I also draw upon the archival 
resources of the various agencies responsible for broadcasting in the two Germanys.  The 
files of the State Radio Committee of the GDR at the Bundesarchiv in Berlin were a very 
helpful means for examining policy decisions regarding broadcasting as well as 
investigating how the GDR tried to ascertain listener attitudes and preferences.  Also at 
the Bundesarchiv are the files of the Socialist Unity Party, the ruling communist party of 
East Germany.  The files of the SED’s Department for Agitation provide further insight 
in programming concerns and the relationship between news broadcasting and ideology.  
Both the DRA and Deutsches Historiches Museum in Berlin also house numerous 
propaganda posters, cartoons, and pamphlets aimed at discouraging listening to RIAS.  
These documents allowed me to explore the GDR’s elaborate anti-RIAS campaign.  
Another valuable source from the GDR that addresses this topic are the files of the 
Ministry for State Security, or Stasi.  These files, which include operation reports and 
reports on RIAS broadcasts provided helpful insight into the level to which the GDR 
feared RIAS and its effect upon the East German population.  The dissertation also draws 
on the files of the West German Ministry for All-German affairs housed in Koblenz. 
 Between 1946 and 1953, RIAS was under the control of three different US 
government agencies: The US Military Government in Germany (OMGUS) from 1946-





States Information Agency/Service (USIA) from 1953 to the station’s dissolution in 
1994.35  The dissertation draws from the files of all of these agencies.  These files, housed 
at the National Archives in College Park, include documents related to RIAS and radio 
broadcasting throughout Germany.  The OMGUS files also include a large collection of 
letters written to RIAS during the Berlin blockade and airlift, many of which stem from 
what was then the Soviet Zone of Occupation (SBZ).  Along with the files of these 
specific organizations, the study also draws upon the files of the United States 
Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency. 
 The historian of Berlin radio is fortunate to have a number of valuable personal 
collections of individuals attached to various radio stations in the city.  The dissertation 
draws from all of these collections.  The Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung in Bonn houses the files of RIAS reporter and Bonn correspondent Egon 
Bahr and of SFB’s freelance commentator Richard Löwenthal.  In Berlin, the city’s 
Landesarchiv contains the personal files of RIAS reporter Victor Klages.  All of these 
collections include personal correspondence and broadcast manuscripts.  Also important 
are the personal papers of RIAS Director Gordon Ewing.  An American official, Ewing 
served as director from 1953-1957.  Thus, he was heavily involved with the station 
during events such as June 17 uprising.  His papers, which include outlines of 
programming goals, listener reports, and personal correspondence, provide a great deal of 
insight into the inner workings of the station.  Along with these archival sources, I also 
draw on a number of valuable published works for primary material.  Most valuable was 
Manfred Rexin’s collection of personal histories of RIAS journalists, radio personalities, 
                                                 
35 The United States Information Agency was called the United States Information Service overseas, or USIS.  See 
Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War, 89.  The USIA and USIS were one and the same, and when referring to the 





and editors.36  The memoirs of RIAS commentator Egon Bahr also provided helpful 
insights into the political atmosphere of RIAS during the early 1950s.37 
 The dissertation is divided into six chapters.  Chapter One focuses on the 
founding of Berliner Rundfunk by German Communists, and examines the station’s 
reports on the Nuremberg Trials and the founding of the Socialist Unity Party.  Chapter 
Two considers the founding of RIAS and how stations in East and West Berlin reported 
on the Berlin blockade and airlift.  During this period, Germany remained under allied 
occupation.  Thus, the political challenges were markedly different than they were after 
1949, with the founding of two sovereign German states.  1949 marks an important 
turning point in other ways.  That year, authority over RIAS was transferred from the US 
Military Government to the US Department of State as the US High Commission for 
Germany replaced OMGUS.  In East Germany, the leadership of Berliner Rundfunk was 
purged as the communist Socialist Unity Party quickly began asserting control over 
media operations.  Thus, in many ways both radio stations faced new challenges and a 
new status quo during the 1950s.   
 Chapter Three considers the development of models for news broadcasting at both 
RIAS and the stations of the GDR.  It also examines the symbolic significance of Sender 
Freie Berlin and its role within the Berlin media landscape.  Chapter Four considers the 
June 17, 1953 uprising.  Radio broadcasts, especially from RIAS, played a decisive role 
in the uprising and a focused examination of the event is an illuminating opportunity to 
examine the impact of broadcasting on political actions and attitudes.  Chapter Five 
moves away from radio broadcasting and turns to the East German propaganda campaign 
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against RIAS, examining the various efforts taken by the GDR to stop its population from 
listening to the US sponsored broadcaster.  Chapter Six begins by examining how GDR 
stations and RIAS reported on the major events of 1956: Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, the 
Hungarian Uprising, and the Suez Crisis, and closes by analysing broadcasts during the 





Chapter One: Laying an Antifascist Foundation: Berliner Rundfunk and the 
Reestablishment of Broadcasting in Berlin After World War II 
 
 
On May 2, 1945, just six days before VE Day, soldiers of the Red Army occupied 
Berlin’s Haus des Rundfunks, the center of the Third Reich’s broadcast network and the 
home of Reichssender Berlin.1  A little over a week later, on May 13, Berliner Rundfunk 
began operations with an hour long broadcast that included the German surrender 
announcement and the first order of the Soviet City Commandant of Berlin.  Berliner 
Rundfunk was soon broadcasting eighteen hours a day, presenting a variety of news, 
music, and radio plays.  In a diary entry for June 17, 1945, Victor Klemperer noted, 
“During every programme, dozens of times a day, Radio Berlin announced the time, and 
that is a blessing.”2  It is likely that many listeners shared Klemperer’s appreciation for 
such a simple service during the confused and chaotic months immediately after World 
War II. 
During its first years of operation, Berliner Rundfunk pursued a variety of goals, 
ranging from broadcasting the orders of the Soviet Military Administration to instilling 
calm by broadcasting music.  At the same time, the station also pursued overtly political 
goals and attempted to lay the foundations for a future antifascist and democratic German 
state.  Reporters and commentators at Berlin Rundfunk actively promoted the policies of 
the Soviet occupying authorities: the purging of fascism from German society and the 
creation of a peaceful Germany based on what was claimed to be a democratic, antifascist 
foundation.  Staffed by communists and socialists who had spent the Third Reich in exile 
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or in concentration camps, the station broadcast a consistent presentation of the world-
views developed by German communists over the past three decades.   
This chapter is about Berliner Rundfunk’s attempts to shape German political 
culture during the first two years of the occupation.  The reporters and administrators at 
Berliner Rundfunk were guided by the belief that radio could be deployed to reeducate 
the German people and remove the harmful and destructive influences of fascism and 
imperialism from the German national mentality.  Throughout Berliner Rundfunk’s 
broadcasts, a coherent worldview dominated news reports.  This worldview, which 
interpreted Nazism as a brutalized expression of deep seeded elements in German 
society, such as imperialism, militarism, the influence of high finance and monopoly 
capitalism, guided how journalists presented the major news stories of the first two years 




The Soviet Military Administration, Group Ulbricht, and the Reconstruction of 
Broadcasting in Berlin 
 
 
Before the end of World War II, the allied powers agreed that upon the German 
surrender, the German Reich would be dissolved and divided into four zones of 
occupation to be administered respectively by the four major Allied powers: the United 
States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France.  It was also agreed that although Berlin 
lay within the Soviet Zone of Occupation, its symbolic nature as the capital of Germany 





occupation between the four allies.  Although each allied power had full control over its 
respective zone, an Allied Control Council was created to govern Germany as a whole.  
However, since decisions needed to be unanimous, its authority was limited.3 
Before the German surrender, the Soviets had taken steps to strengthen their 
authority and position within Berlin and their occupation zone, flying in loyal German 
communists who had spent the war years in the Soviet Union.  The Soviet authorities 
placed the members of this group, led by Walter Ulbricht, in most of the important local 
and municipal administrative posts in the Soviet sectors of Berlin and the Soviet 
Occupation Zone (SBZ).4  Among these was Berlin’s radio station, which Ulbricht placed 
under the authority of his thirty-four year old colleague and fellow exile, Hans Mahle. 
Initially, the Allied powers planned to pursue a unified policy with regards to the 
renewal of radio broadcasting.  However, there was little discussion between the various 
powers with regards to what the nature and character of radio broadcasting would be in 
postwar Germany.5  In contrast to their respective policies with regards to newspaper 
licensing, the Allies were unsure of how to proceed.  They also pursued distinct 
approaches to radio in their respective zones, with the Soviets and United States 
reestablishing local stations and the British creating a large Northwest German radio for 
its entire occupation zone.6   
In April 1945, the leaders of the German Communist Party (KPD) exiled to 
Moscow, along with members of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) devised a number 
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of measures and goals they intended to guide radio and newspaper reporting in postwar 
Germany.  These goals were wide ranging, and included reasserting order, promoting 
support for the Red Army and Soviet Union, and laying the groundwork for a new, 
antifascist and democratic Germany.  Interestingly, many of these aims focused on active 
engagement with the German population.  The guidelines’ drafters intended radio reports 
to educate listeners that the German population were the root cause of the National 
Socialism and that the population should now hate National Socialism, Prussian 
militarism, and racism.  The KPD leadership believed that postwar news reports could 
convince listeners that the eradication of Nazism was in the best interests of the German 
nation.  They also hoped radio would be able to not only educate, but mobilize the 
German population into actively supporting the Soviet Union’s policies and the 
occupation of the Red Army.  While none of these aims declared that radio in the SBZ 
should promote the creation of a socialist Germany, it was clear that they were intended 
to cultivate friendship and support for the Soviet Military Administration (SMA).  The 
overriding goal was the establishment of a broad, antifascist coalition that united all of 
those political movements that were opposed to the Nazis.7     
 A number of factors influenced the shaping of the guidelines.  First, there was the 
practical necessity of establishing Soviet authority over the SBZ.  Secondly, however, 
was the pervading influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the ideas about the need to 
use the mass media as a means for agitation and mobilization developed by Vladimir 
Lenin.8  Propaganda and agitation were critical means for shaping political culture and 
political mentalities.  Lenin and adherents to his theories saw in the organs of the mass 
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media a critical tool that could help in this mobilization.  Consequently, despite 
pretensions of creating a broad popular front, both the Soviets and German communists 
(and with them their ideological preconceptions) heavily influenced the building of 
Berliner Rundfunk.  Although most of the station personnel were not members of the 
KPD or its successor, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), most of its chief 
officials and journalists were committed communists.9  For all of them, the rise of the 
Nazis had definitively shaped their worldviews.  Leading the station, and radio operations 
throughout the Eastern Zone, was Hans Mahle.  Born in Hamburg in 1911, Hans Mahle’s 
upbringing was dominated by the German socialist movement.  His father was a member 
of the Social Democratic Party and joined the Spartacus League in 1918.  During the 
early 1930s, Mahle traveled to Moscow and worked underground in Germany after 
Hitler’s assumption of power in 1933.  In 1936 he officially immigrated to the Soviet 
Union.  While he was in Moscow, Germany invaded the Soviet Union and Mahle became 
actively involved in the counter-propaganda operations of the Soviet government.  He 
worked both in youth radio and to reeducate German Prisoners of War.  In 1943, he 
helped found the Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland (National Committee for a Free 
Germany, or NKFD), and worked for the editorial staff of the NKFD’s radio station, 
“Freies Deutschland.”10 
Mahle faced a considerable number of challenges.  The station house in Berlin’s 
Charlottenburg District lacked a working transmitter.11  Most of the available personnel 
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with experience in radio broadcasting had also worked for the old Reichssender, 
compromising denazification efforts.  While Mahle was able to find adequate equipment 
to recommence broadcasts, the personnel issue was more difficult to solve.  Even those 
employees who were not members of the Nazi Party were politically compromised due to 
the critical importance radio had played in the Third Reich’s propaganda operations.  
Almost immediately, communists were installed in most of the leading positions.  
However, many lower level workers and editors in cultural and artistic programming who 
had worked for the Reichssender remained.12   
The desire to recommence broadcasting as rapidly as possible led the Soviets and 
their German clients to sanction a flexible personnel policy regarding former employees 
of the Nazi run Reichssender Berlin, a division of the Reichsrundfunk.13  Thus, within 
weeks of producing the media guidelines, Soviet and German Communist authorities 
were altering their position that the German people were responsible for the crimes of the 
Third Reich.  Instead, SMA officials placed renewed emphasis on the blaming the Nazi 
leadership.14  SMA officials and German Communists stressed that the Nazi regime was a 
consequence of the larger structural forces inherent to capitalism and that the German 
people complicit in the National Socialist regime could be rehabilitated along Marxist-
Leninist lines.  Thus, Mahle and the Soviet military authorities deemed the presence of 
large numbers of former Reichssender employees acceptable.15  In June and July, 1945, 
110 of the station’s 600 employees were dismissed from Berliner Rundfunk due to ties to 
National Socialism.  Thus, the majority of the station’s employees had worked for the 
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Nazi’s Reichsrundfunk.16  Since their responsibilities had not been overtly political in 
nature, SMA authorities allowed individuals in charge of artistic programming, such as 
childrens’ programming director Ilse Obrig, to continue broadcasting.  Having worked in 
radio since the days of the Weimar Republic, Obrig was a successful children’s author 
and inspected children’s literature for the National Socialist regime during the 1930s.  
While she would eventually be brought before a denazification commission by Soviet 
authorities, she was cleared of any wrong doing and allowed to remain at her position in 
Berliner Rundfunk, where she remained until 1950, leaving to work for West Berlin’s 
radio stations, RIAS and SFB.17   
Despite the prevalence of former Reichsrundfunk personnel, German Communists 
occupied all politically sensitive positions relating to news and politics.  Thus, the first 
journalists to work for Berliner Rundfunk were all men whose worldviews had been 
shaped by the rise of Nazism and the recent war between Germany and the Soviet Union.  
The first reporters and commentators working for Berliner Rundfunk can be divided into 
three groups: individuals who had spent the Nazi years living in exile in the Soviet 
Union, individuals who had spent those years in states other than the Soviet Union, and 
individuals who were incarcerated in Nazi concentration camps.  Belonging to the first 
group of exiles was Markus Wolf.  Comparatively younger in comparison to his 
coworkers, Wolf had spent the Nazi era with his family in exile, living first in 
Switzerland, and then in the Soviet Union beginning in 1934.  Only eleven when he 
arrived in Moscow, he was educated within the Soviet schooling system.  Beginning in 
1943, Wolf worked as a commentator and editor at “Deutschen Volkssender” in Moscow, 
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and would return to Berlin with Ulbricht.  His Soviet citizenship and close relationship 
with Vladimir Mulin, the Soviet radio chief in the SBZ, gave him considerable 
advantages.  He worked both as an employee of Berliner Rundfunk and the Soviet 
Military Administration, serving as a radio commentator from 1945 until 1949.  As a 
Soviet passport holder, he was also allowed to attend the Nuremberg Trials as a reporter; 
a privilege not permitted most German journalists.18  Afterwards he would advance in the 
GDR hierarchy and become the head of the Ministry for State Security’s espionage 
division. 
Belonging to the second group were communist journalists such as Max 
Seydewitz and Heinz Schmidt.  A one time member of the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD), Seydewitz became associated with the KPD in 1934 and worked for the exile anti-
Nazi press in Czechoslovakia.  He eventually moved to Norway and Sweden during the 
Nazi period.19  He returned to Germany in 1946 and worked for SED party organs before 
succeeding the recently promoted Hans Mahle as Berliner Rundfunk Intendant.  He 
served as Intendant for just a year, and was replaced by Heinz Schmidt.  A social 
democrat turned communist, Schmidt had spent the Nazi period in Britain, where he 
worked for the Free German Youth journal Freie Tribüne.  Upon returning to Germany in 
1946, he became Chief Editor and then Intendant of Berliner Rundfunk, serving until 
1949.20 
Several Berliner Rundfunk journalists had lived through the war years in prison.  
One of these was Arthur Mannbar.  Born in 1913, he spent his youth involved with 
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various German communist organizations before joining the KPD in 1933.  He fled Nazi 
Germany in 1935, eventually arriving in the Soviet Union where he attended the Lenin 
school in Moscow from 1935-1937.  Between 1938 and 1940 he worked as a resistance 
fighter before being captured in Denmark in 1940 by the Gestapo.  He spent the 
remainder of the war in prison.  Although expelled from the SED in 1947 due to the 
suspicion that he had collaborated with the Gestapo, he was rehabilitated in 1956.  He 
continued to work for various GDR radio stations and news services until 1977.21  
Another Berliner Rundfunk reporter who had spent the war years in prison was Alfred 
Düchrow.  Born in 1905, Düchrow joined the KPD in 1924.  A teacher and journalist, 
Düchrow spent ten years of his life in Nazi concentration camps.  Upon being liberated 
from Dachau by US forces in 1945, Düchrow immediately began working as an editor 
and commentator for numerous Berliner Rundfunk political programs.  He would 
continue to work as a correspondent for various GDR news organs until 1969.22 
As can be seen, the original staff of Berliner Rundfunk came from a variety of 
backgrounds, yet their biographies all shared fundamental elements.  Some had spent the 
Nazi period in exile in Moscow, where they were able to cultivate a close relationship 
with Soviet authorities.  Many had spent the war years honing their craft as antifascist 
journalists.  Others still spent the Nazi period imprisoned in concentration camps.  Most 
importantly, all had experienced persecution due to the rise of the Nazis.  They were all 
men of the German left whose formative experiences had been during the upheavals of 
the Weimar Republic and the persecution of the Nazi era.  As Catherine Epstein has 
shown in her biographical study of the German Communists who founded the German 
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Democratic Republic, they were hardened men driven by a clear worldview that divided 
the world between fascists and antifascists.23  Their experiences in exile and in the camps 
led them to pursue an aggressive policy against those forces they perceived to be the 
source of Germany’s downfall: capitalist imperialism, militarism, and the disunity of the 
German political left. 
Norman Naimark has shown that the Soviet Union’s policy towards the 
occupation Germany was uncoordinated, inconsistent, and lacking in any kind of 
premeditated planning.24  The improvised character of Berliner Rundfunk’s creation, 
described by Mahle as “chaotic,”25 reflects the ad hoc nature of the Soviet military 
administration.  While the Soviets shared a number of common goals with the Western 
Allies, including denazification, reeducation, and demilitarization, there was little 
agreement on what kind of economic and political system would govern the new 
Germany.  For example, disagreements existed within the SMA and KPD about whether 
or not the Soviets should support the creation of a bourgeois, democratic regime as a 
means of setting the stage for an inevitable socialist revolution, or whether the Soviets 
should embark upon a more radical path and create a Communist regime in the SBZ, as 
advocated by individuals like Ulbricht.  As scholars have shown, even Stalin himself was 
less than enthusiastic about transforming the SBZ into a Communist satellite, preferring 
to leave his options open for an accommodation with the Western Allies.26  These 
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tensions were apparent throughout the various organizations created by the SMA to 
monitor censorship, the dissemination of information, and broadcasting.  On August 18, 
1945 the SMA’s political advisor, Vladimir Semyonov, created the Sector for 
Propaganda and Censorship.27  In December 1945 the SMA’s Propaganda Department 
launched a department for radio propaganda.   In between, in November 1945, the SMA 
had also created a radio division in the German Central Administration for Peoples’ 
Education (DVV). Unlike the first two organizations, the DVV was German run, and the 
Soviets appointed Hans Mahle head of the DVV’s radio operations.  Nevertheless, the 
SMA retained oversight and censorship control over all information in the SBZ.28   
One should not interpret the lack of clear Soviet goals as an indication that 
Berliner Rundfunk’s reporters were free to select their stories and how they reported.  
Many East German journalists, such as Intendant Hans Mahle, have thought back 
favorably about their early days at Berliner Rundfunk and have spoken of the freedom 
afforded its reporters.29  Although Berliner Rundfunk enjoyed relative freedom during its 
first months of broadcasting, the SMA quickly established censorship bodies designed to 
oversee and monitor the station’s broadcasts.  Soviet censors had complete control over 
what Berliner Rundfunk could broadcast.  For example, Mahle and his reporters were not 
permitted to broadcast reports about the Soviet Union unless requested to do so by the 
SMA.30  Even the few moments where the SMA granted Berliner Rundfunk relative 
freedom to report, such as in Marcus Wolf’s Nuremberg Trial reports, Wolf ultimately 
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had to have his broadcasts cleared by the SED leadership.31  Furthermore, although the 
principle wire service for SBZ broadcast and print news, the Allgemeiner Deutscher 
Nachrichtendienst (General German News Service, or ADN) was a limited liability 
organization dedicated to the creation of a broad, nonpartisan antifascist coalition, it was 
nevertheless a creation of Tiul’panov’s Information and Propaganda Department and 
dominated by the Soviets and members of the SED.32   
Critically, there were a variety of opinions and attitudes regarding Germany’s 
postwar future both within the SMA and amongst the SED.  Despite being a friend of 
Ulbricht and member of his Moscow group, Hans Mahle pursued the Soviet’s public 
party line that broadcasters needed to pursue a more moderate approach that was open to 
the creation of an antifascist consensus open to cooperation with non-Marxist parties such 
as the Liberal Democrats and Christian Democrats.33  At the same time, however, both 
Walter Ulbricht and the Soviet Information Chief in the SBZ, Sergei Tiul’panov, favored 
an approach supporting Soviet policies in the SBZ and openly favoring German 
communists at the expense of both other political parties and of inter-allied governance of 
the German Occupation Zones.34  This tension accounts for many contradictions that 
existed throughout Berliner Rundfunk’s political broadcasts during the occupation period, 
especially between the end of the war and the breakdown of inter-allied cooperation in 
1947.  On the one hand, Berliner Rundfunk correspondents promoted broad goals such as 
democratization, antifascism, and cooperation with the Western Allies.  On the other 
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hand, when reporting controversial moments such as the creation of the Socialist Unity 
Party and the announcement of the Nuremberg Trial verdicts in 1946, the station’s 
reporters came down decidedly on the side of the Soviet authorities and promoted a 
Marxist-Leninist interpretation of events. 
In 1946, the SMA placed broadcasting under the control of the newly created 
German Central Administration for Peoples’ Education (DVV) headed by Paul Wandel, a 
journalist and member of the Ulbricht group.  The SMA intended the DVV to oversee all 
areas of education within the SBZ, of which broadcasting was a critical component.35  
Among the DVV’s other responsibilities was also censoring all broadcasts and 
publications.36  Despite the bureaucratic reorganization, Mahle was responsible for all 
radio operations in the SBZ, holding the title of General Intendant for Radio (though 
broadcasts remained subject to SMA censors).37  The staff of Berliner Rundfunk worked 
relatively well with the Soviet control officers.  The Soviet officers spoke excellent 
German and had a strong backing in propaganda techniques.   
In charge of propaganda in the Soviet Zone was Colonel Sergei Tiul’panov, a 
Communist Party official in charge of counterpropaganda during World War II.  
Tiul’panov was responsible for recruiting Germans for the Committee for a Free 
Germany, and thus had a close working relationship with the communists who comprised 
Group Ulbricht.  He played a critical role in many of the political events in the SBZ 
during the occupation, including the creation of the Socialist Unity Party and 
strengthening the power of Ulbricht and his allies.38  Tiul’panov’s radio chief was 
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Vladimir Mulin, an amiable man who got along with both the Soviets and Western Allies 
so well that US observers at one point expressed surprise that he had not been recalled.39  
Before the war, Mulin had been in charge of Radio Moscow’s foreign broadcasts, and 
had worked as a correspondent with the Red Army during the war.  Although he was 
amiable and well liked by the allied leaders, he was also, in the words of Information 
Officials in the US occupation authority, a “good dialectician” who had “no difficulty 
rationalizing the Soviet position on any issue.”40  He fully embraced the ideology of 
Marxism-Leninism, and did not perceive the broadcasts of Berliner Rundfunk and the 
other Soviet zone stations as anything but the truth.41 
Beginning on May 20, 1945 Berliner Rundfunk presented about nineteen hours of 
broadcasting a day.  Of this, roughly forty percent was devoted to spoken word 
broadcasting (as opposed to music).42  For the next year, Berliner Rundfunk would be the 
only large-scale broadcaster in the former German capital.  During this critical period the 
surviving leaders of the Nazi Party would be tried at the Nuremberg War Crime trials.  
From the end of 1945 and throughout 1946, Berliner Rundfunk reporters such as Marcus 
Wolf and Arthur Mannbar were able to use the trials as a means of exposing the crimes of 
the Nazi regime, exploring the nature of German fascism, and promoting the Soviet and 
German Communist vision for a postwar, antifascist and democratic Germany. 
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The Nuremberg Trial Reports 
   
The political culture of the future German Democratic Republic was shaped by a 
Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the world.43  It cast a world divided between antifascist, 
progressive socialism on the one hand, and fascism, reaction, and finance capital on the 
other.  Thus, German Communists analyzed National Socialism as an outgrowth of 
Germany’s long traditions of imperialism, militarism, and the unmitigated influence of 
large-scale finance and capitalism on German society.44  Communism was the ideology 
of progress and antifascism, its importance and historical role proven by the Soviet 
Union’s recent victory of Nazi Germany.   
The important themes of this narrative dominated the broadcasts of Berliner 
Rundfunk, especially when it came to issues such as the Nazi past and the future for 
Germany.  In the very first weeks of Berliner Rundfunk’s broadcasts, it did not evade 
such critical issues as the Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen Concentration Camps, 
Germany’s war guilt, and the need to bring war criminals to justice.45   
 Berliner Rundfunk’s chief correspondents in Nuremberg, Markus Wolf and 
Arthur Mannbar, were amongst the very few Germans permitted into the courtroom itself 
and allowed to broadcast directly from the proceedings.  Berliner Rundfunk featured 
frequent, detailed analyses of the day’s proceedings, the nature of the trial, and the 
lessons that their listeners needed to draw from the events.  In Berlin, other Berliner 
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Rundfunk reporters such as Rudolf Miessner and Alfred Duchrow presented their own 
views and thoughts on the trials.  There was rarely much difference between the 
individual broadcasters beyond style and presentation.  Interpretation remained firmly 
grounded in Marxist-Leninist ideology.  For Berliner Rundfunk, the trials were about 
more than just bringing those responsible for the war to justice.  While many 
commentators discussed the defendants and their individual crimes and character, they 
also stressed that the war’s causes went beyond the actions of the defendants.  The war 
criminals were symbols of those elements in German society that had permitted the 
ascendancy of the Nazis: Militarism, Imperialism, and the corrupting influence of High 
Finance and Capitalism.46  On September 1, 1945, Arthur Mannbar established this 
notion when he declared, “Here we find the representatives of the three pillars of Hitler’s 
Germany: the Generals, the Weapons Industry, and the Nazi Party—this is the clique 
which is directly responsible for the war.”47   
This idea was pervasive.  On November 30, 1945, in a report entitled “Das 
Lachen wird ihnen vergehen” (“They Will Stop Laughing”) Alfred Düchrow described 
how the defendants began the day’s proceedings laughing and in a jovial mood, only to 
slowly fall silent as they listened to the testimony and saw documentary footage of their 
crimes.  Duchrow declared, “All 20 defendants are responsible!  Responsible for the 
wrongdoings committed by the Hitler Regime in the course of twelve and a half years.  
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Finally, they will stop laughing!”48  The title of the commentary was an ironic one, as the 
phrase “They will stop laughing” originated from a speech delivered by Hitler in 
September, 1942.49  Duchrow clearly sought to stir listeners by invoking Hitler’s 
language in such an ironic manner. 
On November 24, Mannbar asserted that Nuremberg was not just a trial of 
individuals, but rather a trial against the entire Nazi criminal state, a trial against the 
militarism and imperialism which had plunged humanity into another war.50  It was thus 
imperative that the tribunal convict and execute the defendants and Berliner Rundfunk’s 
broadcasts cast no doubt that the defendants were guilty and should all be condemned to 
death.51  Shortly before the verdicts were read in October 1946, Heinz Schmidt conveyed 
this sentiment when he declared that the war criminals needed to die so that Germany 
could live.  The phrase was clearly meant to evoke the legacy of the French Revolution.  
In 1792, at the trial of Louis XVI, Maximillian Robespierre made a similar declaration 
when he stated, “Louis must die, so that the country may live.”  Schmidt’s broadcast 
aimed to draw clear parallels between postwar Germany and revolutionary France.52   
Thus, Berliner Rundfunk’s reporters saw the trials as an opportunity for Germany 
to purge once and for all those elements that had helped make the Third Reich possible.  
In an October 27 1945 broadcast, Mannbar drew a direct line between the Kaiserreich 
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and Hitler’s regime.  “As is generally known, those guilty for the First World War 
escaped without punishment.  The Kaiser withdrew to Holland.  His defeated generals 
and the great industrialists, who were initially timid and humble, continued the business 
of German imperialism with boldness and proven routine.”53  Now, the people of 
Germany had the opportunity to insure that this mistake was not made a second time.  
The present situation was an opportunity for the German people to face the crimes of the 
Third Reich and help create a new, democratic Germany.54   
Berliner Rundfunk’s commentators depicted Alfred Krupp and other German 
industrialists as representatives of the greater forces of high finance and capitalism.  
Furthermore, it was the alliance between the forces of fascism, monopoly capital, and 
militarism, that had led to the war.  In a broadcast from December 1945, Alfred Duchrow 
noted: “Up to now, the trial has furnished documentary proof that Hitler and his Party 
were financed and aided by the most powerful representatives of German monopoly 
capital and that a close alliance existed between the leading Nazis (including their 
ministers) and the great stockholders of the German armaments industry.”55  Two days 
later, Duchrow reminded his listeners that they needed to remember the complicity of 
figures such as Krupp and noted that the Nazi leadership and the monopoly capitalists 
were “inseparable.”56  One one was inconceivable without the other.  Duchrow continued 
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to stress the point a year later, when he noted that the Nuremberg Trials were just the first 
step, and that further trials would need be held against those forces which had helped the 
Nazis: the financiers and the large scale industrialists.57  Alongside the financiers and 
capitalists were the German militarists.  On December 12, Duchrow noted the 
involvement of the Wehrmacht and military forces in the invasion of Poland and the 
destruction of Warsaw.58  A month later, after SS soldier Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski 
testified before the tribunal, Duchrow noted that the Wehrmacht high command and 
generals were aware of the actions of the SS mobile killing units on the Eastern Front.59  
In January 1946, Arthur Mannbar noted that the Wehrmacht was complicit in mass 
murder of Russians on the Eastern Front.60 
 When discussing the crimes of the Nazis and the Wehrmacht, the reports almost 
always focused on the Eastern Front and the Soviet Union.  Broadcasts gave little 
attention to the Western Front and Western Allies.  While this was a reflection of the 
Eastern Front’s importance in the context of the war, it also reflected the communist 
assertion that the invasion of the Soviet Union was the Nazi’s greatest crime.61  On 
January 12, Mannbar presented a commentary discussing the crimes of Keitel and Jodl, 
noting their goals for colonization in the east.  He noted the Nazi’s annexation of Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and the crimes against the Soviet Union.62  On March 2, 1946, Marcus 
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Wolf broadcast an ode to the Red Army.  He singled out the Soviets as having suffered 
more than any other nation in Eastern Europe.  He also stressed the sacrifices and losses 
suffered by the Soviets as they fought to liberate these nations from Hitler’s domination.  
Thus, the coming twenty-eighth anniversary of the Red Army’s creation was an 
important day not just for the Soviet Union.  Wolf proclaimed admiration for the Red 
Army, noting that, “Freedom loving nations remember that the Red Army delivered the 
most powerful blow against Hitler’s armies and that it was the decisive contribution to 
their liberation.”63  As in most other reports on the trials, there was little acknowledgment 
of the contributions of the Western Allies.  Predictably, broadcasts condemning Hitler’s 
invasion of Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe did not mention the Soviet’s own 
invasion of the country or the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed in August 1939.   
 Although the majority of broadcasts focused on the defendants and the institutions 
they represented, Berliner Rundfunk did not ignore Adolf Hitler himself and the station 
ran a number of reports on the dictator.  In November 1945 Duchrow noted that the war 
had been Hitler’s war, and despite the complicit forces of imperialism and militarism, it 
was Hitler who sought war at any price.64  The speaker concluded that, “Hitler would be 
the twenty-first [defendant], if we could count him; no, he would be the first of the 
twenty-one defendants.”  In a December 5, 1945 broadcast, Duchrow characterized Hitler 
as a gangster rather than an ideologue.  Hitler ruled through threats and intimidation like 
a common thug.  However, his threats only worked on weaker people.  As Duchrow 
declared, “Perhaps the pistol on the table could have intimidated some weakling.  But 
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then came those who were stronger, who lead the struggle to victory over Nazism, Hitler, 
and the twenty war criminals of Nuremberg!”65  For the most part, Hitler’s ideology was 
characterized as a brutalized expression of German imperialist and militarist traditions.  
For example, reporters characterized his quest for “living space” in the east as an 
imperialist policy of mass plunder, rather than as a quest for a racialist utopia for the 
German people.66  The broadcaster downplayed those elements of Hitler’s ideology that 
could not be reconciled with the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of fascism as a brutalized 
version of monopoly capitalism and militarism.   
Among these elements was the place of the Jews and the Final Solution amongst 
the Nazi’s crimes.  Berliner Rundfunk did not ignore the Final Solution.  However, 
considering the scale and size of the crime and the centrality of the Jews to Hitler’s 
worldview and goals, it did not feature in most commentaries, especially when compared 
to the war against the Soviet Union.  For the most part, Berliner Rundfunk counted the 
Jews a just one amongst the numerous victims of Nazism.  A number of reports described 
the Nazi campaign against the Jews in some detail however.  However, none of these 
reports are devoted specifically to the Final Solution.  The most detailed was a broadcast 
on July 31, 1946 which spoke specifically of the six million Jews murdered by the 
Nazis.67  The report acknowledged that the Nazis had carried out a concerted “operation 
of extermination” against the Jews and described in detail Rudolf Hoess’s testimony of 
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his activities as commandant of the Auschwitz Death Camp.68  Beyond this, however, 
most references to the final solution were brief or presented only because they were part 
of a witness’s testimony.  An example of the former was made in December of 1945 as 
the speaker noted that amongst the Nazi’s crimes were the deaths of over 20 million 
people, of whom 6 million were Jews.  The report did not go into any greater depth.69  
One commentary from September 1945 by Otto Schliewiensky contended that although 
the Jews were one of many victims of the Nazis, reparations needed to be paid for those 
victims who had survived the persecution.70  An example of the latter was a report made 
by Mannbar and Wolf in which a witness, Samuel Reissman, testified in February of 
1946 on his experience at the Treblinka Death Camp and the use of gas chambers there.71  
Thus, while Berliner Rundfunk acknowledged the Nazi’s campaign of extermination 
against the Jews of Europe, they focused more on the crimes against the Soviet Union 
and the people of Eastern Europe in general.   
This lacuna did not go unnoticed by at least one Berliner Rundfunk listener.  An 
anonymous letter sent to the station dated June 19, 1947 expresses frustration at the 
failure of the station and the German Communist leadership to address the issue.  “I have 
yet to hear any hint from these men [Grotewohl and Pieck] that Hitler primarily fought a 
‘defensive war’ against the Jews and did so in the most criminal manner.”72  The radio 
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station had failed to address in any way how Jews who survived Hitler’s terror would be 
compensated for the loss of property and possessions appropriated by the Nazi 
government and for the “twelve to fifteen lost years of pain and hunger.”73  As Jeffrey 
Herf has shown, German communists largely evaded the issue of the Final Solution and 
reparations, focusing more on the Nazi’s crimes against the Soviet Union.74  This 
approach can be seen in Berliner Rundfunk’s broadcasts. 
 The majority of Berliner Rundfunk broadcasts were supportive of the Nuremberg 
trial proceedings.  They saw the trial as a necessary and important means for 
disseminating the truth about the Nazi regime and laying the groundwork for a peaceful, 
antifascist Germany.  However, by the summer of 1946, with the date of the highly 
anticipated verdict drawing nearer, critical comments began to emerge.  In July 1946, for 
example, Marcus Wolf expressed impatience with the court proceedings and argued that 
the trial could have been quicker.75  However, this minor critique soon gave way to 
outrage and a flood of critical broadcasts when the verdicts were announced in October 
1946.  The reporters at Berliner Rundfunk had no problems with those found guilty.  The 
bulk of the critical reports were directed at the three acquittals: Hjalmar Schacht, Franz 
von Papen, and Hans Fritzsche. 
 The outrage revealed the influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology on Berliner 
Rundfunk’s reporters.  To a Soviet Communist’s eyes, men like Schacht and von Papen 
were representative of the very forces that had permitted the rise of Fascism.  The Baron 
Chancellor who had orchestrated Hitler’s appointment to the Chancellorship, von Papen 
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represented Germany’s aristocrats and landed elites who paved the way for fascism’s 
rise.  Even more outrageous was Schacht’s acquittal, for as Hitler’s finance minister he 
represented the most potent and powerful enablers of the Nazi dictatorship.76 
 Berliner Rundfunk broadcast about half a dozen commentaries devoted 
specifically to criticizing the verdicts.  Indeed, noticeably missing are commentaries on 
the actual guilty verdicts or death sentences.  During a broadcast made on the day after 
the verdict’s announcement, Wolf focused on Schacht and von Papen, describing their 
performance at the press conference following the trial as arrogant and self-assured.77  
Wolf characterized the conference (and the acquittal as a whole) as an “inglorious event,” 
and evidence that the struggle against Nazism was not yet complete.78  Heinz Schmidt 
noted that while the guilty verdicts were to be welcomed, he noted, “However, at the 
same time, for the man on the street, at work, the workers and employees in the factories 
and office, in the emporia and workshops, in the assembly plants in the city and country, 
there is only one opinion: these acquittals are a threat to the democratic renewal of 
Germany!”79  Progressive forces in Germany now had reason to fear that fascist forces in 
Germany would welcome the verdicts as a means for strengthening their positions.80  On 
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October 6, Seydewitz reiterated this idea, noting that while the representatives of Nazism 
(Göring, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg) and the representatives of German militarism (Jodl, 
Keitel) had been brought to justice, the representatives of “finance and monopoly 
capitalism,” Schacht and von Papen, had been set free.  In his commentary he asked, 
“Was that justice, my worthy listeners?”81 
 Berliner Rundfunk’s reaction to the verdicts reflected their belief that the 
Nuremberg defendants were symbols of broader reactionary forces.  Thus, they 
characterized the verdict not only as the acquittal of two men who had been complicit in 
the Nazi’s rise to power, but also as a failure on the part of the Western Allies to 
acknowledge the role monopoly capital and high finance had played in building the Third 
Reich.  This approach can be seen in a broadcast sent on September 17, 1946, a month 
before the tribunal announced the verdicts.  The commentator, DVV official Wilhelm 
Girnus, described Schacht as “the key to the entire trial.”82  He was the representative of 
“German high finance, the plunderer with the manners of a gentleman, who used his 
international capitalist relationships and old membership in the bourgeois Democratic 
Party to make Hitler’s program presentable (salonfahig).”83  Schacht had translated 
Hitler’s rhetoric into the “clouded language of capitalist diplomacy.”84  It had been 
Schacht who helped fund the Nazi party so that they could fulfill the imperialist goals of 
finance capital and rebuild the rearmaments industry.   
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The fact that Girnus gave this commentary a month before the tribunal announced 
the verdicts illustrates the strong influence Marxism-Leninist ideology held over Berliner 
Rundfunk.  The outrage over the acquittals was not just a reaction to the fact that some of 
the defendants were found not guilty, but was based on a systematic, and well developed 
argument grounded in Soviet Communist ideology.  This accounts for the lack of focus 
on Heinz Fritzsche (a member of the propaganda ministry), who was not involved in 
economic policy or a representative of the old aristocracy.  For Berliner Rundfunk’s 
reporters, the acquittals revealed the failure of the Nuremberg Tribunal to fully grasp and 
understand the true nature of fascism.  Schacht and von Papen were not just two 
individuals, but representatives of deeper forces embedded within German society, 
“Monopoly Capital” and “Finance Capital,” (“capital” was almost always spoken with 
one of these two qualifiers), and the power of the old Junker elites.  The station’s 
reporters thus asserted that the Tribunal’s failure to acknowledge this influence would 
hinder Germany’s peaceful and democratic rebirth. 
Berliner Rundfunk’s commentaries on the Nuremberg Trials combined both a 
wish to present the trial’s proceedings with a desire to explain the true nature of fascism.  
Doing both would insure the creation of an antifascist Germany.  Several broadcasts 
reminded listeners that the Nazis were not defeated by forces within Germany, but by the 
Allied armies, most importantly the Red Army.85   By following the trials, Berliner 
Rundfunk’s commentators argued, Germans would be prepared to continue the process 
begun by the Allies and bring others to justice, notably the large business and industrial 
leaders who had collaborated with the Nazis and allowed them to wage war.  Berliner 
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Rundfunk interpreted the trials as a founding rite and a means of paving the way for the 
creation of an antifascist Germany accepted by the community of nations. 
 
The German Left: Creating the Socialist Unity Party 
 
Berliner Rundfunk’s approach to the Nuremberg Trials reflected many basic 
Marxist-Leninist tenants.  They argued that the war was the result of German militarism, 
imperialism, and finance-capital.  For the most part, Berliner Rundfunk’s commentaries 
ignored the ideological super structure of National Socialism.  Thus it was apparent that 
when Berliner Rundfunk spoke of rebuilding Germany and laying the foundations for a 
new democratic order, it was not one that would be friendly to capitalism.  In light of this, 
it is illuminating and critical to examine how Berliner Rundfunk approached the question 
of socialism and the German Left.  The most prominent commentaries on this topic 
involved Berliner Rundfunk’s support for plans to unite the social democratic and 
communist parties. 
Tactical aims were the primary motivation behind the Soviet’s plan to merge the 
two largest left-wing parties in the SBZ: the Social Democrats (SPD) and the 
Communists (KPD).  The SMA and KPD leaders considered the unification of the 
political left a critical part of their greater goal of consolidating control not only over 
their zone of authority, but also the western sectors of Berlin.  Many Germans, including 
members of the KPD itself, saw the German Communists as puppets of the Soviets.86  
Uniting with the SPD would allow the KPD to take advantage of the SPD’s popularity in 
                                                 






Berlin (where the first major elections would be held in the fall of 1946), and also 
neutralize a potential left-wing rival.87 
 At the same time, for many Germans of the political left, the time seemed 
appropriate for a renewal of cooperation between Germany’s two working class parties.  
The two parties had been divided since World War I and the failed German Revolution of 
1918.  Many amongst the KPD considered the SPD’s support of the German war effort in 
1914, its leading role in suppressing the German Revolution in 1918, and its support of 
the bourgeois Weimar Republic to be unforgivable betrayals of the German working class 
and German socialism.  As a result, the KPD refused to acknowledge the SPD’s claim to 
represent the working class and characterized the party’s members as “social fascists.”88  
Despite the increasing popularity of the National Socialists, many in the KPD continued 
to assert that the SPD was the greater of the two political opponents.  Consequently, the 
German Left was bitterly divided and fractured at the onset of the Great Depression and 
unable to unite and form a viable coalition to prevent the appointment of Hitler as 
Chancellor in 1933.   
The common experience of persecution, exile, and imprisonment seemed to 
provide the impetus for renewed cooperation and unity amongst the political left.  It was 
along these lines that Berliner Rundfunk promoted the unification of the two parties 
throughout 1945 and 1946.  However, many amongst the SPD, most notably its leader in 
the Western Zones, Kurt Schumacher, saw the proposal as a Soviet directed measure 
designed to increase their influence in Germany by co-opting the more popular SPD.  
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Despite Schumacher’s opposition, SPD leaders in the Soviet Zone, most notably Otto 
Grotewohl, embraced the idea of uniting the two parties.89   
 The merger became a prominent subject of Berliner Rundfunk’s early broadcasts.  
Between the summer of 1945 and the creation of the Socialist Unity Party in April of 
1946, Berliner Rundfunk broadcast some 40 commentaries devoted entirely to the 
creation of a united working class party.90  The broadcasts shared many common themes 
and arguments.  All of the broadcasts insisted that there was a direct causal link between 
the fracturing of the German left during the Weimar Republic and the rise of Nazism.  
Related to this, all of the commentaries argued that the only way Germany could be 
rebuilt was to end this division and create a democratic state based firmly on an anti-
fascist foundation.  Thus, uniting the working class was not a matter of political 
expediency (which was flatly denied), but a moral means of overcoming Germany’s 
fascist past and creating a peaceful postwar order.  If leftwing Germans wanted to secure 
peace and rebuild Germany, then they had no alternative but to reaffirm Marxist 
principles and reunite as a single movement.   
 Most of the commentaries on the creation of a unity party clearly present these 
various arguments.  On June 23, 1945, the political program Tribüne der Demokratie 
broadcast a report on one of the first meetings between leaders of the newly re-chartered 
SPD and KPD, including Grotewohl from the SPD and Ulbricht and Pieck from the KPD.  
At the meeting, held just over a month after the capitulation, the commentary reported 
that the decision was made to rebuild Germany and create a new state free of Nazism 
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based on a firm anti-fascist foundation that would not repeat the mistakes of the past.91  
While the broadcast did not suggest merging the parties, it nevertheless affirmed the idea 
that only through unity and common purpose could the German left prevent the 
resurrection of fascism.  On July14, 1945, Berliner Rundfunk broadcast an interview 
between a Soviet journalist and leading members of the SPD in the SBZ, including Otto 
Grotewohl and Max Fechner.  Through the course of the interview, the SPD leaders 
acknowledged that many mistakes had been made in the past, most notably the failure of 
the SPD and KPD to form a united front against the Nazis.  This accordingly led to the 
weakening of the working class’s strength and allowed the Nazis and their German 
Imperialist allies to launch the Second World War.92 
Even when the main topic of a particular broadcast was not the creation of a unity 
party, KPD leaders and Berliner Rundfunk found subtle means of promoting the merging 
of the left-wing parties.  An example of this was a presentation made by Anton 
Ackermann commemorating the 125th birthday of Frederick Engels, broadcast on 
December 8, 1945.  In the course of the broadcast, Ackermann noted that it was 
encouraging to see communists and social democrats coming together to commemorate 
the anniversary.93  At the same time, Ackermann reaffirmed the argument that uniting the 
two parties was imperative.  He declared, “We vow to march in unity under the banner of 
Marx and Engels; only in unity is our strength guaranteed and only in unity is success 
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guaranteed.”94  In the manuscript, the phrase “nur die einheit” (only in unity) is 
underlined on numerous occasions.  In the course of the broadcast, Ackermann 
reaffirmed the link between German communists in the SBZ and the Soviet Union.  
Socialism, Ackermann asserted, had risen because of Lenin’s efforts, and under Stalin it 
had achieved victory in the Soviet Union.  “Consequently, one cannot be a Marxist 
without accepting the teachings of Lenin and Stalin.  Their teachings, their science, are 
the Marxism of today.”  Thus, the theoretical Socialist Unity Party, though a union 
between the German SPD and KPD, would need to embrace the Soviet Union’s 
interpretation of Marxism.95   
The wish to see a unity party was not just one held by communist leaders, 
Berliner Rundfunk asserted.  On January 19, 1946 the station broadcast an interview 
between Werner Klein and workers at a Factory in Saxony.  While the goal of the 
interview was to demonstrate the wish amongst Germans for a unity party, the answers so 
closely reflected the rhetoric and language of Berliner Rundfunk and the SBZ press that it 
came across as artificial.  The questions were posed to members of the KPD and SPD 
respectively, to demonstrate the unity of thought amongst members of the two parties.  
When one worker was asked about his feelings concerning the unity party, he answered 
that, as a member of the KPD, he and his colleagues stood fundamentally for the 
unification of the working class and would do all they can to achieve it.  He stated that it 
was the only way to completely remove Nazism from German society.96  He further 
noted that, “This should be our task.  Just as we were in the concentration camps together 
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with our comrades from the SPD, arm and arm, so we should also achieve this [socialist 
unity] arm in arm.”97  An answer to the same question from a member of the SPD 
continued this line of argument, noting that the past twelve years had shown the 
consequences of disunity between the two left-wing parties. 
Other reports attempted to soften the German left’s traditionally combative 
language of inevitable class conflict and revolution.  One can see this in a report from 
Tribune of Democracy broadcast on February 16, 1946.  The broadcast was a 
commentary on the Communist Manifesto by Fred Oelßner, a member of the Culture 
Department of the Central Committee of the KPD.  The original, unedited version of the 
manuscript read: 
 
The powerful words with which the Communist Manifesto 
concludes, ‘Proletarians of the world, unite!’ has an 
especially important meaning for us today.  Soon, the 
German proletariat will overcome the century’s long 
division and create a strong political force that will gather 
the democratic strength of our people so that we may fight 
for a better future.98 
 
 
However, the original manuscript has several editorial suggestions written over the 
second half of this passage in pencil.  The edits subtly changed the tone and insured that 
the correct political message was broadcast: 
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The powerful words with which the Communist Manifesto 
concludes, ‘Proletarians of the world, unite!’ has an 
especially important meaning for us today.  Soon, the 
German working class will overcome the century’s long 
division and will unite into a socialist unity Party, and 
create a strong political force that will gather the 
democratic strength of our people in order to fight for a 
better future.99 
 
It is not clear from the manuscript if Oelßner or a Berliner Rundfunk editor made these 
changes.  The original version’s use of “proletariat” was most likely made to keep the 
passage stylistically similar to Marx’s original text.  However, the term “proletarian” has 
a much more revolutionary connotation than the more neutral “working class.”  By 
changing the phrase, Berliner Rundfunk not only changed the tone, but also kept the 
broadcast in line with almost all of their other commentaries (which almost always used 
“German working class” as opposed to “German proletarians.”)  They also used it as a 
chance to stress the overall political goal of the Soviets and German communists.  Not 
only will the working class unite, it will unite as a Unity Party.   
Overall, the broadcasts conveyed a conciliatory tone.  The heated rhetoric 
between SPD and KPD, which had defined their relationship since the First World War, 
was softened.  Almost all of the broadcasts depicted the SPD and KPD as fully equal, and 
made it clear that any unification of the two parties would be a joint (“gemeinsam”) and 
mutual alliance.  Discussion of 1933 only mentioned that disunity had been the cause, but 
did not note who was at fault for this disunity.  Several broadcasts revealed cracks in this 
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interpretation of events however.  East German communists saw 1945 as a “Hegelian 
moment.”  The victory of the Red Army had demonstrated the scientific validity of 
Marxist-Leninist historical materialism.100  Yet, while Berliner Rundfunk promoted this 
concept, as seen in Wolf’s praise of the Red Army in his Nuremberg reports, it also 
presented the assertion that 1918 should have been a Hegelian event.  With the fall of the 
Kaiser and the end of World War I, the November Revolution should have been the 
moment that Germany became a socialist state.  Yet, when history demanded the full 
participation of the German left to purge once and for all militarism, imperialism, and 
racism from the German national psyche, the SPD betrayed the left by employing right-
wing Free Corps to crush the revolution.  A critical part of the German communist master 
narrative was that it was the SPD, and not the KPD, that was at fault for fracturing the 
German left and permitting the rise of Hitler.101   
Despite the apparently new spirit of conciliation between SPD and KPD, many 
communist leaders did not forget the bitterness of 1918.  When Berliner Rundfunk 
broadcast an interview with Walter Ulbricht from October, 1945, careful listeners would 
have noticed that Ulbricht clearly felt the KPD’s approach to socialism was superior and 
that it had sacrificed more for the good of Germany.  Ulbricht declared that, while the 
SPD was a fellow party of the left, it was members KPD who had led the Spartacus revolt 
in 1919 and it was KPD leader Ernst Thälmann who had died leading the opposition 
against Hitler.102  Although he reiterated the common arguments for the unity party, 
stressing the link between the need to rebuild Germany and uniting the workers’ 
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movement, Ulbricht’s rhetoric was more radical, calling for the full participation of all 
workers on councils and in unions and stressing the sacrifices made by the KPD.  By 
bringing up the prospect of worker’s councils, Ulbricht surely aimed to evoke the 
memory of the 1918-1919 Revolution.  In an interview given in January of 1946, Ulbricht 
reiterated these points, but went further and criticized members of the SPD who refused 
to acknowledge the need for a unity party.103  Ulbricht was most likely referring to Kurt 
Schumacher when he spoke about the alternate path of those, “social democratic leaders 
in the west.”  Ulbricht described this approach as the old path of the Weimar Republic 
and accommodation with the political right.104   
Other broadcasts made the contention that the SPD was to blame for the rise of 
the Nazis.  A speech given by Wilhelm Pieck and broadcast on Berliner Rundfunk from 
November 11, 1945 cited the failure of the Revolution of 1918 as one of the events of the 
past that had allowed the fascist rise to power.105  On January 11, 1946 Max Fechner 
noted that, had the workers been united in 1918, then the power of Germany’s large 
industrialists and landed elites could have been broken.106  In a speech given by Wilhelm 
Pieck that was broadcast on January 15 to commemorate the deaths of Karl Liebknecht 
and Rosa Luxemburg, (both killed by Free Corps enlisted by the Social Democrats to put 
down the Spartacus Revolution of 1919), the communist leader noted that the memories 
of their deaths would be hard to forget.107  A February commentary by Karl Steinhoff 
contended that Germany, as in 1918, was once again at a crossroads, thus stressing the 
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memory of the failed revolution as a warning for the future.108  Another commentary 
from February, made by a member of the KPD, Rudolf Lindau, warned listeners not to 
assume that fascism was completely defeated, for German imperialism had also been 
beaten in 1918, only to reemerge.109  This argument was reiterated in an April 1946 
broadcast that noted that in 1918, German militarism and imperialism had been brought 
to their knees, and yet had been allowed a new lease on life after the failed revolution.110  
The commentator noted that this was a consequence of the division of socialists and 
communists during the First World War.  None of these broadcasts mentioned the Social 
Democrats or the role Friedrich Ebert’s government played in putting down the 
Revolutions of 1918 and 1919.  However, this would not have been far from the minds of 
most Germans of the left when recalling the memories of those events, and the 
implication was clear: Germany had a chance to break the power of German militarism 
and imperialism in 1918 and failed because the left was divided.  Yet, the KPD had at 
least attempted to launch the revolution.  Thus, the SPD was at fault.  However, the 
interest of unity precluded any attacks against the SPD.  The SPD of Grotewohl and his 
allies was a new party according to many commentators, and the shared experience of the 
Third Reich had mended the wounds between the two parties.   
However, SPD leaders such as Kurt Schumacher and Ernst Reuter presented a 
problem for those seeking a unity party.  The leaders of the SPD in the Western Zone and 
West Berlin respectively, both their credentials as men of the left were impeccable.  
Schumacher had spent the war in a concentration camp and had both mentally and 
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physically paid for it.  Reuter, a former communist, had spent the war years in Turkey.  
Yet, while so many broadcasts on Berliner Rundfunk were stressing that the common 
experience of the camps had brought the left closer together, both Schumacher and 
Reuter remained staunch anti-communists.  Both recognized the subservience of the KPD 
to the Soviet occupation authorities, and recognized that the goal of creating the unity 
party was hardly a mutual alliance, but a shotgun wedding that would effectively break 
the power of the social democrats in the Eastern Zone.   
Thus, several broadcasts from Berliner Rundfunk attacked Schumacher himself, 
questioning his right to call himself a true socialist.  In February of 1946, a Berliner 
Rundfunk broadcast confronted Schumacher’s arguments head on, claiming that 
Schumacher sought to bring back the party of 1933, and with it opposition to the 
communists.  Listeners were asked to recall the divisions of the 1930s when they heard 
Schumacher’s anti-communist statements, and interpret them as reactionary.111  In 
another broadcast, taken from an article by Social Democrat Karl Doer entitled “The 
Saboteur of Unity,” Schumacher was condemned for aiding the victory of reaction.  The 
Social Democrats of the Eastern Zone recognized that any division in the working class 
would only help reactionary elements.  It was only natural to expect Schumacher and the 
Social Democrats in the west to show the same respect to the social democrats in the east.  
Despite to Schumacher’s claims to the contrary, the vast majority of social democrats in 
the western zones supported building a unification party.  If Schumacher maintained his 
opposition, then true social democrats had no choice but to consider him a saboteur of 
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unity.112  After the creation of the SED, Berliner Rundfunk was forced to explain how it 
was that, if ninety-nine percent of social democrats supported unity, such a large and 
powerful SPD remained in the western zone and West Berlin.  One solution can be seen 
in manuscripts where the term “social democrats” is simply placed in quotation marks.  
There is no indication that the broadcasters had a special technique to allow their listeners 




From 1945-1946, Berliner Rundfunk enjoyed an effective broadcast monopoly in 
the former German capital.  During this period, its journalists had the opportunity to 
report and interpret some of the most important events of the early occupation period.  
Most notable among these were the Nuremberg Trials and the creation of the Socialist 
Unity Party.  Recognizing radio’s critical role as a source for information, Soviet leaders 
used Berliner Rundfunk to announce the capitulation of the Third Reich and the end of 
fascist rule in Germany.  At the same time, Soviet leaders hoped to use radio as a means 
of establishing a new order in Germany.  Thus, from the moment it began broadcasting, 
Berliner Rundfunk was dedicated to crafting a new political culture for postwar 
Germany.  What this meant exactly was vague.  Broadcasts spoke broadly of 
democratization, denazification, and the renewal of the German economy.  Critical to all 
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broadcasts was the perpetuation of the antifascist coalition.  This coalition not only 
included the United States, Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain, but also all of those 
political parties that were opposed to the Nazis and newly constituted by the Soviets: the 
Christian Democrats, Liberals, Communists, and Social Democrats.  
However, while the goals and aims described by Berliner Rundfunk broadcasts 
remained broad and vague, the station was nevertheless committed to presenting Soviet 
policy.  Despite the fact that Berliner Rundfunk was nominally under the authority of 
German Intendants such as Hans Mahle and Max Seydewitz, SMA censorship bureaus 
retained oversight authority over all Berliner Rundfunk broadcasts.  The Soviets placed 
responsibility for all radio operations in the hands of loyal German communists such as 
Hans Mahle and Marcus Wolf.  Although they were charged with promoting the common 
antifascist goals of denazification and democratization held by the allied powers and 
German political parties, the leaders of Berliner Rundfunk nevertheless utilized Marxist-
Leninist narratives to interpret events.  The Nuremberg Trial reports of Marcus Wolf 
stressed the heroic efforts of the Soviet army and characterized Nazism as an incarnation 
of big capital imperialism.  At the same time, Berliner Rundfunk broadcasts presented the 
proposed merger between the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party as a 
moral necessity.  Broadcasts accused opponents of the fusion of being fascist supporters 
and opponents of true progress and democratization in Germany.  The moral imperative 
of building a strong communist party outweighed the need for true political plurality. 
Thus, by 1946 it was clear to US and British officials that the Communist 
controlled Berliner Rundfunk would not present a balanced perspective on allied plans in 





Soviet tone of its political broadcasts, led both occupying powers to begin construction of 
their own stations.  Anticipating the breakdown of inter-allied governance of Berlin in 
1948, the United States launched a rival broadcaster in September 1946: Radio in the 
American Sector, or RIAS.  Although the station’s operations would be relatively modest 
until 1948, its creation nevertheless was the first step in bringing an end to Berliner 







Chapter Two: Political Broadcasting and the First Berlin Crisis, 1945-1949 
 
 
With the creation of RIAS in September 1946, both the Soviet Union and the 
United States had launched stations to serve their respective interests in Berlin.  Both 
stations, Berliner Rundfunk in the Soviet Zone and Radio in the American Sector (RIAS), 
were created to provide news and entertainment to listeners while also providing a means 
for both super-powers to present and pursue their respective goals for the future of 
Germany.  Like Berliner Rundfunk, RIAS also pursued a policy of denazification.  
However, whereas Berliner Rundfunk sought to actively encourage a certain type of 
political thinking amongst its listeners, RIAS aimed to introduce an American model of 
journalism to the German public based on objectivity and accuracy that would contribute 
to the American’s goal of democratization, reeducation, and denazification. 
 In 1946, both radio stations existed in a political landscape that assumed the 
Allied occupation of Germany would be brief, reunification would come soon, and the 
United States and Soviet Union would maintain their wartime cooperation.  Over the 
course of the next three years however, the hopes for postwar collaboration had faded and 
been replaced by suspicion and tension between the United States, Soviet Union, and 
their respective allies.1  The unification of the British and American zones of occupation 
into the Bizone in January 1947, the announcement of the Marshall Plan in June 1947, 
and the London Foreign Ministers Conference held in the spring of 1948 had made it 
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clear to Stalin that the United States and Britain would not permit the unification of 
Germany if it meant opening it to Soviet control.  When the US and British sought to 
stabilize the economies of their occupation zones by introducing a new currency, the 
Deutschemark, in the spring of 1948, the Soviets condemned it as an attempt to divide 
Germany and violate inter-allied cooperation.  When the Western Allies introduced the 
new currency into their occupation sectors in Berlin, the Soviets, gambling that neither 
the US nor Great Britain would risk war over maintaining their rights in Berlin, claimed 
all of Berlin to be an integral part of the SBZ and ordered a blockade of all traffic to the 
three western sectors of the city.  The Truman administration opted to supply the city by 
air transports.  The airlift was successful, both politically and economically, and in May 
1949, the Soviets suspended the blockade and opened traffic to West Berlin.2 
 Reporting and explaining the events of the blockade and airlift presented 
challenges for both Berliner Rundfunk and RIAS.  Berliner Rundfunk needed to justify 
what was perceived by many to be an act of aggression to a population that was hardly 
supportive of the Soviets to begin with.  For RIAS, the crisis forced it to make a choice 
between maintaining complete neutrality with regards to the Soviet Union and thus 
allowing Berliner Rundfunk’s claims and attacks go unanswered, or openly criticizing the 
Soviets’ actions and ideology of Soviet communism. Berliner Rundfunk depicted the 
blockade as a defensive measure meant to prevent the division of Germany and its 
economic subjugation at the hands of American big capital and fascism.  While Berliner 
Rundfunk continued to pursue a policy praising the Soviets and their actions, it also 
engaged and confronted the arguments of the western media, often citing and analyzing 
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the western press to find both evidence and justification for the Soviet’s actions.  RIAS, 
on the other hand, faced a heavily demoralized population and Berlin political 
establishment, both of which felt the United States needed to do more to defend the 
liberal-democratic order against the encroachments of Soviet communism.  Thus, RIAS 
ended its policy of neutrality, and pursued a policy of aggressive anti-communism that 
characterized the Soviet Union as a totalitarian state that cared little for true workers and 
sought only to subjugate Eastern Europe and Germany.  Just as Berliner Rundfunk argued 
for continuities between Nazi Germany and the United States, so too, did RIAS draw 
links between the Nazis and the Soviets.   
 Historians of the US occupation have often focused on 1947 and the start of the 
Cold War as a major turning point in US media policies in Germany.  These works have 
argued that the US, initially dedicated to forging a democratic and liberal mass media, 
turned away from this goal, dismissed individuals sympathetic to the Soviets or to an 
accommodation with the Soviets, and pursued an aggressive, anti-communist media 
policy that overlooked journalistic principles in favor of a propaganda war against the 
Soviets.3  In the words of Larry Hartenian, “The propaganda role of media came to 
overshadow the original concerns for democratization.”4  However, as Jessica Gienow-
Hecht has demonstrated in her study of the American sponsored Neue Zeitung, many 
decisions regarding the media in postwar Germany were made by lower level officials, 
many of whom were often Germans themselves.5  By focusing on the experience of RIAS 
within the context of occupied Berlin, we can see that the story was much more complex.  
                                                 
3 Hartenian, Controlling Information in U.S. Occupied Germany and Barbara Mettler, Demokratisierung und Kalter 
Krieg: Zur Amerikanischen Informations und Rundfunkpolitik in Westdeutschland 1945-1949,  (Berlin: Verlag Volker 
Spiess, 1975). 
4 Hartenian, “The Role of the Media in Democratizing Germany: United States Occupation Policy, 1945-1949,” 
Central European History 20 (1987): 145. 





1947 was a critical turning point for the station.  At the end of that year, the US 
authorities did dismiss station officials sympathetic to the Soviets.  At the same time, the 
station turned towards anti-communist broadcasting.  Yet, it is important to remember 
that these changes came after two years of pressure from local German political leaders, 
such as Ernst Reuter, who were becoming increasingly frustrated by RIAS’s refusal to 
repudiate Berliner Rundfunk’s attacks against those members of the SPD who opposed 
the SED.  With the city’s largest radio station under the control of the SED and Soviet 
authorities, members of the SPD argued that RIAS’s insistence on neutrality allowed the 
SED to undermine the democratic order in Berlin.  Thus, many German and American 
officials saw the station’s turn to anti-communism as a means of strengthening liberalism 
and democracy in the city, rather than weakening it. 
 This chapter explores how Berliner Rundfunk and RIAS Berlin reported the 
events of the Berlin blockade and Berlin airlift.  Throughout, I argue that this was a 
period of fundamental transition in the Berlin radio landscape.  By the end of 1949, RIAS 
had eclipsed Berliner Rundfunk as the most popular source for news in the city.  Initially 
designed to promote neutral, impartial journalism, RIAS redefined its role and directed its 
programs to the East German population itself with the intent of actively undermining the 
German Democratic Republic.  While RIAS certainly gained listeners because of the 
quality of its reporting, it nevertheless took advantage of Berliner Rundfunk’s failure to 
present an accurate assessment of the airlift.  Predicting that Western efforts to provision 
the city would fail, the station suffered a blow to its credibility that only became worst as 
each day of the airlift passed.  At the same time, Berliner Rundfunk laid the foundations 





threat from American capitalists and fascists.  As a consequence, Marxist-Leninist 
ideology became a far more overt influence and guiding force on GDR broadcasts.   
 
Berliner Rundfunk and the Berlin Blockade and Airlift 1948-1949 
 
Despite pretensions of creating a broad popular front, Soviet officials and German 
communists dominated Berliner Rundfunk. 6   Berliner Rundfunk had demonstrated its 
Soviet sympathies throughout 1945 and 1946 with its Nuremberg Trial reports and other 
stories.  However, throughout this period, it continued to maintain the position that its 
support for policies such as the unification of the SPD and SED was simply its way of 
supporting the antifascist coalition.  However, by 1947 it had become clear to US 
officials that Berliner Rundfunk was firmly in line with Soviet goals and policies.  A 
report drawn up by the US Occupation Government in September 1947 illustrates the 
bias towards the Soviet perspective at Berliner Rundfunk.  Of 1,113 foreign press items, 
923 came from Soviet news agencies.  Of 721 domestic news items, 268 came from 
Soviet sources.  The report’s author noted that Berliner Rundfunk broadcast news 
according to a “preconceived working plan.”  Reports focused on Eastern successes and 
Western failures.  The main topics for the Eastern Zone were socialist reconstruction, 
agricultural production, industrial progress, and trade union activities.  Topics on the 
three Western Zones included the problem of black markets in the British Zone and 
refugee problems in the American Zone.  The SED official organ Neues Deutschland and 
                                                 





the Soviet licensed Tägliche Rundschau were the papers most often cited in Berliner 
Rundfunk broadcasts.7 
Despite the dominance of the Soviet viewpoint, the station had attempted to stress 
the common links between communists and other antifascist parties in Germany.  In a 
September 1946 conference attended by the chief radio officials in the SBZ, a Berliner 
Rundfunk commentator recommended that stations in the SBZ be aware of “non-
partisan” interpretations of major events.8  The same official also recommended that 
Berliner Rundfunk employ a commentator who was not associated with any particular 
party.  Mahle responded that there were no “suitable” individuals who could occupy such 
a position.9  Thus, there was a limit to how “non-partisan” station officials were willing 
to go.  In 1948, for example, reporter Oscar Hoffmann noted, “Even though we are not a 
Marxist broadcaster, we must still present and express the lessons and analyses of 
Marxism more than has been done up till now.”10  Thus, although broadcasts and officials 
spoke of an antifascist coalition and the need to reduce the dominance of socialist rhetoric 
in Berliner Rundfunk broadcasts, the overwhelming influence of Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine heavily influenced such considerations.  Most likely, in considering the 
commentators already working for the station, “suitable” meant one loyal to the Soviet 
Union and able to pursue the type of political line advocated by the Soviets, Mahle, and 
the DVV.   
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By 1947, the station began to give more overt, explicit support of Soviet policies 
and harshen its criticism of the Western powers.  The change was a direct consequence of 
the Cold War.  On March 12, 1947, the President Truman declared unequivocal support 
for anti-communist movements throughout the world.  Specifically citing communist 
uprisings in Greece and Turkey, Truman pledged US financial support to the 
governments of both states.  On March 14, 1947, Berliner Rundfunk broadcast a news 
story from the Soviet news agency ISVESTIA that condemned Truman’s speech and 
declared that, like Hitler, the US government was using the threat of communism as an 
excuse to expand and subjugate free peoples.  The report criticized the US for disavowing 
the UN Security Council by not seeking its help.  The chief victim of Truman’s new 
doctrine, the report declared, was the independence and freedom of the Greek people.  
Greece was giving up one overlord (England) for another (the United States).11  Thus, for 
Berliner Rundfunk and Soviet news reports alike, the United States had quickly become 
the new fascist threat previously represented by Nazi Germany.  This view became 
official Soviet policy and was announced in September 1947 when Stalin’s spokesman at 
the newly created Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), Andrei Zhdanov, 
delivered his “Two Camps” speech.  In the speech, Zhdanov declared that the Europe was 
divided into two hostile and irreconcilable camps, the imperialist, anti-democratic West 
and the anti-imperialist, democratic Soviet bloc.  Communist tactics subsequently became 
more aggressive throughout Europe.12   
                                                 
11 Report from Ilse Nehemias to Charles Lewis, “ISVESTIA Comment on Truman Speech,” March 18, 1947, NARA 
RG 260 (OMGUS), ICD, Records of the Radio Branch, (390/42/21/3) Box 304. 
12 Stöver, Der Kalter Krieg, 73-74.  See as well Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European 





 Leading Berliner Rundfunk throughout this period was Heinz Schmidt.  Schmidt 
was originally a member of the Social Democratic Party who had eventually turned 
towards the KPD.  Unlike many of the Berliner Rundfunk officials however, Schmidt had 
spent the war in a western state, Great Britain, where he worked for the Free German 
Youth journal Freie Tribüne.13  While in London, he also became friends with members 
of the British journalist and radio establishments, notably Hugh Carlton-Greene, the 
guiding force behind Northwest German Radio (NWDR) and later head of the BBC.14  
Upon returning to Germany in 1946, he became Chief Editor and then Intendant of 
Berliner Rundfunk, serving until 1949.  Upon becoming head of the station, Schmidt set 
about hiring a staff of experienced journalists, mostly from stations in the American and 
British Zones.  Not all of the members of Schmidt’s group were committed communists 
or members of the SED.  Many were professional radio journalists who had worked with 
various stations such as NWDR and the BBC’s German service.  Most had communist 
sympathies however.  They included Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler and Herbert Gessner 
from NWDR and Radio Munich respectively.  Schmidt also hired fellow communists 
who had lived in western states like himself, such as Bruno Goldhammer and Leo Bauer, 
for administrative purposes.15   
Of these new reporters, von Schnitzler and Gessner were particularly significant.  
Their biographies lacked the benchmarks that typically characterized the lives of many of 
their Berliner Rundfunk associates.  Neither had been a member of the German 
Communist Party, and both spent the war as a soldier in the German army.  Born in 1918, 
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von Schnitzler had initially gone to medical school.  In 1944 he was captured by the 
British and incarcerated in a British POW camp.  Like Schmidt, (and future RIAS 
Program Director Eberhard Schütz), he was recruited by the British to work for the 
BBC’s German Service and subsequently returned to Germany as a correspondent for 
NWDR.  It is not clear when he turned to socialism, but by 1947 his communist 
sympathies were so great that the British dismissed him from his post.  Moving to Berlin 
in 1948 he subsequently joined the SED and began a long career as a radio journalist in 
the service of the GDR that lasted until 1989.  Gessner also served in the German army, 
but deserted in 1944.  In 1945 he became a chief commentator for Radio Munich, the US 
sponsored station in Bavaria.  In 1947 he left Radio Munich and began working for 
Berliner Rundfunk, joining the SED in 1948.  He retired from radio work in 1955 and 
died a year later. 16 
Throughout the Berlin blockade and airlift, Berliner Rundfunk presented a 
consistent explanatory narrative that mixed criticism of American policies with German 
nationalist sentiments.  The primary theme of these broadcasts was that the Berlin 
blockade was an act of self defense aimed to protect German unity and independence.  
The reports argued that the primary threat to German freedom was the Marshall Plan and 
the introduction of a new Deutschmark into the American and British Zones.  In March of 
1948, Hans Mahle instructed the stations throughout the Soviet Zone to present the 
Marshall Plan as the primary threat to German freedom, democracy, and independence.17  
Mahle recommended that the stations focus on refuting US claims that the plan would 
help Germany.  Instead, Mahle ordered radio stations to demonstrate how the plan 
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exploited the German economy and lay the groundwork for making Germany into a 
colony of the United States.18  Reporters, Mahle argued, needed to present listeners with 
a choice: either embrace an economic system of peace that would increase industrial 
output and improve the standard of living for the German people, or follow the Marshall 
Plan, which would lead to constant economic crises, unemployment, and the 
transformation of Germany into a semi-colony under the rule of corporations.19  SBZ 
stations needed to broadcast stories about the economic deprivations of western states, 
and Mahle specifically singled out blacks living in the southern United States as an 
example of poor individuals forced to rely on charity.  Thus, Mahle warned, the Marshall 
Plan threatened to transform Germany into another version of the American south.  Such 
a wave of charity (which Mahle argued was a condescending method of robbing 
Germany of her independence) crippled chances for German unity and freedom.20 
Mahle’s arguments would appear throughout Berliner Rundfunk’s broadcasts 
during 1948 and 1949.  The guidelines are interesting, as they lay the groundwork for 
East German political broadcasts throughout the 1950s.  Mahle’s stress on German unity 
is particularly important.  Throughout the 1950s, GDR stations contended that East 
Germany was the true Germany because it, unlike West Germany, was dedicated to 
uniting Germany rather than accept division.  Thus, one can already see, over a year 
before the founding of the German Democratic Republic, the attempt to link German 
Communism with German nationalism.21  With Mahle’s warning that the Marshall Plan 
would transform Germany into a colony of the United States and his suggestion that both 
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the German people and American blacks were victims of America’s so-called “charity,” 
Mahle recommended SBZ stations present a curious iteration of Marxism-Leninism that 
drew upon German nationalist sentiments and attitudes.  The offensive against the 
Marshall Plan was linked with Germany unity.  Germany would either be a united, 
peaceful, disarmed, and economically productive state, or it would become a divided, 
colony of American capitalism.   
Another critical precedent established by Mahle’s guidelines (and the subsequent 
SBZ broadcasts) was the story of self-defense.  As discussed in Chapter One, Berliner 
Rundfunk’s initial political broadcasts were imbued with confidence and optimism.  The 
Soviet victory, Nuremberg Trials, and creation of the SED were all evidence that 
Germany was being reborn as a new, progressive, antifascist state that was now shorn of 
its imperialist and militarist elements.  Yet, by turning to a narrative that focused on 
creating a siege mentality, GDR broadcasters found themselves attempting to legitimize 
Soviet and SED actions by characterizing their economic and political situation as fragile 
and tenuous.  As Sigrid Meuschel has pointed out, East German state’s attempts to 
establish legitimacy were usually grounded in an attempt to evoke a sense of fear within 
its population.22  Even before the founding of the GDR in the fall of 1949, SBZ 
broadcasters attempted to evoke fear of the west, fear of capitalism, and fear of the 
United States.  This narrative of self-defense and a state of siege would be one of the 
dominant elements of East German broadcasting throughout the following decade, and 
would reach a culmination with the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961.  Its origins 
can be seen here in 1948. 
                                                 





An example of how Berliner Rundfunk depicted the United States as a resurgent 
fascist threat is a commentary made by Alfred Duchrow in April 1948.  In it, Duchrow 
related to listeners how he first learned of Franklin Roosevelt’s death while still in a 
concentration camp.  “The executioners exulted: they abandoned themselves to the hope 
that there would be a great change in the course of the war, they fantasized about an 
alliance of the western states with Himmler and Hitler against the Soviet Union.  We 
know, that the SS men were deceiving themselves.”23  Duchrow’s opening, drawing on 
the image of the camp experience shared by so many fellow victims of the Nazis, 
characterized the notion that the Western Allies would ally against the Soviets to be the 
fantastical delusion of despondent, drunken men.  Yet, Duchrow continued by pointing 
out that the Marshall Plan and rule of monopoly capital had made the three Western 
Zones into a safe haven for Nazis fleeing the SBZ.24  The dichotomy and continuities can 
clearly be seen in Duchrow’s broadcast.  The three Western Zones (The Trizone) were 
sanctuaries for fascists and reactionaries because of the developments of the Marshall 
Plan, Thus, the United States was forming the anti-Soviet alliance between the US and 
German fascists proposed by the SS guards in Duchrow’s camp.  The SS soldiers, 
Duchrow contended, were not as foolish as observers had thought. 
Two commentaries sent on July 2 and July 8 1948 respectively present a good 
overview of the major themes presented by Berliner Rundfunk during the period of the 
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blockade and airlift.  Both were sent just weeks before the Soviet ordered West Berlin 
blockaded and the Western Allies had commenced with the airlift.  The first commentary, 
written by Duchrow, focused on the financial and economic threat of the Marshall Plan 
and Deutsch Mark.  The Marshall Plan was described as a plan for mass plunder launched 
by “international financiers.”  The “Franfkurter Clay Mark,” as Duchrow described it, 
(stressing its connections to both US Military Governor Lucius Clay and German 
statesmen in the Western Zones), was part of an attempt to divide Germany and destroy 
the economy of Berlin and the Eastern Zone.  The commentary was also strongly 
nationalistic.  Against “international finance,” true Germans needed to preserve German 
unity.  Yet, the western powers were transforming Germany into a protectorate.  
Duchrow contended that the Saar was to become a French province and the Ruhr was to 
remain under Western control.  German unity was to be broken by the division of the 
country into federal states.  The western claims of creating a democracy in Germany was 
merely, in Duchrow’s words, a “façade for the dictatorship of the dollar,” and national 
enslavement.   
Eduard von Schnitzler’s commentary from July 8 1948 is another good example 
of the type of broadcasts sent to defend the blockade.  Although his July 8 commentary 
was concerned with the blockade, von Schnitzler opened by asking his listeners if recent 
events reminded them of World War II, asking,  “Haven’t the past days reminded you of 
the war?  The drone of engines, provisions coming from the air, the siege mentality, the 
feeling of hunger?”25  Von Schnitzler then proceeded to condemn the Western press for 
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fanning the flames of hostility and war.  The newspapers, von Schnitzler argued, had 
alternated between condemning the East, praising the need for the Deutschmark, and 
calling for the use of Atomic Weapons to pave a path through the Soviet Zone to West 
Berlin.26   Schnitzler then noted that all signs showed that the Western Allies’ policies 
were failing.  The Deutschmark, which von Schnitzler noted had been described by one 
West Berlin newspaper as “worth a mass,” was now worth a “requiem.”  The airlift could 
not possibly work and was being used as a means of reducing the loss of prestige that 
would occur with the inevitable withdrawal of western troops from Berlin.27  These 
troops, von Schnitzler contended, were superfluous and increased the threat of war 
breaking out. 
The commentaries just described are only two of thousands of broadcasts made 
throughout the blockade by Berliner Rundfunk.  However, their central arguments could 
be heard in most other Berliner Rundfunk political broadcasts concerning the Berlin 
blockade.  The western powers, under US leadership, were using the Marshall Plan and 
Deutschmark to divide Germany and make it a protectorate of international finance and 
capital.  The Germans of the Eastern Zone were the true German nationalists, struggling 
to preserve German unity and independence as well as prevent the outbreak of a Third 
World War.  The blockade was consequently an act of self-defense and self-preservation 
designed to save Germany as a nation.  Although Stalin himself had described the 
blockade as an act of self-defense,28 it was East German commentators who coupled the 
action to the language of German unity and national integrity.   
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Along with confronting the threat of economic division, many broadcasts focused 
on Germany’s immediate past.  Von Schitzler’s description of droning engines and a 
siege mentality was clearly aimed at evoking these memories.  On October 1, 1948 
Herbert Gessner made a similar comment, noting that the sound of the anglo-american 
bombers was just like that of the planes in 1944.29  These were not the only instances in 
which Berliner Rundfunk attempted to draw a connection between the Nazis and the 
Americans.  In many broadcasts, the British and American sponsored media were seen as 
the successor of Joseph Goebbels.  In July, the western press was described as “Braggarts 
of the airlift.”  The commentator noted that the last “Braggart” of the Nazi era, Goebbels, 
avoided responsibility for his actions by taking his own life.  The speaker then asked how 
the current incarnation of war-agitators would pay for their actions.30  The station also 
attacked western reports favorable to the airlift by claiming that their constant coverage 
of how many tons of material was delivered each day was akin to Goebbel’s reports of 
how many tons of British shipping was sunk by German Submarines during World War 
II.31  In June of 1948, referencing a Voice of America broadcast, commentator Hans 
Hagen continued to make connections, declaring, “The same melody: the Russians are all 
guilty, declared the Voice of America today.  It is just as Goebbels sang his song 
yesterday: the Jews are all guilty.”32  The Russians had become the new Jews to the 
resurgent fascists in the United States.   
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As Christoph Classen has noted, Berliner Rundfunk’s attempts to evoke the 
memory of the allied bombings and memory of war failed to convince listeners to look 
beyond the fact that of the two sides of the dispute, it was the Soviets acting as the 
aggressor.33  The Soviet contention that the United States was pursuing a plan to divide 
and subjugate Germany does not accord with either the actions and goals of either the 
Truman Administration or those West European leaders who requested that the United 
States maintain its presence in Western Europe and eagerly accepted the much needed aid 
of the Marshall Plan.  Certainly, US actions during this period, such as the declaration of 
the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, had increased tensions between the West and the 
Soviets.  Furthermore, both the US and British had begun to openly favor the creation of 
a West German state beginning as early as 1946.  But Berliner Rundfunk’s presentation 
of the international situation ignored the Soviet decision to unilaterally govern its own 
Zone, did not consider the curtailment of political and civil liberties in the SBZ, and did 
not address the Soviets’ own consolidation of control over Eastern Europe.34  
Furthermore, it simplified the situation.  In the scope of a series of brief commentaries, 
this was perhaps inevitable.  Yet, the monothematic approach to all of Berliner 
Rundfunk’s commentaries, regardless of their authors, usually led to an overly simplified 
view of events. 
Von Schnitzler’s bold prediction that the airlift could not possibly work also 
became a liability for Berliner Rundfunk.  In the summer of 1948, Berliner Rundfunk 
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commentaries had openly declared that it was not possible to provide for all of West 
Berlin using only air transportation.  As it became clear by the spring of 1949 that the 
airlift had been a success, the tone of this critique turned to ridicule.  In von Schnitzler’s 
lengthy commentary from July 4, 1948, for example, he noted that while the airlift could 
provide food, it was neglecting to bring raw materials for Berlin’s industry.  Von 
Schnitzler then asked, “And how long do you think that the American and British and 
French tax payers are prepared to pay these mad costs?”35  On July 9, 1948, Alfred 
Duchrow’s commentary continued to describe the airlift as impossible and at the same 
time cast Berliner’s memories back to another event: the difficult winters of 1945-46 and 
1947-48.  He noted that residents in East Berlin’s Pankow district were already hard at 
work chopping down wood to their homes during the coming winter.  He then proceeded 
to note that, “the dream of supplying coal from the air is over.”36  The airlift was 
“fantastic” and only a fool living, “in cloud cuckoo land” would consider it an adequate 
solution.37  On August 18, Arthur Mannbar focused on the lack of supplies in West 
Berlin.  “In the western sectors there are around 952,000 households.  If every West 
Berliner family consumes a hundredth weight (50 kilograms,) of coal, aircraft must bring 
in 47,600 metric tons of coal.  Bear in mind that is only for heating purposes in the 
Western Sectors.  Therefore, from now on every aircraft must bring to Berlin nothing but 
coal for 25 days.  No food, only coal, if every family is to receive a hundredth weight.”38  
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Mannbar stressed the shortages and claimed that the Western Allies would never be able 
to provide enough supplies.  In fact, the Western Allies were concerned during the 
summer of 1948 about the coming winter.  The airlift was providing about 3,000 to 4,000 
tons of material a day, indeed less than needed for the coming winter.39  Yet the Berliner 
Rundfunk strategy of demoralizing its audience was a curious way of attracting listeners.  
An anonymous letter sent to RIAS in August, 1948, noted that, “The program of Radio 
Berlin, however, is really shattering the nerves.”40  Many other letters to the station 
complained of the malnutrition and hunger many were suffering.  It is important to note 
that residents in the Soviet Zone, which was supposed to be fully provisioned, wrote 
many of these letters.41  
By presenting broadcasts of this nature, Berliner Rundfunk had also linked its 
very credibility to the airlift failing.  Thus, the change in tone and emphasis that marked 
its broadcasts during the winter of 1948-49, as it became clear the airlift would succeed, 
is not surprising.  By the winter of 1949, the airlift was shipping between 5,000 and 6,000 
tons of supplies to West Berlin a day.   Berliner Rundfunk subsequently began to either 
disparage the airlift or ignore it altogether.  On December 12, 1948, the station broadcast 
a commentary discussing the major events and accomplishments of 1948.  It stressed the 
successes of the communist states in Eastern Europe such as the rise of socialist unity 
parties in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Poland.42  It also touched on the 
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Soviet Union’s economic growth and stressed climbing jobless rates in France, Italy, and 
the United States.  The commentary also described the success of communists in Malaya, 
Greece, and China.43  The broadcast was a thorough and detailed analysis of the major 
events in the world over the course of 1948.  Yet, the blockade and airlift were hardly 
mentioned at all.  For Berliners listening to the station, this absence would have been a 
noticeable lacuna.  When British Prime Minister Clement Atlee visited West Berlin in 
March 1949, he described the airlift as a wonder of the world.  Berliner Rundfunk latched 
onto this phrase, and in a broadcast from March 12, 1949 sarcastically declared, “Thus, 
one will learn in school in a later period, ‘Outside of the seven wonders of the ancient 
world there is an eighth:  the airlift.  Made in the USA.’ ”44 The use of the phrase “Made 
in the USA,” further stressed the supposed link between capitalism and the airlift.   
Berliner Rundfunk freely cited the western press to make its arguments.  The most 
open confrontation with the western media was in a program called Blick in die 
Weltpresse.  The program focused on the major stories from a variety of newspapers, the 
majority of which were pro-communist.  However, the program always featured non-
communist periodicals such as Le Monde, News Chronicle, and the New York Herald 
Tribune.  The selection of excerpts and stories was almost always made with the intent of 
undermining the Western Allies and the United States.  Often, the original meaning of 
these quotations was taken out of context.  For example, an excerpt from a November 
1948 story from Newsweek was read over the air and paraphrased to undermine the airlift.  
The program quoted airlift pilots complaining about the fatigue from flying so many 
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missions for the “madcap” airlift and having to sacrifice themselves for the “pigs in 
Berlin.”45  Although pilots likely complained about the operation, Berliner Rundfunk 
declared they represented the opinion of all pilots flying the airlift.46  This also fell in line 
with Berliner Rundfunk’s frequently made contention that most Americans cared little for 
the German people and were growing tired of the exorbitant cost of funding the 
operation.47   
Inevitably, no matter what newspapers were discussed on a particular program of 
Blick in die Weltpresse, a story from The New York Herald Tribune was featured.  
Usually, the story was by the columnist Walter Lippmann.  As a politically moderate 
critic of the Truman administration’s foreign policy, Lippmann provided Berliner 
Rundfunk with the chance to demonstrate that not only communists opposed US foreign 
policy.  Lippmann’s columns were often read over the air throughout the blockade and 
usually dwelt on the columnist’s own criticisms of the Truman administration and the 
policy of containment.  For example, in August 1948 Herbert Gessner, asked:   
 
And what does it say about the situation that Walter 
Lippmann, the most influential American journalist, and 
above all a right-wing journalist, made the following 
prognosis concerning General Clay’s bankrupt Berlin 
policy on July 28 in the New York Herald Triune?  
“Perhaps our predicament in Berlin, and the hair-raising 
methods that are needed to extricate ourselves from this 
predicament, will finally convince Secretary of State 
Marshall that he cannot make policy in Europe as long as 
he allows the military in Berlin to make their own German 
policy.”  That sentence does not come from Berliner 
Rundfunk, but in fact is taken literally from criticism made 
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This excerpt from Herbert Gessner’s August 1948 commentary reveals an important 
component of Berliner Rundfunk’s approach to the US media.  By stressing that 
Lippmann was supposedly a right-wing journalist (he was not) and that it was Lippmann, 
not Berliner Rundfunk, who was making these criticisms, the station hoped to 
characterize the US government as out of touch and isolated from the rest of the world.  
Yet, it also greatly simplified Lippmann’s politics.  For although Lippmann opposed the 
escalation of tensions between the US and Soviets, and felt that supporting the creation of 
a West German state was increasing these tensions, he supported the airlift, feeling that 
the Western Allies could not be forced to withdraw from Berlin through intimidation.49  
Lippmann’s criticism of the Truman Administration was not based on ideology but on a 
sense that the tactics and approaches taken by the President and Secretary of State were 
only exacerbating an already tense situation.50  However, such a nuanced approach to the 
major issues of the day was not particulary helpful for the arguments Berliner Rundfunk 
was trying to make.   
 Another popular subject of Berliner Rundfunk’s commentaries was Franklin 
Roosevelt’s former vice-president Henry Wallace, who had briefly served in the Truman 
administration as Secretary of Commerce.  In 1948, he ran for president on the ticket of 
the Progressive Party.  Belonging to the political traditions of leftwing American 
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liberalism, Wallace’s campaign was pulled increasingly leftward to such an extent that 
his speeches came to sound like the Soviets’ own arguments.  This was a consequence of 
both the prevalence of communists within the Progressive Party and Wallace’s own 
naiveté.51  His speeches and pronouncements bore a strong resemblance to the rhetoric 
and arguments of the Soviets and Berliner Rundfunk.  Like Berliner Rundfunk, and 
Soviet backed media in general, he spoke of the “ ‘Truman-led, Wall Street-dominated 
military backed group that is blackening the name of American democracy around the 
world.’”52  He denounced the Marshall Plan as tool of “Wall Street monopolists,” a 
means of dividing Europe into separate camps, and a tool for subverting the economic 
independence of Britain, France, and Italy, forcing them to abandon their policies of 
industrial nationalization.53 
The station depicted Wallace as the one progressive force in the United States, 
casting him as a symbol of the old policy of US-Soviet friendship of the Roosevelt era 
destroyed by Truman and Marshall.  On October 6, 1948, the editor Hermann 
Budziskawski broadcast a portrait of the American candidate.  He opened by describing 
Wallace as young, viral, and athletic.  His background as a farmer and friendship with 
Roosevelt were also stressed.  “Not only was Wallace Roosevelt’s closest political 
associate, but he was also a close personal friend, and he helped President Roosevelt’s 
efforts to make the Democratic party independent of big capital and corruption, and make 
it a true American people’s party.”54  Budziskawski claimed Wallace’s setbacks and lack 
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of publicity in the 1948 election were the consequence of the fact that the two US 
political parties were both slaves to big capital and were preventing Wallace’s voice from 
being heard.  “The reactionary feudal lords of the Southern States have, with Truman’s 
help, quickly bought control of the Democratic Party.” Thus, the democrats were no 
different than the reactionary Republican Party.55  The report stressed that Wallace was 
not a socialist or a communist, declaring: 
 
Henry Wallace, who is not the dreamer his opponents 
allege he is, is becoming the focal point for all the 
progressive forces in the country.  He has entered the 
election race without occupying a party machine and he 
knows that he can hardly hope to win more than a couple 
million votes.  However, he is also conscious of the fact 
that he is fulfilling a great historical mission in which he 
will finally bring together what monopoly capital opposes. 
After the election his new party will continue to grow and 
become a powerful factor in the struggle for international 
peace and will help break of the power of the monopolies 
in America.56   
 
 
Throughout the United States presidential election campaign of 1948, Berliner Rundfunk 
aired frequent comments made by Wallace in which he criticized Truman and Clay.  On 
July 31, 1948 the station broadcast long excerpts, verbatim (though translated) of 
                                                                                                                                                 
naher persönlicher Freund, und er halt Präsident Roosevelt, bei dessen Versuch, aus der korrupten, vom Großkapital 
abhängigen, demokratischen Partei, eine Art amerikanischer Volkspartei zu machen.” 
55 Ibid., „Die reaktionären Feudalherren der Südstaaten erorberten, mit Präsident Truman’s Hilfe, sehr schnell die 
Macht der demokratischen Partei, die sich seitdem nicht mehr wesentlich von der alten reaktionären republikanischen 
Partei unterscheidet.“ 
56 Ibid., “Henry Wallace, der keineswegs, wie seine Gegner behaupten, ein Träumer ist, ist der Kristallisationspunkt 
aller fortschrittlichen Kräfte des Landes geworden.  Er ist in den Wahlkampf gegangen, ohne Parteimaschine zu 
besitzen, und er weiß, daß er kaum mehr als ein paar millionen Stimmen erhoffen kann.  Er ist sich aber auch bewußt, 
daß er eine große historische Mission erfüllt, indem er endlich die Kräfte zusammenfaßt, die sich dem Monopolkapital 
entgegenstellen wollen, und daß seine neue Partei nach den Wahlen weiter wachsen wird und ein mächtiger Faktor 






Wallace’s acceptance speech at the Progressive Party nominating convention in 
Philadelphia seven days earlier.  Notable sections included a call for a more isolationist 
policy, as Wallace declared: “I say the peace of the world is far too fragile to be shuttled 
back and forth through a narrow air corridor in freighter planes.  I say the lives of our 
children, and our children's parents, are far too precious to be left to the tempers of 
second lieutenants at road barriers where zone meets zone-or to the generals who are 
quoted calmly as favoring a “show of strength.”57  The arguments were very similar to 
those made by Berliner Rundfunk: the airlift was a dangerous act of brinkmanship that 
was threatening world stability and was not in the interest of the United States.   
Through its frequent quotation Wallace and Lippmann, Berliner Rundfunk 
utilized a technique that has been described by Jeffrey Herf as “asymmetrical strategic 
interaction.”58  By exploiting the open debate of liberal democratic societies as a means 
of gaining strategic advantage, Berliner Rundfunk hoped to transform those virtues in 
vices.  Berliner Rundfunk’s staff also drew the conclusion that the best means for 
pursuing the station’s goals was to engage, confront, and refute the arguments being 
made by the western press.  However, SED leaders considered the very act of 
acknowledging that there was another side to an argument to be an unacceptable 
compromise.  In October 1949, Schmidt and 16 of his co-workers at the station were 
dismissed.   
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By the fall of 1949, it was clear that Berliner Rundfunk had failed in the 
competition with western radio in presenting a credible, convincing program.  At the 
same time, the failure of the blockade the previous spring had dealt a considerable blow 
to the Soviet Union’s position and authority in Germany.  In the same month that 
Schmidt was removed from his post, the Soviets had also sanctioned the creation of the 
SED controlled German Democratic Republic.   
Spearheading the efforts to purge GDR broadcasters were Kurt Heiss and Gerhart 
Eisler.  Both would become prominent figures in East German broadcasting throughout 
the 1950s.  Born in 1909, Heiss had worked as a journalist for German communist 
newspapers during the Weimar period.  He fled to France in 1933.  In 1935, he moved to 
Moscow where he worked for “Radio Moscow.”  He remained there until 1947.  Upon 
returning to Germany that he year, he worked as a political broadcaster at Berliner 
Rundfunk.  After a brief period as Intendant of Mitteldeutsche Rundfunk (MDR), he 
returned to Berliner Rundfunk to act as the new Intendant of both that station and 
Deutschlandradio.  In 1952 he replaced Hans Mahle as General Intendant and became 
chairmain of the State Radio Committee in 1959, serving as chair until leaving to work as 
editor for the Ostsee Zeitung in 1961.59   
Born in 1897, Eisler would become one of the dominant figures in East German 
radio throughout the 1950s and 1960s.  Gerhart had joined the KPD in 1921.  He fled 
Germany after the Nazi seizure of power, living in the United States and France, serving 
in the Spanish Civil War, and eventually returning to the United States in 1941.  As a 
prominent communist and representative of the Communist International living in New 
York, Eisler quickly came under the suspicion of the House Un-American Activities 
                                                 





Committee.  Facing conviction for perjury, Eisler stowed away aboard a Polish ship in 
May of 1949 and fled to the GDR.  Greeted as a hero upon returning to Germany, the 
SED quickly gave him a post as the head of the Office for Information in the newly 
created GDR.  He remained at this post until he was dismissed in 1952 due to his 
association with purged SED member Paul Merker.  The SED allowed him to return to 
work in 1956, when he became deputy chair of the State Radio Committee (StRK).  From 
1962 until his death 1968 he would serve as chair of the committee.60 
Gerhart Eisler’s criticism of Schmidt’s management of Berliner Rundfunk 
focused on the Intendant’s supposed pursuit of objective journalism.  In November of 
1949, Eisler declared that, “If it is said that it is necessary to accommodate enemy 
propaganda in order to be objective, then we are of the opinion that one must not hear all 
sides.  We are of the opinion, that our side is right.”61  There was only one side: the 
arguments of the Socialist Unity Party and Soviet Union.  The comment was made about 
a month after the SED held a lengthy meeting discussing the need to dismiss Schmidt and 
reprimand most of his staff at Berliner Rundfunk on October 30, 1949.  The meeting was 
attended by the most important figures in East German broadcasting, including General 
Intendant Hans Mahle, Heiss, Eisler, Schmidt, Leo Bauer, Bruno Goldhammer, Alfred 
Duchrow, Herbert Geßner, and Hermann Axen.  It shows the initial steps taken by the 
SED to consolidate and assert party control over all broadcasting operations in the newly 
created German Democratic Republic.  The process, begun in the fall of 1949, lasted until 
1952 and ended with the complete consolidation of broadcasting operations under SED 
control in East Berlin.  Examining these meeting minutes also allow us to examine many 
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fundamental positions held by the SED with regards to the relationship between radio, the 
public, and objectivity.   
The primary problem facing Berliner Rundfunk, according to Radio General 
Intendant Hans Mahle, was that its broadcasts were ideologically weak.  Schmidt suffered 
due to the fact that he had lived in England during the war.  The station as a whole was in 
a precarious position due to the fact that its facilities were physically within the British 
Sector of Berlin.  Mahle declared, “Evidently, under the influence of class enemies in the 
British sector, Berliner Rundfunk has developed a propensity, indeed, a love, for fruitless 
polemics with the West Berlin and West German press and journalists.”62  Mahle asserted 
that Schmidt had allowed his wish to refute the reports of the western media to supersede 
his true responsibility: to present the correct socialist, antifascist course for Germany to 
Berliner Rundfunk’s listeners.  The station’s reporters, Mahle observed, cared more about 
West German, British, and American broadcasts than they did the Soviet’s own 
arguments.  Like Eisler, Mahle belittled Schmidt’s attempt to be “objective.”  “The 
situation at Berliner Rundfunk is marked by an injurious propensity towards so-called 
objectivity, which—I would like to say, often finds its expression in Berliner Rundfunk 
broadcasts in a downright loving and literal citation of the aspersions and contortions of 
the class enemies.”63  Mahle characterized the desire to be objective as a sickness and 
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contended that it represented a failure to embrace and promote the principles of 
socialism.  The two were not compatible.64   
As one can see from Mahle’s comments, the fact that Berliner Rundfunk was 
geographically inside the British Sector in Berlin-Charlottenburg was of considerable 
concern to the SED.  Towards the end of the meeting, Kurt Heiss described the station as 
an advanced post in enemy territory.65  Because of this, Heiss argued, it was imperative 
that the station’s reporters present an ideologically clear line in their broadcasts and that 
party influence should be strong and pervasive.  This was a clear change in course from 
earlier efforts to downplay the partisan character of the station.  Mahle described Schmidt 
as arrogant, and declared that his arrogance (“überheblichkeit”) had hindered station 
operations and led him to avoid a frank, critical self-assessment that could have improved 
the station’s broadcasts.66  Schmidt had also failed to install an effective means of 
collective leadership.   
Mahle also criticized Schmidt’s subordinates, such as Bruno Goldhammer, 
commenting that he was responsible for Berliner Rundfunk’s lack of ideological clarity.  
The criticism of Goldhammer is telling, as he was among several members of the SED 
purged due to his connections with the SED Politbüro member Paul Merker.67  
(Ironically, as noted above, Eisler himself would pay for his association with Merker in 
1952).  The expulsion of Goldhammer and his colleague, Deutschlandsender chief Leo 
Bauer, from the party in 1950 was part of a larger scale anti-cosmopolitan action waged 
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by pro-Stalinist officials throughout the Soviet bloc.  Both had spent the war years in 
Switzerland and had worked for Berliner Rundfunk and Deutschlandsender respectively.  
Authorities arrested Leo Bauer in 1950 and charged him with espionage.  Condemned to 
death in 1952, his sentence was commuted in 1953 to 25 years in a work camp.  
Goldhammer was arrested on similar charges and sentenced to ten years in prison.  In 
1956 he was rehabilitated by the SED and subsequently returned to work as a journalist.68   
In comparison, Schmidt’s dismissal as Intendant was a relatively light sentence.  
No longer allowed to work in broadcasting, he nevertheless continued to work as a 
journalist in East Germany, eventually becoming a high-ranking member of the National 
Front.69  Nevertheless, the language and concerns of the GDR’s anti-cosmopolitan 
campaign can be felt throughout the October 30, 1949 meeting transcript.  Along with 
criticism for communists who had spent the war years in western states, SED leaders 
criticized Berliner Rundfunk for its ineffective reporting of the trial of Laszlo Rajk.  A 
long-time member of the Hungarian Communist Party, Rajk was put on trial by 
communist leaders in Hungary for associating with Titoist and western elements.  The 
trial was a critical catalyst for anti-cosmopolitan actions throughout the Eastern Bloc.70  
Consequently, Berliner Rundfunk’s reporting of the trial came under close scrutiny by 
SED leaders.  Hermann Axen, the SED central committee secretary responsible for media 
matters, accused Schmidt of downplaying the severity of Rajk’s crimes by focusing on 
Rajk’s psychological makeup and background as an anti-fascist fighter.71  Furthermore, 
the station had made the mistake of describing him as a “ ‘capable young man who 
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struggled against dictatorship.’”72  Berliner Rundfunk, Axen contended, had tried to 
argue that Rajk’s struggles and suffering as an antifascist fighter could account for his 
criminal actions.   Thus, Berliner Rundfunk had not adequately condemned his 
criminality.   
The meeting minutes indicate that the session was tense and antagonistic.  At one 
point Heiss admonished Schmidt for speaking out of turn when the former Berliner 
Rundfunk Intendant protested the accusations being made against him by the SED 
leadership.  At another point, Eisler accused Schmidt of not taking the Politbüro’s 
recommendations seriously, and mocked Schmidt by asking rhetorically who was right, 
Schmidt or the Politbüro.73  He characterized Schmidt as a leader incapable of 
confronting the many challenges of effectively leading a radio station, noting that, “…if a 
general declares to his troops, there are too many enemies and too many difficulties, then 
he is a bad general.  Consequently, he must go.”74  Eisler went on to criticize Schmidt’s 
staff, including von Schnitzler, and compared the Berliner Rundfunk reporters 
unfavorably to RIAS.  RIAS, Eisler noted, was too smart to broadcast reports that 
undermined its own position and the position of the West Berlin and West German 
governments.75  He went on to criticize Berliner Rundfunk for trying to model itself on 
RIAS.  It was fine if RIAS wanted to liberally cite stories from the SED organ Neues 
Deutschland.  The appropriate response, however, was not for Berliner Rundfunk to just 
begin citing western newspapers.  As Eisler declared, “We must take up the opponent’s 
arguments.  Not to propagate them, but so that we can slash them apart and smash them 
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with our own arguments.”76  It was not Berliner Rundfunk’s job to be the propagandistic 
mouthpiece for RIAS in the Eastern Zone. 
The SED resolved to dismiss Schmidt, enforce collective leadership over Berliner 
Rundfunk, and make sure that the station only broadcast politically acceptable reports.  
Despite Mahle and Eisler’s criticisms, Berliner Rundfunk’s reports were hardly objective.  
Their reports had been dedicated to presenting a single viewpoint, the accepted 
communist master narrative as sanctioned by the Soviet Union.  Broadcasters cited 
sources like Wallace and Lippmann with the intention of using the quotations to attack 
western policies in Berlin.  Nevertheless, the debates held by Berliner Rundfunk’s staff 
and SED reveal that tensions frequently emerged between presenting the Marxist-
Leninist interpretation of events and attempting to produce reports that were attractive to 
listeners.  The primary means of doing this was to downplay the impression that Berliner 
Rundfunk only served Soviet interests.  By citing Lippmann and Wallace, Berliner 
Rundfunk attempted to present the argument that the Soviet Union was not the only critic 
of the Marshall Plan or the airlift, and that liberal elements within the United States were 
also opposed to the Truman Administration.  By late 1949 however, the SED was more 
concerned about the form of the Berliner Rundfunk broadcasts than their intent or 
content.  By citing western newspapers and arguments, the East German station had 
given the impression, in the eyes of Heiss, and Eisler, that it was giving the arguments 
legitimacy and unintentionally giving listeners the opportunity to listen to them.  As 
Eisler argued, it was not enough to present the western viewpoint.  The western view 
needed to be smashed by effective argumentation from Berliner Rundfunk reporters.   
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What is clear from Eisler and Heiss’s critical comments is the firm conviction that 
the Marxist-Leninist approach was the only correct model for journalism.  News reports 
could not just be an end to themselves.  But, even more importantly, news reports could 
not be broadcast solely for the purpose of refuting western propaganda.  Their primary 
focus and goal had to be spreading the correct Communist line to listeners with the intent 
of encouraging listeners to adopt the ideological worldview of the SED and Soviet Union.  
In the mindset of Eisler and Heiss, objective reporting was coterminous with western, 
bourgeois reporting, and consequently not conducive to the construction of a socialist 
society.   
The need to confront western broadcasts would become the primary concern for 
GDR broadcast news during the early 1950s.  Consequently, the dismissal of Schmidt in 
1949 represents an important turning point in the history of broadcasting in the German 
Democratic Republic.  The tension between Marxism-Leninism and broad anti-fascism 
which had shaped the station’s reporting since 1945 would be resolved in favor of a style 
of journalism that fully embraced and promoted Marxist-Leninist principles. 
 
 
Ending Neutrality: RIAS and the Turn to Anti-communism 1947-1949 
 
 
 Like the Soviets, United States’ information policy in Germany was dedicated to 
insuring that Nazism was purged from German political culture and society.77  However, 
                                                 






unlike the Soviet approach, which called for the active use of the media to shape 
mentalities, the US initially pursued a policy that aimed to introduce a culture of 
journalism and radio that respected neutrality, objectivity, and accuracy.78  US plans for 
media operations in postwar Germany developed out of a number of wartime information 
operations.  A number of different approaches and organizations dominated postwar 
planning.  The first was the civilian Office of War Information (OWI).  Founded 
immediately after the US entry into the war, the OWI sought to wage an information 
campaign that would not only undermine the Third Reich’s war effort but also lay the 
foundations for a liberal-democratic Germany.  Dominated by liberal New Dealers and 
European émigrés, OWI operatives hoped to establish a US media campaign that was 
moral, truthful, and distinct from the Nazis.  Drawing upon the Atlantic Charter, the OWI 
promoted the vision of a liberal international system grounded in Wilsonian principles.  
Its hesitation to use the term “propaganda” and instead use the word “information” to 
describe the material it broadcast reflects this aim.79  Perhaps its most enduring legacy 
was the Voice of America (VOA), the first official station representing the United States 
oversees.   
Competing with the OWI were the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the 
Psychological Warfare Division (PWD).  Whereas the OWI opposed the adoption of 
Nazi-style tactics, the OSS treated information as a means for achieving military goals 
and believed that the US should use any means at its disposal to defeat Nazi Germany.  
Unlike the OWI for example, OSS members supported the production and dissemination 
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of false information.80  By 1944, with the creation of the Psychological Warfare Division 
(PWD) within the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force, the military 
asserted control over anti-Nazi propaganda operations in the field.  Although the PWD 
continued to pursue an OWI style “strategy of truth,” it also believed that war goals and 
interests needed to be the primary influence on the selection and presentation of 
information. 81 The PWD pursued what Larry Hartenian has described as an “austere” 
policy that focused on the allied goal of unconditional surrender and forbade any 
compromise with Nazism.82   
All of these approaches would strongly influence how US occupation authorities 
treated media and radio operations within its zone of occupation in Germany.  No one 
approach ever came to dominate and supersede the other.  Instead, especially at RIAS 
Berlin, broadcasting would be defined by a mixture and balancing of these different 
ideas.  With the end of the war, the PWD was eventually dissolved and replaced by the 
Information Control Division (ICD).  A department of the US Military Government in 
Germany (OMGUS), the ICD was responsible for all media operations within the United 
States Zone of Occupation.  This included newspapers, the performing arts, and radio 
broadcasting.  The US hoped to use radio as both a tool for denazification and as the 
mouthpiece for OMGUS.  Stations would affirm the authority of the US military 
authorities and also stress the need for Germans to take personal responsibility for the 
crimes of the Nazis.  At the same time, ICD stations would promote the creation of a 
pluralistic democracy by demonstrating objective, impartial reporting that addressed a 
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wide array of topics, issues, and political perspectives.83  Various radio stations and 
newspapers promoted political pluralism by broadcasting divergent opinions and hiring 
personnel with a variety of political backgrounds, ranging from communists, socialists, 
and conservatives.84   
Like the British, the US planned to rebuild German broadcasting through a three-
step approach.  First, there would be a total blackout of broadcasting followed by a 
resumption of radio operations under direct US control.  Second, the new radio stations 
would be placed under German control, but with US oversight.  Finally, the US would 
grant full sovereignty to German stations.85  US policies differed from the British in that 
while the latter occupier used the BBC, the US did not utilize any specific model.  British 
officials sought to create one large, centrally coordinated public broadcaster for its Zone.  
This station, the Northwest German Radio, would eventually become the model and 
standard for West German broadcasters.86  US operations, on the other hand, were much 
more widespread, with local stations created by Military Government authorities 
throughout its zone.  These included Radio Munich, Radio Stuttgart, and the Radio in the 
American Sector (RIAS).87   
As noted in Chapter One, the US created the Radio in the American Sector in 
response to the Soviet’s refusal to share sovereignty over Berliner Rundfunk.88  During 
its early days, RIAS was a relatively small operation with little support.  Initially it lacked 
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a working transmitter, and its lack of resources and equipment meant that it was heard by 
only a very small number of Berliners.  For the first seven months of its existence, it 
could not even use airwaves to broadcast, having to rely on a “wired broadcast” 
mechanism (Drahtfunk) that utilized Berlin’s telephone lines to send radio signals.89  
Only about 5,000 Berliners had access to this type of receiver, and of these only 15% 
could actually hear the station.90  Even after RIAS acquired a long-range transmitter in 
1947, the station could only broadcast at less than a quarter the strength of Berliner 
Rundfunk.91  Also, whereas Berliner Rundfunk was able to broadcast for most of the day 
and night, RIAS only had enough personnel and resources to broadcast in the afternoon 
and evenings.92  In the words of US Military Governor Lucius Clay, the RIAS operation 
at this time was a “rather timid venture.”93   
US control officers remained in charge of the operation.  Numbering between 
three and four officials, they held oversight duties over programming and political 
broadcasts.94  Nevertheless, the station quickly assembled a number of reporters, many of 
whom remained with the station for decades.  The staff was small, and made up mostly of 
Germans.  These included veteran reporters who were unable to continue working after 
the Nazi rise to power in 1933 such as Hans Herz as well as new, younger reporters such 
as Jürgen Graf.  Born in 1892, Herz had worked as a foreign correspondent and editor for 
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the Ullstein Verlag before the Nazis dismissed him in 1934 because of his Jewish 
ancestry.  He remained in Germany through the remainder of the war, though he was 
unable to work.  In 1946, he presented and edited RIAS’s program Berliner 
Pressestimmen as well as commentaries and reports.95  While Herz was an experienced 
journalist, his colleague Jürgen Graf was a newcomer to journalism.  Born in 1927, he 
was not even twenty when he came to RIAS in 1945 (before it had even begun 
broadcasting) to work as a reporter.  Graf would become one of the most familiar and 
popular voices at RIAS, working as a reporter until he left the station in 1982.96   
 For the first two years of its existence RIAS attempted to maintain complete 
neutrality with regards to Berlin and German politics.  All political parties were afforded 
equal airtime to broadcast their positions, (though, critically, only RIAS used the form of 
a political roundtable.  The other US sponsored stations in Germany allowed parties their 
own individual airtime).97  A number of factors led the station’s leaders to pursue this 
policy.  First, in accordance with agreements reached at the Potsdam Conference, Allied 
licensed media organs were banned from openly criticizing any of the occupying powers.  
The directive declared, “No Occupying Power will permit radio stations within its zone to 
make broadcasts which constitute malicious material directed against the Occupying 
Powers with the aim of disrupting the unity among the Allies or evoking the distrust and 
hostility of the German people against the Occupying Powers.”98   
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Personnel factors also informed this decision.  Two of the station’s most 
influential control officers during its first years of broadcasting were German émigrés 
who had worked for the Office of War Information: Ruth Norden99 and Gustav Mathieu.  
The Chief of Station for RIAS from May 1946 to January 1948, Norden was born in 1906 
in London to German parents.  Her father was Christian and her mother Jewish.  
Following the outbreak of the First World War, her family returned to Germany.  From 
1930 until 1934 she worked as a publisher in Germany before immigrating to the United 
States in 1934.  Between 1935 and 1942 she worked as a journalist, editing and writing 
for periodicals such as The Living Age and The Nation.  In 1940, she became an 
American citizen.  Following the US entry into World War II, she worked as an editor for 
the radio section of the OWI until 1945, specializing in broadcasts to Austria and 
Germany.  Following the end of the war, she returned to Germany where she became a 
civilian official within the ICD’s Berlin branch.100   
Gustave Mathieu was another émigré who had worked for the OWI.  The son of a 
German Jewish and a French Catholic, he was born in Mannheim in 1921.  In 1934, his 
family fled to France and in 1937 Mathieu emigrated to the United States.  Following the 
US entry into the war, he worked as an instructor for US soldiers and for US officials 
planning for the occupation.  In 1944, he began working for the OWI, writing and 
delivering German-language broadcasts.  Following the war, he worked for OMGUS, 
helping to assemble public opinion surveys on the Nuremberg Trials.  At the end of 1945, 
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he moved to Berlin to help start the RIAS operation.  He would remain at RIAS until 
1948.101 
 Petra Galle’s describes both Norden and Mathieu as “typical representatives” of 
the liberal traditions of the OWI.102  Critically, both were émigrés with a Jewish parent.  
Both had also participated in the allied war effort.  Their approach to US broadcasting in 
Berlin was firmly grounded in the belief that inter-allied cooperation was essential to the 
reconstruction of Germany.  Furthermore, as former OWI officials with leftwing 
sympathies, they adhered to the idea that broadcasts should be balanced, politically 
neutral, and should help promote inter-allied cooperation and perpetuate the wartime anti-
Nazi alliance.  Their approach (and its consequences) is well illustrated in how the station 
approached the creation of the Socialist Unity Party.  As discussed in Chapter One, 
Berliner Rundfunk’s reports strongly advocated the merger, with some 40 broadcasts 
declaring that the merger was not just an act of political expediency, but a moral action to 
insure that the German working class would never again be divide, as they had been in 
1933.103  However, many social democrats, especially its leader Kurt Schumacher, saw 
the creation of the SED as an attempt by the communists to capitalize on the SPD’s 
popularity while also neutralizing a potential rival from the political left.  Thus, with 
Berliner Rundfunk broadcasting a barrage of pro-unity commentaries with Soviet 
backing, members of the Berlin SPD approached RIAS, seeing if it would serve as a 
counter-balance to Berliner Rundfunk.104  In this regard, they hoped it could serve the 
same role as the American licensed newspaper, Der Tagesspiegel, which had become the 
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major voice in the media against the merger.105  US officials at both the ICD’s Radio 
Branch and RIAS refused to commit the station to one side or the other.  The Radio 
Branch chief, Charles Lewis, argued in March 1946 that the US goal should be to, 
“…highlight the Drahtfunk [RIAS] handling of the political issue as an illustration of the 
American conception of freedom of expression, permitting comparison to be made with 
the one-sided handling of the campaign by Radio Berlin.”106  Lewis argued that 
maintaining neutrality in the political debate would demonstrate the benefits and 
strengths of American traditions of liberal democratic journalism.  In comparison to 
Berliner Rundfunk, which depicted the merger as a choice between right and wrong, 
moral and immoral, fascist and antifascist, US Radio simply presented a, “discussion of 
the pros and cons of the proposed KPD-SPD merger.”107 
Yet, as the political landscape changed, this policy became increasingly difficult 
to maintain.  Controlling one of the few radio stations in Berlin and monitoring what was 
broadcast already meant that the United States could not truly claim it was completely 
objective or neutral.  Also, while Charles Lewis spoke of the SED as if it were just 
another political party, it was in fact openly favored by the Soviet administration.  During 
the unity debate, many social democrats that opposed the merger were imprisoned on 
Soviet orders.  Many who opposed the SED in the SBZ lost their jobs.  The Soviets also 
used their authority to strike non-SED candidates from election lists.108  With the Soviets 
openly supporting the SED and using its administrative powers to help influence the 
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political landscape of the SBZ in its favor, it was becoming more and more unrealistic for 
the United States to remain completely detached. 
Many of Mathieu and Norden’s staff also found themselves in opposition to the 
decision to remain neutral.  Indeed, several German workers at RIAS such as Intendant 
Franz Wallner-Basté and Chief Editor Hans-Ulrich Kerstens complained to US 
authorities that RIAS’s leadership was decidedly pro-communist and not neutral at all.109  
Wallner-Baste had worked as a journalist and arts critic before the Nazis dismissed him 
from his post at Southwest German Radio due to his political views.  In 1945 he became 
RIAS’s first Intendant.  However, his sympathies for the SPD and personal differences 
with Norden and her Program Director Ruth Gambke, led to his resignation in September 
of 1947.110  Hans-Ulrich Kerstens had worked as a journalist before serving in the 
German army from 1943-1945.  Like Wallner-Baste, he was a supporter of the SPD.  
Following his dismissal from RIAS in April 1947 (due to claims that he had covered up 
his membership in the Nazi party),111 Kerstens contended that Mathieu edited stories 
critical of the Soviets, considered the United States the greatest danger to world security, 
and gave frequent talks at Berliner Rundfunk.112  The resignations of Wallner-Basté and 
Kerstens did not bring an end to the criticism of RIAS’s leadership.  In October 1947 a 
US Military Inspector found the station mismanaged and unbecoming of a US 
institution.113  In November, the SPD leader and West Berlin official Ernst Reuter 
complained to the US Military that RIAS was using stories from a Soviet news service to 
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criticize his handling of Berlin’s electrical problem.114  Commenting on RIAS, Reuter 
declared that the station was “Berlin’s second communist broadcaster.”115 
Letters from Norden indicate she was critical of the increase in tensions between 
the Soviets and United States.116  In her letters to the author Hermann Boch, residing in 
the United States, Norden frequently commented on how the political atmosphere was 
becoming inhospitable for someone of her political views.  In a letter from September 1, 
1947, she wrote, “The political trends in the States have a strong reflection here.  I don’t 
feel that we are really accomplishing our goal with the occupation much as I would like 
to say that we do.”117  She wrote of the wish for true four-way control of Germany and 
acknowledged how the Soviets were frequently breaking agreements.  However, she 
wrote, “the solution is not to stoop to the same practices, it would seem to me.”  The 
situation in Berlin, Norden complained, lacked men of vision and stature.  Her comments 
on the Greek Civil War also revealed a sympathy for the anti-royalist cause there and a 
disappointment with what she was being ordered to broadcast at RIAS: “I don’t see how 
one can feel in favor of the Greek Government.  Calling all the rebels communists is too 
much of a simplification.”118  Norden claimed the anti-Russian feeling in Berlin was 
rampant, so much so as, “to make one feel uncomfortable.”119  Although she was proud 
of her work at RIAS, she indicated that she was unsure about asking for a contract 
                                                 
114 Memorandum, Complaints about RIAS, November 14, 1947, (NARA), RG 260 (OMGUS), Records of the Berlin 
Sector: Records of the Director’s Office 1945-1949, 390/48/8-9/7-4, Box 20. 
115 Schivelbusch, Vor dem Vorhang, 185. 
116 Letter from Ruth Norden to Hermann Broch, September 1, 1947, Hermann Broch und Ruth Norden: 









extension.120  Whether Norden was feeling pressure to leave the station is uncertain, but it 
is clear that she was herself unsure about whether or not she wanted to retain her post.   
At the same time as these disputes were taking place US media policy in Germany 
made a turn towards overt anti-communism.  In October 1947 US Military Governor 
Lucius Clay declared that the US media organs would abandon its former policy of 
neutrality and engage in a “political information campaign” designed to overtly attack the 
Soviets and German communists.121  The impartiality that had characterized much of the 
US media campaign since the end of the war gave way to a much more aggressive and 
politicized approach that actively criticized the communist system.  In January 1948, both 
Norden and Mathieu were dismissed from RIAS.122  Their dismissals were characteristic 
of many similar personnel changes made throughout the American Zone, as left-leaning 
officials were replaced throughout the Zone’s media installations.  While many scholars 
of this period have seen this as a surrender of the principles of pluralism and 
democratization in favor of anti-communism and Cold War,123 the US military 
government and many German political figures saw the changes as necessary for 
defending the still fragile democratic order in Germany.124  Many within the US Military 
Government felt that Germany could easily succumb to dictatorship once more and saw 
the SED and Soviet Communism as the most likely threat to building a democratic order.  
For RIAS and US information policy as a whole, weakening the influence and 
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attractiveness of communism was the most direct and prominent means for strengthening 
a democratic order in Germany. 
 Norden and Mathieu’s successor was a military intelligence officer in the Berlin 
Occupation Government named William Heimlich.  Like his predecessors, Heimlich had 
experience in broadcasting, having managed a small station in the US Midwest.125  
Heimlich stands as a controversial figure in the history of RIAS Berlin.  Born in Ohio in 
1911, Heimlich was, by both his own account and those of his subordinates, an 
aggressive, forceful personality with little time for the nuances and sensitivities of 
European intellectual and cultural life.126  Along with OMGUS Political officer Boris 
Schub, Heimlich embarked upon a radical reordering of the station’s programming and 
content, firmly establishing it as an anti-communist broadcaster. Heimlich faced three 
major goals: to remove the “communistic or extreme-left personnel” from RIAS, to 
change the policy of RIAS from neutrality to anti-communism, and to provide the station 
with better broadcasting facilities.127  Heimlich pushed for the construction of a 100 kW 
transmitter, increased the hours of daily programming, helped organize new facilities for 
the station, and hired new reporters and personalities.  He also promoted new 
programming, including the popular cabaret program Die Insulaner (The Islanders) under 
the direction of Günter Neumann, which quickly became one of RIAS’s most popular and 
memorable satirical shows.128  The political commentators, most notably Victor Klages 
and Eugen Hartmann, were given relative freedom in choosing and presenting their 
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topics.  Both were anti-communists and dedicated many of their broadcasts to criticizing 
both the Soviet system and propaganda.129 
Victor Klages was 58 years old when he came to RIAS in April, 1947.  In 1909 he 
worked as a freelance journalist, after serving as a volunteer for the Hamburgischen 
Neuesten Nachrichten.  During World War I he worked as the press officer for the 
General Governor of German occupied Belgium.  After the war, he worked as a foreign 
correspondent for the Berliner Tagesblatt.  During the Third Reich, he worked under a 
pseudonym, Waldemar Keller, and wrote novels.  Since he spoke French, Polish, and 
Danish, he worked as an interpreter during the early years of World War II.130  At the end 
of the war, he returned to journalism, writing for both the Western and Soviet licensed 
press.  In April, 1947 he was hired to work as a political commentator for RIAS. 
Eugen Hartmann was one of several reporters who first began working for 
Berliner Rundfunk after the war.  Born in 1903, he worked as a reporter for various 
newspapers during the 1920s such as the Dortmund Generalanzeiger. He worked 
throughout the Nazi period as a sports reporter for various newspapers and then as an 
economics reporter for the Reichsrundfunk before being drafted into military service in 
1944.  He returned to work for the Reichsrundfunk in 1945, but subsequently fled to the 
Soviet side with the aid of contacts in the Committee for a Free Germany.  He then 
became a department head for Berliner Rundfunk, but was dismissed from the Soviet 
backed station under suspicion of “western tendencies” in 1947.  He then came to work 
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for RIAS.  Despite his past ties to the communists and Soviets, he would quickly gain the 
reputation of being a militant anticommunist through his commentaries.131   
 Although the station was firmly opposed to the SED, it did not openly favor either 
the SPD or the CDU.  It nevertheless forged close ties with the West Berlin municipal 
government.  Upon becoming director, William Heimlich established a liason between 
RIAS and Ernst Reuter, who subsequently presented a Sunday commentary every two 
weeks on the station.132  Reuter worked closely with the station, and although he had 
been critical of the broadcaster during its early years, he eventually praised the station as 
a critical part of Berlin’s cultural and political landscape.133  While the station worked 
closely with the local Berlin government, it was not a social democratic institution nor 
did it ever become one, despite claims made by Heimlich years later.134  Indeed, while 
many of its reporters were either men associated with the political left (such as Eberhard 
Schütz) or would become prominent social democrats (such as Egon Bahr), others were 
conservative in their political outlook.  However, this did not mean that reporters’ politics 
necessarily dominated their broadcasts.  On December 5, 1948, for example, Victor 
Klages commented on the recent municipal elections and praised individuals for 
voting.135  Yet, in his diary weeks later he admonished the voters as “idiots” and 
complained that they had “voted for Marxists of another form.”136  This frustration with 
the voters did not emerge in his broadcasts. 
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RIAS commentaries attacked the Soviet Union’s chief claim to legitimacy: that it 
was the leader of the socialist and progressive world.  Instead, RIAS depicted it as 
another incarnation of totalitarianism, completely uninterested in the true interests of the 
people of Germany, Eastern Europe, and communist ideology.  Its leaders were 
opportunists and lacked a true concern for the welfare of its people.  Soviet claims were 
contrasted with Soviet actions as a means of undermining Soviet and SED credibility.  
For commentators such as Victor Klages, the Soviet Union was no different than the 
National Socialist state.  On February 13, 1949 Klages stated this clearly when he 
asserted that, “Totalitarian states are alike, with the possible exception that one egg is 
dressed in brown and the other is dressed in red.”137  Both states secured power through 
terror, brutally eliminated their enemies, used concentration camps, and had secret police.  
Both veiled their dictatorial rule in the language of legality.  Just as Hitler claimed to 
“appoint” ministers, so too, did officials in the SBZ.138  The Germans living in the SBZ 
were just as powerless as they were under twelve years of Nazi rule.   
A memo from Berlin Information Services chief Charles Lewis dated September 
9, 1948, illustrates the dramatic change that RIAS’s reporting had undergone in the past 
year.  In it, Lewis recommended to the Chief of the OMGUS Radio Branch, Gordon 
Textor, that, “Opportunity should be made to repeat in the news events which illustrate 
SED and SMA responsibility for disruption of functions by the daily elected government 
for the whole city of Berlin.”139  It was important for RIAS reporters to stress that Berlin 
was not a local issue, but one of international importance and that the defense of Berlin 
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was crucial to the survival of freedom in other areas.  It was not enough that reports 
present factual information however.  Reporters needed to “give reality to the struggle 
here,” by presenting on site reports that would better illustrate the events and 
circumstances in the city.140  It is interesting to compare this memo to the Berlin 
Information Service Branch memo from September 1946 (also written by Lewis) 
instructing RIAS to present a fair and balanced approach to the SPD-KPD merger.  RIAS 
remained dedicated to presenting accurate information.  However, the station’s selection 
of stories, its style of presentation (live, on the scene reporting) and the perspective of its 
commentaries were all aimed to attack the legitimacy of the Soviet position and 
undermine the broadcasts of rival stations.   
The RIAS broadcast commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of Lenin’s 
death illustrates this point and also shows how closely the station monitored Berliner 
Rundfunk and based many of its broadcasts on those of its rival.  To commemorate the 
anniversary, Berliner Rundfunk broadcast an excerpt from Beethoven’s Appassionata 
Sonata for Piano, followed by a quote from the Soviet leader: “I know nothing more 
beautiful than the Appassionata and I could listen to it every day. Wonderful, immortal 
music.  I always think, with perhaps a naïve childish pride:  How can man create such 
wonders!”141  Forty-five minutes later, RIAS broadcast an almost identical program, also 
with an excerpt from the sonata.  However, this time RIAS completed the quote, noting 
that Berliner Rundfunk had edited it:  
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But I can’t listen to music too often.  It affects my nerves, 
and makes me want to say sweet nothings and stroke the 
heads of men who live in a dirty hell and can still create 
such beauty.  But these days you can’t go around stroking 
people’s heads lest your hand be bitten off.  You have to 
smash them over the head—smash without mercy, even 
though in theory we are against every form of oppression of 
mankind, Hm…Ours is a hellish task.142   
 
The RIAS program then went on to note that of Lenin’s five pallbearers, four (Kamenev, 
Zinoviev, Bukharin, Pjatakov) were shot on orders of the fifth, (Stalin), a man who was, 
according to Leinin, unsuited for leadership. 
In many of his commentaries, Victor Klages depicted the Russian people 
themselves as victims of the Soviet Union.  In an October 18, 1948 report on the United 
Nations, Klages noted it was not the Russian people who were represented in the General 
Assembly but their oppressors.143  He then touched on Russia’s revolutionary past, noting 
that the Bolsheviks, despite claims to the contrary, could not claim any involvement in 
the revolution of March 1917.  Their seizure of power in November 1917 was not a 
revolution but a “conspiracy.”144  On the anniversary of the October Revolution in 1948, 
Klages declared, “November 7 is the most tragic day in Russian history.”145  He 
continued to criticize the communist claims that the Bolsheviks were responsible for the 
Russian revolution, pointing out that when the March Revolution of 1917 occurred, Lenin 
was in Switzerland and Trotsky was in the United States.146  Rather than come to power 
by a mass movement, Lenin had seized it, and then dismissed all moderate and socialist 
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ministers, even though far more voters had elected socialists to serve in the constituent 
assembly.147   
Official US Military Broadcasts also stressed the theme that the Soviets were not 
true friends of the working class.  In June 2, 1949, OMGUS broadcast a commentary on 
all of its stations in Germany discussing a rail workers strike in East Berlin.  The 
commentary asserted that, despite Soviet claims to be friends of labor, the striking rail 
workers had been labeled saboteurs and were immediately fired upon by police forces in 
the SBZ.  This act of repression, coupled with the SED’s refusal to back the 
Deutschmark, stemmed from the party’s need to insure complete control over the workers 
of East Berlin.  Despite their claims, neither the SED nor the Soviets were concerned 
about workers’ rights.148 
RIAS also responded to the support given to Henry Wallace by Berliner 
Rundfunk and other SBZ media organs.  In May 1948, Klages noted that, “A man like 
Wallace could simply not exist in the Soviet Union.  He would be sitting in a 
concentration camp in the distant east or, like so many discontented Russians, he would 
be muzzled and unknown.”149  Thus, Klages argued, despite claims that the big political 
parties and capitalists were stifling Wallace’s voice, he was still permitted to openly 
criticize the Truman administration.  In 1948, with a policy of renewed repression being 
implemented by the Stalin regime in the Soviet Union, critics like Wallace could not 
exist.  Again, Klages aimed to stress the discrepancy between Soviet claims and rhetoric 
with their actual actions. 
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For many of its listeners, RIAS’s focus on the discrepancies in the Soviet Union’s 
policy towards German soldiers captured during World War II must have had particular 
resonance.  On December 20 1948, January 4, 1949 and January 11, 1949, Eugen 
Hartmann broadcast commentaries reminding listeners that despite Soviet promises to 
release prisoners by the end of 1948, there was no sign that they would be returning 
home.  He touched on listener’s sympathies, stressing they were incarcerated contrary to 
international agreements and noted that they were in, “forced labor camps,” rather than 
Prisoner of War camps.150  On January 4, Hartmann told listeners that evidence indicated 
some 2 million soldiers remained in camps in the Soviet Union.  On January 3, 1949, 
Klages broadcast a commentary on the topic of Soviet dictatorship.  During the course of 
the broadcast, speaking about political prisoners in the Soviet Union, Klages noted that 
there were nine million Russians, two million Czechs and Poles, “and also two million 
Germans in Soviet Concentration camps.”151  Although Klages does not refer to those 
incarcerated as prisoners of war, the figure of two million, used earlier that week by 
Hartmann, indicates that Klages was most likely referring to POWs.  Thus, former 
soldiers were given the same status as prisoners from those states invaded and occupied 
by the German army: Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Russia.  All were equal victims of 
Soviet Communism.   
As historians such as Robert Moeller have demonstrated, the fate of German 
soldiers captured on the Eastern Front was of paramount concern for Germans after the 
war.152  In an indication of the importance radio stations held for Berliners during this 
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period, many wrote to Berliner Rundfunk for answers.  In May 1947 alone, more letters 
sent to the station concerned prisoners of war than actual programming.  Of the 4,994 
letters received, station officials reviewed 1,273.  The most pressing concern of most of 
them was food and housing, with 232 and 223 of the letters concerning nutrition and 
provisions respectively.  The third most popular topic was prisoners of war, addressed in 
141 of the letters.  134 concerned employment, and 109 concerned “returning home” and 
“refugees.”  More letters concerned nutrition, housing, and the prisoner of war issue than 
what was actually being broadcast on station programs (135 letters).153  One letter writer 
asked the station why all of the POWs held in the United States had been allowed to 
return, but not those in the Soviet Union.154  Another writer asked simply for a list of 
those still alive in camps.155  Another listener asked why, if Berliner Rundfunk was so 
interested in promoting the livelihood and education of German youths, they showed so 
little concern for German youths still in prisoner of war camps.156 Another simply asked 
for some kind of mail, having received no word from her loved one since the summer of 
1946.157 
The POW issue was a difficult one for the German communists in the SBZ.  The 
Soviet leadership was slow to reveal information about soldiers still in camps, and 
although it was clearly a concern of the German populace, the SED was unable and 
unwilling to confront the Soviets about the issue.  Hence, RIAS saw a weakness in the 
SED’s inability to assert its authority.  In a March 1949 broadcast, Klages noted that 
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only, “dependable anti-fascists” were permitted to return because the SED knew that the 
return of all German prisoners of war from the Soviet Union would unleash a wave of 
anti-communist propaganda from the soldiers.158  By broadcasting commentaries on the 
lack of information about POWs and also noting that the Soviets were constantly 
reneging on their promises to release the soldiers, the station was clearly exploiting 
discrepancies in both Berliner Rundfunk’s broadcasts and public statements made by the 
SED and the Soviet leadership in Germany. 
Like Berliner Rundfunk, RIAS could often be too optimistic and try and depict an 
obvious setback as a victory.  It was an approach criticized by listeners.  An example was 
a commentary by Victor Klages discussing the communist coup in Czechoslovakia. On 
February 25, 1948, communists under the leadership of Klement Gottwald seized control 
of the Czechoslovak Government.  Shortly after, Czech foreign minister Jan Masaryk was 
found dead under mysterious circumstances.  The event increased the divide between the 
United States and Soviets and convinced many socialists and liberals that communist 
claims to want to share leadership in Eastern Europe were false.  It was also perceived by 
many as a blow to constitutional and democratic government in Eastern Europe.159  
However, Klages interpreted it as a sign of weakness on the part of the communists, 
arguing that the Czechoslovak communists were aware of their weaknesses and 
concluded that the violent seizure of power was the recourse of a desperate movement.160  
The Czechoslovaks would not be so easily beaten according to Klages (this was 
broadcast before Masaryk died on March 10).  The communists lived in fear that the full 
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truth of their actions and goals would be discovered, and that people of Czechoslovakia 
would demand their democratic rights.  The same situation, Klages contended, was 
happening in the SBZ.161  It was a highly optimistic appraisal of what was in reality a 
catastrophe for democracy in Czechoslovakia.   
In many ways, however, listeners preferred an honest appraisal of the situation 
rather than overly optimistic reports that proved false.  In a listeners meeting held by the 
US Military Government in December 1948 to discuss RIAS reports on the final division 
of the Berlin government into western and eastern halves, listeners complained about 
overly optimistic broadcasts.162  In particular, they noted that depicting Soviet victories as 
communist setbacks reminded them too much of Goebbel’s propaganda.  The tone of 
both letters to the station and listener meetings reveal a population fearful of the Soviets 
and concerned about allied resolve to maintain their position in Berlin, not one confident 
in Soviet and communist defeat.163 As an OMGUS survey of public opinion between July 
1948 and January 1949 indicated, many Berliners felt that the Americans needed to do 
more to relieve the city, with about 30 percent feeling not enough was being done in 
contrast to under 10 percent in the rest of the American occupation zone.164  
Consequently, honesty was better appreciated in a period of high tension.  Thus, for 
example, broadcasts were often skeptical, such as when talk abounded that the Berlin 
blockade would be lifted.  During the first two weeks of May, RIAS broadcast several 
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commentaries cautioning listeners not to get the hopes up about a lifting of the blockade, 
noting previous moments when the Soviets had backtracked.165  
RIAS’s staff often faced the challenge of how critical to be of allied policy and 
the United States.  The station and US Military Government was not entirely uncritical, 
such as in a US Military Broadcast sent on March 3, 1949 in which it was acknowledged 
that US attempts to purchase and redistribute large estates to small farmers throughout its 
occupation zone had, up to that point, been largely unsuccessful.166  However, a debate 
between US Information officers in December of 1948 revealed the limits to which the 
US would present self-criticism.  In December 1948 a memo was sent to the Information 
Control Division suggesting US stations broadcast stories about a US government report 
concerning US education policies that also contained admissions of low enrollment, low 
graduation rates, and overcrowding.  In a memorandum from December 9, 1948 on the 
report, Heimlich wrote to the US Berlin Commander, Frank Howley, “Granted that these 
figures may be correct, their use in Europe would immediately be distorted to the 
advantage of Soviet propaganda instruments.”167  Howley concurred, and a memo sent to 
Gordon Textor, commander of information policy through the US Occupation Zone, 
noted that, “The purpose of our support of RIAS is not to discuss American weaknesses 
but to put emphasis upon our strong points.”168  Textor concurred, but then pointed out 
that, “We are grinding out anti-Soviet material in all forms and to the extent that recently 
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we have been criticized all over the Zone for overdoing it, to the exclusion of other types 
of information in which perhaps the Germans in the Zone are more interested.”169  Textor 
expressed frustration with both Howley and Heimlich, as well as weariness with the 
overwhelming volume of anti-communist press and broadcasts.   
As can be seen from an overview of RIAS’s broadcasts, the anti-communist tone 
must have been overwhelming.  The vast majority of news commentaries broadcast 
during 1948-1949 were focused on discrediting Soviet claims and the Soviet system, to 
the exclusion of other stories.  Thus, while RIAS’s staff made a concerted effort to 
provide accurate reports, its selection of stories was designed to undermine the Soviet 
Union.  
Listeners were appreciative, however, as indicated in numerous letters sent to the 
station throughout the blockade.  Whereas before 1947 Berliner Rundfunk effectively 
held a monopoly on broadcasting, by 1949 some 90% of Berliners were claiming RIAS 
as their favorite station.170  The correspondence with RIAS is a fascinating means of 
examining how RIAS went from being just a purveyor of news and information into a 
quasi-US embassy, a representative of the United States in East Germany.  Many of the 
letters do not address programming, but were used by their writers as means of 
expressing their frustration with the SED and the lack of resources.  A woman from 
Saxony asked her sister in a letter from August 28, 1948 to visit RIAS and tell them “how 
we are clinging in our desperate situation to the news broadcast by them.  They know of 
our situation which is unworthy of human beings, and they alone can inform the world of 
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our sufferings.  How long will it last yet?”171  On July 19, a woman from Magdeburg 
complained about malnutrition and commented on how she looked at the Western Zones 
with envy.172  Letter writers often used the opportunity to correspond with RIAS as a 
means to condemn the Soviets.  In these cases, old Nazi attitudes often came to forefront.  
In a letter dated July 15, 1948, one writer declared, “We Germans are indignant at the 
mean actions of the hodgepodge of Asiatic peoples such as Tatars, Mongols, ect.  without 
our being able to offer resistance. And with shame we see that the three ‘Great Powers’ 
fear the Russian dictator and don’t check him.”173  The writer went on to state that the 
three Western Allies should expel the “Bolshevist power” from Germany, and that if 
Germans were given the necessary weapons, “…no Russian would be in Germany or 
would disturb the world. ”174  Another writer, who declared that it was better to die by 
“atomic bombs” rather than Russian oppression, echoed this same hatred of the Soviets.  
“Piek, Grotewohl, and followers have to be exterminated for they are the worst enemies 
of the people. ”175 The writer went on to declare that, “If the Russians were human they 
could have proved it in East Prussia…They are as lions and tigers delighted with the 
blood of mankind.”176   
Such attitudes, stemming from years of National Socialist anti-Bolshevist 
propaganda, coupled with the memory of the brutal Soviet occupation during the months 
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immediately after the war, were not uncommon.177  Other writers also offered their 
services to help Berlin, though certainly not in such a belligerent manner or tone.  On 
August 30, 1948 a writer noted her sadness at the state of the Reichstag building.  She 
summarily sent RIAS a letter offering the services of both herself and her 13-year old son 
to help rebuild the structure.178  On July 26, 1948 a listener wrote asking if he could 
volunteer to help the airlift efforts.  Describing himself as a “seventy-five percent 
disabled former police-officer,” he nevertheless promised to do the best he could to 
help.179  In other cases, writers sent letters expressing their thanks for the airlift.  When 
the station announced the death of pilots in accidents related to the airlift, writers sent 
letters expressing their thanks and condolences and asked RIAS to forward their letters to 
the appropriate authorities.  On July 25, 1948 a mother wrote, “Just now I heard that 
another American airplane has crashed.  Deeply moved I think of the victims and ask you 
to deliver the condolence of millions of Berliners to the American authorities.  When my 
15-year old son heard the terrible news the tears rushed to his eyes—and he is no 
weakling indeed.”180  RIAS was neither in charge of the airlift or responsible for 
reconstruction efforts in Berlin.  Yet, the fact that letter writers treated RIAS as a conduit 
to the authorities responsible for these efforts reveals that many saw RIAS as more than a 
radio station.  It was a two-way channel from which individuals could hear the voice of 
the United States and through which listeners could direct their concerns directly to 
American officials.  
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As the blockade was lifted in May 1949181, and the situation in Berlin stabilized, 
RIAS underwent a number of personnel changes as the US government transferred 
control of the station from the military to the High Commission for Germany under John 
McCloy.  The change led to the dismissal of most of the more ardent anti-communist 
broadcasting officials: Heimlich, Eugen Hartmann, and the satirist S.S. Varady.  A 
memo, presumably by Heimlich, criticized the action by arguing that, “This action can 
only indicate to the Berlin population that RIAS is to turn back to the innocuous non-
fighting station which it was prior to February 1948 when Heimlich took it over upon the 
direction of General Clay and General Howley.”182 The official reports at the time 
attributed the need for change to mismanagement and the simple fact that Heimlich was 
spending money he had not been sanctioned to spend. 183  The RIAS staff had also been 
granted programming freedom, “to such a degree that political and other programming 
decisions were made almost entirely by the German staff.”  The RIAS staff was not 
receiving political guidelines from US Military Government officials. Berlin Radio Chief 
Charles Lewis concluded that the staff was not working efficiently, programs were 
uncoordinated, and a more efficient operation needed to be implemented.184  Thus, just a 
month before Heinz Schmidt at Berliner Rundfunk was dismissed, his counterpart at 
RIAS was replaced, though for very different reasons.   
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 The political circumstances of the emerging Cold War forced both Berliner 
Rundfunk and RIAS to make compromises with basic founding principles.  For Berliner 
Rundfunk, it meant turning from the broad goal of forging an antifascist coalition and 
focusing much more of its airtime on engaging and criticizing the media of the Western 
Allies.  The failure of the blockade and the increasing popularity of RIAS led the SED 
leadership to replace the station’s leadership.  Coming the same month as the creation of 
the German Democratic Republic, the dismissals began a process of ideological 
centralization at the station.  Over the course of the next two years, most of the leading 
officials who had helped found Berliner Rundfunk were removed from their positions as 
the SED placed control over radio in the GDR under the State Committee for Radio.  The 
loss of most of the professional broadcast journalists to emigration and denunciations 
required the creation of specialized Radio Schools in 1950 to train reporters in Marxist-
Leninist theory and further strengthen the ideological character of radio in the GDR.185  
Thus, the events of the Berlin blockade sped up the process of centralization under SED 
administrative and ideological control. 
 Neither Berliner Rundfunk nor RIAS presented a completely balanced view of the 
causes of Germany’s division and the blockade.  RIAS downplayed the US’s own 
decision to break with the Soviets over governing Germany as a unified unit.  The 
station’s reporters’ also underestimated how much Marxist-Leninist ideology influenced 
the worldview of the Soviet leaders.  Thus, they failed to acknowledge the impact that 
measures such as the Marshall Plan and Deutschmark would have on Soviet perceptions.  
                                                 





Its reporters’ tendency to interpret events such as the 1948 Prague Coup and division of 
Berlin as evidence of Soviet weakness also rang false with many listeners.  Yet, RIAS 
was accurate in its reports about the blockade and airlift.  Stalin’s decision to blockade 
Berlin was certainly an act of aggression.  The blockade also threatened the stability of 
the Berlin economy.  RIAS was also correct when it reported that the suppression of 
democracy and establishment of communist satellites in Eastern Europe contradicted the 
Soviet’s claims that it represented democracy and justice.  Likewise, the Soviet promise 
to release German POWs, frequently made and broken, was evidence that Soviet words 
and claims could not be trusted. 
 While it simplified and misrepresented American policies as a wish to create an 
imperialist-capitalist dominion over Western Europe, Berliner Rundfunk was not 
incorrect when it argued that the Marshall Plan and introduction of the Deutschmark were 
neither benign nor altruistic.  Both policies were based primarily on preserving the 
fundamental foreign political and economic interests of the United States.  The Marshall 
Plan, while it helped rebuild the European economy, was also deployed to undermine 
communism’s attractiveness.  Thus, the Marshall Plan was as much an anti-communist 
measure as it was an economic one.  Yet, Berliner Rundfunk failed to acknowledge the 
fact that Europe’s democratically elected leaders accepted the Marshall Plan aid and 
joined the NATO alliance out of fear of Soviet encroachments.  Furthermore, while 
Western Europe quickly coalesced into an alliance led by the United States, it was not 
transformed into an American dominion, but remained a constellation of independent, 





 For RIAS, the blockade saw the station abandon its goal of neutrality in favor of 
overt anti-communism.  Both German and American officials saw it as a means of 
defending the fragile political order in West Berlin.  By the summer of 1949 however, it 
was clear that the immediate threat to liberal democracy in West Berlin had subsided.  
Heimlich’s dismissal in 1949 must be seen in this context.  With the emergency over, 
Heimlich’s lack of oversight over programming and weak management skills were seen 
as a liability.  Despite his dismissal, RIAS remained an active critic of the SED, Soviets, 
and German Democratic Republic.  The far more conciliatory Fred Taylor and Gordon 
Ewing replaced the combative and confrontational Heimlich.  At the same time, with 
West Berlin’s status as a free enclave of West Germany secure, the station shifted its 
programming to undermining the political order in East Germany. 
The Berlin blockade and airlift was a watershed moment.  The blockade 
strengthened RIAS’s position as the principle source for news and information for East 
Germans.  Its reporting of the Berlin airlift not only served to bolster the morale of West 
Berliners, but also solidified the station’s reputation for providing accurate news 
broadcasts.  This had as much to do with Berliner Rundfunk’s own reports as it did with 
RIAS’s.  With each day that West Berlin remained under blockade, Berliner Rundfunk’s 
prognosis for Western survival rang more and more false.  Despite Berliner Rundfunk’s 
June 1948 prophesies of failure and war, the Allies successfully provisioned the city 
without starting World War III.  The planes did not carry bombs but flour and coal.  At 
the same time, RIAS made sure to exploit the Soviets’ unkept promises, such as when it 
focused a number of broadcasts on the failure of the USSR to release German POWs in 





POWs to return and also by predicting that the airlift would succeed and West Berlin 
remain free, RIAS considerably strengthened its credibility.  It was not just that RIAS 
promoted and reinforced listeners’ worldviews and political attitudes.  As noted, the 
airlift had worked.  The Allies had not started a Third World War.  The Western half of 
the city remained free of Soviet control.  These facts could not be disputed. Thus, RIAS 
was able to strengthen its position as a reliable source for information due to its approach 
to reporting as well as to the deficiencies and failures of its rival broadcasters. 
The events of the blockade were also critical to defining the political 
programming of both RIAS and Berliner Rundfunk.  The major themes, assertions, and 
motifs deployed by both stations during the conflict over the blockade would recur 
throughout the 1950s.  The events of the blockade also established the basic principles 
guiding both broadcasters.  Berliner Rundfunk’s primary focus would be to present news 
stories in such a way that they would support the arguments of the SED and help build 
socialism in East Germany.  RIAS’s new goal was to serve the East German populace as 
a rival station to the GDR’s broadcasters.  Although the station styled itself as an 
objective, factual alternative to the GDR’s radio stations, it nevertheless devoted itself to 















The early 1950s were a period of considerable institutional transition for Berlin’s 
radio stations.  The end of the Berlin blockade and founding of two German states 
sparked a period of consolidation and transformation with regards to broadcasting.  At the 
same time, important continuities remained between broadcasting during the late 1940s 
and throughout the 1950s.  In West Berlin, RIAS continued to style itself as a broadcaster 
serving the interests of both the people of Berlin and the German Democratic Republic.  
The combative style of Heimlich’s RIAS management was replaced by a more moderate 
style of leadership that continued to encourage American-German cooperation but also 
aimed to undermine the GDR.  In East Germany itself, the SED embarked upon a process 
by which it centralized all broadcasting operations under a State Radio Committee.  At 
the same time, Marxist-Leninist ideology became the primary guiding principle behind 
both news reporting and the training of journalists.  A further important change for Berlin 
radio was the founding of Sender Freies Berlin in 1954 as the first independent, West 
Berlin based public broadcaster in the city. 
All of these changes affected broadcast journalism in the city.  This chapter 
explores the development of different models of journalism and means engagement at 
Berlin’s radio stations during the 1950s.  It also considers the major institutional 
developments that influenced both how each station operated and informed its approach 





stemmed from guiding principles laid down during the occupation period, dominated 
broadcast reporting throughout the 1950s, until the construction of the Berlin Wall in 
1961.  The chapter will explore three major subjects.  First, I will examine how RIAS, 
journalists and commentators developed a systematic approach to news broadcasting that 
stressed the need to balance objective reporting with the need to actively use broadcasts 
to disrupt and undermine the German Democratic Republic and drive a wedge between 
the ruling SED and East German people.  As I will show, for RIAS’s staff “objective” did 
not only mean accurate, but also connoted a style of presentation.  Through its reports, 
RIAS hoped to transform itself into a rival fourth estate for the East German people that 
would attack the hegemony of the GDR’s information organs.  Second, I will examine the 
development and creation of Sender Freies Berlin.  By examining the debates 
surrounding the station’s creation, I will not only examine how SFB tried to establish 
itself as a voice for the people of West Berlin Third, but I will also compare its position 
in West Berlin to that of RIAS.  Finally, I will consider how reporters in the GDR 
became ideological fighters dedicated to promoting and defending the major tenets of 
Marxist-Leninist ideology.  The SED and StRK encouraged active engagement and 
openly subjective, pro-communist reporting that would agitate the masses and undermine 
RIAS’s credibility.  In the course of this chapter I will consider both the institutional 
transformation of the GDR’s broadcasters as well as consider how the SED trained and 
prepared reporters capable of presenting a Marxist-Leninist worldview to its listeners.  
 






 RIAS’s goals remained consistent throughout the 1950s.  According to a United 
States Information Agency report from 1958, its purpose was to transmit the policy of the 
United States to the inhabitants of East Germany, to maintain the morale of the East 
German population, and to remind East Germans that they have not been forgotten by the 
west.  It was to, “maintain in the East Germans a critical judgment and questioning 
attitude which will assist them in giving proper balance to and making proper 
comparisons between, the ideologies of the East and the policies, aims and aspirations of 
the West.”1  RIAS’s goal was not just to present American viewpoints and information to 
East German listeners, but to actively encourage critical thinking and a critical attitude 
within the populace of the GDR.  These goals determined the nature of character of RIAS 
political broadcasts. 
In 1973, a member of the station’s political department, Frederick Noppert, wrote 
in a history of the station:  “From the very first day, news broadcasts were the most 
important information transmitted by RIAS.  It still remains so today.”2  A RIAS 
organization plan from 1950 helps us understand this importance.  Four American 
officials appointed by the US government supervised all RIAS operations: a Director, a 
Director of Programming and Production, a Deputy Director, and a Comptroller.  Like 
other German radio stations, there were three central departments: technical, 
programming, and administration.  However, importantly, political programming at 
RIAS was under the authority of the Deputy Director and Political Director and not the 
programming director.  Thus, while the program director (who was German) had 
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authority over cultural broadcasts, music, and entertainment programming, he or she did 
not have authority over political broadcasting.  The political programming department 
was divided into five sections: a current affairs, domestic politics and economic issues, 
news a department for freelance commentators, and a department responsible for the 
western broadcasting (“Sendestelle West”).3  While news and commentary were the 
responsibility of a diverse number of individuals, both American and German, RIAS 
directors considered it necessary to draw a clear distinction between political 
programming and the rest of RIAS’s programs.   
Between 1949 and 1961, five individuals served as RIAS Directors: Frederick G. 
Taylor (1949-1953), Gordon A. Ewing (1953-1957), Laurence P. Dalcher (1957-1959), 
Alexander Klieforth (1959-1961), and Robert Lochner (1961-1968).  The most influential 
of these during the 1950s was Gordon Ewing.  Ewing had been RIAS’s political director 
and deputy director since 1949.  Finding the work interesting, he retained his duties in the 
political department even after becoming Director of the station in 1953.4  As Political 
Director from 1949-1957, he was responsible for guiding the station’s political 
programming during an eight year period that saw Stalin’s death in 1953, the East 
German Uprising of June 17, 1953, Khruschev’s Secret Speech and Destalinization, the 
Suez Canal Crisis, and the Hungarian Uprising.  Like his two predecessors, William 
Heimlich and Fred Taylor, Ewing had been a student in Germany during the 1930s, 
attending the University of Kiel in 1931.  During the occupation of Germany, he worked 
with the Cultural Administration in Wiesbaden and then as an editor for the American 
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sponsored newspaper, Neue Zeitung.5  In May of 1949, just as the Berlin blockade was 
lifted, the ICD assigned him to work as political director for RIAS.  Ewing enjoyed great 
popularity as RIAS director.  RIAS Journalist Peter Schultz recalled that he was, “the 
very model of the American gentlemen, tall, slender, musical and literary, always well 
dressed, amiable, and confident on the social and diplomatic dance floor.”6  His 
management style was cautionary and moderate.  Throughout the numerous crises of the 
1950s, Ewing demonstrated a good understanding of the tensions and anxieties that 
affected German politics in Berlin during the early Cold War.  Furthermore, he was 
keenly aware of how East German and Soviet officials perceived RIAS’s broadcasts. 
The working atmosphere at RIAS during these years was extremely harmonious, 
and many reporters have reflected on how collegial German-American cooperation was 
years after the fact.7  Both reporters Jürgen Graf and Peter Schultze recalled this 
collegiality years later, with Peter Schultze noting that the America-German relationship 
created a distinct spirit of experimentation and freedom in terms of broadcasting and 
reporting.  Reporters, Schultze declared, were treated as journalists and not as civil 
servants.8  Egon Bahr, RIAS’s Bonn Bureau Chief, also remembered the good working 
environment at the station, and noted that many of his colleagues at other German 
broadcasters envied the interpretive freedom RIAS afforded him and his fellow 
reporters.9   
RIAS’s German reporters included both journalists who had joined the station at 
the very beginning in 1945-46, such as Jürgen Graf, Gerhard Löwenthal, Victor Klages, 
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Hans Herz, and Peter Schultze, and several reporters who entered the station’s service 
during the latter months of the Berlin blockade.  Notable amongst these was Eberhard 
Schütz, RIAS’s Program Director during the early 1950s.  Unlike many of his coworkers, 
Schütz had extensive experience in international broadcasting and also had a history of 
committed involvement in politics.  Born in 1911, he became affiliated with the German 
Communist Party during the Nazi Period, working as head of the Party’s Propaganda 
section for Frankfurt.  He was a committed anti-Nazi, and it was this factor more than 
anything else that motivated his decision to join the Communists.  After Hitler’s seizure 
of power, Schütz fled to Paris and eventually went to the Soviet Union where he taught 
German.  However, Schütz became disillusioned with the Soviets as a result of the Great 
Purges and was arrested by the NKVD.  After staging a hunger strike, the Soviets 
deported him to Germany.  He immediately fled to Paris and then to London in 1938.  
Schütz experience made him a valuable resource for the British Broadcasting 
Corporation, and he worked as a radio commentator for the BBC’s German Service 
during the Second World War.   He returned to Germany with the British Occupation 
Authorities, where he worked for both the British sponsored Northwest German Radio 
(NWDR) and the American sponsored radio station in Stuttgart.10  In November 1949 he 
became a commentator and editor for RIAS Berlin.11 
Schütz’s background stands out amongst RIAS reporters.  Not only did he have 
experience in political broadcasting, but had also been an active participant in anti-Nazi 
and anti-communist political movements.  His was an outlook and political worldview 
shaped from experiences living in Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, and wartime Britain.  
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Most of his colleagues, in contrast, were either young and inexperienced upon entering 
work at the station, (Jürgen Graf, Peter Schultz, Egon Bahr, Hans-Peter Herz, Mathias 
Walden) or older, more experienced journalists who had no open political affiliation 
(Victor Klages) or were forced out of their positions due to the Nazi’s racial laws (such as 
Hans Herz).  Many had served as soldiers in the German military and many were simply 
seeking work following the end of the war in a Germany afflicted by economic 
deprivation and uncertainty.  Many of RIAS’s first reporters came to the broadcaster with 
little professional experience.  Three of these were Egon Bahr, Heinz Frentzel, and 
Mathias Walden.   All had served in the German military during World War II and all 
three were under thirty when they began work for the station: Bahr was 27, Frentzel was 
28, and Walden was 23.   
Egon Bahr was born in 1922 and served in the Wehrmacht from 1942 until 1944. 
Although trained in industry before being called to service, he embarked upon a career in 
journalism upon the end of the war, reporting for both Soviet and US licensed 
newspapers in Berlin, most notably Der Tagesspiegel.  In 1950, he left Der Tagesspeigel 
and began working for RIAS, becoming head of the station’s Bonn Bureau, where he 
reported on the parliamentary proceedings of the West German Bundestag.    During his 
time at RIAS, Bahr also became involved in the politics of West Berlin’s Social 
Democratic Party, and subsequently joined the party in 1956.  In 1960 he left RIAS to 
become press secretary for Willy Brandt, where he continued to maintain connections 
with both RIAS and SFB and even continued to present commentaries at both stations.  





played an important role in shaping Ostpolitik and the foreign policy of the SPD 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s.12 
Heinz Frentzel’s experiences before joining RIAS were similar to Bahr’s.  Born in 
1921, Frentzel had worked in publishing before serving in the Wehrmacht from 1941 
until 1945.  At the end of World War II, he moved to Thuringia where he found work in 
the Education Ministry.  While there he also worked as an editor for the Thüringer 
Landvolk and for Thuringia’s radio station.  Disillusion with the increased controls over 
journalism in the Soviet Zone led Frentzel and his family to move to the American Zone, 
despite an offer of 50,000 Marks from the Thuringian government to stay.  Upon moving 
to the American Zone he worked for Sueddeutsch Rundfunk and then, in 1949, was hired 
by RIAS.  He worked a RIAS for the next thirty years, providing foreign affairs 
commentary on all of the major events of the next three decades for RIAS listeners.13 
Mathias Walden, whose real name was Otto Baron von Sass, was born in 1927.  
During World War II he served in the Luftwaffe.  Upon the end of the war he began to 
work as an editor for Der Union, the official newspaper of the Christian Democratic 
Party in the Soviet Zone.  In 1950 he left the SBZ to work for RIAS, where he served as a 
commentator until 1956, when he moved to the newly created Berlin broadcaster Sender 
Freies Berlin.  He worked at SFB until 1964.14  Walden was a prominent member of West 
Germany’s community of journalists until his death in 1984 and was also a close friend 
and associate of publisher Axel Springer.  Throughout his career, he worked for Der 
Monat, Die Welt, and Die Welt am Sontag.  The Frankfurter Allgemeine, describing his 
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political outlook, wrote, “The profile of Walden’s opinions was clear and distinctive: a 
liberal conservative, who with his pen lobbied for the unity of the nation, for the freedom 
of Berlin, for reconciliation with the Jews, for the social market and with it won 
admiration and honors from admirers and detractors alike.”15 
Bahr, Frentzel, and Walden were all born in territory that either comprised part of 
East Germany (Thuringia, Saxony) or was partly occupied by the GDR (Berlin).  Thus, 
for all three, the territory and people that comprised East Germany was not another, 
foreign state or even another “Germany,” but was an integral part of their Germany and 
their homeland.  Evidence of this conviction can be seen in a US State Department memo 
in which one official noted that RIAS’s staff opposed placing the station under the 
direction of Radio Free Europe (RFE), the US broadcaster designed specifically for 
Eastern Europe.  Doing so, RIAS’s staff contended, would imply that the Eastern Zone 
was a Soviet satellite and not German territory under Soviet occupation.16  Reporters 
Jürgen Graf, Peter Schultze, Hans Peter-Herz, Roland Müllerburg, Gerhard Löwenthal, 
Erich Nieswandt, as well as Cultural Program Editor Friedrich Luft and Die Insulaner 
director Günter Neumann were all born in Berlin.  They all opposed the SED regime and 
the division of Germany.  They supported the alliance with the United States, and for the 
most part opposed those neutralist elements within Germany’s emerging postwar political 
culture that aimed to detach Germany from the western alliance and embrace a distinctive 
path that would be more amenable to reunification.  More than anything, for these men 
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(and they were predominantly men) the division of Germany was the critical problem of 
the day.  Thus, many RIAS reporters had a personnel interest in both opposing the 
German Democratic Republic and providing news to those Germans living behind the 
Iron Curtain.  For RIAS’s reporters, journalism was a task imbued with deep political and 
moral obligations that went beyond simply reporting events.  This personnel investment 
played a critical role in creating an atmosphere of cooperation between Germans and 
Americans. 
The US department responsible for overseeing RIAS’s operations changed 
numerous times.  From 1946-1949, it had been an institution of the OMGUS ICD.  RIAS 
was the only ICD station not to be placed under German control in 1949.  Instead, it 
became the official broadcaster of the United States High Commission for Germany 
(HICOG).17  In 1953, the Eisenhower administration created the United States 
Information Agency (USIA) to organize and coordinate the various US information 
campaigns directed against the Eastern Bloc.18  The USIA was responsible for 
coordinating US information efforts throughout the world.  Its creation represented a 
distinct shift in US psychological warfare, as the Eisenhower administration shifted from 
the containment of the Truman presidency to the more aggressive and confrontational 
policy of “roll back” that sought to actively encourage open opposition throughout the 
Eastern bloc.19   
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As will be seen, RIAS had been pursuing a policy of openly engaging and 
undermining the GDR years before the USIA was even created.  RIAS’s relationship with 
the USIA was a complex one that showed no clear lines of direction or implementation of 
policies.  RIAS had established its programming and reporting profiles years earlier 
during the Berlin Crisis of 1948-49.  The station’s success as well as logistical factors 
meant that its reporters and editors enjoyed considerable freedom from authorities based 
in the United States with regards to reporting and programming.  Many RIAS reporters 
have frequently commented on this independence.20  Ewing also noted that, while USIA 
input was welcomed, it was often kindly accepted but not implemented.21  As a news 
broadcaster, RIAS required the freedom to report news stories as they occurred without 
waiting for oversight approval from the USIS offices in Europe or the USIA in 
Washington.  Consequently, during events such as the June 17, 1953 uprising in the 
GDR, RIAS reporters were often forced to make on the spot reporting decisions.22  Yet, 
as Schanett Riller has shown, there was considerable synergy between what policies the 
USIA wished to pursue and how RIAS carried those policies out.  In nearly five hundred 
broadcasts sent during the 1950s, Riller notes, there was not a single example of USIA 
goals not being satisfied.23  In spite of the often spontaneous and on-the-spot decision 
making on the part of US directors and the freedom afforded to the station’s German 
staff, RIAS programs often demonstrated a remarkable adherence to overall US policy 
goals.  Much of this was certainly due to the USIA’s broadly defined goals of 
disseminating a favorable and positive image of the United States.  As long as RIAS 
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remained popular in East Germany and its reporters were committed to criticizing the 
SED regime, the USIA had little reason to interfere or micromanage the RIAS operation. 
RIAS styled itself as an objective radio station that was nevertheless not neutral.  
In an official report on the station written by HICOG in the early 1950s to provide a 
general overview and background of the station to interested parties, the author declared, 
“For [Germans in the Soviet Zone] RIAS constitutes the only major source which 
provides them with straight, unbiased and clean cut news.”24  In their recollections, 
reporters and officials frequently remarked upon the stress on accuracy advocated by the 
station leaders.  In 1981, Gordon Ewing remarked that, “we prided ourselves and we 
were justified in doing so, on straight news broadcasts.”25  The station’s Bonn Bureau 
Chief, Egon Bahr, also touched on this issue, noting, “Nothing that we sent could have a 
second, concealed meaning.”26  RIAS reporters understood that any sign that news had 
been fabricated would be detrimental to the station’s overall goals of winning the favor of 
German listeners.  As Ewing recalled, “Our whole existence was based upon our 
credibility with that big Soviet Zone audience.”27  Credibility was linked with accuracy.  
News stories could not be broadcast unless they appeared on at least two wire services or 
some other source.28   These included the Deutsche Nachrichtenagentur (DENA), 
Associated Press (AP), Deutscher Pressedienst (DPD), and Reuters.  The station also 
relied on other radio station reports and considered the BBC German language service 
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and VOA to be trustworthy sources of information.29  By the mid 1950s, the station had 
earned a reputation as an efficient, professional news organization.  A USIA official once 
commented, upon visiting the station, “ ‘Good heavens, that’s like sitting in on the New 
York Times editorial staff.”30 
News editors conferred daily with the American control officers and political 
officers.  Nearly all news was political in nature, “designed to inform and supplement the 
knowledge of the listener in the Soviet Zone.”31  News selection was based on the 
assumption that East Germans wanted to be primarily informed about world events.  The 
focus on international events showed a clear understanding of GDR listener concerns.  
Opinion surveys made by the GDR’s State Radio Committee (StRK) throughout the 
1950s demonstrated a clear belief amongst listeners that not enough airtime was being 
spent addressing international affairs and news outside of the GDR.32  Not only did 
accurate reporting set RIAS apart from East German stations, but it was also the station’s 
best defense against the attacks from those same stations.  Since the East German media 
could attack RIAS’s legitimacy if it broadcast inaccurate information, truthful reporting 
was not just a journalistic principle, but also a potent broadcasting technique that could 
be deployed to undermine the East German media and government. 
RIAS’s conception of political broadcasting is well synthesized in a USIA report 
drawn up in 1953.  Written by Ralph White of the agency’s research office, the USIA 
intended the memo for all USIA operations.  RIAS’s broadcasts nevertheless closely 
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followed its recommendations.  In his report, White declared that, “A sharp distinction 
should be made between objectivity, which we seek, and neutrality, which we do not 
seek—between distorting bias, which we try to avoid, and strength of conviction, which 
we take for granted in ourselves and frankly try to create in our listeners.”33  Here, as 
with RIAS’s broadcasts, objectivity does not mean impartiality and detachment, but 
accuracy and a wish to avoid actively distorting facts for political ends.  White’s 
recommended approach entailed two distinct techniques: scrupulous accuracy on the one 
hand and a commitment to a particular political viewpoint on the other.34  It required, in 
White’s words, the creation of a, “necessary but difficult combination of forcefulness and 
objectivity…”35 It was necessary for reports to be scrupulous and accurate.36  Important 
documents should not be ignored, even if they were problematic, for Soviet and 
Communist media most likely had access to a similar document.  Stations needed to 
avoid sweeping statements.  As White noted, “People often like the feeling that they are 
drawing conclusions directly from the facts, without having these conclusions pushed in 
their faces.”37   
 However, this style of journalism went beyond simply reporting accurate facts.  
Another important element was a sincere commitment on the part of reporters to their 
material.  “No speaker or writer should be asked to say or write anything that he believes 
to be even an exaggeration of the truth.”38  White considered silence on a particular issue 
preferable to insincerity.  Genuine interest in the audience’s viewpoints, culture, and 
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traditions on the part of reporters was also a critical element.  As White warned, “A 
listeners’ feeling that he is being merely manipulated—that he is looked upon merely as a 
means to the propagandist’s ends, and not also as an end in himself—is an important 
element in his readiness to apply the label “propaganda;” and if the feeling of respect is to 
be conveyed it must be real.”39  Style of presentation was as critical as content.   
 Reporters also needed to present their stories with frankness and honesty.  In 
comparison to Soviet propaganda, White contended, American broadcasts needed to 
avoid a black-and-white picture of the world.  Nuance and candor, he argued, were more 
effective means for winning the loyalty of listeners.  White argued that this needed to be 
expressed in a very selective use of concessions that refuted or qualified the arguments 
being made by American media outlets.  While the primary US goal of fostering support 
for collective security against the Soviets could not be conceded, minor points and 
arguments could be acknowledged as long as they did not harm this primary goal.40  
Overall, White proposed that an “atmosphere of objectivity” needed to be created through 
US broadcasts.  As he concluded, “The crucial factors in creating an atmosphere of 
objectivity are intangibles which cannot be confined in any formula: the ring of sincerity, 
genuine respect for and psychological contact with the audience….and the kind of 
empirical attitude which shows itself in cautious, balanced statements of fact.”41 
White’s report was drawn up to address perceived deficiencies in a number of 
USIA operations, mostly those directed at western, non-communist states.  Yet, the 
model of journalism White proposed in 1953 had been developed and institutionalized by 
RIAS by 1948.  It had been pursuing this mix of objectivity and accuracy coupled with 
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sincerity and engagement through both its news and commentaries since the Berlin 
blockade.  A letter sent from RIAS News director Hanns Schwartz to Program Director 
Eberhard Schütz in 1953 provides a good illustration of some of the concerns and 
challenges facing RIAS’s news staff and the need to balance accuracy with engagement.  
Throughout, Schwarz presented a number of guidelines intended to improve RIAS’s 
news programming and insure that news reports were accurate.42  Critically, Schwartz 
was concerned that reports not only be accurate, but sound accurate and objective.  
Schwarz wrote, “I undertook my task half a year ago of improving our news by cleaning 
its language and formulate radio news along objective lines.”43  Among Schwartz’s 
recommendation was that direct citations should only be used in exceptional cases, such 
as when someone used words that were, “especially meaningful or especially 
grotesque.”44  Whenever a reporter directly quoted a statement, it was critical that he 
precede it with phrases that indicated the words were not those of the reporter.  Here, 
Schwarz touched on the critical difference between radio news and printed news: one 
could not see quotation marks in a radio broadcast.  Failing to elaborate on who said what 
threatened to cloud the distinction between speaker and source and imply that RIAS itself 
was making the declaration. 
Throughout, Schwarz also cautioned news broadcasters about the dangers of 
indirect citation and excessive description.  Schwarz wrote, “For the purposes of 
objectivity, description and quotations using indirect language should not be 
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intermingled.”45  Indirect citations needed to make sure they used the subjunctive I form 
of conjugation.  Unlike English, German uses a verb conjugation known as Subjunctive I 
(Der Konjunktiv) to indicate when someone other than the speaker or writer has said 
something.  Thus, Schwarz cautioned speakers to use the word “sei” instead of “ist.”  
Both mean “is.”  Thus, even though in English there is no other way to conjugate the 
word “to be” in the sentence, “Adenauer said, he will work until the EVG is created,” 
(italics mine), in German, a distinction can be made.  As Schwarz wrote: 
 
 
…also nicht: Adenauer sagte, er werde solange arbeiten bis 
die EVG geschaffen ist,  
sondern bis die EVG geschaffen sei.46 
 
 
Consequently, speakers needed to draw clear distinctions between their words and the 
words and declarations of their subjects.  
To illustrate the problems with excessive description, Schwarz presented the 
following sentence: 
 
Based on communications of the Chancellor, based on the 
words of the Chancellor, based on the intention of the 
Chancellor, Germany will be reunited tomorrow.  The 
Chancellor turned towards the question of German unity 
and disclosed that, based on his information tomorrow, it 
will be reunited…he named the coming Friday as the day 
for the reunification.47 
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The previous sentence, due to its excessive use of description, clouded the meaning of the 
sentence, and implied that the Chancellor had set a specific date for Germany’s 
reunification.  To further illustrate the problem, Schwarz presented a series of weaker 
sentences: 
 
Ollenhauer demands the renunciation of the EVG. 
 
This phrasing, Schwarz contended, failed to provide adequate distinction between 
commentary and news.  So did the second possibility: 
 
 
  Ollenhauer demands a renunciation of the obsolete EVG. 
 
This sentence implied that it was common, accepted knowledge that the European 
Defense Community was “obsolete.”  Instead, Schwarz recommended the sentence:  
 
Ollenhauer demands a renunciation of the EVG, which he described as 
obsolete.48   
 
The preferred sentence distinguished RIAS’s report from Ollenhauer’s opinion.   
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 Interestingly, Schwarz made a special note on “quotations from Eastern Men” 
(“Eastern” referring to leaders in both East Germany and the Communist Bloc).  “When I 
directly or indirectly quote people from the East, I cannot expect my listeners to believe 
that these “Ostmenschen” utilize our terminology for their area and public facilities.”49  
In this regard, Schwarz was referring to RIAS’s refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of 
the GDR.  The station always used terms such as “Soviet Zone” or “Pankow Authorities” 
or “Pankow Regime.”50  Likewise, Schwarz continued, it was unlikely that Zhou en Lai 
described his country as “Red China.”  Implying that East German and Chinese leaders 
called their governments “the Pankow authorities” and “Red China” would ring false to 
RIAS listeners, thus threatening credibility.  To solve this problem, Schwarz 
recommended, “In the cases of Grotewohl and Zhou Enlai one can respectively say: 
….declared, their governments would.”51  Another alternative was: “Based on 
Grotewohl’s message, the Pankower authorities want to implement action.”52  As with 
Schwarz’s other recommendations, this sentence demonstrates a clear distinction between 
Grotewohl’s declaration and the language deployed by RIAS news editors and speakers 
to describe Communist Bloc regimes. 
 Schwarz letter reveals an important characteristic of RIAS’s news broadcasts.  It 
was not enough that broadcasts were accurate.  They needed to sound accurate and 
objective and present a sense of personal detachment.  News language needed to be clear 
and straightforward, drawing understandable boundaries between reporters’ own 
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declarations (and hence, RIAS’s declarations) and quotations of subjects (the topics of 
RIAS’s reports).  The selection of specific words, terms, and phrases was a painstaking 
process, with great political implications attached to each decision.  Critically, Schwarz 
stressed the need to treat radio as an oral medium that was heard and not read.  The RIAS 
news director argued that it was imperative for RIAS reporters to speak in a clear, 
succinct, understandable language that left no doubt in the listeners’ minds who said what 
and when.  
 One can see these rules displayed (and the accompanying balance between 
accuracy and partisanship) in most RIAS news broadcasts, especially those concerning 
the German Democratic Republic.  For example, when the North Korean army invaded 
South Korea in June of 1950, RIAS’s initial report on the attack presenting a basic 
overview of the events, and made sure to explicitly note the source for the story: 
 
This morning, the Communist Government of North Korea 
has officially declared war against the South Korean 
Republic.  Communist troops, supported by tanks and 
artillery, have penetrated several points in South Korea.  
According to a dispatch from the Associated Press, the 
Deputy Prime Minister of South Korea has requested 
military support from the United States.  At the request of 
the United States, the United Nations Security Council will 
convene at 7:00pm to discuss the situation in Korea.53 
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When, in March 1952, Stalin delivered his note proposing German reunification to the 
Western Allies, RIAS reported the factual details about the proposition.  When it 
broadcast doubts about the note, it made sure to attribute the criticism to a particular 
source.  Thus, while it was likely that RIAS’s staff found Stalin’s proposal dubious, it 
nevertheless made sure to back up their doubts with other sources.  Thus, in a news 
broadcast from March 11, 1952, the RIAS reporter noted: “According to a commentary 
from the Basler Nationalzeitung, the appearances of a generous offer falls into the 
background, if one is aware of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy in the last seven 
years.”54  Thus, while RIAS freely broadcast the criticisms of individuals like Ernst 
Reuter and the French Foreign Ministry, it made sure to attribute the quotations and 
observations and not make it seem as if RIAS endorsed these beliefs. 
However, even in its official news reports RIAS made sure to undermine the 
legitimacy of the GDR and its political culture.  For example, in an October 15, 1950 
broadcast on elections in East Germany, RIAS reported:  
 
In the Soviet occupation zone in Germany, so-called 
(sogenannten) peoples’ elections organized by the peoples’ 
democracy for the National Front began early today around 
8:00.  The Soviet licensed newspapers described this day as 
a ‘National Holiday of the Nation’ and a ‘Festival for the 
People.’55   
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In this brief passage, the RIAS broadcast took every opportunity to undermine the East 
German state.  It was “the Soviet occupation zone in Germany.”  The report described the 
elections as “so-called peoples’ elections.”  And even though RIAS made sure to note its 
source, it used the phrase “Soviet licensed newspapers” to describe the GDR’s press.  At 
the same time, however, the report also went into specific detail about the election 
procedure, noting that: 
 
According to previous reports from the Eastern Zone, 
voters receive a ballot with a list of candidates, stamped 
with the words “For Peace and the Five Year Plan.”  It has 
been reported that in different locations, neither ballots nor 
pencils are available.  The ballots are handed over to 
officials, who place them in the ballot boxes themselves.  




The report, most likely based on anonymous East German sources providing RIAS with 
information (“it has been reported”), demonstrated a clear wish to provide listeners with 
specific detail and information.  It also acknowledged that its sources were limited due to 
the fact that no outside observers were permitted in the GDR to monitor the votes.  At the 
same time, RIAS did not ignore the East German press, and repeated the GDR news 
service ADN’s claim that individuals were marching lock step to the polls in a festive 
mood.  While it did not lend credence to these reports, it nevertheless stressed that it was 
listening to and monitoring the East German press. 
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The goal of producing accurate broadcasts, while grounded in the principle that 
journalism should be objective, reflected a stance that eschewed neutrality in favor of 
open confrontation with East Germany’s media organs and the SED.  RIAS aimed to 
insinuate itself as a political actor in East German political culture and create a rival 
fourth estate for the German Democratic Republic.  As Alexis de Tocqueville and Jürgen 
Habermas have both argued, a free and independent press is a critical means for 
establishing an open public sphere.57  In large democratic states, the press stands as a 
mediator and purveyor of information.  However, both Hambermas and Tocqueville were 
speaking of the role of a free press in a “democratic” public sphere.  In contrast, RIAS 
hoped to create a rival public sphere within a dictatorship.  By connecting East Germans 
to one another through its broadcasts, RIAS hoped to do exactly what the SED wanted its 
radio stations to do: organize the citizens of East Germany and promote a particular 
political worldview.  
The most notable means of doing this were programs designed specifically for 
GDR audiences, such as Werktag der Zone, (Workday in the Zone), Berlin spricht zur 
Zone, (Berlin speaks to the Zone) Aus der Zone, für die Zone (From the Zone, to the 
Zone), and Sendung für die Landbevölkerung, (Broadcasts for the Rural Population).  
One of the most popular of these, Werktag der Zone, began broadcasting in 1951 and was 
aimed specifically at the working classes of East Germany.  Broadcasting just after 5 in 
the morning, the show gave workers a chance to hear news about working conditions in 
East Germany as they prepared for a day’s work.  The program broadcast information on 
social laws and benefits, problems with wages and wage levels, statistics related to the 
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labor market, and social justice.  The programs included news broadcasts, commentaries, 
and live interviews.58  Other programs operated on a similar principle: to provide an 
alternative viewpoint from the broadcasts of the East German media on conditions in the 
GDR.59 
The goal behind Werktag der Zone, and similar programming reveals a critical 
component of RIAS’s programming.  The station criticized the SED by advocating 
workers’ rights.  The purpose was to attack the SED’s chief claim to legitimacy: that it 
was the only German political movement that could claim the right to interpret and 
understand the principles of Marxism and workers’ rights.  RIAS thus continued to utilize 
an argumentation that it had developed during the Berlin blockade: East Germany was a 
totalitarian state whose supposed Marxism was merely a veil masking its true purpose: to 
increase the power of its leaders and, subsequently serve as a puppet of the Soviet Union. 
RIAS’s 1951 campaign against Collective Contracts in East Germany illustrates 
many of the elements of RIAS’s East German political broadcasting.  The Collective 
Contracts were one of several means deployed by the SED to centralize its authority.  
Throughout 1951, RIAS waged a campaign focused on disrupting the implementation of 
the contracts and subsequently gain a foothold amongst East German listeners.  In a 
report on the campaign, RIAS Political Director Gordon Ewing acknowledged that RIAS 
was aware from the start that it could not prevent the implementation of the contracts.  
However, he noted, RIAS could aid the people of East Germany to, “win a new sense of 
solidarity against the rule of the Socialist Unity Party (SED)…”60 Assessing the 
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campaign’s success, Ewing concluded that, “a radio station made, perhaps for the first 
time in the cold war—a systematic, calculated, prolonged effort to give practical aid to a 
large group of oppressed people battling only with their wits on an issue sharply defined 
in time and content.”61  Facing an isolated population unable to organize or assert itself 
against the SED regime and its media monopoly, RIAS’s goal was to act as a guiding 
voice.  As Ewing commented, the campaign could disrupt the GDR in a number of ways: 
 
But the people of the Zone, aided by RIAS, nevertheless 
had much to gain: they might greatly delay the 
deterioration of their working and livings standards; they 
could win a new sense of solidarity against the rule of the 
Socialist Unity Party (SED), as the Communist party is 
called in the Soviet Zone; they might cause the SED 
difficulties with the Soviets, and the Soviets a renunciation 
of some sort of the hoped-for increase in reparations from 
current production.62   
 
 
Thus, RIAS was not just interested in providing East Germans with information on wage 
and working conditions in East Germany.  It sought to provoke political change.  The 
hoped for change was modest and there is no indication that RIAS aimed to provoke a 
revolt or somehow topple the East German government.  Yet, there was a firm conviction 
that radio broadcasting could both affect life in East Germany and harm relations 
between the SED and Soviet Union.  This last point was important, for RIAS was not 
only interested in driving a wedge between the SED and East Germans, but also in 
isolating the SED from Soviet Union. 
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The campaign against the contracts focused on three goals: informing listeners 
about when the contracts would be implemented, provide analysis that would reveal those 
provisions in the contracts that would be disadvantageous, and finally “expose the 
regime’s real purpose in introducing the contracts and the consequences for the 
workers.”63  Broadcasts focused on the true aim of the SED contracts: to isolate and 
control the workers in the GDR as part of the general goal of centralization and 
Stalinization.  As Ewing reported, “We had to supplant the lack of a local free press.  
That is, we had to gather and disseminate as much news as possible about the nature of 
the contracts in various works in order to break down the isolation of the many worker 
groups.”64    If an employee achieved a victory against the GDR at one plant, Ewing 
noted that it was RIAS’s responsibility to insure that “all other plants in the Zone were 
informed.”65  Combating the isolation inherent to totalitarian societies, RIAS aimed to 
construct an “imagined community” of East Germans, a community that could challenge 
the national and socialist consensus that the SED hoped to create.66 
At the same time, these broadcasts attempted to resurrect the German traditions of 
democratic, trade union politics that had been destroyed by the Nazis and suppressed by 
the SED.  Rather than deploy the language of right-wing anticommunism, with its roots 
in Nazi era anti-Bolshevism, RIAS embraced the ideas of workers’ rights, solidarity, and 
unionism.  For example, the station granted West German union leaders such as Gerard 
Haas of the Deutsche Gewerkschaftbund (DGB) airtime on Berlin spricht zur Zone, so 
that he could describe working conditions and the nature of workers’ rights in the Federal 
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Republic.  In his report, Ewing noted, perhaps ironically, “The dangers of workers 
solidarity were well known to the Communists, of course.”67  As Ewing reminded his 
readers, “We believed that it was important to show (a) that we had no intention of siding 
with former Nazis just because they opposed the Communists, and (b) that the West was 
not deceived by the Communists’ play on undesirable social elements.”68  The station 
presented the argument that the SED were not true Marxists, that it deliberately distorted 
Marxist ideology for its own ends, and that it was a puppet of the Soviet Union.  An 
example of this was heard on a broadcast of Berlin spricht zur Zone, sent in September 
1951 in response to a speech made by Deputy Free German Union Alliance (FDGB) 
Chairman Kirchner.  In the course of the broadcast, the speaker declared: “The fight over 
the collective contracts really is a class struggle…Let us ask ourselves what the classes 
are today.  They are the exploited and the exploiters.”69  Thus, RIAS attempted to turn the 
SED’s interpretation of Marxism on its head by transforming the SED into the exploiter 
class.  The broadcast then closed by stating: 
 
‘ ‘The proletarians’ labor, through the use of machinery and 
the division of labor, has lost all independent character and 
therefore all interest for the worker.  He has become a mere 
attachment to the machine.  The costs created by the 
worker are limited almost entirely to the cost of 
nourishment necessary to maintain him and procreate his 
kind.  To the same degree that the repulsiveness of work 
increases the pay decreases.  Moreover, to the same degree 
in which the use of machinery and the division of labor 
increase, the amount of work increases, whether through 
extension of the hours of work, the amount of output 
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If these words sound familiar, it is because they were not written by any of RIAS’s 
reporters.  As the program speaker noted in closing, “Well, Herr Kirchner, these last four 
sentences were not written by us.  Their author was Karl Marx…Herr Kirchner, while he 
was in the Soviet Union, forgot how to read the Communist Manifesto correctly and 
apply it to present conditions…”71 RIAS utilized a line of argumentation it had been 
using since 1948: namely attacking the SED’s claim that it was the sole interpreter of 
Marxist Ideology. 
 This approach belonged to a distinctive form of anti-communism that had been 
developed by SPD leaders such as Ernst Reuter, Kurt Schumacher, and Willy Brandt.  
Both Reuter and Brandt in particular had stressed that the SED did not have the 
monopoly on Marxist interpretation, and that the SPD was both a democratic and a 
Marxist political party.72  It was an anti-communism that was distinct both from the 
Nazi’s anti-bolshevism as well as the anti-communist rhetoric of Christian Democratic 
Leader and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.  Thus, one can see that RIAS in 
many ways belonged within the West Berlin political milieu of anti-communist social 
democracy. 
 RIAS also exploited the Soviet Union’s dominance of the East German 
government.  On the May 19, 1951 broadcast of Werktag der Zone, the commentator 
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declared, “You keep asking yourselves: Why this ruthless exploitation of the labor 
forces?  Why isn’t the raising of norms accompanied by better provisions for the 
workers?  You must understand this: The entire industry of the Soviet Zone is undergoing 
a basic change, at Moscow’s demand.”73  The Soviet government, RIAS contended, was 
forcing East Germany to become an industrial state, despite the fact that Germany’s 
industrial centers had traditionally been the Ruhr.  Further compounding the foolishness 
of the Soviet’s plans was that its occupation authorities had already dismantled and 
plundered what industrial capacity East Germany actually had.74  Drawing on memories 
of the industrial and material requisitions during the Soviet occupation of Germany, 
RIAS emphasized that the SED was nothing more than pawns of the Soviet Union.  RIAS 
argued that workers were forced to enter into collective contracts not to protect and 
guarantee their rights but to serve the exploitive foreign policy of the Soviet Union. 
 Critically, RIAS’s broadcasts had an effect upon workers in the GDR.  In April 
1951, the FDGB attempted to convince workers to take Sunday shifts to make up for low 
rates of production.  RIAS encouraged workers to resist.  On April 26, 1951, the SED 
organ Neues Deutschland reported that the FDGB (Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) 
had concluded that the extra shifts were no longer needed.75  While RIAS acknowledged 
that this resistance was not due solely to its broadcasts, it nevertheless considered it an 
important expression of radio’s effectiveness.  As Ewing wrote: 
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For the second time within six months, they [the workers] 
had forced the FDGB to make a public retreat.  For the 
second time within six months, they had won a clear-cut 
victory over their oppressors.  The psychological aspect of 
this triumph should not be under-estimated.  It portended a 
re-awakened self-consciousness that might—as we saw it 
in 1951—be important to the West.  It had demonstrated 
for the second time that within the limitations of passive 
resistance under Soviet Zone conditions, tangible successes 
could be achieved.76 
 
 
RIAS’s goals went beyond simply encouraging passive resistance.  Tangible results were 
critical.  But the station was also interested in a psychological factor.  Wrote Ewing: “It 
was RIAS’s task to make them conscious of the psychological and political aspects of 
their action.  Only if they understood these aspects could the victory be made to work for 
them on the major issues: the collective contracts.”77  In an April 27, 1951 broadcast, 
RIAS declared that, “ ‘The indisputable fact is that the government backed down before 
the workers.’”78  Thus, RIAS imparted significance to the workers’ actions.  Whatever 
the reasons behind the SED decision to abandon pursuing Sunday shifts, RIAS made a 
concerted effort to convince listeners that the workers’ passive resistance had been 
integral.  Throughout the remainder of the summer of 1951, RIAS stressed that each day 
the collective contracts’ implementation was delayed was evidence of the workers’ 
abilities to resist the orders of the SED.  Furthermore, as broadcast in Werktag der Zone 
in early July, the station implored listeners to, “ ‘…stay on the watch…Don’t let 
yourselves be split up into little groups that can easily be put under pressure.’ ”79 When 
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the contracts were finally imposed in July, Ewing pointed out that “All the expenditure of 
manpower to make it seem that the contracts were accepted by the workers had been 
useless.”80  By forcing the SED to impose the contracts, without popular consent, East 
German workers had achieved a seemingly small yet significant victory.   
 Ewing’s language here is reminiscent of the type of rhetoric broadcast by RIAS 
that bothered many listeners during the blockade: namely attempting to interpret SED 
policies as evidence of weakness and failure.  Yet, Ewing’s report clearly demonstrates 
that RIAS believed it had played an influential role in influencing the actions and 
attitudes of East Germans’ attitudes.  This opinion was emphasized in another report from 
Ewing to the US High Commission in Germany from 1952 that declared, “It is widely 
recognized in Germany that RIAS played the leading part in a major Communist set-back 
in 1951.81   
East German newspapers and SED Politbüro meeting minutes also reveal that the 
station was having an effect upon the East German populace.  The August 7, 1951 issue 
of Thüringer Volk specifically named RIAS as the source of arguments of class enemies 
and opponents of the collective contracts.82  On September 11, 1951, the official party 
organ Neues Deutschland reiterated these arguments, noting RIAS’s aspersions were the 
lies of the enemies of the German people.83  In a January 1952 meeting of the SED 
Politbüro, the listening to RIAS in East Germany was addressed as a critical issue that 
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needed to be confronted and dealt with immediately.84  While the meeting did not cite the 
collective contracts broadcasts specifically, it is almost certain that the station’s 
broadcasts during the Summer of 1951 were on many meeting participants’ minds as they 
discussed the “lies” and “aspersions” being broadcast by the enemy stations with aim of 
sabotaging the peaceful construction of the GDR.85  While it is impossible to ascertain 
what exact role RIAS played in individuals’ decision making when they chose to resist 
the collective contracts, it is important to note that both RIAS and the SED were firmly 
convinced that the station’s influence was decisive.  As Ewing concluded, “The point is 
that a small editorial staff equipped with a transmitter of sufficient power can put a huge 
Communist propaganda machine on the defensive.”86  As will be seen in Chapter Five, 
the SED propaganda machine strongly reacted to RIAS’s success. 
RIAS’s broadcasts linked accurate reporting with the principle of engagement.  
The tone of reporters during broadcasts of Werktag der Zone and Berlin spricht zur Zone 
was not that of a detached observer, but of a committed advocate of East German rights 
and freedoms.  RIAS styled itself as an active participant in East German politics as well 
as a partner and ally of the East German people sharing in the collective struggle against 
the SED and Soviet Union.   
 
From a Station in West Berlin to a West Berlin Station: The transformation of NWDR 
Berlin into Sender Freies Berlin 
 
                                                 
84 Anlage 4 zum Protokoll no. 87 vom Januar 15, 1952, BAB, Protokolle des Politbüro des Zentralkomitees SED, 
SAPMO, DY 30/ IV2/2/ 187. 
85 Ibid. 





The founding of Sender Freies Berlin in 1954 ended RIAS’s monopoly as West 
Berlin’s primary radio station.  The new station’s relationship with RIAS was a collegial 
rivalry in which personnel often left one station for the other while at the same time both 
stations shared important departments, most notably the music department.87  At the same 
time, SFB made a concerted effort to present a distinctive voice for West Berlin as the 
city’s sole, independent radio station.  Thus, the debates surrounding its creation and the 
station’s participation in the general political dialogue then taking place over Berlin’s 
airwaves merits our attention. 
Between 1945 and 1954, West Berlin had no radio station under German control.  
What would become Sender Freies Berlin (Radio Free Berlin) was originally the Berlin 
station house of Northwest German Radio (NWDR), the large West German station 
created by the British occupation authorities in 1945.88  Unlike RIAS, NWDR Berlin 
never enjoyed the full commitment of the British in terms of funding and support.  For 
the British and the German controllers who overtook the management of NWDR in 1948, 
the main purpose of the Berlin affiliate was to broadcast NWDR programs to Berlin and 
East Germany.  Since NWDR was created to provide programming for all of Germany, 
its Berlin programs lacked the local quality provided by RIAS.  During the blockade, a 
period in which Berlin was a particularly important topic, NWDR devoted about only 
17% of its programming to issues concerning the city.89  Consequently it was not as 
                                                 
87 In 1954, the RIAS Symphony Orchestra became the Berlin Radio Symphony.  It performs to this day as the Deutches 
Symphonie Orchester. 
88 Peter von Rüden and Hans-Ulrich Wagner ed., Die Geschichte des Nordwestdeutschen Rundfunks, (Hamburg: 
Hoffmann und Campe, 2005), 13-86 and Herbst, Demokratie und Maulkorb, 88-112.  
89 Anja Schäfers, “ ‘In Berlin war eben überhaupt nichts unpolitisch,’ Der NWDR-Berlin bis zur Gründung des SFB,” 





popular as RIAS.  As Anja Schäfers notes, “The NWDR General Directory wanted to 
support a broadcaster in Berlin, but not a Berlin Broadcaster.”90 
 Both HICOG and RIAS opposed the first proposals to create a West Berlin 
station.  The first, presented in 1950, proposed transforming the NWDR station house 
into a fairly autonomous affiliate called Deutscher Rundfunk Berlin (DRB).  However, 
the West Berlin Senate rejected the proposal since it meant the station would not be 
completely independent, but would remain an outlet of NWDR.91  Another proposal, 
from the same year, suggested using the city’s drahtfunk network (first used for RIAS 
broadcasts in 1946) to establish a small radio operation called Berliner Werbefunk.  The 
plan, sponsored by a local Social Democratic official named Willy Kressmann, lacked 
necessary financial resources.92  Furthermore, its pro-Social Democratic slant and lack of 
professional guidelines and resources troubled US officials.  As the US High 
Commission’s Radio Branch Chief, Hans Meyer, noted in a memo from June 29, 1950,  
 
According to the plans revealed by Herr Kressmann in his 
press conference the news coverage of the future Dratfunk 
organization would lack any basis of accurateness and 
reliability.  No realistic sources would be available and no 
responsible editing is intended.  Composing news 
broadcasts from such ill defined sources as ‘quotations 
from newspapers etc.’ opens the door for irresponsible 
reporting and untruthfulness: Attempts at competition with 
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In making his argument against the Berliner Werbefunk, Meyer focused on the 
journalistic principles promoted by RIAS: professional reporters and editors, accurate 
reporting, and the need to avoid sensationalism.  The last point was particularly pertinent 
to the situation in Berlin.  As Meyer noted: “There is no need to stress the dangers of 
such reporting in any political tense situation such as have been and will be recurrent in 
Berlin.  An irresponsible broadcasting organization might have done unmeasurable 
damage on such occasions as the great anti-blockade demonstration, the May day rallies 
or the FDJ meeting.”94  Meyer reiterated these concerns in a letter to HICOG’s Public 
Relations Branch, writing, “Communist activities in the East Sector and communist 
pressure from the East Zone are more than likely to create recurrent situations of danger 
and tension in the city.  Any irresponsible or sensationalist reporting over the radio may 
lead to incidents, panic or undesirable effects if and when such situation will reoccur.” 
Meyer went on to note that there was no way to guarantee that the reporting from the 
proposed station would match the standards and quality of NWDR or RIAS. 95 
The speed with which radio could deliver a report was of particular concern.  
While newspaper stories could be retracted, it was much more difficult to manage and 
refute a false piece of information being broadcast over the airwaves.  US High 
Commissioner John McCloy concurred.  In a letter written to Berlin Commandant 
General Maxwell Taylor from June 17, 1950, McCloy wrote, “It is strong view of Public 
Affairs, HICOG that continuing critical East-West complications make it imperative that 
Western Berlin broadcasting situation be under tight control, that no new operations be 
                                                 
94 Ibid. 
95 Memo from Hans B. Meyer to K.T. Downs, PuB HICOG, Berlin Elements, Radio Branch, ISD, PAO, HICOG, July 
17, 1950, NARA RG 466 (HICOG) Berlin Element Public Affairs Division Classified Subject Files 1949-1953, Entry 





encouraged or advanced pending further notice.”96  Consequently, the concerns about 
control of radio in West Berlin revolved around a fear that a lack of control could be 
manipulated by the Soviets or SED.  Both McCloy and Meyer demonstrated wariness 
with regards to what could and should be broadcast over radio airwaves in Berlin.  For 
both men, public and HICOG stations like NWDR and RIAS were better equipped, both 
in terms of finances and personal resources, to handle major stories.  RIAS reporters may 
have had considerable freedom and independence in what and how they chose to report.  
But this freedom was only possible, in the American’s eyes, as long as it existed within 
the framework of an adequately staffed and funded professional institution that could 
effectively and responsibly edit and check stories and prevent sensational broadcasts.  
Thus, the Berliner Werbefunk’s lack of an adequate institutional foundation was the 
principle reason for US opposition to the venture.  The Cold War continued to shape the 
development of broadcasting in the former capital city.   
If West Berlin was to have a radio station, it would have to be a public one under 
the oversight and management of the West Berlin municipal government.  Initially, the 
US and RIAS were opposed to this plan as well.  On July 11, 1950, RIAS’s Program 
Director Ruth Gambke (herself German) sent a detailed memo to Governing Mayor Ernst 
Reuter noting that another station in West Berlin would be superfluous.  For all intents 
and purposes, Gambke noted, the Intendants of West Germany’s radio stations 
considered RIAS the West Berlin broadcaster.  West Berliners respected the station for its 
programming aimed at students, unions, and its reporting on economic and political 
affairs.  700 of RIAS’s employees were Germans.  Just 4 were American.  The staff was a 
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German staff.  For all intents and purposes, Gambke asserted, RIAS was the station for 
West Berlin.  Gambke also noted that having the station under American control was 
highly advantageous to West Berlin.  Since RIAS was funded by the State Department, 
the city effectively had a public station without having to pay for it itself.  Most 
importantly, Gambke noted that much of RIAS’s popularity in the GDR was due to the 
fact that listeners felt that the force of the United States was behind it.  Because the US 
was the only power capable of confronting the Soviet Union and effecting any change in 
the Eastern Zone, RIAS broadcasts carried far greater weight than the broadcasts of a 
hypothetical independent West Berlin station.  RIAS was popular, affordable, and 
effective precisely because it was an American funded operation.97   
It should be remembered that RIAS and HICOG’s opposition to a Berlin 
broadcaster was not based on a desire to dominate West Berlin broadcasting and insure 
that West Germans had no voice.  Rather, the reluctance to support a private venture 
stemmed from the wish to insure a station remained under the control of individuals 
HICOG felt it could trust to report news accurately and responsibly.  In light of the 
situation in early Cold War Berlin, in which both East German and Soviet observers 
could interpret anything broadcast by Western stations as the official dictates of the 
Western governments, such a concern was not unfounded.  Thus, when the West Berlin 
Senate began making official proposals for a public station, RIAS began to look more 
favorably on the prospect of a new station.   
Despite US support however, the process of creating a West Berlin station was a 
long one.  This was due to a variety of factors, including opposition from NWDR, the 
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need to acquire a suitable wavelength for broadcasting, and finding adequate means for 
financing the project.98  Since NWDR Berlin had the necessary financial resources and 
facilities, the West Berlin government focused most of its plans on transferring the station 
house into what would become Sender Freies Berlin.  NWDR, however, was reluctant to 
give up its presence in Berlin, especially since this would reduce its ability to reach 
listeners in East Germany.  However, by the fall of 1953, the West Berlin Senate had 
succeeded in acquiring appropriate broadcast frequencies and a means of funding the 
station using West Berliner licensing fees.  On November 20, 1953, the West Berlin 
Senate finally passed a law creating Sender Freies Berlin.99  A year later, following 
months of negotiations between NWDR and other parties, SFB began broadcasting as the 
first independent West Berlin station. 
In terms of structure, SFB mirrored West Germany’s other public stations.  The 
November 20, 1953 law creating the station stated that the station could not be used as a 
“tool of a government, group, or an individual personality….”100 The Berlin Senate held 
only legal oversight responsibilities.  For all intents and purposes, SFB was an 
independent public broadcaster.101  As with stations like NWDR, the principle authority 
at SFB was an oversight panel made up of a Radio Council and an Administrative 
Council.  No member of the West Berlin government had the right to serve on either 
council.102  An Intendant, (who initially doubled as Programming Director), an 
economics director, and a technical director oversaw programming and day-to-day 
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operations.103  Two years later, in order to grant the Intendant more authority, the station 
was restructured so that the Intendant was the only chief executive.104  Beneath the 
Intendant was a Program Director responsible for overseeing station programming.  
Programming was in turn divided into departments for culture, politics, music, youth and 
education, radio plays, and entertainment.  These departments were similar to those at 
RIAS, with the notable exception that the political department was not separated from the 
other departments as at the American station. 
 Although SFB focused on West Berlin interests and concerns, its programming 
profile was not dramatically different from RIAS’s.  Like RIAS, SFB provided a wide 
variety of programs designed to serve both West German and East German listeners.  
These included Zwischen Gestern und Morgen (Between Today and Tomorrow), Hier 
spricht Berlin, Zur Politik der Gegenwart, Alte und Neue Heimat, and Unteilbares 
Deutschland.105  The station also attracted talent from RIAS, most notably Mathias 
Walden.  The RIAS commentator left the American station in 1956 to become a member 
of SFB’s foreign affairs department.  Though Walden noted to a confident that the 
decision was a difficult one, especially in light of the good working atmosphere at RIAS, 
Walden nevertheless made the decision to leave because SFB afforded him the chance to 
report on topics more suited to his personal interests and skills.106  Upon arriving at the 
station, however, Walden reflected at the lack of resources the West Berlin public 
broadcaster had in comparison to the American station.  Writing to a colleague, he noted, 
“Finally, you also have the standard of two competing Berlin stations—RIAS and SFB—
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and know which one ranks behind the other.  Marquardt from the News Department, who 
deserted RIAS a few months before me, reckoned, it was as if one had earlier worked 
with a hot water boiler and now each morning must rend before shaved wood.  But that 
alone is not decisive.  The technical limitations have not led me to regret my choice.”107 
A comparison of RIAS programming with that of SFB’s drawn up by SFB editor 
Rolf Menzel shows that both stations devoted equal airtime to news.  In 1956, roughly 
27% of RIAS airtime was devoted to political issues, compared to 28% at SFB.  The 
marked differences were in entertainment programming, with RIAS devoting roughly 
45% of its airtime to “Unterhaltung und Tanzmusik” (Entertainment and Dance Music), 
compared to 29% at SFB.  The greater amount of time devoted to spoken programming 
(50%, compared to RIAS 43%) troubled Menzel, who felt more time needed to be spent 
with musical programming.108  Using RIAS as the point of comparison revealed both a 
concern with what the other station presented as well as a high regard for the station’s 
broadcasts.  A comparison of news topics also indicates a common conception between 
the two stations concerning what stories needed to be addressed.  For example, a chart 
drawn up by SFB presenting all the news stories sent on April 9, 1957 indicated that both 
stations reported on the same topics: Great Britain and the Suez Canal, Soviet atomic 
testing, and political changes in Indonesia, disarmament, US aid to Saudi Arabia, and 
Iran.109   
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 Unlike RIAS, with its focus on the GDR, SFB’s creators, backers, and staff 
intended SFB to be a neutral broadcaster that would address the needs and interests of as 
wide a demographic as possible.  This approach was based on principles laid down since 
the late 1940s with the creation of NWDR and other German stations.110  A consequence 
of this decision was that many interest groups and individuals often felt SFB was not 
doing enough to address specific issues and problems.  Invariably, these objections often 
stemmed from the belief that SFB was not sufficiently anti-communist.  On September 5, 
1958 for example, the Swiss anticommunist newspaper, Die Weltwoche, accused SFB of 
ignoring East German issues, claimed it was not sufficiently anti-totalitarian, and charged 
that the West Berlin broadcaster was censoring its reports to avoid antagonizing the 
Soviet Union.111  The story’s writer, Martin Pfeideler, reiterated his arguments a month 
later in a letter to SFB, writing, “In this context, it is illuminating, that the editors utter 
Bolshevism (ante portas) in the same breath as Nazism (the comparative phantom).  And 
honestly: the anti-Nazi commentaries show boldness and verve, but not the anti-bolshevik 
commentaries.”112  Thus, Pfeideler believed that while SFB devoted considerable airtime 
to criticizing the Nazi Past, it failed to adequately confront the current totalitarian 
menace.   
SFB responded to the Weltwoche’s assertions on September 12, 1958.  The 
broadcast, given by Mathias Walden, shows us a great deal about how the station 
conceived political reporting.  First, Walden stressed the wide variety of programs for 
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East Germany.  Every day, the station devoted an hour and a half of programming aimed 
specifically at the population of the GDR.113  The station’s program, Unteilbares 
Deutschland (“Germany Indivisible”) was also broadcast weekly, as well as evening 
commentaries.  Walden noted, “More than 50% of SFB’s broadcast time allotted for 
politics—with the exception of news—and the current affairs programming—are 
reserved for contributions for listeners in the Zone.”114  On the assertion that SFB was not 
adequately “anti-Bolshevik” and wished to avoid conflict with totalitarianism, Walden 
responded that, “In fact, daily broadcasts demonstrate that SFB seeks out and maintains 
this debate.  Incidentally, SFB does not limit this debate only to Bolshevism, but rather 
feels obligated to expand the debate to all forms of totalitarianism, especially Nazism.”115  
SFB also asserted that it based its broadcasts on commonly accepted standards that 
balanced the personal opinions of commentators with facts.  Articles in the East German 
press, notably the papers of the SED, demonstrated the station’s effectiveness and its 
popularity amongst East German listeners.   
Two days earlier, SFB Chief Editor Rolf Menzel had also stated these arguments 
in a letter to the editor of Die Weltwoche, declaring the contention that SFB wished to 
avoid confrontations with totalitarianism as “grotesque.”116  To question SFB’s resolve 
on this point was to question its fundamental purpose of serving the people “in central 
Germany.” (“Mitteldeutschland”)  Menzel also touched on a challenge that RIAS faced: 
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how to work as an advocate of the East German people and oppose Communism without 
appearing to be a propaganda station.  As he noted: 
 
Incidentally, the central German population, which has 
been exposed to totalitarian propaganda for thirteen years 
twice over now, will not be served with patriotic slogans 
from a secure port.  They want factual reporting about 
world events, they want to hear the arguments, that are 
required in the grueling day-to-day struggle against the 
SED dictatorship, they want to remain aligned with the free 
West—which unfortunately often gives enough for self-
sufficiency.  The political editors of SFB and with them all 
of Sender Freies Berlin feel obligated to these goals.117 
 
 
Thus, like RIAS, SFB’s editors were keenly aware that presenting an open, polemical 
anti-communist position based on “anti-bolshevism” threatened to alienate East German 
listeners.  Credibility was far more effective, especially in light of the fact that so many 
listeners were cynical and mistrusting of overtly political broadcasts.  Menzel reiterated 
the belief that factual reporting was the most effective means of reaching listeners in the 
GDR.  Thus, if SFB’s broadcasts did not appear to be overtly anti-communist, they 
nevertheless were dedicated to undermining the GDR and forging a bond between East 
and West Germans. 
 The dispute with Weltwoche was a minor one.  It came, however, just months 
after a larger dispute involving the Berlin Federation of Expellees and the Federal 
Ministry for All-German Affairs.  The problem stemmed from SFB’s decision to cut the 
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broadcast time of one of its broadcasts Alte und Neue Heimat, a cultural-political program 
about the culture and society of those territories of western Poland that had once been a 
part of the German Reich.   
Producing a program about the territories ceded to Poland and about the German speakers 
expelled from those territories during the final months of World War II was a politically 
controversial one.  In a period where the West German government refused to recognize 
the legitimacy of the cession and referred to the territories as “regions under Polish 
administration,” speaking of an “old and new homeland” was in itself a politically 
charged topic.  In 1952, RIAS rejected a proposal from the Federal Ministry for All-
German Affairs to establish similar programming due to its politically charged nature.  In 
explaining RIAS’s decision to the Ministry, Program Director Eberhard Schütz touched 
on the politically charged atmosphere of Berlin as grounds for not presenting a program 
devoted specifically to either the ceded territories or the expellees themselves.118  While 
Schütz noted that issues such as the people, art, and music of the ceded territories were 
addressed in RIAS’s cultural and political programs, he nevertheless also expressed 
concern about how the proposed program could be misinterpreted by listeners in both the 
GDR and West Germany.  The various interest groups representing the expellees were 
also prone to dramatic and propagandistic statements.119 
 Perhaps in light of these concerns, the SFB’s program avoided overt political 
assertions.  Nevertheless, Alte und Neue Heimat was not an apolitical program.  Although 
the program never advocated the reacquisition of the lost territories, it did sympathize 
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with the difficulties faced by German communities that were expelled and those that 
continued to live on the other side of the Oder-Neisse Line.  The program referred to the 
lost territories as “German Areas under Polish Administration” and as “east Germany.”  
Predominantly, programs focused on the fading German cultural character of the 
territories of East Prussia and Silesia.  On April 24, 1957 for example, the program noted 
with dismay that although the Göttinger Arbeitskreis ostdeutscher Wissenschafter 
(Gottingen Study Group for East German Scholars) reckoned there were, “more than a 
million Germans currently still live in the Polish administered Oder-Neisse Region and in 
Peoples’ Poland,” only 60,000 were considered part of the German minority by the Polish 
government.120   The broadcast on September 28, 1957 noted the decline in German 
language schools in the region.121  Another program, broadcast on May 17, 1958, focused 
on a Westphalian who had opened a library devoted to the literature of “East” Germany 
in an attempt to preserve the cultural heritage of the ceded territories.122  Another, 
broadcast on April 19, 1958, examined how Polish bureaucrats used the term 
“Autochthon” rather than “German” to refer to the German speakers of its western 
regions in order to mask the German character of the area.123  A number of programs 
touched on the deterioration of German memorials and landmarks located throughout 
what was once East Prussia and Silesia.  During its February 15, 1958, the program noted 
that only 900 of the 2,000 cultural sites in the western regions of Poland were protected 
by landmark status.124  The broadcast stressed that this threatened the cultural heritage for 
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the region, and not just for the Germans who had lived there.  Of particular concern, 
however, was the Tannenberg monument erected to commemorate the German World 
War I victory over the Russian Army and destroyed at the end of World War II.  On 
November 16, 1957 a report chronicled the vain efforts of a Canadian journalist to find 
the site, only to come across the abandoned debris of the memorial.  The language of the 
journalist’s report is striking at points.  Speaking about one of the monument’s statues, 
the report declared, “The statue lies with its face in the rubble---a more symbolic 
situation is hardly imaginable.” The report also noted the gleeful reaction of a local Pole 
when asked about the significance of the memorial.  “ ‘The Germans lie finished!,’ And 
again, a grin appeared across his whole face.”125  The report clearly bemoaned the loss of 
the monument.   
 The same story touched on another theme that dominated many Alte und Neue 
Heimat broadcasts.  This was that the new borders were artificial constructs and the result 
of nearly half a century of population and border changes that disrupted the natural state 
of affairs in east-central Europe.  For example, the same November 16, 1958 story 
touching on the remains of the Tannenberg monument noted that many of the towns in 
East Prussia and Silesia such as Allenstein/Olsztyn and Neidenburg/Nidzica were still in 
ruins and depopulated, thirteen years after the end of World War II.126  In general, “Alte 
und Neue Heimat” sought to depict the expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Europe as 
part of a decades long process of deportations that had begun before World War I.  Thus, 
the role of the Nazis and the German minorities in helping to instigate the backlash that 
led to these expulsions in the immediate postwar period was downplayed in favor of 
                                                 






seeing the expellees as fellow victims of these deportations.  The opening of a broadcast 
from August 3, 1957 clearly illustrates this approach: 
 
The new national migrations of our time began in 1912 as 
the so-called Balkan War raged in South-Eastern Europe.  
But a harrowing number were undertaken at the beginning 
of the Second World War.  In the years of bloody conflict, 
22 million Europeans lost their homeland.  And after the 




The programs considered the German expellees victims of a broader process of migration 
and deportation.  This process even included mass emigration to the United States.  
Again, there was little consideration for the specific reasons for the deportations.  The 
broadcast then presented a broad overview of the different national groups that had been 
expelled or relocated over the past four decades.  These included 900,000 Greeks, Turks, 
and Bulgarians expelled from the Balkans during the Balkan War, 1.2 million Germans 
forced to leave territories lost through the Treaty of Versailles, 6 million people deported 
from European Russia to Siberia, 1 million Volksdeutsche forced to migrate to Hitler’s 
Greater Reich, nine million people from various European states conscripted as slave 
laborers in Germany during World War II, and thirteen million Germans expelled from 
western Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Hungary.  Incredibly, this long litany of 
expelled populations makes no mention of the six million Jews deported and murdered by 
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the Nazi government.  The closest the story gets is when it mentions 750,000 “Germans, 
Austrians, and Spanish” forced to flee their homelands because of political persecution.  
Not only did the description of the expulsions gloss over the specific historical factors 
that led to them, but it also failed to acknowledge the most descrutive and murderous of 
these expulsions.128   
 Alte und Neue Heimat focused on addressing as broad a demographic as possible, 
and presented a mixture of news and culture on the German communities that had once 
lived outside of the two Germanys.  Thus, the program was not only concerned with the 
expellees from East Prussia and Silesia, but also Germans that had lived in Hungary, the 
Ukraine, and Russia.  Despite this, organizations such as the Federation of Expellees 
looked upon the program as its show, as a program that represented its interests and 
concerns.  As can be seen, the program was highly sympathetic to the problems and 
concerns of the Germans expelled from western Poland.  It saw the region as still 
fundamentally German, and though it did not openly advocate the return of the territories 
to Germany, the program nevertheless expressed concern for the fading German cultural 
identity of the area.   
When SFB decided to curtail the show’s running time from 30 minutes to 15 
minutes in July 1958, it spurred uproar from the organizations and interest groups 
representing the expellees.  As with the dispute with Weltwoche, the debate illustrates the 
central tenets of SFB’s political programming.  On July 23, 1958 the Berlin State 
Federation of Expellees wrote a letter condemning the decision.  Reminding SFB that the 
Federation was one of the largest political groups in Berlin, the letter requested a personal 






meeting between the Federation and SFB Intendant Walter Geerdes.129  The move also 
elicited protests from the Association of Agriculture, the expellee newspapers 
Ostpreussenzeitung and Unser Schlesische Heimat, and two West German ministries.  On 
the programming cut, the head of the Association for Agriculture, Baron von Manteuffel-
Szoege, declared that if SFB, as the sole independent German station within the 
geographical area of East Germany, demonstrated an indifference to the topic by 
reducing the programming time, then it would be seen as a signal to other West German 
stations to curtail programming on the topic of expellees as well.130  Both the Minister for 
All German Affairs, Ernst Lammer and the Minister for Expellees, Refugees, and Those 
Affected by War, Theodor Oberländer, expressed regret at the prospect of a shortened 
program and beseeched Geerdes not to go through with the programming change.131  
Oberländer even suggested adding another half hour block of the program each week.132  
Far more critical were the expellee newspapers, especially the Ostpreussenzeitung, which 
declared on August 2, 1958 that “the German capital’s station has an unclear, fearful, 
crooked, cosmopolitan position with no line.  It bows to all sides, and above all makes 
sure not to anger the Kremlin!  But even that is done without conviction.”133  The paper 
went on to assert that, “It does not want to anger any listeners, and does not feel obligated 
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to any of them.”134  The station, critics asserted, feared angering the Soviets and thus 
aimed to pursue a course of weak neutrality. 
 By shortening the broadcast by fifteen minutes, SFB had opened itself to criticism 
from two federal ministries and several powerful lobbies and newspapers.  In one case, 
critics had claimed the station’s decision was evidence of its weak political convictions 
and its own fear of the Soviet Union.  Yet, SFB had neither canceled the broadcast nor 
shown signs that it wished to change the broadcast’s content, which, it should be noted, 
was strongly favorable to the interests and concerns of the German expellees to begin 
with.  Nevertheless, SFB’s response to all of these parties reinforced its mission as a 
public station focused on objectively serving a broad demographic.  In a letter written by 
SFB Program Director Rolf Menzel to Administration Committee Member Emil Dovifat, 
Menzel noted that the change was not politically driven, but simply the consequence of 
providing more time for other types of programs.  On the various groups pressuring SFB 
to reconsider its decision, Menzel noted that the program was aimed at a general audience 
and focused on a general topic.  It was not the program of a single lobbying group 
pursuing its own goals.135  Such groups, Menzel warned, threatened independent 
broadcasting in their attempts to shift broadcasting to serve extreme goals.  Geerdes 
expressed these sentiments himself in a response to the Berlin Federation of Expellees on 
August 20, noting that, “All of our broadcasts are construct so that they never address a 
single specific group, but rather that constructed to appeal to a greater selection of 
listeners.”136  Geerdes also used the opportunity to refuse the assertions made by the 
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various expellee newspapers.  In light of the constant criticism leveled at SFB by East 
Germany, Geerdes noted that to describe its reporters as too afraid to take a firm position 
against the Soviet Union was unfair and unjustified. 
 Both the disputes with Weltwoche and the various Expellee organizations touch 
on a number of similar themes.  First, there was the belief held by SFB’s critics that the 
station was too neutral and lacked the necessary conviction to represent West Berlin and 
West Germany in the Cold War.  Second, SFB defended its position by stressing its 
fundamental purpose of reading a broad number of listeners and its refusal to allow any 
group or critic pressure it to make programming changes.  Unlike RIAS, the station did 
not devote large areas of programming to undermining the Communist system in East 
Germany.  Nevertheless, the station remained a firm critic of the GDR, and as programs 
like Alte und Neue Heimat demonstrate, the station was firmly anti-Soviet.  In this regard, 
SFB’s anti-communism was expressed in programs stressing the unity of the German 
people, such as Unteilbar Deutschland and Alte und Neue Heimat.  Like RIAS, SFB 
walked a fine line between neutrality and engagement and eschewed anti-Soviet and anti-
Communist propaganda.  Thus, although SFB attempted to set itself apart from RIAS as a 
truly independent, German station, the two stations shared many mutual goals and 
challenges.   
 
 
The Transformation of Berliner Rundfunk and the Creation of Communist Broadcast 







 Throughout the 1950s, the broadcasting institutions of the German Democratic 
Republic were in a state of flux.  Between 1949 and 1952, the stations underwent a series 
of institutional changes.  The changes were part of a larger scale process designed to 
transform the media in the GDR into what Hermann Axen described as “the party’s 
sharpest weapon.”137  In a speech to the SED given in February 1950, Axen laid down the 
justification for the institutional and personnel changes: 
 
The majority of the party leadership underestimates the 
significance of the press as the party’s sharpest weapon.  
On the part of our circle of editors, this corresponds to the 
present underestimation of their duties and obligations as 
party functionaries.  Many of our editors have adopted, as 
we call it, an ideology of “pure journalism.”138 
 
 
Axen condemned so-called “pure” or professional journalists for adopting opportunistic 
bourgeois forms and hindering the transformation of the East German media into a “press 
of a new type.”  Up until that point, Axen commented, too many journalists had 
underestimated the potency of the media as a means of building socialism in the GDR.139  
Axen’s speech came just months following the dismissal of Heinz Schmidt from Berliner 
Rundfunk.  Following the dismissals of Schmidt, Bruno Bauer, and Leo Goldhammer in 
1949-50, Axen, along with Gerhart Eisler, and Kurt Heiss, led a movement towards 
placing GDR stations firmly along a socialist path.  Their prototypes were the highly 
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centralized broadcasting institutions of the Soviet Union.140  In order to achieve this, the 
SED undertook a series of purges that reduced the personnel strength of the GDR’s 
stations to a third of what it was in 1949.141  To quote historian Christoph Classen, a 
“climate of denunciation and mutual distrust” ruled the stations during the early 1950s.142   
 The most notable dismissal was Hans Mahle in 1952.  His removal as General 
Intendant of GDR radio represented a fundamental shift in the goals and aims of the SED 
and East German radio officials.  Unlike Schmidt, Bauer, and Goldhammer, who had all 
spent the war years in western countries, Mahle had spent the Nazi-period in Moscow 
with Ulbricht and had returned with the Ulbricht group in 1945.  He had also been the 
principle architect of radio in the GDR, a leading member of the DVV, and the first 
General Intendant of the GDR’s radio operations.  Despite these credentials, Mahle 
became the victim of the drive to shape the GDR into a Stalinist state.  Since he first 
became director of radio operations in the Soviet Zone, Mahle had pursued his goals in 
the spirit of the antifascist coalition.  Though an orthodox communist, he nevertheless 
was opposed to transforming the GDR’s radio stations into outlets for SED propaganda, 
feeling that the only way to compete with Western programming was to produce less 
ideologically defined radio programs.  He also strongly believed that radio needed to 
address all Germans, not just communists, and needed to be less partisan and openly 
favorable to the SED.  Perhaps most damning was his belief that Germany still needed to 
develop into a bourgeois democracy before it could embark upon the establishment of 
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full socialism.  Such an opinion was clearly at odds with the Stalinizing drive of Ulbricht 
and the SED.143  
 Goldhammer, Bauer, Schmidt, and Mahle were just four of the thousands of 
individuals either dismissed or purged from their positions in radio.  The grounds for 
dismissal were similar to those cited for Mahle and usually focused on western 
connections.  Many were removed because of their connections to Bauer and 
Goldhammer, inevitable considering the leading roles the two played with 
Deutschlandsender and Berliner Rundfunk.  The fact that Berliner Rundfunk’s studios 
were physically in West Berlin was also damning, for it meant that its studio workers 
could not help but have contact with the Western Sectors of the city.  Schmidt’s decision 
to import journalists from the Western Zones in 1947 was also attacked and described by 
Heiss as a “congenital defect.”144  Employees were condemned as spies working for the 
“anglo-american imperialists.”  The accusations were not only directed at officials in 
leadership positions or news editors.  Musicians were also targeted, most prominently the 
entire “Radio-Berlin-Tanzorchester,” which the SED considered a source for degenerate 
Americanism.  In 1950, Heiss ordered the orchestra’s dissolution.145   
 Accompanying the dismissals, the SED began to establish means to monitor and 
control both the radio stations and their operations.  In 1950, the newly created Ministry 
for State Security (Stasi) began to infiltrate the various stations with informers and agents 
to better monitor the broadcasting activities in the GDR.  The Stasi were able to employ 
informants in all areas of radio operations.  Along with Stasi agents, SED Party Cadres 
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were also given greater authority and influence over each of the GDR’s stations and day-
to-day operations, thus insuring both the continued dominance of the party over radio 
stations and that broadcasts presented the correct ideological interpretation of events.146     
 In September of 1952, the GDR dissolved its regional broadcasters and moved all 
radio operations to East Berlin.  Commenting on the change, the GDR’s Minister 
President Otto Grotewohl, declared that the, “new, great task of building the foundations 
of socialism in the German Democratic Republic make the raising of the political and 
cultural consciousness of the population necessary.”147  Radio was a critical instrument in 
achieving this goal.  Consequently, Grotewohl and the SED contended, it was necessary 
to centralize all radio operations in Berlin under a unified, collective administration.  The 
SED replaced East Germany’s various regional stations with the prosaically named 
stations Berlin I, Berlin II, and Berlin III.148  Each station was given a specific area of 
responsibility: Berlin I replaced Deutschlandsender as the station designed primarily for 
West German listeners.  Berlin II was directed at the cultural and political elites whereas 
Berlin III broadcast light entertainment and more popular programming.149   
The same month, the SED abolished the position of General Intendant.  Since the 
SED Department of Agitation had taken over most broadcasting responsibilities since 
Mahle’s dismissal, the post was effectively obsolete.  In line with the needs for collective 
leadership, the SED replaced the post with a State Radio Committee (StRK).150  The 
                                                 
146 Daniela Münkel, “Herrschaftspraxis im Rundfunk der SBZ/DDR: Anspruch—Sicherung—Grenzen,” in 
Radiozeiten; Herrschaft, Alltag, Gesellschaft 1924-1960, ed. Inge Marßolek and Adelheid von Saldern (Potsdam: 
Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 1999), 83-100. 
147 Verordnung über die Bildung des Staatlichen Rundfunkkomitees vom 14. August 1952 GBL 52/733, DRA Potsdam, 
Historisches Archiv, Büro des Komiteevorsitzenden, Geschäftsunterlagen, F094-00-00/0003. 
148 Münkel, “Produktionssphäre,” in Adelheid von Saldern and Inge Marßolek ed. Zuhören und Gehörtwerden II: 
Radio in der DDR der fünfziger Jahre zwischen Lenkung und Ablenkung, (Tübingen: edition discord, 1998), 138.  See 
as well Herbst, Demokratie und Maulkorb, 46 and Holzweißig, Die schärfste Waffe der Partei, 200-201.   
149 Münkel, “Produktionsspäre” 138-139, Classen, Faschismus und Antifaschismus, 218. 





thirteen-person committee was given control over all aspects of broadcasting in the 
German Democratic Republic.151  The makeup included members responsible for music, 
education, technical issues, television, cultural politics, West Germany, cadres, as well as 
the chief editors for Berlin I, II, and III.  The Committee directed all station operations 
and insured that they adhered to a Marxist-Leninist approach to the media.  At the same 
time, the committee was also responsible for insuring smooth operations and using all 
means to imbue “the spirit of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin” into the leadership.152   
The spirit of the broad anti-fascist coalition had given way to a clear declaration that 
Marxist-Leninist principles were to be the guiding doctrine for East German radio.  This 
change was further emphasized in April of 1953 when the GDR formally transformed the 
SED controlled ADN wire service into an official state institution.153  
 The reorganization did not last long:  Abolishing the local broadcasters had been 
an unpopular move, and many listeners complained in letters that they simply wanted to 
hear local news and local sports broadcast.154  In response, the StRK reorganized the 
station structures once again in 1956.  Local broadcasting was delegated to the newly 
created Radio DDR, a large broadcaster which also utilized smaller, regional station 
affiliates throughout the GDR.  Berliner Rundfunk once again served East Berlin.  
Finally, Deutschlandsender was recreated to serve its original purpose as the East 
German broadcaster for the Federal Republic.155  At the same tme, Heiss’ influence over 
East German radio declined in favor of Albert Norden, the SED’s Secretary for Agitation 
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since 1955.156  However, despite the institutional and personnel changes, the principle 
that radio was to continue focusing on building a socialist society based on Marxist-
Leninist ideology remained. 
 The purges had led to the removal of most professional reporters from the GDR’s 
radio stations and meant that new editors and reporters needed to be found to replace 
them.  In response, the SED created Radio Schools designed specifically to train 
broadcast journalists for the GDR.  Two schools were created; one in Grünau in 1950, 
and then at Weimar in 1953.  Only 222 individuals graduated from the Radio Schools in a 
total of just five classes between 1950 and 1955.157  However, despite the relatively small 
number of students, an examination of the Radio School’s courses, student makeup, 
examinations, and lessons provides scholars with an excellent overview of what kind of 
journalists the GDR hoped to create during this period.  With the anti-cosmopolitan 
purges coming to an end, the SED was committed to establishing a Stalinist dictatorship 
in East Germany dedicated to building a communist society.  Radio journalists were to be 
important participants in achieving this goal.   
 The most striking and prominent feature of the Radio Schools is the 
overwhelming influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology over every aspect of instruction.  
The schools’ leaders declared that journalism in the GDR needed to be distinct from both 
the practices of the National Socialist era as well as from the bourgeois journalism of the 
west.  To be a radio journalist meant not only being able to present and elucidate the 
goals and policies of the SED to the masses, but also required winning the masses over to 
the correct political line.  Consequently, to be a socialist journalist meant not just a 
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professional commitment, but a personal commitment to both the SED and the state.158  
What is clear from the recruitment goals, lessons, and application reviews at the Radio 
Schools that the ideal journalist for the SED was capable of mastering, understanding, 
and debating the principle tenets of Marxism-Leninism.   
Examining student applications to the school, one can see the importance that 
social background and aptitude with Marxist-Leninist ideology played in how candidates 
were selected for admission.  A November 1952 report discussing the school admissions 
criteria listed “social origin” as the top condition, followed by “political development.”  
Ability and competency was listed below these criteria.159  Finding adequate applicants 
was difficult however.  The same report noted that too many students from the previous 
class needed to be properly reared towards an active political consciousness.160  The 
report declared that more students needed to have had experience in an organization “as 
an agitator” and that at least a fourth of the applicants needed to have attended a party 
school of some kind.161  An intermediate assessment made of a student in 1954 noted that 
she was part of a working class family and consequently had a good understanding of the 
working class.  Yet, the positive review did not indicate whether or not the student had an 
aptitude for radio or journalism.  Her good understanding of class issues was more 
important.162  In contrast, the administration accused a student who was excluded from 
the school collective in 1953 of lacking an adequate class-consciousness.  The student 
report noted that his moral attitude, compared to other students, was “unsauber” 
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(impure).163  In December 1953, the administration dismissed another student from the 
school because her “immoral political attitude” was intolerable.  The file further noted 
that she had no understanding of workers’ issues and had no capacity for self-criticism.164   
The need for students to remain loyal to the party persisted throughout their entire 
time of enrollment.  For example, the Weimar school dismissed one student, Ingo H, on 
July 2, 1954 because he had briefly visited West Berlin.  As a member of the Free 
German Youth (FDJ) organization attached to the school, he was forbidden to do so.  
Both the school administration and the FDJ assembly concluded that this action was the 
expression of a weak class-consciousness and that he was not well connected to the 
working class.165  The minutes of the various meeting held by the FDJ and the school 
administration discussing Ingo H’s dismissal read like an official party denunciation.  
The minutes from a June 14 FDJ assembly was filled with many criticisms and attacks 
that went beyond the actual infraction.  One student declared that Ingo H was a bad 
secretary for the FDJ and that his work was unpunctual.166  Another noted that he was a 
quick learner and extremely intelligent.  Consequently, his decision to go to West Berlin 
could not have been a mistake or an act of absent-mindedness, but had to be a 
premeditated decision.167  At a meeting held the next day, a student leader condemned 
Ingo’s actions, declaring, “He studied here at the expense of the worker and farmer state 
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and slapped that state directly in the face with his hostile act.”168  Another student 
commented that although Ingo was an intelligent individual with a good knowledge of 
political theory, he demonstrated a failure to display this knowledge in practice.  Instead, 
his transgression made him an adversary of the youth movement.  The accusations soon 
evolved to include allegations of espionage.  Though he was not directly accused of 
spying for the United States, at least one student suggested it was a possibility and 
another noted how youth could easily be lured into working as spies by listening to 
RIAS.169  All agreed however, that Ingo H’s action was neither innocuous nor innocent, 
but was in fact a grave infraction against the FDJ, the Radio School of Weimar, and the 
GDR itself.  It was an irresponsible and potentially dangerous act.   
In testimony from June 19, 1954, Ingo H noted that, “I did not have any bad 
intentions; however it was still a great mistake.  I have abused the trust of all of the 
students and all the workers.”170  When he learned of the recommendation to expel him 
from the school, he noted regret but also agreed that it was the correct action to take.  The 
school expelled him June 21, after a series of meetings and discussions held by both the 
school FDJ and the School administration.  The personal attacks on his abilities, the 
assumption that he must have had a subversive motive, and the fact that all of these 
reflected a weak moral attitude are strikingly similar to an official SED denunciation or 
purge.  Ingo’s contrition also reads like an official confession of guilt for crimes against 
the Party.  Thus, even at a young age, East German radio workers were being 
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indoctrinated not only in Marxist-Leninist ideology, but also in authoritarian means of 
repression and control. 
Political attitudes were not the only factor that played a role in a student’s success 
however.  Many students were dismissed from the school due to the fact that they simply 
did not exhibit a mastery of writing or speaking German.171  The report cited above from 
1952 noted that a great number of students had only a minimal knowledge of the German 
language.172  Since the applicants were all German, and were consequently native 
speakers, we can infer that the problem stemmed from clarity and speaking ability.  
Another requirement was the ability to argue and defend positions.  The schools ruled 
one student unqualified for journalism and radio work due to the ease with which she 
conceded arguments and failed to defend her position.173  By the time a second class was 
recruited, the requirements were broadened somewhat to include individuals who already 
had some experience in radio.174  However, for the most part, there was little 
consideration for the technical aspects of radio in the student reviews.  The primary 
prerequisite remained a commitment to defend Marxist-Leninist ideology in news 
broadcasts.   
The various applications to the schools also reveal a good deal about how 
individuals in the GDR perceived radio.  Perhaps the most prominent theme to emerge 
when one looks through the various letters of application to the Radio Schools in the 
early 1950s is that they are usually not stamped with ideology of any kind.  The 
impression one gets is that the prospective students were applying to the schools because 
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it was one of many options before them for a career.  Often, it was not the first option.  
For example, one student from Leipzig admitted in her application letter that the reason 
she was applying to the Weimar Rundfunkschule was because she had not been admitted 
to Theater School.175  Another student frankly admitted that radio was not her first choice 
for a career, but due to scheduling problems, she could not attend a University.  Thus, 
Fachschule was her backup plan.176  A father of another applicant praised his daughter for 
her success as a speaker for various Mass Organizations at her school and stressed his 
own working class credentials.  Yet, even he noted that his daughter was applying 
because her application to medical school had been short-listed.177  Others frankly 
admitted that they sought admission to the school to better their employment 
opportunities in other fields.  These included a mechanic and a secretary.178  The 
frankness with which the applicants expressed their indifference to broadcasting in their 
letters of application is striking. 
There were certainly those who expressed excitement and an eagerness to work in 
radio.  One prospective student expressed his specific wish to become a Reporter-Editor 
for “Democratic Radio.”179  Another application letter opened with a very grave tone, 
noting that the subject of this letter and the chance to work for the radio of East Germany 
was of tremendous importance to the writer’s future.180  However, the overall trend is a 
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frank admission that radio was just another career path to be taken if one wished to go to 
Fachschule.  The tone was not that of eager agitators seeking to help build socialism.  
Granted, the purpose of the schools was to make these somewhat lukewarm students into 
dedicated propagandists able to disseminate Marxist-ideology to the German people.  
Yet, for most students, their concern was simply to find an agreeable career path. 
The actual syllabi and examinations reveal a number of important elements about 
what the SED hoped to see in their journalists.  Although Marxist-Leninist ideology was 
certainly the overarching leitmotif of all plans of instruction, it was a very specific type 
that stressed both class conflict and the conflict between the Soviet bloc and the Western 
world.  A student in the 1954-55 class of the Weimar Radio School would have attended 
lessons such as, “Class and the Class Struggle,” “National and Colonial Questions,” 
“Strategies and Tactics for the Proletarian Parties,” and “Imperialism and the General 
Crisis of Capitalism.”181  They would have also attended lectures on the history of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the history of Germany.  The lesson plans for 
the history of Germany predictably conformed to a Marxist Interpretation, with the first 
course focusing on the Peasants War and the Reformation followed by lectures on the 
French Revolution and Wars of Liberation which were in turn followed by nine lectures 
tracing the history of the German Communist movement from Marx to Thälmann.  These 
were followed by lectures on the antifascist struggle in Germany from 1933 to 1945, the 
liberation by the Red Army, and finally, the New Course.182   
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Even lectures on journalistic development were developed by teachers looking 
through an ideological lens, with lecture titles such as “Radio as Collective Agitator and 
the Main Features of Bolshevik Agitation,” “The Education of Socialist Ethics,” and 
“Press and Radio as Political Institutions in the Capitalist and Socialist Social Order: The 
Foundation of True Freedom of the Press and Radio.”183  Practical exercises ranged from 
writing manuscripts to practicing debating skills.  The latter exercise called for students 
to address issues such as “recognizing and formulating problems,” and “the thought 
process of listeners and how they are influenced and lead by argumentation.”184  Thus, 
ideology even guided practical exercises and lessons.   
The lessons strongly reflected contemporary concerns.  A 1952 lecture from the 
Grünau Radio School was clearly based on the master narratives developed by German 
Communists during the 1930s and 1940s.  Entitled, “The Resurgence of German 
Imperialism,” the lecture began with “the total failure” of 1945.  The lesson began by 
drawing broad distinctions between East and West Germany.  In East Germany, the 
economic resources of German imperialists were liquidated.  In West Germany, there was 
a brief period in which war criminals were put on trial, but the western powers had 
mistakenly left the foundations of “monopolist capital” untouched.  German imperialism 
was now in alliance with United States imperialism.  The Federal Republic of Germany 
was an occupied state whose economy was now dependent on American capital.185  
German Imperialism had reemerged in a number of stages.  The syllabus connected all of 
these stages to US policies.  The Marshall Plan, Schuman Plan, and the drive to include 
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West Germany in NATO were all part of a US effort to remilitarize Germany and rebuild 
the German armaments industry as a means of helping corporate and banking leaders.186  
The proposal to include West Germany in the European Defense Community and NATO 
was a means of uniting Western Europe under American leadership in order to wage war 
against the Soviet Union, the Peoples’ Democracies, and the GDR.  Drawing on a 
political tradition dating back to 1918, the lesson also condemned the Social Democrats 
as supporters for German Imperialists.  In language reflecting the anti-cosmopolitan 
purges then taking place, the lecture contended “The working class and their party stand 
at the peak of the national struggle for liberation.  The Imperialists cannot gloss over their 
policies with nationalist phrases, but instead must avail themselves to 
cosmopolitanism.”187  The lecture closed with a section entitled “Our Tasks” (Unsere 
Aufgabe).  Hence, this was not a lesson for contemplation but a call to arms.  The goals 
included strengthening the West German working class, weakening the right-wing 
leadership of the SPD, building socialism by fulfilling the Five Year Plan, and 
confronting the ideology of imperialism.  The lecture closed with, “American 
Imperialism is the common enemy of the working classes of all European countries; the 
outcome of this is the international solidarity of the working class.”188 
A cursory look through the library holdings of the Grünau school demonstrates 
the focus of the SED’s efforts.  According to a summary produced by the Grünau 
school’s library, there was just one work, specifically and solely about radio, Der 
demokratische Rundfunk in Kampf für eine realistische Kunst by Wilhelm Girnus.  Along 
with Girnus’ volume were two books on press and propaganda and 18 on agitation and 
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the press.  Compared to this, there were 120 books on Marxism-Leninism.189  The 
majority of works were volumes by Marx and Lenin.  These included Das Kapital, 
Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonimie, Lohn, Preis und Profit, Lohnarbeit und 
Kapital, and the Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei.  Overall, the library held 20 
volumes by Marx.  There were 34 volumes by Lenin, including Der Imperialismus als 
höchstes Stadium des Kapitalismus, Staat und Revolution, Über den Staat, and Was tun?.  
These works were all standard and critical works that formed the foundations of Marxist-
Leninist ideology.  However, volumes by Marx and Lenin were both outnumbered by 
Stalin.  In 1952, a year before his death and four years before Khruschev’s Secret Speech 
before the 20th Party Congress, Stalin remained at the pinnacle of the world Communist 
movement.  He was represented by 46 volumes in the library at Grünau, a testament to 
the influence he continued to hold over the early GDR’s political culture.  The books 
included Fragen des Leninismus, Der Marxismus und die Nation, and Partei und 
Arbeiterklasse. Indeed, of the 34 volumes by Lenin at the library, five were co-authored 
by Stalin.190   
The Radio Schools at Weimar and Grünau did not last long.  The last class 
graduated in 1952 and responsibility for journalist education was transferred to the Karl 
Marx Universität.  The schools simply failed to adequately provide the necessary 
professional training needed to work in the medium of broadcasting.191  The majority of 
its graduates never went on to pursue lengthy careers in broadcasting.  Despite this, 
however, the radio school’s curriculum provides a good view into the type of reporters 
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the GDR sought for its radio stations.  Grounded in Marxist-Leninist ideology, they were 
expected to be able to argue the central arguments of communism in order to defend the 
true, democratic Germany from the threat of “anglo-american” imperialism.  The radio 
school curriculums and student makeup thus reveal, in the broadest sense, the SED’s 
ideal type of radio journalist  
 By 1960, the SED and StRK had developed a clear set of principles and doctrines 
that defined how news should be treated and reported over radio.  These are summarized 
in a set of guidelines entitled, Die Nachricht und Nachrichtengebung im Rundfunk, (News 
and News Guidelines).192  The guidelines declared that the main tasks of GDR 
broadcasters was to achieve peace, strengthen the German Democratic Republic, and lay 
the groundwork for German reunification.193  For a GDR radio journalist, Die Nachricht 
und Nachrichtengebung im Rundfunk provided answers to questions such as “What is 
News?” and “What is Information?”  It also defined terms such as “objectivity” and 
“sources,” and provided detailed suggestions on the use of jargon, tone, and presentation.   
“News,” the guidebook stated, was traditionally defined as, “a certain genre of 
journalism whose core is information.”194  Information could be defined as a, “form of 
human understanding through the intercession of new knowledge.”195  However, the 
guidelines noted, traditional definitions failed to account for the how class interests 
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helped to define and shape news.196  Information and news was not just an end unto itself.  
Individuals and parties, themselves shaped by class interests, could use news to either 
help develop a socialist consciousness or manipulate it to serve reactionary political 
interests.  Thus, the guidelines insisted that journalists needed to use news to promote 
understanding of class politics.  In this regard, information in a socialist press was distinct 
from traditions of “bourgeois” journalism.  According to the guidelines, the latter was 
grounded in an “ostensible” objectivity that masked true class position and interests.197  
Thus, whereas bourgeois journalism concealed the truth behind the mask of objectivity, 
socialist journalism acknowledged the presence of class interests.198  Since news could 
not be detached from these class interests, the distinction between objective and 
subjective news was a false and illusory one.  The guidelines author noted that, “The 
disposition to ‘objectivity’ is nothing other than a disposition to petit-bourgeois neutrality 
and is finally a partisan stance of the adversary.”199  Socialist journalism acknowledged 
the interests, and thus aimed to use information and news as a means towards a socialist 
end without masking it beneath the veil of so-called objective reporting. 
The guidelines devoted considerable space to analyzing the specific requirements 
and challenges of broadcast news.  These notes balanced theoretical issues with more 
practical concerns about day-to-day operations and presentation.  As the guidelines 
indicated, GDR stations acquired news from a variety of sources, such as onsite reporters, 
newspapers, other radio stations, and news services.  Agents from all over Germany and 
in foreign states called in news stories. Agreements were set up between the radio 
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stations of the GDR and friendly stations in other countries.  The meetings of the GDR 
parliament and press conferences were broadcast and interviews were held with 
important personalities on critical questions.  State ministries provided the station with 
information on meetings and policies.   These particular sources were not unlike the 
sources used by RIAS and similar stations in West Germany and West Berlin.  However, 
at the GDR stations the information had to be reviewed and arranged by the news editor 
for broadcast before it could be broadcast.200 
 Thus, editors were critical participants in news broadcasts.  In the words of the 
radio guidelines, “The news editor has a high political responsibility.”201  Critically, the 
news editor was responsible for “observing the maneuvers of the enemy” in order to 
determine the appropriate course of counter-attack.202 Thus, even before news was edited 
or broadcast, a decision of what to broadcast was informed by what the western press and 
radio was printing and broadcasting.  The GDR considered the position of broadcast 
editor as “an advanced post” for observing the movements of the enemy.  Thus, the duty 
of news editing was cast in militaristic, adversarial language.  News editors needed to be 
“vigilant,” especially with regards to enemy source material.  According to the 
guidelines, “Here nothing can be assumed, and everything must be tested and selected 
from the standpoint of class.”203  The guidelines described sources as “raw material” with 
which the editors could form and shape news broadcasts.  The news editor’s primary task 
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was to act as a mediator between sources and the listeners and to wage an aggressive 
media campaign against western broadcasters. 
 The guidelines provided specific rules concerning what type of language to use as 
well.  In line with Lenin’s original precepts, the pamphlet argued that language needed to 
be, “clear and succinct” without “superfluous words and bloated phrases.”204  According 
to the pamphlet, an unfortunate inheritance from the Nazi era was an over-reliance on 
bureaucratic jargon and on the passive voice.  Reporters were discouraged from using 
either in their broadcasting.  The over-reliance on the passive voice also led broadcasts to 
sound tedious.  This was caused by overly complex sentences with superfluous elements, 
such as “to the area of culture,” and “in the direction of socialist education.”205  The 
pamphlet noted that “in culture” and “for socialist education” were better and more exact 
ways of phrasing these statements.  The statements also did not sound so “inflated.”206  In 
the words of the pamphlet, the News Editor needed to be a “master of language,” able to 
simplify and clarify statements broadcast by the various GDR stations.  Language needed 
to be simple and understandable and draw from both the style of classic literature and 
from the standard works of Marxism-Leninism.207  Thus, teaching goals that had shaped 
the curriculum of the Weimar and Grünau Radio Schools remained influential seven 
years later.  The news editor was not only responsible for using language well and 
clearly.  He was also responsible for developing a new national language based on 
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socialist content.208  Language and words were transitory and, like information itself, raw 
material to be shaped and melded towards fulfilling a specific goal. 
 The guidelines even presented suggestions for how to open and close reports.  
According to the pamphlet, the first sentence needed to immediately address a specific 
piece of information that was new and interesting for the listener.  Broad generalities only 
weakened the quality of the news broadcast.  The broadcast then needed to address the 
traditional five ws (what, where, who, when, how) and in doing so, avoid direct citation.  
“A literal citation at the start of a broadcast in general addles the listener and is therefore 
to be avoided.”209  Like RIAS reporters, East German reporters were instructed to avoid 
literal quotation, though for different reasons.  The pamphlet even specified sentence 
structure, indicating where subjects and predicates should be ordered in a particular 
phrase.     
 By the mid-1950s, the institutional organization of the GDR’s media organs had 
largely been set.  They would remain relatively unchanged until 1989.  The ADN served 
as the media’s principle wire service.  The StRK and SED’s Department for Agitation 
and Propaganda were the dominant influence on broadcasting operations.  Furthermore, 
the media was strongly defined by the official, party sanctioned interpretation of 
Marxism-Leninism.  Although at a number of points journalists would attempt to create a 
system of broadcasting that was less overtly stamped by the SED’s ideology, these 
attempts were relatively minor and had little lasting impact.  The SED continued to 
instruct reporters to treat the reporting of news as a means to an end.  Reporting was 
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designed to agitate the masses and educate them in the ideology of Marxism-Leninism.  
The SED derided so-called objective journalism as a bourgeois construct designed to 
mask class interests.  Consequently, the interests and goals of the SED defined GDR 
stations and broadcast journalism throughout the state’s existence. 
   
Conclusion 
 
 Throughout the 1950s, RIAS, SFB, and radio stations in the GDR developed 
different approaches to journalism.  RIAS developed a model that balanced accuracy with 
engagement.  On the one hand, RIAS focused on presenting news that was accurate and 
verifiable.  The station drew upon multiple wire services, newspapers, and radio stations 
for news stories and information.  Sources were cited and properly attributed in 
broadcasts and reporters drew a clear distinction between factual and editorial content.  
Consequently, RIAS’s pursuit of objective news was as much about style of presentation 
as it was about accurate information.  Stories needed to sound objective and impartial.  
However, while RIAS made efforts to be objective and accurate, it did not see itself as 
neutral.  The station made concerted efforts to forge a bond with East German listeners, 
break them out of isolation and encourage them to oppose the policies of the German 
Democratic Republic.  It produced programming designed specifically for East German 
listeners that challenged the SED’s media monopoly. 
 The creation of Sender Freies Berlin (SFB) also presented new challenges and 
means for pursuing journalism in divided Berlin.  As an independent, public broadcaster 





programming to RIAS.  It produced shows for East Germany and pursued a firm, anti-
communist line in its broadcasts.  However, as a public broadcaster, the station did not 
focus entirely on a specific group or demographic.  As a result, many critics complained 
that SFB was not sufficiently anti-communist.  SFB’s response to these criticisms 
touched on the necessity and effectiveness of avoiding news broadcasts dominated by 
ideology.   
 As a result of the widespread purges that afflicted not only radio but all of the 
GDR during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the stations in the GDR underwent a process 
of de-professionalization and centralization that resulted in the dismissal of most 
experienced radio journalists and the dissolution of local stations through east Germany.  
News reporting, already strongly guided by communist ideology, was now thoroughly 
grounded in it.  Radio journalism schools placed greater stress on learning the works of 
Lenin, Marx, and Stalin than in the practical tasks of reporting and broadcasting.  The 
atmosphere at these schools was like a miniature SED, with the threat of public 
denunciation and dismissal apparent for infractions against school rules.  Once out of 
school and attached to a radio station, GDR journalists were schooled in specific 
techniques of broadcasting and presenting news.  News Editors were given the task of not 
only choosing what news to broadcast, but also insuring that news broadcasts helped to 
develop a socialist class-consciousness amongst the citizens of the GDR.  At the same 
time, editors were expected to pay close attention to the broadcasts coming from enemy 
radio stations in order to develop effective means of combating them and refuting their 
assertions.  As always, radio in East Germany was linked to broadcasting coming from 





Chapter Four: Berlin’s Radio Stations and the June 1953 Uprising in East Germany 
 
  
Among the many programs produced to celebrate RIAS’s sixtieth anniversary by 
its successor Deutschland Radio was an interview with RIAS reporter Egon Bahr.  The 
interview focused on RIAS’s involvement in the June 17, 1953 uprising against the East 
German state.  That uprising, the first of its kind in any communist state, shook the GDR 
to its foundations and had consequences affecting not only East Germany but the Soviet 
Union as well.  In the course of the interview, Bahr reiterated a contention he had made 
both in his memoirs and in several articles written about the uprising.  The presence of 
protest banners emblazoned with slogans using the same language as RIAS broadcasts 
indicated that the station’s influence had had far reaching consequences.  As Bahr 
declared, “That meant that RIAS was, without knowing it and without intending it, the 
catalyst of the uprising.”1   
 RIAS’s participation in the events of June 17, 1953 in East Berlin has occupied a 
considerable amount of interest amongst scholars of both the station and the uprising.  
Most of this work has engaged the question of whether or not RIAS provoked the 
uprising and to what extent it helped to spread it throughout the GDR.2  Although the 
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station did not openly incite the uprising, it nevertheless played a role in forging an 
atmosphere of protest and dissatisfaction in the months before June 1953.  During the 
protests themselves, its reports helped transform a general strike in East Berlin into a 
nation-wide uprising.  Furthermore, RIAS played a critical role in analyzing and 
explaining the uprising to listeners as the events unfolded.  Individuals on both sides of 
the Iron Curtain strongly believed the station’s broadcasts were decisive in encouraging 
East Germans to stage protests against the SED.  However, the SED believed that RIAS 
had a far greater influence on the events, and believed that the station had in fact helped 
launch the uprising through the use of coded messages broadcast to agents lurking 
throughout the GDR.   
 Few scholars, however, have paid attention to analyzing the language and 
assertions the station was actually broadcasting during the course of the uprising.  An 
analysis of what RIAS and East German stations broadcast during the days preceding, 
during, and after the uprising present a number of new questions to consider with regards 
to the relationship between the mass media and historical circumstances.  As events 
unfolded at a phenomenally rapid rate, RIAS reporters were faced with the task of both 
analyzing and explaining events to their listeners, often as they were occurring.  Thus, 
radio reporters were afforded the chance to shape political culture at the very moment 
events were taking place.  As they did this, they helped construct an explanatory narrative 
of the June 17 uprising.  The initial impetus for the uprising, the reduction of work quotas 
and reforms within the GDR itself, were downplayed in favor of stressing radical 
democratic reforms and national reunification.   Thus, as the events unfolded, RIAS was 
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already laying the groundwork that would transform a workers’ uprising into a dramatic 
plea for national unification. 
 East German radio also developed explanatory narratives with which it presented 
and analyzed the uprising.  Unlike RIAS, East Germany’s three radio stations, Berlin I, 
II, and III, were largely silent during the June uprising.  However, within days of the 
revolt’s suppression, the East German stations were pronouncing the uprising the act of 
fascist agents attempting to launch a coup against the East German state.  At the same 
time, however, reformist elements within East Germany’s radio institutions attempted to 
use the event as a possible means for improving the quality of radio journalism by 
reducing the heavy influence of Communist ideology on news broadcasts.  Although this 
ultimately did not come to pass, it nevertheless reveals the important influence of the 
uprising on radio broadcasting in East Germany. 
 This chapter examines the commentaries broadcast by both RIAS and East 
German radio during and after the events of the June 17 uprising.  Both groups of 
broadcasters developed narratives used by station reporters to explain and analyze the 
causes and consequences of the uprising.  Radio in both West and East Germany made a 
concerted effort, even before the events had completely unfolded, to not only report on 
the uprising, but to also shape how listeners understood the events and define what the 
June 1953 uprising was actually about. 
 






The East German uprisings were the result of four years of economic and political 
instability caused by the GDR’s attempts to both establish its legitimacy and build a 
socialist society.  Walter Ulbricht’s 1949 decision to collectivize the GDR’s economy 
and Stalinize its political system was reaffirmed at the Second Party Conference of the 
Socialist Unity Party (SED) in July 1952.  During the conference, Ulbricht declared that 
the “establishment of socialism” was the primary goal of the SED and East German 
government.  In order to achieve this goal, the SED ordered the economy to be heavily 
industrialized, a difficult task in light of the fact that most of East Germany’s economy 
was agriculturally based.  Furthermore, reparations payments to the Soviets were taxing 
the GDR’s economy.  At the same time, exports decreased while workers’ wages 
increased, threatening production levels.  To combat this, the SED initially tried to 
implement collective contracts and then raised work quotas.  At the same time the GDR 
was afflicted by a food shortage as East German farmers fled the state for West Germany, 
abandoning arable land and consequently reducing agricultural production.3  It should not 
be forgotten that throughout these difficulties, RIAS’s programs like Werktag der Zone, 
Aus der Zone für die Zone, and Berlin spricht zur Zone were constantly broadcasting 
news of economic problems and encouraging workers to be recalcitrant with regards to 
the GDR government’s demands. 
The SED’s domestic troubles were compounded by its uneasy relationship within 
the Soviet bloc.  Joseph Stalin had greeted the creation of the German Democratic 
Republic with little enthusiasm.  The specter of a united, rearmed, and hostile Germany 
haunted Stalin, and while the GDR obviously posed no threat to the Soviets, a divided 
Germany increased the likelihood of a rearmed West German state allied to the United 
                                                 





States.4  Proposals to integrate West Germany into NATO and plans to create a European 
Defense Community (EDC) further exacerbated these fears.  In March 1952, Stalin made 
a proposal calling for elections in both Germanys, the reunification of a neutral Germany, 
and the withdrawal of all allied troops from German territory within the year.  The 
proposal was confronted with skepticism and distrust on the part of the West, who 
perceived it as diplomatic posturing intended to cast the Western Allies as the primary 
obstacles to German unification.5  However, while it is not certain whether or not Stalin 
would have gone through with German reunification, what is clear is that the leader of 
world communism had publicly declared a willingness to sacrifice the German 
Democratic Republic at the very moment it was trying to establish a society along 
communist lines. 
It was in this atmosphere of uncertainty that Stalin died on March 5, 1953.  In the 
wake of Stalin’s death, a mood of anticipation emerged as observers throughout the world 
waited to see who would take Stalin’s place and what changes in policy Stalin’s death 
might bring.  The leading candidate to succeed Stalin, NKVD chief Lavrentiy Beria, 
presented himself as a possible reformer.6  With a new presidential administration in 
Washington using rhetoric that included phrases like “liberation” and “roll back,” the 
new Soviet leader was interested in relaxing tensions with the west.7   
This meant putting the brakes on Ulbricht’s drive towards socialism.  In June 
1953, Soviet leaders pressured the SED to adopt a New Course that called for a relaxation 
of industrialization, support for private enterprise, guaranteeing civil rights, and 
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strengthening non-SED organizations.8  Fractures began to show in the leadership of the 
SED, as Neues Deutschland editor Rudolf Herrnstadt tried to exploit Ulbricht’s 
differences with Moscow to gain support for a leadership change.  On June 11, 1953 the 
SED published its decision to adopt the New Course and abandon the previous policy of 
building socialism.  Yet, in contrast to this apparently new policy of reform, increased 
work quotas remained even though wages did not change.  The divisions in the leadership 
became public when, on June 14 Herrnstadt’s Neues Deutschland published a 
commentary condemning Ulbricht’s decision to maintain the present quotas.  It seemed, 
to the public, that a dramatic and perhaps decisive change was about to occur in East 
Germany. 
 
RIAS and its East German Audience on the Eve of the Uprising 
 
 Throughout the early 1950s, RIAS remained the most respected and popular news 
source for listeners throughout the GDR.  A survey from the US State Department 
produced by the United States Information Service of East German listeners from 
February 1953 revealed a population that was strongly interested in listening to Western 
broadcasts, in particular RIAS.  Furthermore, it reveals a country in which radio was 
extremely popular.  Roughly eight out of ten East Germans tuned in to Western radio 
stations.9  There was approximately one radio set per every five inhabitants in the GDR.  
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In Berlin, the number was higher, with one set for every four inhabitants.  Radio was also 
the primary means used by East Germans to maintain contact with the western world. 
 Thus, for the most part, a family of four or five people would have had access to a 
radio set in the GDR.  Furthermore, this set was the principle way individuals could 
obtain news of events outside of East Germany.  Amongst the numerous radio stations 
one could hear in the GDR, RIAS was the most popular.  Not only did listeners tune into 
the station, but many corresponded with it as well, thus strengthening the bond between 
audience and broadcaster.  In the first half of 1952, for example, the station received an 
average of 4,500 letters a month from East Germany.10  Furthermore, listeners spread 
information obtained from news broadcasts through word-of-mouth.  Over half of those 
responding during a series of interviews of East German listeners done in 1951 indicated 
that the contents of western broadcasts were spread by word-of-mouth.11   
It is important to note that the USIS’s surveys were not representative of the entire 
East German population.  This was especially pertinent regarding listeners’ opinion of 
RIAS.  The respondents were refugees and visitors, individuals who were more likely to 
be critical of the GDR and more politically active.  The report’s authors themselves freely 
acknowledged this, but went on to note that according to two other independent studies, 
all evidence indicated that RIAS was clearly the most popular broadcaster in the GDR.  
According to the survey, “The most frequently cited reason for listening to Western 
stations, and particularly to RIAS, is the listeners’ need for truthful, factual and 
variegated news and information about political and economic developments and 
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conditions in East and West.”12  Furthermore, the sudden increase in jamming operations 
against RIAS indicated that the station was having an impact (at least in the eyes of the 
SED) on the population of the GDR.  Listeners were motivated by RIAS’s status as a 
source for accurate news.  News programming was RIAS’s most popular product, with 
42% of respondents indicating that it was their favorite area of programming.  In 
comparison, only 22% indicated music programs as their favorite.  To further emphasize 
the status accorded to RIAS’s news, just 9% indicated that NWDR’s news was their 
favorite programming.13  Critically, however, the survey also acknowledged that many 
listeners sought out RIAS in order to “obtain psychological reinforcement of their anti-
Communist attitudes and opinions.”  Thus, the report acknowledged that while RIAS was 
popular, it was not necessarily altering listeners’ opinions.  Individuals often turned to 
RIAS because they wished to hear their own opinion and attitudes confirmed and 
discussed.  It is also important to note that listeners did not ignore the GDR’s radio 
stations.  As the survey noted, individuals often listened to the news broadcasts of both, 
in order to compare the broadcasts from both the western and eastern stations.14  For the 
most part, however, listeners preferred the music programming of the East German 
stations to their news programming.   
The volume of letters sent from the GDR to RIAS frequently struck the station’s 
staff members and US officials alike.  US and RIAS officials were well aware that letters 
were not always representative of the population.  A report from the Bureau of Social 
Science Research at American University examining fan letters sent to various US 
Information Agency programs in November 1953 noted that a politically active and 
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engaged minority usually wrote letters to US stations.15  Yet, the act of letter writing 
demonstrated that listeners in East Germany were willing to forge some kind of 
connection with the American station.  A RIAS internal report from May 1955 indicated 
that RIAS had received 794,550 letters since 1948.  On average, the station received 
about 15,000 letters a month, with about 10-15% of those letters emanating from the 
GDR.  Prior to an increase in East German efforts to intercept letters that began in March 
1952, GDR letters amounted to about a third of the total letters received by the station.  In 
the course of the report, the author cited a number of letters considered representative by 
the station.  Comments from these letters (whose authors remained anonymous in the 
report) included statements such as, “RIAS is like a beloved son of America whom 
America has sent to Germany to pour consolation and hope into troubled, discouraged 
hearts,” and “We are always astonished to learn how well informed you are about what 
goes on here.”16   One listener, in a letter dated from February 1952, wrote, “RIAS seems 
to know our most private thoughts, wishes and hopes.  Its voice penetrates into the most 
modest dwellings…RIAS can properly lay claim to being a station for the people.”17  
Another commented that listening to RIAS made them feel less isolated.  Writers 
included housewives, professionals, former political prisoners, a former head of a factory 
union, craftsmen, students, and pensioners.  Thus, letters did not necessarily emanate 
from one particular class or age group.  Letter writers did not only send messages of the 
thanks to the station.  Many used letters to provide the station with information about 
conditions in East Germany, including the productivity of factories and the biographical 
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information about SED officials.  Letters of this nature were so numerous that RIAS 
began producing a program focusing on presenting this information to listeners in 1952.18 
 Many among RIAS’s audience were not passive listeners.  Instead, they were 
actively engaged, seeing RIAS as a representative of the United States in East Germany.  
The picture created by RIAS’s letter survey and the USIS’s listener surveys is of an 
engaged, interested audience that sought out RIAS’s broadcasts as a source for accurate 
news and information.  Many spread this news via word-of-mouth, thus disseminating 
RIAS news reports even further.  At the same time, the survey also showed that listeners 
did not just listen to RIAS, even if they believed the American station was more accurate.  
Listeners tuned into multiple stations, including the GDR’s own broadcasters, in order to 
assemble information to make their own judgments.  This listening behavior played an 
important role during the June 17 uprising.  
 
Exploiting Mistakes: RIAS and June 17 
 
 The GDR’s problems were largely self-inflicted.  It was Ulbricht’s insistence on 
creating a hard-line Stalinist state, despite less than favorable political and economic 
conditions, that caused the material circumstances that were the principle cause of the 
uprising.  Once the New Course was announced, it did not take long for RIAS to seize 
upon the contradictory messages publicized by the SED and exploit the political divides 
within the East German government.  Beginning on June 11, the day the SED made the 
New Course public, RIAS made sure the new policies were the focus of the daily news.  
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The first broadcast was sent at 5:30 am, meaning that many listeners waking up for work 
would possibly hear the news of the New Course from RIAS before they read or heard it 
from official SED organs.19  The presumably unsuspecting listener would have heard the 
following, startling broadcast: “During yesterday’s evening hours, the SED Politburo has 
proposed a range of measures to the Soviet Zone government that outline an essential 
change in policies vis-à-vis the population of the Zone.  The grounds for this, according 
to the SED, were mistakes committed by the SED and the government.”20  Following the 
remarkable acknowledgment that the Party had made mistakes, the theoretical listener 
would then hear the news that the SED would be providing ration cards for all of its 
citizens, providing amnesty for political prisoners, permitting the return of farmers who 
had fled to West Germany and West Berlin without reprisal and punishment, and making 
guarantees for private enterprises.21  Throughout the day, the station’s news broadcasts 
pointed out that the SED had not only committed mistakes but was also acknowledging 
the errors to the public.22  The station continued to broadcast this news over the next two 
days.23 
   What was important about these broadcasts was not that RIAS was reporting the 
SED had made mistakes, but that RIAS was reporting the SED had admitted making 
mistakes.  A RIAS listener who read the official SED organ, Neues Deutschland on June 
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14 would have found RIAS’s statements confirmed in an article critical of the measures 
taken by the Politburo before the New Course.24   
 Despite the introduction of the New Course, the SED remained firm that it would 
not reduce the current work quotas.  This news bred discontent throughout East Germany, 
especially amongst the construction workers currently building the Stalinallee.  On June 
15, during its 7:30 pm newscast, RIAS reported that workers were planning to go on 
strike:  
 
In East Berlin today, protest strikes erupted at three 
construction sites of the publicly owned Business Industry 
Building against the government-mandated work quota 
increase of ten percent.  RIAS has learned that, at the 
construction site of Friedrichshain Hospital, work will stop 
at 9 O’clock tomorrow, while the workers at the 
construction site at Stalinallee, Block 40 and 
Volkspolizeiinspektion Friedrichshain will take part in the 
strike at 2 pm and 3 pm.  The protest resolution to the 




The same broadcast was repeated at 10 pm and at midnight and similar broadcasts were 
made throughout the morning.26  Thus, even before June 16 began, RIAS listeners 
throughout East Germany were aware that a work stoppage was planned in East Berlin 
for that day.  At 4:30 pm on June 16, 1953, RIAS became the first German language 
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station to report specific details about the work stoppages.27  The report announced:  
“Today, in the Soviet Sector of Berlin, large mass demonstrations of workers have 
erupted before the buildings of the Zonal Government protesting against raising work 
quotas, against conditions in the Soviet occupied part of Germany, and against 
government policies.”28  The RIAS report was straightforward and factual.  However, it 
nevertheless revealed that the strikers’ concerns were moving beyond just labor issues.  
The reporter then revealed the demands of the protesters, quoting their slogans: “Soon, 
the square before the government building was filled with a dense crowd, which called in 
loud chants, ‘We demand higher wages and lower prices, we ask for the elimination of 
the quotas, away with the government, we want free elections.’”29  The reporter then 
noted that when GDR Ministers Heinrich Rau and Fritz Seldmann appeared before the 
building window, the crowd demanded, with ever increasing volume, “ ‘Ulbricht or 
Grotewohl.’ ”  When Selbmann attempted to speak to the strikers, the crowd declared: “ 
‘We are not just against the quotas in the Stalinallee, we are against the quotas in all of 
Germany.  We want free elections.  We are all of Berlin.’ ”30 The report also noted that 
policemen responsible for protecting the building did not intervene to stop the 
demonstration.31   
The RIAS broadcasts did not radicalize the protests.  The demonstrators 
themselves did this, as the strikers’ demands quickly moved beyond labor issues and 
became a call for fundamental political change.  However, subsequent RIAS broadcasts, 
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marked by vivid and detailed descriptions of the events transpiring across East Berlin, 
focused on this fundamental transformation.  The image created by the 4:30pm broadcast 
is of an extremely forceful crowd capable of intimidating the East German government 
and bending it to their will.   Before listeners’ ears, the June 16 work stoppage was 
quickly transforming into a general uprising against the political system of the German 
Democratic Republic itself. 
 Initially, western news services and the US High Commission found RIAS’s 4:30 
report dubious.  RIAS’s political chief, Gordon Ewing, recalled, “They thought we’d 
gone off the deep end, at first.”32  However, Ewing and his staff were aware that 
something unprecedented was occurring in East Germany.  Reporters from other 
newspapers also began to confirm the RIAS broadcasts.  The scene at RIAS was one of 
excitement and anticipation.  The corridors before the political office were filled with 
people, many of them East Berliners talking with RIAS editors and providing them with 
information.33  At 3:00 that afternoon, three delegates from the strike arrived at the 
station and met with Egon Bahr and fellow editor Mathias Walden, requesting to go on 
the air.34 
The request forced RIAS to develop guidelines for reporting the uprising.  As has 
been discussed in the previous chapter, RIAS was fairly autonomous.  Its German and 
American staff made its programming decisions, not the State Department or HICOG.  
However, there were concerns about the immensity of the event transpiring.  It was not 
just the East German government that was threatened with collapse, but a satellite of the 
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Soviet Union and an area of Soviet responsibility.  Furthermore, RIAS was not just a 
radio station, but the voice of the United States in East Germany.  Anything it broadcast 
would be interpreted with that fact in mind.  Indeed, one delegate even believed that 
RIAS’s broadcasts of support for the strikes would be followed by Western Allied 
invasion.35  To complicate matters, the chief American official in West Germany, High 
Commissioner James Conant, as well as HICOG’s Public Affairs Director Alfred Boerner 
were in Washington DC at the time.36  West Berlin’s mayor, Ernst Reuter, was also out of 
the city.  Waiting for responses from Washington DC to each and every programming 
question was not a realistic option.  Thus, as Ewing put it, “We were on the air…in the 
end only we could decide, we were on the spot.”37  The station directors opted for a line 
that was described by one HICOG official as “sympathetic reporting.” 38   The station 
could not lend itself as a voice to the strikers.  However, it could report the events 
thoroughly and factually.  A wire exchange between HICOG’s Berlin office and US 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles confirmed this course of action.39  Ewing then 
directed Program Director Eberhard Schütz to prepare for special programming focusing 
on the events in East Berlin for the foreseeable future.40  That night, at 7:45 pm, Eberhard 
Schütz delivered the first editorial commentary on the events. 
Schütz’s commentary, though aimed at presenting a “sympathetic” viewpoint, 
nevertheless presented a strong and vigorous endorsement of both the protesters and the 
official requests of the workers’ delegation.  It presents a clear illustration of the often-
                                                 
35 Christian F. Ostermann, Uprising in East Germany, 1953: The Cold War, The German Question, and the First Major 
Upheaval Behind the Iron Curtain, (New York: Central European University Press, 2001), 173. 
36 Ewing Interview, Ewing Papers, Marshall Library, 47.   
37 Ibid., 47. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ostermann, Uprising in East Germany, 1953, 173. 





tenuous balance RIAS tried to achieve between objective reporting and engaging the East 
German government and openly supporting its population.  While Schütz sought to 
provide an analysis of the Uprising, he also clearly expressed sympathy for the action and 
hopes for its success.  The fact that it was broadcast at 7:45 in the evening was also 
critical.  As the State Department’s February 1953 survey indicated, the period between 
7:00 pm and 10:00 pm were the most popular hours for listening to radio for East 
Germans.41  
Schütz opened by describing the unprecedented nature of the events:  
 
 
When, days ago, we heard of workers’ demonstrations in 
Pilsen, many of us were disposed to treat this news with 
attentive reservation and describe it as ‘incredible.’  
Incredible, not because people in the west doubted the will 
to resistant of those behind the Iron Curtain, but because, in 
light of the predatory terror in the peoples’ democracies 
with which we have grown accustomed, resistance against 
the Bolshevik regime was evidence of either irresponsible 
carelessness, the expression of hopeless desperation, or the 
hallmark of a martyr’s bravery.42 
 
 
Schütz declared that the current demonstrations were neither irresponsible nor suicidal.  
The protests aimed to achieve legitimate democratic goals and, importantly, it was 
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reasonable to believe these goals were achievable.  Thus the overall aim of the 
commentary was to help transform a general strike against work quotas into a revolt 
against the GDR that focused on achieving major political reforms.  Schütz’s central 
assertion was that the events in East Berlin were an unprecedented declaration for 
fundamental democratic rights for all Germans living in East Germany. 
Even before the protests erupted into a general uprising on June 17, Schütz 
declared the actions in East Berlin a victory for democracy and the people of East 
Germany.  “It is this victory which our East Berliners share with the entire working 
population of the Soviet Zone.”43  He went on to declare that the protests had forced the 
GDR leadership to back down.44  Drawing continuities between the twelve years of the 
Third Reich with seven years of the GDR, Schütz praised the demonstrators’ political 
intuition: “In seven years of accumulating corruption of Union principles—and this after 
thirteen years (sic) of the national socialist working front—more than a thousand East 
Berliner working men have demonstrated admirable political instinct.  And these are the 
construction workers of the Stalinallee, who have been heavily praised by the SED 
regime.”45  Schütz then noted how the events in East Berlin were moving from a strike 
into a political revolt.  The demands for free elections, the removal of the “Pankow 
Regime” and the freedoms shared by West Germans went beyond labor gains and entered 
the realm of true political achievement.46  As Schütz declared, “[The protesters] demand 
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free elections, they demand the resignation of the Pankow Regime, and they demand the 
freedoms, which have been granted to us in West Berlin and the Federal Republic.”47 
When Schütz came to discuss the workers delegation which had visited RIAS that 
afternoon, he noted the delegates wished to broadcast their demands on the radio station 
in order to help spread the movement.  Here, Schütz was on shaky ground.  RIAS, as 
Ewing noted, could not become the mouthpiece for the striking workers.  Yet, Schütz 
bypassed this problem by simply reporting about the delegates’ demands.  In doing so, he 
declared that RIAS was under a moral obligation to present news of the demands.  “We 
would be quixotic and not worthy of our listeners’ trust, if we did not award entitlement 
to such a demand.  We simply want to say this: What the population of East Berlin and 
the Soviet Zone want today and what it considers achievable with the means at its 
disposal, is nothing more and nothing less than the end of totalitarian rule in the 
Kremlin’s German satellite.”48 
Schütz proceeded to remind his listeners of the SED’s mistakes.  “When a Matern 
or a Dahlem makes a mistake, it is a crime.  When an Ulbricht, a Grotewohl, or even a 
Zhukov makes a mistake, it should also be a mistake, also be a crime.”49  By invoking 
Dahlem, Schütz attempted to exploit divisions within the East German leadership, as 
Franz Dahlem, recently expelled from the SED, represented an anti-Ulbricht alternative 
for leadership in the GDR.  Schütz then declared that the people of the Eastern Zone 
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could no longer tolerate such mistakes.  Ulbricht and his associates needed to be made to 
account.  As Schütz came to a close, he encouraged the strikers to push for greater 
demands.  As he said, referring to the day’s achievements, “We know from the delegation 
of East Berlin construction workers, that they are not willing to be satisfied with this 
victory.”50  He went on to declare, “We feel connected with our listeners in East Berlin 
and the Soviet Zone in the ambition, of achieving the greatest gains, of exploiting the 
insecurity of the party functionaries, to profit from the uncertainty of the SED Central 
Committee vis-a-vis the aims of the Kremlin, without which the single danger stops, 
which would be avoided.”51  He closed, provocatively, stating that, “We, dear listeners, 
would be happy if we could continue to report of further victories in the coming days.”52   
Schütz’s June 16, 1953 commentary presents one of the clearest examples of how 
tenuous RIAS’s attempts to balance accurate reporting with engagement could often be.  
Throughout, he stressed that it was the workers who were driving the protest and it was 
the workers who were formulating the demands.  The demands, Schütz stressed, were not 
being made by RIAS itself.  Nevertheless, Schütz never hid his support for the demands 
or his sympathy for the protest.  Furthermore, he proclaimed it was RIAS’s obligation to 
give its approval to the movement and throw its support behind the action.  Through the 
commentary, Schütz made RIAS a partner of the movement, stressing the bond between 
the station and its listeners and pushing protesters to try and achieve greater gains. 
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The picture Schütz depicted of the movement is remarkable.  Even though 
historians have since concluded that the uprisings of June 16-17 were disorganized and 
lacked effective leadership,53 Schütz nevertheless created the image of a coordinated 
movement capable of toppling the German Democratic Republic.  Most striking was his 
optimism.  Throughout the broadcast, Schütz made his belief clear that the fundamental 
democratic demands were achievable goals.  There was no consideration that the Soviet 
Union would take action.  Perhaps the excitement of events and wishful thinking played a 
role in Schütz optimistic assessment of the situation in East Berlin.  It is also likely that 
Schütz did believe the protests were better organized and coordinated than they really 
were.  Yet, the RIAS program director failed to acknowledge the very real possibility of a 
harsh and brutal crackdown on the part of the Soviets.  Despite being a commentator 
responsible for presenting an analysis of events, he nevertheless ignored this very real 
possibility. 
Following Schütz’s 7:45 pm commentary, RIAS broadcast a variety of speakers 
and commentaries throughout the night.  At 10:15 pm, the West German Minister for All-
German affairs, Jakob Kaiser, went on the air to affirm his support for the protests and 
beseech the Soviets and Western Allies to use the events as an opportunity to reach a 
quick decision on German unification.54  Thus, Kaiser presented one of the first instances 
in which the demonstrations in East Germany were linked with the issue of reunification.  
At 11:00 pm, RIAS once again broadcast a report on the strikes in East Berlin and the 
protesters’ demands.  It repeated the broadcast at midnight, and then at one, two, three, 
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and four o’clock during the morning of June 17.55  Throughout the night, the station also 
repeated Schütz’s June 16 commentary at 12:10 am and 2:10 am.56  At 1:21 am, the 
station broadcast an interview with an eyewitness of demonstrations at Alexanderplatz in 
East Berlin.  The interview focused on the lack of police action on the part of East 
German security forces, thus adding to the sense that the security apparatus of the GDR 
had collapsed.57   
On June 17, 1953 at 5 am, RIAS reported that the protesters would be assembling 
at Straussberger Platz to stage a larger demonstration.  The day’s production of Werktag 
der Zone was broadcast at its regular time of 5:35 am.  The program presented an 
analysis similar to Schütz’s June 16 broadcast.  For months, the speaker noted, the radio 
show had made an effort to represent the workers of the GDR and represent their 
concerns and interests.  The events of the previous week had revealed that the SED was 
unable to cope with the concerns of East German workers.  But now, the stakes were 
much higher.  “But yesterday, it was no longer about the quotas.  From the protests 
against arbitrary reduction of wages has emerged a protest against the entire regime 
demanding free elections and the resignation of the Zone government.”58  The speaker 
then affirmed that RIAS was “on your side.”59  The program then announced the rallying 
place at the Straussberger Platz, reading out the announcement of the protest leaders.60  
Once again, the station was openly affirming solidarity and support for the protests in the 
GDR.  At the same time, it also stressed that the movement was “no longer about the 
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quotas” but was about democratic reforms.  During the program, the head of the West 
Berlin branch of the Deutsches Gewerkschaftsbund, Ernst Scharnowski gave a 
commentary praising the protesters, affirming the solidarity of West Berlin’s unions with 
the strikers, and again reaffirmed the general theme that the protests were not just about 
workers’ rights, but fundamental human rights.61 
Beginning at 7am, RIAS broadcast news every half hour on the demonstrations at 
Straussberger Platz and Stalinallee.  Between 12:30 pm and midnight, RIAS broadcast 
ten news reports devoted entirely to the events in East Germany.62  East Germans seeking 
out radio as an escape from the political upheavals taking place around them would still 
be confronted with the events, as music programming was frequently interrupted to 
provide listeners with updates on the events in the Eastern Sector.63  RIAS was helping to 
define the June 17 demonstrations.  Eye witness accounts, preemptions, constant news 
flashes, interrupted programs, and commentaries describing great victories and the 
potential for real political change, meant that individuals who listened to the station 
throughout East Germany (which was a majority of radio listeners in the GDR according 
to contemporary United States Information Agency polling),64 could not escape the 
presence of the demonstrations or the sense of anticipation that was defining RIAS news 
broadcasts.  An individual could not listen to the station for an hour without being 
reminded of the events taking place.  Each report also made sure to stress the significance 
of the event, its unprecedented nature, and the very real possibility that it could succeed. 
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On the morning of June 17, the strikes and protests, which had up until then been 
focused in East Berlin, exploded across the German Democratic Republic.  In all, at least 
500,000 people in 560 towns throughout East Germany participated in demonstrations of 
some kind.65  Workers, students, and farmers all participated in the protests, leading to a 
general “peoples’ uprising” throughout East Germany.66  As the revolts moved across 
East Germany, RIAS’s staff and officials from the Soviet Union both perceived RIAS’s 
effect.  As noted above, Egon Bahr has frequently noted how reports from various 
protesters throughout the GDR were making the same demands as those in East Berlin, 
using the same language and slogans of the delegation that had approached RIAS the 
previous afternoon.67  In his memoirs, he recalled that the demands presented in the 
previous evening’s commentaries were being used in protests and emblazoned on 
placards throughout the GDR, often in the same language as RIAS had presented them.  
This view was corroborated by Mathias Walden, who noted the effect the instant and 
simultaneous broadcasting of news could have.  “Dresdeners know what is happening at 
that moment in Magdeburg, Leipzigers listen, what is playing out in Berlin.”68  Radio’s 
ability to provide information instantaneously and simultaneously throughout the GDR 
demonstrated RIAS’s effectiveness and critical role in the demonstrations.  A report 
made by Soviet observers recently found in Russian archives from June 24, 1953, also 
noted the use of slogans.  Co-authored by the Soviet’s representative in East Germany, 
Vladimir Semyonov, “In all these political slogans the influence of the broadcasts of the 
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American radio station in Berlin, ‘RIAS,’ was felt.”69  Importantly, the Soviet officials 
noted that in East Berlin and Magdeburg strikingly similar slogans were used: demands 
for free elections, lower prices, and the abolition of the work quotas.  The observers drew 
the conclusion that, “The organized nature of all the demonstrations calls attention to 
itself: the presence of slogans written in advance and nearly identical in all areas of the 
GDR, the presence of communications [equipment] and automobiles, identical duration 
of actions, demonstration routes and gathering places determined in advance (Berlin, 
Leipzig, Berlin, and others).”70  It is interesting to note that both Soviet observers and 
RIAS reporters believed the revolt was more coordinated and organized than it really 
was. 
Throughout June 17, RIAS presented eyewitness accounts, commentaries, news 
broadcasts, and a declaration made by all three of West Berlin’s political parties.71  At a 
meeting between Semyanov and SED leaders who had fled to the Soviet headquarters in 
Karlshorst, the Soviet representative informed his German clients, “RIAS is broadcasting 
that there is no government any more within the GDR.  Well, that is almost true.”72  By 
midday Soviet commanders in East Germany deployed tanks throughout the state to quell 
the protests.   Throughout the day, RIAS continued to broadcast news of the strikes.73  By 
the end of the day, however, it was obvious there was little the protesters could do against 
the Soviet troops.  By the evening Russian observers were acknowledging that RIAS had 
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called upon protesters to submit and avoid any clashes with Soviet troops.74  It is telling 
that the Soviets were listening to the station and relying on it as a means to calm the 
crowds, rather than the GDR’s own radio broadcasters. 
A RIAS newscast from that evening announced that the West Berlin House of 
Representatives had voted to use any means necessary to support the protesters across the 
sector border.75  However, the broadcast was dominated by a somber tone as it had 
become obvious the protests were being suppressed.  This language of frustration and 
anger characterized many of RIAS’s broadcasts during the days immediately after the 
uprising was suppressed by the Soviets.  Commentaries broadcast over the course of the 
next three days often sounded like verbal requiems.  The number of dead was rising, 
demonstrators wounded near the sector border had been taken to West Berlin hospitals, 
and shots could still be heard into the evening hours.  The station reported the Soviet 
curfew order, but also noted continued protests.  At the same time, the report attempted to 
present a positive assessment of the events.  It closed by noting the rest of the world was 
watching, a theme that would dominate RIAS’s post-June 17 broadcasts.  “The entire free 
world follows the events with great sympathy.”76  A broadcast from later that evening 
again noted the entire free world was watching, and reported Eisenhower’s observations.  
“In Washington, President Eisenhower called the demonstration of the East Berlin 
population an extremely important event and a evidence of communists’ lies.”77 The 
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same report noted statements of support from chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee Alexander Wiley and Konrad Adenauer.78   
The June 18, 1953 Wertag der Zone presented a vivid overview of the previous 
day’s events.  The report, drawn from eyewitness accounts and second hand reports, casts 
the events in a dramatic narrative, beginning by describing initial protests in Magdeburg.  
Here, for the first time, RIAS began the process of constructing an explanatory narrative 
with which to analyze the uprising:  
 
Magdeburg: June 17, 1953.  Work begins at a Magdeburg 
factory.  The workers discuss amongst themselves.  The 
Berliners went on the march yesterday.  The construction 
workers from the Stalinallee were the first.  And what are 




The broadcast subsequently related how the workers marching through the Karl-Marx 
Werk, which they proceed to call its original name, Schaeffer and Budenberg, and then 
described their march to the abandoned SED offices.  Subsequently, the protesters storm 
the Palace of Justice, free prisoners and burn files.  On their goals, the speaker noted: “ 
‘We demand free elections’—screams one chant,--‘Freedom.’”80   
 The report then described the emergence of the Soviet tanks at 2:30 pm: “Around 
2:30 the first Soviet armored scout cars appear.  A short time after the first Soviet tanks 
emerge.  They drive into the crowd.  They shoot.  An 11-year-old boy is shot.  Dead.  
                                                 
78 Ibid. 
79 WZ, June 18, 1953, DRA Potsdam RIAS Depositium, A 104-00-05/0002.  “Magdeburg, 17. Juni 1953.  
Arbeitsbeginn in einem Magdeburger Betrieb.  Die Arbeiter diskutieren.  Die Berliner sind gestern marschiert.  Die 
Bauarbeiter von der Stalinallee als erste.  Und was machen wir?  Ein Transparent wird gemalt.  Darauf sieht: 
Magdeburg folgt Berlin.” 





There are deaths on this June 17, 1953 in Magdeburg.”81  Interestingly, the italicized 
portions, perhaps the most dramatic, are crossed out in the manuscript.  Whether this was 
done for the sake of time constraints, stylistic revision, or on the orders of RIAS editor is 
uncertain.82  However, the language is the most provocative and critical of the Soviet’s 
actions, and was likely removed to soften the broadcast. 
 Following the report on Magdeburg, a second speaker continued, noting, “We are 
reporting on June 17, 1953.  Not on Berlin.  Not on a District Capital, but on a city of 
20,000 inhabitants, Rosslau bei Dessau.”83  Following this came a description of protests 
in the small Saxon town, then a commentary on uprisings in Bitterfeld, and Leipzig.  
Each account deliberately mirrored the other.  They all began with the workers’ decisions 
to march.  Then followed an account of their demands followed by a description of Soviet 
tanks putting down the protest movements.  The purpose of the broadcast’s style is clear: 
to characterize June 17 as an event affecting all of East Germany.  At the close of the 
commentary, one speaker reported: “There are marches in Chemnitz, Premnitz, Gera, 
Erfurt, Leuna, Buna, in Warnemünd…” Immediately, in order to emphasize the Soviet 
intervention and the manner in which it silenced the protests, a second speaker 
interrupted and completed the sentence, “…and then the armored cars arrive, and then the 
tanks, and the state of emergency.  The Soviets intervene.  They knew: the party, the 
Volkspolizei, and the Stasi, they no longer work.  They are impotent.  Thus: the tanks 
                                                 
81 Ibid.  “Gegen 14 Uhr 30 erschienen die ersten sowjetischen Panzerspähwagen.  Kurze Zeit drauf die ersten 
sowjetischen Panzer.  Sie fahren in die Menge.  Es wird geschossen.  Ein 11-jährige junge wird erschossen.  Tot.  Es 
gibt Tote an diesem 17. Juni 1953 in Magdeburg.” 
82 The broadcast manuscript was published in RIAS’s own official report of the events from later that month and can 
also be found in Herbert Kundler’s history of the station.  Both are edited versions, meaning it is likely the broadcast 
version did not include the lines concerning the tanks storming the crowd and the murder of an 11 year old boy.  See 
RIAS Berlin, Der Aufstand der Arbeiterschaft im Ostsektor von Berlin und in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone 
Deutschands, 11 and Kundler, RIAS Berlin, 185. 
83 Ibid., “Wir berichten über den 17. Juni 1953. Nicht über Berlin.  Nicht über eine Bezirkshauptstadt, sondern über 





roll!”84  The first speaker concluded the commentary by condemning the SED’s efforts to 
describe the uprising as the act of fascists and western agents.  “With these declarations, 
they believe they can excuse their impotence.”85 
 Throughout June 16-18, 1953, the focus of the protesters had been on conditions 
within East Germany.  The major demands had also been East German concerns: free 
elections in the Zone, lower quotas, and freedom for political prisoners.  Yet, almost as 
soon as the events had come to a close, West German statesmen began the process that 
would transform June 17th into the “Day of German Unity.”  RIAS played a role in this 
process from the beginning.  During the June 18, 1953 broadcast of Berlin spricht zur 
Zone, at 7:40pm, Egon Bahr gave a commentary that transformed the uprising against the 
SED into an uprising for German reunification. 86  He opened by declaring: “What 
perhaps hardly anyone in the west believed possible, workers and other members of the 
population have demonstrated with a single will.  They demonstrate not only against the 
quotas and the high cost of living, but for something else, for their unification with the 
rest of Germany, for freedom.”87  RIAS’s previous commentaries, notably Schütz’s June 
16 broadcast, had also noted that the demonstrators sought more than the reduction of 
quotas.  But linking freedom with unification was new, and was to become a common 
element of the narrative of June 17 created in West Germany.  Bahr noted that the people 
                                                 
84 Ibid., “Es wurde marschiert in: Chemnitz, in Premnitz, in Gera, in Erfurt, in Leuna, bei Buna, in Arnemünde, in 
Rathenow…und dann kamen die Panzerspähwagen, und die Panzer und der Ausnahmezustand.  Die Sowjets griffen 
ein.  Die Sowjets wussten: Die Partei, die VP und der SSD, sie schaffen es nicht mehr.  Sie sind unfähig.  Also: Panzer 
marsch!” 
85 Ibid., “Mit dieser Erklärung glauben sie ihre eigene Unfähigkeit entschuldigen zu können.” 
86 BsZ, June 18, 1953.  The transcript was published in RIAS Berlin, Der Aufstand der Arbeiterschaft im Ostsektor von 
Berlin und in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschands, 15-17.  An original manuscript, dated June 17, can be 
found in Ewing Papers, Box 1, Folder 8: RIAS Special Reports, Marshall Library.  Citations come from the text 
published by RIAS. 
87 Ibid., “Was wohl kaum jemand im Westen für möglich gehalten hat, die Arbeiterschaft und sich anschliessende 
Menschen aus allen Bevölkerungsschichten haben aus eigenen Willen demonstriert.  Demonstriert nicht nur gegen die 
Normen und die hohen Lebenshaltungskosten, sondern für etwas, für ihre Vereinigung mit dem übrigen Deutschland, 





who protested against the SED had much to be proud of, and the events of the previous 
day were a success.  “A success not only for the population of East Berlin, a success not 
only for the population of the Zone, a success for German unity, for today the East Berlin 
demonstrations is the topic in the entire world.”88  The uprising, “ruled the headlines of 
the world press as never before since the blockade.”89  The uprising was, “irrefutable 
evidence of the will for German unity.”90  At the same time, the workers had delivered 
the SED its “greatest defeat” since its creation.  The world had seen evidence, for the first 
time, that part of the German population had, though unorganized, found the means and 
the will to press for freedom against a hated regime.  At the same time, Bahr lamented 
that Germans living in West Berlin like Bahr and his colleagues at RIAS were unable to 
do more to help.  In a telling comment not found in the original manuscript, Bahr 
declared: 
 
It was tragic, wanting to help and not being able to provide 
direct assistance.  It would not have been difficult to get 
West Berlin’s population to their feet with a fiery appeal, 
and who would have refused to join in? It is historic that 
this did not happen.  It remains to be proven that any plea 
for help—and men came to RIAS and brought an appeal—
has been rejected—as difficult as it was—, as we can now 
see, the appeal has been rightly refuted, to say nothing of 
the stupidity to want people to believe that the Americans 
or some clandestine people caused the reactions in the 
Zone.91 
 
                                                 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid., “Berlin beherrscht die Schlagzeilen der Weltpresse wie niemals seit der Blockade.” 
90 Ibid., “Nicht nur, weil das Ausland einen unwiderlegbaren Beweis für den Willen zur deutschen Einheit bekam, 
sondern weil hier im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes die Brüchigkeit eines verhassten Regimes demonstriert wurde.” 
91 Ibid., “Es war tragisch, helfen zu wollen und nicht unmittelbar helfen zu dürfen.  Es wäre ein Kleines gewesen, durch 
einen flammenden Aufruf Westberlin auf die Beine zu bringen, und wer hätte sich versagt?  Es ist historisch, daß dies 
nicht geschah.  Es ist zu beweisen, daß jegliche Bitten nach Hilfe--und die Menschen kamen zum RIAS und brachten 
die Aufrufe--abgeschlagen wurden und--so schwer es war --, wie man jetzt sieht mit Recht abgeschlagen worden sind, 
ganz zu schweigen von der Dummheit, Menschen glauben machen zu wollen, amerikanische oder sonst welche 






It is possible that the section, which focuses on the inability of West Berliners to do more 
to help, was added in a moment of frustration as the uprising was quickly suppressed by 
the Soviet troops.  Its structure and line of thought are disorganized, and it is even 
possible this departure from the original script was improvised on the air.  Like Schütz, 
Bahr cited RIAS’s moral obligations.  A dispute between Ewing and Bahr, related in 
Bahr’s memoirs, provides insight into the sentiment behind this broadcast.  As Bahr 
recounts, many felt that RIAS needed to do more to support the uprisings on June 17.  
Ewing was concerned about how the Soviets would perceive the RIAS broadcasts, 
especially calls for a general strike.  The previous day, HICOG Eastern Affairs Element 
Chief Charles Hulick had phoned Ewing and warned him: “My God, Gordon, watch your 
step. You can start a war with that station.”92  When Bahr pressed Ewing on the issue, the 
RIAS Political Director asked him what would happen if the Soviet tanks decided to 
continue moving into the western sectors.  Bahr responded that such an occurrence was 
“politically impossible.”93  Ewing asked Bahr how he could be so certain, and would only 
continue broadcasting the calls for a general strike if Bahr could guarantee such an 
intervention would never happen.  Ewing recalled the tension in the RIAS studios those 
two days.  “But there were some [editors] who would have liked to do a lot of fire-eating 
on the air, of course, bound to be.  We had hot arguments but in the end we had no real 
difficulty in getting a line for the evening broadcast that was actually going on the air.”94  
Though he did not mention Bahr by name, he was certainly thinking of Bahr and possibly 
                                                 
92 Ewing Interview, Ewing Papers, Marshall Library, 49. 
93 Bahr, Zu Meiner Zeit, “Ich antwortete, das sei politisch unmöglich.” 78-79. 





Schütz.  Bahr’s June 18th commentary expressed deep frustration with both RIAS’s 
actions and the reaction of the Western powers during the uprising.  
 The addition did not distract Bahr from his predominant concern, which was to 
characterize the events of June 17 as an assertion of German national identity.  The 
events in Berlin, Bahr hoped, would lead the Western Allies and Soviets to come together 
and agree on a solution to the German question and unification.  The Soviet Union had 
abandoned the GDR, forced it to reverse its policies, and had undermined its 
functionaries, revealing their lack of concern for the current state.  He closed with an 
optimistic outlook, “The power of the regime was reduced, the Zone’s worth to the 
Soviets diminished, and that will accelerate German unity.  There can be no doubt that 
the days have accelerated the path towards unity.  All Germans have the population of 
East Berlin and the population of the Soviet Zone to thank for this.”95 
 Bahr’s assessment was certainly overly optimistic.  The value of the GDR to the 
Soviet Union became, ironically, greater, as a result of the uprising.  Since many linked 
the uprising to Beria’s proposed path of reform, his opponents in Moscow used the 
uprising as a means of undermining him and eventually orchestrating the Soviet leader’s 
arrest and execution.  Consequently, Beria’s accusers were forced to legitimate their 
power by insuring the survival of the GDR.  The connection between June 17 and the 
succession crisis in Moscow had improbably given the GDR a new lease on life.  If 
anything, the uprising had made unification less likely than ever before.96 
                                                 
95 Ibid., “Die Macht des Regimes wurde verkleinert, der Wert der Zone für die Sowjets wurde verringert, und das ist 
der Weg, der die deutsche Einheit beschleunigen wird, und diese Tage werden die Einheit beschleunigen, daran kann 
kein Zweifel sein.  Alle Deutschen haben dies der Bevölkerung Ostberlins und der Bevölkerung der noch sowjetische 
besetzten Zone zu danken.” 





 Bahr’s commentary is an important contribution to West German political culture.  
By linking the uprising to the quest for German reunification, Bahr and others lay the 
groundwork that would transform June 17th into the “Day of German Unity.”  This idea 
was reinforced when West Berlin mayor Ernst Reuter delivered a RIAS commentary 
following Bahr’s broadcast on the night of June 18th.  Reuter gave a commentary that 
again stressed the importance of German reunification.  “But we will continue do 
everything to attend to the goal we have set for ourselves: that Germany will once again 
be reunited.  There is no problem that is as pressing as the reunification of Germany.  
There is no rest, no peace that does not honestly deal with this problem.  And I would like 
to say, for everyone with a heart, everyone with understanding, everyone with feelings, 
there can be no sacrifice large enough in order to achieve this goal—the unification of 
Germany—through a true peace.”97  Like Bahr, Reuter linked peace with German 
reunification.  June 17 was an uprising for reunification, an event affecting all Germans, 
not just those living in East Germany. 
 A RIAS newscast from June 19, 1953 provides a good overview of the type of 
news stories the station was broadcasting throughout the days following the June 17th 
uprising.  It presented a somber overview of events without trying to cast them in a 
favorable light.  It began by noting the increased presence of soldiers throughout East 
Berlin, a sign of the curfew and the state of emergency that had been instituted by the 
Soviet authorities in East Germany and then related how governments around the world 
had expressed sympathy and solidarity with those East Germans killed during the 
                                                 
97 Ernst Reuter spricht, June 18, 1953, produced in RIAS Berlin, Der Aufstand der Arbeiterschaft im Ostsektor von 
Berlin und in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschands, 19-20.  “Aber wir werden alles tun, um unsere Arbeit, die 
wir immer uns zum Ziele gesetzt haben—Deutschland wieder zo vereinigung—fortzusetzen.  Es gibt keinen Frieden, 
ehe dieses Problem nicht gelöst ist.  Und ich möchet auch sagen, für jeden von uns, der Herz hat, der Verstand hat, der 






uprising.  The broadcast closed by paraphrasing a message from the West Berlin DGB 
that invoked the memory of Lenin’s famous phrase.  “The workers demanded freedom, 
bread, and peace, yet their answer was salvos of gunfire.”98 
 RIAS was a participant in the events of June 17 and played a decisive role in 
analyzing and explaining the uprising.  Beginning with the June 16 4:30 pm newscast and 
Schütz’s 7:45 pm commentary, the station helped spread news of the East Berlin protests 
throughout the GDR.  Furthermore, it had encouraged East Germans to press for more 
radical and sweeping goals and had helped coordinate the 7:00 Strausberger Platz Rally.  
Critically, the station had also spread the idea that the protests had a realistic chance of 
success.  RIAS, which had originally simply been a shaper of rhetoric and political 
culture, had become an active political actor in the events taking place in East Germany.  
RIAS did not cause June 17.  However, the events would not have transpired as they did 
without the stations’ active involvement.  The RIAS broadcasts followed a programming 
tradition that had been developed since the Berlin airlift.  The station had been actively 
attempting to undermine the legitimacy of the GDR since 1949, and it is critical to note 
that the same programs it had broadcast to do this since 1949 and 1950, Werktag der 
Zone and Berlin spricht zur Zone, played an important part in shaping the discourse and 
ideas of the June 17 Uprising.   
It is important to note the role RIAS played in shaping the conception and 
narrative of June 17.  It may not have played a direct role in managing the events, but it 
certainly participated in explaining them to listeners.  From the moment the 
demonstrations began, Schütz, Bahr, and their colleagues set about examining the events 
                                                 
98 RIAS News Broadcast, June 19, 1953, DRA Potsdam, RIAS Depositium, B 203-00-02/0001, “Die Arbeiter hätten 





and placing them within a broader context.  Thus, even before the protests broke out 
across the GDR, Eberhard Schütz was already stressing the democratic demands of the 
strikers.  Their demands for lower quotas were acknowledged, but considered only 
secondary to the more radical goals of fundamentally changing the government of the 
GDR.  By June 18, Egon Bahr was already describing June 17 as a push for German 
unity and an expression of the East German peoples’ yearning for reunification with the 
rest of Germany.  Democratic reform, change in the East German government, and peace 
were all linked with unification.  Thus, RIAS participated in the process that transformed 
June 17 from a workers’ uprising into a popular uprising in the name of German unity. 
 
East German Radio, June 17, and X Day 
 
 Perhaps the most notable element of East German political broadcasts during June 
17 is their silence.  RIAS effectively ruled East Germany’s airwaves during the uprising, 
to the point that the SED and Soviet officials themselves were relying on it for 
information during the protests.  As Ingrid Pietrzynski writes, radio stations reported “as 
good as nothing” about the events on June 17.99  Regular news broadcasts were sent, but 
without any mention of the work stoppages and demonstrations.  This silence was 
decisive.  As noted above, East German listeners often tuned into a variety of radio 
stations along with RIAS to gain news and information.  The failure of the GDR’s 
stations to confront the protests meant that RIAS’s broadcasts about the uprising went 
unchallenged.  For the most part, light music was broadcast, further allowing RIAS to 
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control and manage the story throughout the day.  It would not be until the evening of 
June 17 that an East German station broadcast a commentary on the current events in the 
GDR, over a day since RIAS first began broadcasting news of the demonstrations during 
the afternoon of June 16.100   
Thus, East Germany’s radio stations reacted in much the same way as the rest of 
the GDR’s institutions.  Panicked and shaken by the size of the uprising, it was shocked 
into a state of confusion until the Soviet troops brought stability back to the GDR.  The 
cause for the silence was a mixture of confusion and Ulbricht’s own order to State Radio 
Committee Chairman (StRK) Kurt Heiss, to maintain normal programming.101  Just as 
RIAS was helping to create June 17, East Germany’s three Berlin broadcasters tried to 
make it into a non-event.  This approach was harshly criticized by many in the GDR, 
particularly by members of the East German intelligentsia such as Stefan Heym and 
Bertolt Brecht.102   
 The journalists at the GDR’s three Berlin radio stations were nevertheless faced 
with considerable intellectual challenges.  First, the stations needed to explain and justify 
the sudden policy change of the SED and its adoption of the New Course without 
undermining the SED’s claim to authority.  Second, in the wake of the June 17 uprising, 
the GDR’s stations needed to explain why it was that the people of the GDR, the German 
workers’ state, rose up against the SED.  In answering these two challenges, East German 
radio participated in the construction of a narrative that explained how an uprising of 
workers could occur in the workers’ state of East Germany.  The narrative placed the 
                                                 
100 As discussed in the previous chapter, all radio operations in the GDR were centralized in Berlin in 1952.  Berliner 
Rundfunk and all other stations were dissolved and replaced with Berlin I, II, and III.  Although each of these focused 
on different areas of programming, political commentaries and news were often broadcast on all three at different 
times. 
101 Pietrzynski, “Der 17. Juni 1953 im Rundfunk der DDR,” 117. 





blame for the uprising on a US sponsored fascist coup attempt.  An important component 
of this interpretation was RIAS’s broadcasts, which the East Germans accused of 
directing the uprising through the use of both coded and overt messages. 
 The process began as soon as the New Course was made public on June 11.  On 
June 13, Karl Eduard von Schintzler gave a commentary that attempted to explain how 
the adoption of the New Course, while an explicit admission that the SED had made 
mistakes, was nevertheless a testament to its authority and infallibility.  The title already 
indicated his goal: “A Confession of Mistakes: Evidence of Strength.”  The commentary 
was broadcast on all three Berlin stations over the course of the next two days.  Von 
Schnitzler opened with a simple declaration: “A government has made mistakes; and it 
admits these mistakes with frankness and is using drastic measures to correct these 
mistakes.”103  It must have been surprising to hear a GDR reporter like von Schnitzler 
admit that the government had made mistakes.  That he repeated the word three times in a 
single sentence must have been equally surprising.  The Party had made 
recommendations based on a frank self-criticism of its policies.   
 Von Schnitzler continued by arguing the SED’s decision was unprecedented and 
marked a decisive turn in German history.  “This is something new in Germany,” he 
proclaimed.  “Hitherto, no government and no ruling party, though it might have wanted 
to, could dare to acknowledge mistakes, or even to take the helm and energetically alter 
the course of the ship of state in order to bring it onto the right course once again.”104  
                                                 
103 Sendemanuskript, “Eingeständnis von Fehlern—ein Beweis der Stärke,” Eduard von Schnitzler, June 13, 1953, 
DRA Potsdam, Historisches Archiv, Bestand Hörfunk, B 095-00-01/0002, Tsig 0125. “Eine Regierung hat Fehler 
gemacht; und sie gesteht diese Fehler freimütig ein und trifft tiefgreifende Massnahmen, um diese Fehler zu 
korrigieren.” 
104 Ibid., “Das ist etwas Neues in Deutschland…Keine Regierung und keine Regierungspartei hat es bisher wagen 
können, noch hätte sie es gewollt, begangene Fehler zuzugeben, oder gar das Ruder energisch herumzureissen, um das 





Only one party and one government could do this.  “Comprehending past mistakes, 
frankly admitting them, and boldly correcting them, is not evidence of weakness, but of 
strength, of the authority deeply rooted in the people, of the faithfulness to the peoples’ 
interests, of sincerity and honesty.”105  Thus, according to the logic of von Schnitzler’s 
argument, the party was always right because it could admit when it was wrong. 
 Von Schnitzler continued, further stressing the link between the frank admissions 
of mistakes with strength.  This frank discussion distinguished the GDR from Adenauer’s 
regime in Bonn.  There, honest discussion ´was impossible.  As a consequence, the 
interests of the people were ignored and neglected.  In contrast, the SED’s frank self-
criticism strengthened and fortified its authority and allowed it to better serve the 
interests of the German people.  Von Schnitzler proceeded to praise the New Course, 
declaring that there was “no doubt” that the new policies would improve the economic 
situation in East Germany and provide better conditions for the East German people.  The 
commentary praised the major tenets of the New Course, specifically noting the 
provisions encouraging remigration to the GDR and a more conciliatory relationship with 
the East German churches on the part of the SED.  The careful “examination” of past 
criminal procedures would, “without a doubt,” increase the trust in the democratic order.  
Von Schnitzler even expressed support for private industry.  “At this juncture, the 
importance that will devolve to the trades and small and medium sized private factories, 
who constitute such an important factor in our consumer goods industry, is self 
evident.”106   
                                                 
105 Ibid., “Die Einsicht begangener Fehler, ihr freimütiges Eingeständnis und die kühne Korrektur sind keine Zeichen 
der Schwäche, sondern Beweis der Stärke, der tief im Volke wurzelnden Autorität, der Ergebenheit gegenüber dem 
Volke und seinen Interessen, der Aufrichtigkeit und Ehrlichkeit.” 
106 Ibid., “Es liegt auf der Hand, welche Bedeutung hierbei, dem Handwerk und den kleinen und mittleren 





 Citing the Politbüro’s proceedings from June 9, von Schnitzler declared that the 
primary goal of these changes was to lay the groundwork for the reunification of 
Germany.  Von Schnitzler noted, “Today, the unity of Germany stands as the decisive 
question.”107  Again, Adenauer’s West German government was invoked as the chief 
obstacle to unification, and the Chancellor’s policies were blamed for creating a spirit of 
hostility in West Germany.  The commentary closed by paraphrasing the words of August 
Bebel, the nineteenth century Social Democratic leader, by declaring that “one should 
look less at the mouth and more at the finger.”108  Actions spoke louder than words, and 
the GDR, by adopting the sweeping provisions of the New Course, was demonstrating its 
commitment to German unification.   
 Von Schnitzler’s commentary belongs to a series of remarkable commentaries 
presented by the East German radio stations in June and July of 1953.  The broadcast was 
clearly in line with the policy dictates of the SED Politbüro.  The party was still the only 
legitimate force of authority in the GDR, even when it admitted errors.  The New Course 
was praised as a necessary measure, and there was no reason to doubt that it would have 
an immediate and positive effect.  Von Schnitzler endeavored throughout the broadcast to 
use the SED’s admission of errors as evidence of the party’s strength.  He did not detail 
what these mistakes were, and instead focused on the actual act of admitting them.  His 
praise of the “frank” acknowledgement of error was anchored to the needs of 
strengthening the authority of the SED and presenting evidence for the New Course.  
Thus, although it was unusual for an SED controlled organ to frankly admit that the 
SED’s policies had been wrong, von Schnitzler’s commentary nevertheless remained, in 
                                                 
107 Ibid., “Die einheit Deutschlands steht heute als die entscheidende Frage vor uns.” 






terms of its goals and style, fully in line with the type of commentaries East German 
stations had been broadcasting since 1947. 
 East German stations continued to develop the ideas of error and mistakes after 
June 17.  On July 2, 1953, roughly two weeks since the uprising, Herbert Gessner 
presented a broadcast that placed partial blame for the uprising on the radio stations of 
the GDR.  He opened in much the same way von Schnitzler had opened his broadcast on 
June 13.  “Our radio has, for a fairly long time, made a range of mistakes.”109  
Discussions with workers had revealed this, “plainly and clearly” and it was the 
obligation of East German Radio to respond accordingly.  The focus of Gessner’s 
discussion was on how East Germany’s radio stations had failed to adequately serve the 
workers.  As the SED had declared on June 21 of the previous month, if the workers do 
not understand the party, it was not the fault of the workers but the fault of the workers.  
Furthermore, “If masses of listeners do not understand our radio—and that means, if they 
turn off the station or go to another station—it is the radio that is guilty, not the 
listeners.”110  The primary complaint against East German radio stations was that it 
“white washed” its stories (“Schönfarberei”).  Gessner admitted the accusation was true.  
“In many cases we have broadcast that which has suited us.  That must change.”111   
 However, this did not mean the airing of multiple opinions.  “Does this mean, that 
we will broadcast every opinion?  That we will not do, we answer plainly and clearly.”112  
Nothing aimed at agitating the Soviet Union could be broadcast.  At the same time, 
                                                 
109 Sendemanusckript, Kommentar zum Sontag, July 2, 1953, Herbert Gessner, BAB, DR 6 193.  “Unser Rundfunk hat 
seit geraumer Zeit eine Reihe ernster Fehler begangen.”   
110 Ibid., “Wenn Massen von Hörern unseren Funk nicht verstehen—und das heisst, wenn sie ihn abdrehen oder auf 
andere Sender gehen—ist der Funk schuld, nicht der Hörer.” 
111 Ibid., “Wir haben aber vielfach gesendet, was uns genehm war.  Das muß man ändern.” 
112 Ibid., “Aber heißt das, daß wir jede Meinung senden werden?  Das, um auch hier klipp und klar zu antworten, 





despite the heated debates over US policy in Germany, nothing attacking the American 
people themselves would be transmitted.  Nothing that could divide the working classes 
would be broadcast either.  This, the commentary declared, was what RIAS had done and 
doing this had helped fan the flames of June 17 and given, “the leaders of the fascist 
provocateurs” the chance to assume their former positions as SS commanders.  In spite of 
these goals, there were nevertheless differences of opinion amongst the East German 
people.  These needed to be discussed over the airwaves.  However, again, those who 
sought to follow the Americans and help transform Germany into a nuclear battlefield 
could never be permitted to speak.  Said Gessner, “We are for free discussions about how 
to prevent war and how to defend peace.  However, the microphone is never open to 
advocate a policy encouraging war.”113   
 Yet, Gessner admitted with frankness, the East German radio stations had offered 
boring broadcasts and insulted the intelligence of its listeners:   
 
When, for example, our news service said, ‘The Bonn War 
Chancellor Adenauer declared yesterday that the Adenauer 
Clique will, through inattention to the populations’ desire 
for peace, proceed with its policy of war,’ that was 
naturally such nonsense with regards to how it was phrased.  
Adenauer is not so dumb, as to enunciate such things 
openly.  But, that he, as the representative of the Bonn 
Regime, through inattention to the populations’ desire for 
peace, is pursuing a policy that threatens to provoke a war, 
that is right, that is true.114 
 
                                                 
113 Ibid., “Wir sind für freie Diskussionen darüber, wie ein Krieg verhindert, der Frieden bewahrt werden kann.  Für 
eine Politik der Kriegsvorbereitung jedoch wird bei uns niemals das Mikrofon offen stehen.” 
114 Ibid., “Wenn es zum Beispiel in unseren Nachrichtendiensten hieß, „Der Bonner Kriegskanzler Adenauer erklärte 
gestern, die Adenauer-Clique werde unter Mißachtung des Friedenswillens der Bevölkerung ihre Kriegspolitik 
fortsetzen“, so war das natürlich Nonsens, was die Formulierung betrifft.  So dumm, das offen auszusprechen, ist 
Adenauer nun einmal nicht.  Aber dass der als Vertreter des Bonner Regimes unter Mißachtun des Friedenswillens der 






Gessner continued to situate the problem in comparison to RIAS and other western 
broadcasters.  “We have often awkwardly formulated the truth.  The Western stations 
formulate many lies ingeniously.”115  East German stations needed to learn to react faster 
and present news quicker to prevent the embarrassing situation by which East Germans 
already heard news from western stations before reading about it in East German 
newspapers the next day.  Gessner implored listeners to come forward with their honest 
opinions about East German broadcasting, noting that radio broadcasting could not 
improve unless listeners made their voices heard.  Gessner closed with a recapitulation of 
the major tasks of East German radio: to forge German reunification, its peaceful 
development, and its peaceful integration into the rest of Europe, guided by the will and 
interest of the people.  “That was our task, which we pursued with, in many respects, 
rather defective and inadequate measures.  This is our task, which we must now pursue 
with more justice.  This remains our task, unchanged in content, that we, my listeners, 
together with you, will solve with better methods and greater conviction.”116 
 Gessner’s commentary reads like many of the SED Politbüro and Central 
Committee meetings held to discuss problems with East German radio.  Yet, this frank 
and critical commentary was transmitted and made public.  It reveals an earnest wish to 
improve the quality and popularity of radio broadcasting in East Germany.  On July 8 and 
11, Gessner and von Schnitzler respectively gave commentaries focusing on mistakes 
made by the East German stations.  At the same time, Gessner and von Schnitzler had 
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unzulänglichen Mitteln verfolgt haben. Das ist unsere Aufgabe, der wir jetzt besser gerecht werden müssen.  Das bleibt 
unsere Aufgabe, in ihrem Inhalt unverändert, die wir, meine Hörerinnen und Hörer, mit Ihnen zusammen, mit besseren 





been working on a memorandum calling for sweeping changes to be instituted at the East 
German radio stations.  The two reporters, both of whom had been trained at western 
stations117, were opposed to the radical Stalinization of East German radio and broadcast 
news.  Their reforms called for greater objectivity, a wider survey of different opinions, 
and programming that focused on all social classes and not just members of the SED.   
However, before the memorandum could be made public, the SED made efforts to 
reassert its authority over the East German radio stations.  The GDR radio stations’ 
frequent broadcasts of self-criticism and frank assessments of its effectiveness received a 
good deal of derision and criticism in the German Democratic Republic’s press.  On July 
17, 1953, the Berliner Zeitung featured a cartoon depicting five life-sized, 
anthropomorphic microphones crying before a group of bewildered and disapproving 
spectators.  The cartoon is marked “Selbstkritik der Mikrofones.”118  At the end of July, 
the 15th Party Congress of the Central Committee of the SED condemned East German 
radio for its “discussions of mistakes.”119  The StRK report discussing the SED’s 
conclusions reads like the minutes of the meeting held to dismiss Heinz Schmidt from 
Berlin Rundfunk in 1949.  Once again, the Politbüro condemned GDR radio for 
objectivity and for failing to pursue an adequately revolutionary posture in its broadcasts.  
The previous approach was marked by “objective tendencies” and “petit bourgeois 
conceptions.”  Once again, mistakes in radio broadcasting were due to the lack of 
appropriate cooperation with cadres and party representatives.  There was no discussion 
of the events of June 17 and GDR Radio’s failure to broadcast anything on the events.  
Instead, the focus of criticism was on von Schnitzler’s and Gessner’s frequent 
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“discussions of mistakes.”120  Neither von Schnitzler or Gessner were forced to step down 
as a result of East German radio broadcasts during July 1953.  Their memorandum was 
never made public.  However, the frank admission of mistakes, which began even before 
June 17, came to an end.   
Nevertheless, the SED was aware that something needed to be done to improve 
the quality of broadcasting.  Beginning in the summer of 1953, the StRK introduced 
measures aimed at improving cultural and entertainment programming.121  By the fall of 
1953, the programming change seemed to have had an effect, as one can see in a report 
drawn up by StRK’s Department for Listener Connection (Hörerverbindung).  They also 
give us a sense of why listeners were drawn to RIAS in the first place.  The report 
presented the results listener letters and a series of listener assemblies held during the fall 
of 1953.  Writers and assembly participants praised the GDR stations for their renewed 
interest in entertainment programming.  The report, interestingly, noted that, “Around 95 
percent of listeners express positive opinions about the new programming because it is 
more relaxed, diverse, and entertaining.  A radio correspondent from Rieasa wrote, 
among other things, ‘Today, no one hears people say, I would like to turn on RIAS so 
that I can hear beautiful and light music.’”122  The report also remarked that audiences 
had come to trust the GDR stations more.  However, in this context “trust” did not refer 
so much to accurate news but more to seeing the stations as a place to which they could 
send personal questions about housing affairs and job advancement.  Thus, listeners saw 
                                                 
120 Quartalsbericht III/1953 der Hauptabteilung Kader des Staatlichen Rundfunkkomitees, quoted by Pietrzynski, “Der 
17. Juni 1953 im Rundfunk der DDR,” 129. 
121 Arnold and Classen, “Radio in der DDR,” in Zwischen Pop und Propaganda, 16.  See as well Dussel, “Die 
Sowjetisierung des DDR-Rundfunks in den fünfziger Jahren,” 1001. 
122 Analyse uber die Massenverbindungen des Rundfunks, October 19, 1953, BAB D 6/231, “Ungefähr 95 Prozent der 
Hörer äussern sich zustimmend zum neuen Programm, weil es aufgelockerter und abwechslungsreicher ist und mehr 
Unterhaltung bringt.  Ein Funkkorrespondent aus Riesa schrieb u.a.: „Heute hört man niemand mehr sagen, man 





the stations as a repository of knowledge and information outside of its news broadcasts.  
However, there were still complaints about the news programming and the StRK was 
concerned that individuals were not discussing political attitudes and opinions enough.  
Listeners complainted that “The news was too dry, and there was too little reported on 
affairs from the rest of the world.”123  Listeners also asked for more light entertainment 
and lighter music throughout the day.  Regarding this, the StRK noted that at the Listener 
Assemblies, participants did not discuss political and current events broadcasting 
enough.124 
A more enduring consequence of June 17 on East German radio was the creation 
of the X Day narrative.  At the same that Gessner, von Schnitzler, and their colleagues 
were presenting commentaries describing errors committed by East German stations, the 
same reporters also gave commentaries explaining how the events of June 17 came to 
pass.  The concept of “X Day” was developed through GDR propaganda, yet was 
grounded in fundamental ideas held by the SED and its security arm, the Ministry for 
State Security (Stasi) concerning the origins of the mass uprising.   
 RIAS was critical to the legend of “X Day” (“Tag X”).  The GDR government 
believed that RIAS, as an arm of US espionage in Berlin, had both subverted the 
authority of the East German government and then sent broadcasts on June 16 and 17 
throughout the GDR in order to launch and direct the fascist coup plot.  A report from the 
Stasi gives insight into how the East German government perceived RIAS’s actions 
during the summer of 1953.  The report declared that western stations claimed to be 
                                                 






objective in order to deceive listeners.125  Furthermore, it fanned the flames of discontent 
with pessimistic reporting that threatened to disrupt the social order.  Stations tried to, 
“empoison the relationship between the individual and the whole; with unfathomable 
pessimism is bred distress, despair, and hopelessness, the people are talked into hardship 
and misery, bondage, depression and exploitation until they lose their moral footing and 
perspective.”126  Thus, the Stasi attributed discontent with the GDR to the influence of 
foreign radio stations.  The stations exploited this discontent to encourage East Germans 
to commit acts of sabotage and resist the government.  Western stations also defamed 
Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet Union.  
 The report addressed all western stations, not just RIAS, and focused on NWDR 
Berlin, RIAS, the BBC, Radio Paris, Radio Belgrade, and Südwestfunk.  However, RIAS 
was the station the Stasi monitored the most and the station the Stasi believed to be the 
most influential.  Of the 99 broadcasts concerning the June 17 uprising that were 
excerpted and analyzed, nineteen were from NWDR Hamburg, 12 were from the BBC, 1 
was from SWF and 67 were from RIAS.   
 Although the Stasi often misinterpreted the goal and content of RIAS broadcasts, 
it nevertheless showed a keen understanding of its techniques and tactics.  The Stasi 
observed, for example, that RIAS was making an effort to cause a rift between the SED 
and East German workers.  This had been an element of RIAS broadcasts since the Berlin 
blockade.  The Stasi report noted, “…one uses this opposition to signify a struggle 
                                                 
125 Analyse über die Sendungen des RIAS usw. im Zusammenhang mit d. Putschversuch v. 17.6.1953, Die 
Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatsicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deuschen Demokratischen Republik 
(BStU), Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, Zentrale Auswertungs- und Informationsgruppe, 25253, 5-93, 16 (I use the 
BStU’s pagination of the MfS documents).  
126 Ibid., “Unter diesen Voraussetzungen wird versucht das Verhältnis vom Einzelnen zur Gesamtheit zu zersetzen; mit 
abgrundtiefen Pessimismus werden Verzweiflung, Hoffnungslosigkeit und Ausweglosigkeit gezüchtet, den Menschen 
Not und Elend, Unfreiheit, Unterdrückung und Ausbeutung solange eingeredet, bis sich moralischer Halt und 





between the working classes and the SED and conclude that the party has neither the 
classes nor the people behind it and that it will therefore come to an end.”127  Similarly, 
the Stasi understood the motives guiding RIAS broadcasts after the New Course was 
announced.  The report noted that, “The June 9, 1953 decisions of the Politbüro of the 
Central Committee took the wind out of the opponents’ sails.”  The sudden reversal of the 
SED’s policies had left the stations at a loss.  However, it was not long before they 
established a “unified line and system” to assault the New Course.128  This “unified line” 
stressed the success of the Western powers, the success of the opposition in the GDR, and 
focused on the bankrupt declarations of the SED.  RIAS and other western stations were 
attached to a so-called “Adenauer-Reuter Consortium” a group pressing for German 
reunification on their terms at the expense of the interests of the GDR.129  Citing a RIAS 
broadcasts of Voice of America and a speech from Jakob Kaiser, the Stasi noted western 
stations were trying to disrupt the GDR through their calls to free prisoners of war in the 
Soviet Union, institute freedom of the press and freedom of assembly.   
 An important element in the Stasi’s report is how it creates a monolithic picture of 
western media.  Although RIAS is the focus of its attention, NWDR Hamburg and the 
BBC are nevertheless considered part of the broader unified line, despite the fact that one 
answered to a board of directors in Hamburg, the other to directors in London, and the 
last one to the USIA.  Furthermore, there is little consideration for distinctions in RIAS’s 
own broadcasting.  VOA broadcasts, produced in Washington DC and exported to USIA 
                                                 
127 Ibid., “Zugleich benutzt man sich diesen Widerstand als Kampf zwischen Arbeiterschat und SED zu bezeichnen und 
daraus zu schlußfolgern, daß die Partei weder die Klasse noch das Volk hinter sich hat und daß es demzufolge mit ihr 
zu Ende geht.”  21. 
128 Ibid., “…eine einheitliche Linie und Systematik feststellen….” 58. 





stations, were made independently of RIAS’s own programs.130  Secondly, speeches 
made by West German officials were considered just another element of RIAS’s 
organized campaign against the GDR.  The notion, for example, that Jakob Kaiser would 
be given free reign to say what he wished and that his speech did not necessarily reflect 
the views of RIAS and its staff, was not considered. 
 Naturally, the Stasi devoted considerable attention to western broadcasts sent on 
June 16 and 17.  On the broadcasts of RIAS, NWDR Hamburg, and the BBC, the report 
noted, “All following news broadcasts afforded the provocation for war top priority and 
reported on them in great detail.”131  The stations encouraged listeners to participate in 
the demonstrations.  The fiery speeches of the war provocateurs had been relayed through 
the airwaves by the various radio stations.  All of this was done at the orders of the 
imperialist forces, such as the “Adenauer Clique” and other “Bonn functionaries” who 
were directing and organizing both the broadcasts and the demonstrations.  The word 
“strikers” was placed in quotation marks throughout to stress the belief that the strikes 
were in fact cover for fascist activities.  The Bonn regime hoped, the Stasi report 
indicated, that the demonstrations would succeed in destroying the GDR.   
 While a number of radio stations were cited throughout the report, RIAS was the 
principle provocateur.  Schütz’s June 16 commentary was heavily quoted to provide 
readers with a sense of RIAS’s argumentation and approach to the demonstrations.  
However, the quote is inaccurate, presenting the correct language, but conflating two 
different commentaries and placing them out of order.  The first half of the quotation 
presents a near verbatim passage from Schütz’s commentary.  However, the second half 
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is a quotation of a description of the workers’ delegations’ visit to the RIAS station house 
that same evening.  There is no indication that these two excerpts were broadcast in the 
way the Stasi presented them.  The latter half of the quotation was, according to RIAS 
records, broadcast before Schütz’s commentary, and was in fact part of a commentary 
sent to introduce the Schütz broadcast.  Both were sent during the same program.132  The 
actual language of the broadcasts was accurate.  However, the report fails to distinguish 
between different speakers and mixes up the order of paragraphs.  The Stasi were not 
always accurate in their transcriptions. 
 The Stasi report presented a monolithic depiction of western radio stations. RIAS, 
NWDR, and the BBC were all part of the same conspiracy.  All took their orders from a 
broad imperialist clique.  With the exception of references to Adenauer and the West 
German government, the members of this clique are rarely described in detail.  There is 
nothing in the report concerning the individuals working for the stations either.  For the 
most part, the radio stations are the faceless tools of pro-fascist war provocateurs.  The 
quotations from various broadcasts are sometimes wrongly transcribed and do not 
provide any indication of different viewpoints, different speakers, or different programs.  
The broadcasts are presented as evidence of a unified line of argumentation presented at 
all the western radio stations. 
 Within weeks after the June 17 uprising, East German ratio stations translated the 
Stasi’s interpretation of the events through their broadcasts.  The daily commentary on 
July 2, 1953 discussed how terrorist fascist organizations armed and funded by the United 
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States had launched covert missions into East Germany to help incite a revolt.133  
Gessner’s daily commentary for July 6 implicated West German banking concerns, 
claiming that increased telephone conversations between various corporations was 
evidence of a preconceived plot.134   
The idea of “X Day” would be a prominent element of East German radio during 
programming broadcast to mark the anniversary of the events as well.  In this sense, radio 
participated in a general project undertaken by the GDR to develop and disseminate the 
legend of “X Day.”  In 1954, East German radio’s Programs I and II both featured reports 
and commentaries on the show trials held to convict those who were supposedly involved 
in organizing and staging the attempted coup.  A documentary-commentary from June 
11, 1954 illustrates the various elements of the “X Day” narrative.  The focus of the 
broadcast was defendant, Wolfang Silgradt.  Born in 1905, Stilgradt worked as a 
journalist in Heidelberg, Leipzig, and Vienna before serving in the armed forces and 
being incarcerated in an American POW camp.  Returning to Leipzig in 1945, he moved 
out of the GDR in 1950 because of his contacts with the CDU’s Ostbüro and the threat of 
being arrested by the Stasi.  On February 20, 1954 the Stasi kidnapped him after he 
entered the Eastern Sector of Berlin.  Along with three others, he was subsequently put 
on trial for participating in the June 17 uprising.135  The commentary depicted Silgradt as 
a fascist agent and a capitalist.  He had earned his money “in the most discriminating 
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style and manner,” and had worked as an advisor to German cartels.136  He had worked as 
a member of the economics administration in fascist occupied Poland during the war.  A 
former member of the Advisory Board for Questions on German Reunification 
(Forschungsbeirat für Fragen der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands), he had used his 
influence with that organization to continue the acts of “plundering” he had perpetrated in 
Poland.137  In East Germany, he was an opponent of the anti-fascist Bloc Politics and 
worked as a spy for the CDU’s Ostbüro.  Upon his departure from the GDR, he continued 
to work as a spy and became involved with the Federal Ministry for All German Affairs.  
At the same time, the program noted, “Then, he initiated relations with an institution, 
which calls itself with rare brazenness as a radio station and as RIAS sends everything 
objectionable to the ear.”138 Through his connections with RIAS, Silgradt became 
involved with “Stein,” an American agent.  Although the broadcast does not specify, the 
“Stein” referred to here was Lisa Stein, a worker for RIAS’s Ostbüro responsible for 
interviewing visitors to the station from the Eastern Zone.  Stein would figure 
prominently in subsequent Stasi reports on RIAS and was frequently a target of anti-
RIAS activities (see next chapter). 
Thus, in the years before the June 17 uprising, Silgradt had developed into the 
type of individual who would be willing and eager to participate in a pro-fascist 
attempted coup.  The commentator presented the day in a dramatic fashion.  The 
perpetrators sought, by using poison gas and terror, to make “the fortress ripe to be 
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stormed.”  “The day was X Day, the fortress was the German Democratic Republic.”139  
However, the day passed and the GDR survived due to the steadfastness of the Soviet 
army and the commitment of the true workers and farmers dedicated to the institutions of 
the GDR.   
A broadcast sent three days later further developed these themes.  The broadcast, 
another commentary by Mendelsohn, was designed to provide a final report on the 
Silgradt trial.  In this particular commentary, the speaker implicated RIAS as the catalyst 
for the uprising.  “Let’s go back one year to June 17, 1953.  One day before, the call to 
start the coup was sent over RIAS and the call for a general strike was broadcast by Ernst 
Scharnowski, the West Berlin Chairman of the Deutschen Gewerkschaftbund.”140  The 
broadcast created the picture of a vast network of spies, assembled in West Germany and 
deployed across the GDR with the intent of destroying the East German state.  Members 
of this network included but were not limited to the CDU, FDP, SPD, the Federal 
Ministry for All-German Affairs, the DGB, and RIAS.  Importantly, this network was 
planning a second coup attempt.  As the commentator concluded:  
 
And for this new X Day, which is now being planned and 
arranged, the agents are now getting ready and the reports 
are being compiled, from Herr Jöhren, from the Eastern 
Office of the CDU, from Herr Götze, from the League of 
Human Rights, from Herr Nase, the leader of the Eastern 
Office of the FDP, from Herr Haas, from the Eastern Office 
of the SPD, from Herr Deiters, a leading representative of 
the Association of Political Eastern Refugees, from Frau 
Stein and her crony Kirnstadt at RIAS, from Rainer 
Hildebrandt, who has now accepted the Committee “17. 
Juni,” from Professor Kramer, Professor Thalheim, Dr, 
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Seume, Professor Meinberg, Dr. Franz Rupp, Herbert 
Wehner, Dr. Ing. Spenrat und Frederich-Karl von 
Zitzweitz-Nuttrin.  Their names are known, as are their 
deeds.  Their judges belong to our generation.  There is a 
name, which has not yet been named in this long sequence, 
yet would still be named.  Its carrier: a weazly, little old 
man who wobbled to West Berlin from the ash-heap of 
history to also be present: Kerensky.141 
 
 
The list included nearly every non-GDR official and personality and organization that 
was responsible for issues concerning East Germany.  Even Kerensky, living in the 
United States and politically powerless since 1917, was nevertheless believed to be part 
of this large conspiracy aimed at destroying East Germany.   
 During subsequent anniversaries, East German radio stations made sure to present 
a broadcast further reinforcing and develop the X Day narrative.  On June 16, 1955 both 
Programs I and II presented a broadcast condemning the United States for arming 
saboteurs and agents and sending them into the GDR to disrupt the state.  With the help 
of Ernst Reuter and his successor Otto Suhr, the US had erected a spy network in West 
Berlin designed to sabotage the GDR.  RIAS continued to broadcast lies and aspersions.  
Berlin was still a “frontstadt” and would remain so until West Berliners exposed the “nest 
of agents” in their midst.142   
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 That same day, Deutschlandsender, the East German station designed specifically 
for West German broadcasts, reviewed the chronology of events that led to X Day.  The 
espionage action was taken in reaction to the announcement of the New Course.  “In 
Korea, the cease fire was being signed.  A four-power conference emerged on the 
horizon.  The government of the German Democratic Republic announced on June 9 and 
11 the New Course.  Everywhere in the world as well as in Germany, the Cold War fever 
declined and a relaxation of tensions began.  The course of rearmament actions on the 
stock exchanged was being turned back.  New tensions and insecurity needed to come 
about in order to create a war psychosis.”143  Thus, threatened by the New Course, the 
West rapidly set about destabilizing the GDR.  German concerns sent Adenauer their 
demands and orders.  The West German espionage organization, the Gehlen group, 
created a network of spies to send into East Germany.  “And then began that 
“spontaneous peoples’ uprising,” managed over the airwaves by RIAS, in which paid 
male prostitutes (“Achtgroschenjungen”) burned red flags, demolished union buildings, 
dynamited consumer emporia, in which disguised fascists murdered work functionaries, 
in which such a beast as the former commanders of the Dorn Concentration Camp in 
Halle raged.”144  The “coup” once again failed, due to the solidarity of the workers and 
their Soviet allies.   
 Once again, East German radio created the image of a large, highly coordinated 
espionage action designed to undermine the GDR.  In this case, the commentator argued 
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that the action was launched to insure that the Cold War tensions were not relaxed.  The 
New Course was now hailed as evidence that East Germany and the Soviet Union sought 
a rapprochement with the west.  June 17 was seen as evidence that the west, rather than 
seek a relaxation of hostility, deliberately sought to increase the Cold War rivalry for the 
sake of the armaments industry in the US. 
 The primary element of the “X Day” narrative was a vast profascist conspiracy.  
All enemies of the GDR, from real critics to perceived threats, were placed within its 
broad umbrella.  Perhaps the most prominent idea that emerges is the overall siege 
mentality that the “X-Day” narrative creates.  The GDR is a state under threat.  West 
Berlin is depicted like a knife to East Germany’s throat, with RIAS and other 
organizations free to send agents into East Berlin to stage acts of sabotage and try and 
destroy the GDR.  Also critical is the belief that another “X-Day” is being planned.  
Thus, East Germany was depicted as being infiltrated and surrounded by enemies. 
 
 
Conclusion: Political Mythmaking and the June 17, 1953 Uprising 
 
 Both RIAS and East German radio helped create explanatory narratives of the 
June 17 uprising.  At both, this process began almost immediately after the events.  At 
RIAS, in fact, the process took place as the events unfolded.   
 The RIAS narrative is best represented by the commentaries presented by 
Eberhard Schütz, Egon Bahr, and Berlin spricht zur Zone.  Over the course of three days, 





reunification of Germany.  An analysis of these broadcasts, especially by Schütz and 
Bahr, reveals a large number of declarations and contentions to this effect as both RIAS 
reporters tried to explain the meaning of the uprising.  Frequently, both emphasized that 
the demonstrations were not just about the work quotas, but also about something bigger 
and more significant.  Schütz’s commentary stressed the democratic elements of the 
demonstrations, and focused on the demands for free elections, amnesty for strike 
participants, and the resignation of the Ulbricht government.  Bahr went further, and 
linked democratic reforms with German unification.  The June 17 uprising was a 
declaration for reunification.  The original impetus for the demonstrations, the work 
quotas, fell into the background.   
 Strikes and demonstrations became a popular uprising.  RIAS did not necessarily 
cause this transformation.  The June 16 demonstrations and the workers’ delegation all 
spoke about the need for democratic reforms and significant changes in the East German 
state.  However, a study of RIAS’s broadcasts between June 16 and 18 tells us a great 
deal about how a medium of the mass media can both develop and disseminate political 
narratives.  By June 18, RIAS’s morning broadcasts had already constructed a narrative 
framework.  The June 18th Werktag der Zone stressed this by describing how the same 
sequence of events occurred in multiple cities and towns throughout the GDR.  The event 
began with workers’ demands for a reduced quota and strikes.  The GDR’s inactivity led 
to a radicalization of demands for democracy and German unification coupled with a 
march upon government buildings.  Then, just as true fundamental change seemed 





events, the broadcast declared, was repeated throughout the GDR in a similar manner, 
with little variation. 
 East German radio also constructed narrative frameworks to describe June 17.  
However, the confusion and political rivalries afflicting the GDR government meant that 
the narrative was les consistent, especially during the weeks immediately after the 
uprising.  Whereas RIAS developed an explanatory framework for the uprising before it 
even began, East German radio produced two often-conflicting explanations.  The first 
focused on the mistakes made by both the SED and the radio stations.  Although Herbert 
Gessner made a point on July 2 to reinforce the idea that the uprising had been a minority 
action, he nevertheless focused on radio’s failure to understand the true needs and 
interests of the East German workers.  Thus, Gessner attributed the revolt to a failure on 
the part of the SED.  However, at the same time, reporters developed the idea of X.Day, 
and the belief that June 17 was a massive conspiracy launched by western agents to 
prevent a relaxation of Cold War tensions and attempt to bring down the GDR.  These 
narratives existed side by side until the end of July, when the SED ordered a stop to 
broadcasts about mistakes and failures.  This change reflected the resolution of the 
political rivalries afflicting the SED leadership between Ulbricht on the one side and 
Zaisser and Herrnstadt on the other.  In July, Ulbricht, whose own power and authority 
were strengthened, expelled the latter two from the party.  Thus, the hard-line Stalinist 
policies that had governed the SED since 1949 returned.  Radio reflected the 






Chapter Five: The East German Campaign Against RIAS. 
 
 
 In 1956, the deputy head of the East German State Radio Committee, Gerhard 
Eisler, received a letter from a lower level SED functionary.  The majority of the letter 
praised the GDR’s radio programming.  In closing, however, its author noted a point of 
concern.  “I have pointed out that many people in our Republic listen to RIAS and SFB 
alongside democratic Radio, and are of the opinion that the truth lies in the middle.  In 
any case, to be sure, many listen to RIAS and SFB!”1   GDR citizens, the letter 
confirmed, still listened to the radio stations of East Germany, Berliner Rundfunk 
included.  The problem was that they chose to listen to other broadcasters as well.   
 An important challenge facing the GDR during the 1950s was not just that their 
radio stations needed to engage and confront the broadcasts being sent by RIAS Berlin 
and other western broadcasters.  It was also that residents of the GDR chose to listen to 
West German stations as well as East German stations.  As a rival source for news and 
information for the GDR’s citizens, RIAS Berlin represented a critical challenge to the 
SED’s need for a monopoly on truth and interpretation.  Furthermore, many amongst the 
SED and the GDR’s Ministry for State Security, or Stasi, believed that the American 
funded station was a magnet for spies and a nerve center for espionage operations in East 
Germany.  For both these reasons, the German Democratic Republic undertook an 
aggressive campaign using radio broadcasts, newspaper articles, pamphlets, Stasi 
                                                 
1 Letter from Heinz Danke to Gerhart Eisler, November 27, 1956, BAB, Abteilung Agitation, SAPMO DY 30/ IV2/ 
9.02/84.  “Ich habe festgestellt, daß viele Menschen unserer Republik die Praxis üben, Rias und SFB, aber auch den 
demokratischen Rundfunk hören, und der Meinung sind, die Wahrheit liege in der Mitte.  Fest steht jedenfalls, daß 





infiltration, arrests, show trials, and broadcast jamming to prevent individuals from 
listening to West German broadcasts, with particular attention paid to RIAS.   An 
exploration of the GDR’s anti-RIAS campaign is critical to understanding how RIAS and 
other stations played a role in shaping German political culture.  Examining the campaign 
also allows one to explore important elements of East German political culture during the 
1950s.  The anti-RIAS campaign was a very visible expression of the SED’s concerns 
about its authority and legitimacy.   For the GDR, RIAS was a symbol of the war 
mongering policies of the imperialist United States and its illegitimate and fascist West 
German puppet state.  A consistent narrative pervaded almost all of the anti-RIAS 
pamphlets and newspaper stories produced by the GDR.  RIAS was almost always 
depicted as a militaristic, imperialist organ aimed at keeping Germany divided and 
provoking a war with the Soviet Union.  However, the GDR went beyond simply 
attacking the station.  RIAS listeners were also targeted, and were invariably cast as a 
minority of unpatriotic, treasonous, warmongers who were easily duped by the lies of the 
United States.  Listening to RIAS and visiting the station were acts of treason.  At the 
same time, allowing people to listen to RIAS was a threat to the very existence of the 
GDR.  Years before the SED physically sealed the GDR border in 1961, the East German 
government had already sealed its airwaves from outside influences by discouraging 
listening to foreign broadcasts and using transmission jamming to make such an act 
impossible.   
 Examining the GDR’s anti-RIAS campaign also allows us to examine the 
reception of RIAS’s broadcasts.  The virulence of the GDR’s campaign against the 





to the station.  This was corroborated by polls and surveys assembled by the United 
States Information Agency, the US Embassy to West Germany, and West German 
stations such as NWDR.  Throughout these polls, RIAS was consistently named the most 
popular source for news and information by those East Germans surveyed.  Thus, US, 
West German, and East German authorities were in agreement that RIAS was an 
immensely popular news source for GDR citizens.  At the same time, the GDR’s anti-
RIAS campaign allows us to examine how the SED and East German government 
received and understood RIAS’s broadcasts.  Thus, an analysis of the GDR’s anti-RIAS 
operations, ranging from propaganda to espionage, is another means of exploring the 
reception of dissemination of RIAS’s broadcasts.2 
 This chapter explores the anti-RIAS campaign as a multifaceted project that 
utilized a variety of media and tactics.  I begin by examining anti-RIAS media produced 
by the GDR throughout the 1950s.  I will then consider state directed harassment, 
attempts at infiltration, and show trials used against the station and finally consider the 
most effective anti-RIAS tool, frequency jamming.  I will conclude with a consideration 
of the broader consequences of the anti-RIAS campaign for the station’s position in 
German society. 
  
Print Media and Radio 
 
                                                 
2 Grimm ed. Literatur und Leser, Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1978), and Thompson, “Reception Theory and the Interpretation of Historical Meaning,” 





 In January 1952, the SED Politbüro resolved to wage an aggressive campaign 
aimed at curtailing “the listening to enemy radio.”3  The campaign focused on RIAS and 
the West German station Northwest German Radio.  In the words of the Politbüro, 
“These enemy radio stations serve the American and English occupying powers, are war 
mongers, propagate aspersions and lies against our Republic with the purpose of 
disrupting the peaceful construct, and organize sabotage and diversions.”4  The SED 
further declared that, “Those who listen to RIAS or NWDR open their ears to those who 
wish to incite war, open their homes to our peoples’ worst enemies and supports the 
enemies of peace and our system.”5  Since the stations were the mouthpieces of American 
and English imperialists, individuals who listened to either station helped the 
imperialists’ propaganda efforts and aided their war mongering.  Consequently, the SED 
declared that it needed to wage a, “campaign of ideological enlightenment” against both 
the station and those who listened to them, using newspapers, broadcasts, and other forms 
of mass pressure.6 
 If radio was to be a primary means for developing and shaping a socialist 
mentality within the masses of the GDR, then it was necessary for the GDR to have a 
monopoly on broadcasting.  However, as long as RIAS existed, the SED would never be 
able to hold a monopoly on all broadcasting within East Germany.  Even if only a small 
minority listened to the station, its ability to broadcast into the GDR represented a clear 
and present danger to the viability of the GDR.  Thus, the challenge was only 
                                                 
3 Protokolle des Politbüro des Zentralkomitees SED, no. 87, January 15, 1952, Bundesarchiv Lichterfelde, Stiftung 
Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO) DY 30/ IV2/2/ 187. 
4 Anlage 4 zum Protokoll no. 87 vom Januar 15, 1952, BAB, Protokolle des Politbüro des Zentralkomitees SED, 
SAPMO DY 30/ IV2/2/ 187.  “Diese Rundfunkstationen stehen im Dienste der amerikanischen und englischen 
Besatzungsmächte, hetzen zum Kriege, verbreiten Verleumdungen und Lügen gegen unsere Republik mit dem Ziele, 
den friedlichen Aufbau zu stören und Sabotage und Diversionen zu organisieren.” 
5 Ibid., “Wer RIAS oder NWDR hört, leiht den Kriegsbrandstiftern sein Ohr, öffnet seine Wohnung den schlimmsten 
Gegnern unseres Volkes und unterstützt die Feinde des Friedens und unseres Aufbaus.   





compounded by the fact that the station was popular amongst East Germans.  RIAS 
enjoyed consistent popularity amongst East German listeners, as shown by surveys taken 
by various services attached to the United States Information Agency and the US 
Department of State throughout the 1950s. 
 The USIA and State Department frequently assembled polls in order to determine 
the effectiveness of US psychological warfare operations behind the Iron Curtain.  
Berlin’s open border gave US officials the opportunity to grant East German individuals 
a relatively free forum with which to express their opinions about issues related to 
broadcasting.  Usually employing the services of the Deutsche Institut für Volksumfragen 
(DIVO), the US embassy in Bonn took advantage of events where traffic between the two 
sectors was heavy (such as Berlin’s annual Green Week Festival) to assemble data on 
listener preference and reception problems. 
 Before we examine the results of these polls, it is worth examining the questions 
and sample sizes of these surveys.  One typical poll was assembled in the fall of 1955 
from individuals attending the Berlin Trade Affair.  The poll was assembled by the Office 
of Public Affairs at the US Embassy in Bonn.  Critically, the poll acknowledged that the 
picture created by the poll could not necessarily be considered an unbiased picture of 
listening habits in the GDR.  At the outset, the survey’s writers acknowledged the 
shortcomings of the poll sample.  “As readers of this report realize, a true area probability 





reliable statistics concerning the population itself, a quota sample faces obvious 
shortcomings.”7  
 Thus, the poll focused on assembling a sample that was as representative of the 
East German population as possible.  In defending the poll results, the writers noted, 
“They most certainly are, on the other hand, of more worth than the reactions and 
comments of scattered individuals who may volunteer disjointed scraps and information 
from East Germany.”8  Of the 399 individuals questioned for the survey, 240 were men 
and 159 were women.  186 were between 18 and 34 years of age, 195 between 35 and 64 
and 18 over 65.9  In terms of employment background, no one group stood out.  The 
largest group polled were white-collar workers, with 72 individuals questioned.  73 were 
classified as housewives, 69 as skilled laborers, 46 as students, 43 as professionals, 34 as 
businessmen, 29 as semi-skilled laborers, 18 as unemployed or retired, and 15 as farmers.  
The low number of polled individuals classified as “farmers” attests to the fact that most 
visitors were from urban environments: 143 of the surveyed individuals were from a city 
with over 100,000 inhabitants.  93 came from cities with populations between 5,000 and 
24,999 and 73 came from cities with between 25,000 and 99,999 inhabitants.  Thus, 77% 
of those surveyed came from towns with at least 5,000 inhabitants, and over half (54%) 
came from areas where the population was at least 25,000.   Interestingly, a majority 
traveled a considerable distance to reach Berlin.  Most resided in Saxony or Saxony-
Anhalt, with 81% living at least 100 kilometers away from the East German capital.  
                                                 
7 Research Staff, Office of Public Affairs American Embassy, “Some East Zone Radio Listening Habits-as Revealed by 
Visitors to the Berlin Trade Fair,” September 24-October 5, 1955, NARA RG 306 (USIA), Research Reports on 
German Public Opinion,” Entry 1005, 250/67/04/02-04, Box 7.  
8 Ibid. 





Thus, the individuals answering these surveys were not making a casual, unplanned visit, 
but most likely an excursion planned in advance.   
 The survey questions ranged from broad to specific, and did not necessarily lead 
individuals to respond favorably to RIAS.  Initially, they were asked, “Which radio 
station do you tune in most?”  This was followed by “Which of these stations do you like 
best?”  Following this, individuals were then asked questions specifically about the 
stations they selected as their favorite.  RIAS listeners were initially asked questions 
about listening habits.  Questions included, “Approximately how often do you listen to 
RIAS?” “At what time of day do you usually listen to RIAS?”, “And over which wave-
length do you tune in?”   
 This was followed by “How is the reception of RIAS lately, let’s say, during the 
past six months, it is improved, worsened or is it unchanged?”10  This question was then 
followed by what was probably the most leading one in the survey, “How effective is 
RIAS, in your opinion, in refuting Eastern propaganda: Very effective, fairly effective, 
only slightly effective or not effective at all?”  While in this case 73% answered 
“Very/fairly effective,” one needs to ask how individuals could accurately answer this 
question.  First, to know if RIAS was effectively refuting East German propaganda, one 
had to know what claims and assertions made by the GDR were in fact propaganda.  
Second, one had to trust that RIAS was correct when it refuted the official claims of the 
GDR media claims.  Due to the difficulty of obtaining accurate information in East 
Germany, it is difficult to consider the answers to this question to be an accurate 
assessment.  Nevertheless, the fact that so many stated that RIAS was effective in this 
                                                 





area indicates that the majority likely turned to the station because they believed it refuted 
GDR propaganda.   
 The results for this particular poll ranked RIAS as the second most popular 
broadcaster in East Germany.  58% stated they tuned into it the most.  Amongst West 
German stations, NWDR came first, with 62%.  34% selected SFB and 22% tuned into 
the BBC.  The majority (65%) tuned into the GDR’s broadcasters the most.  However, it 
is critical to note that the station an individual tuned into the most was not necessarily 
their favorite station or the one they believed to be the most accurate or credible.  More 
often it was the radio station with the best reception.  Thus, the researchers made sure to 
follow the question about which station individuals tuned into the most with the question: 
“Which of these stations do you like best?”  In this case, no station held a clear majority, 
with 33% selecting NWDR and 20% selecting RIAS.  19% selected SFB, with 3% 
selecting the BBC.  Just 8% selected the GDR’s broadcasters as their preferred station.  
Interestingly, the ratio did not remain the same across gender or professional lines.  For 
example, while individuals between 18 and 54 prefered NWDR, individuals over 55 
preferred RIAS.  RIAS was also more popular than NWDR amongst housewives.11 
 The preceding survey was just one of a number of similar surveys assembled by 
the DIVO under contract with the US embassy.  Importantly, the researchers and US 
officials themselves never claimed that these were definitive or representative.  They 
acknowledged their drawbacks, but also noted that, due to the difficulty of obtaining 
listener information from the GDR, they nevertheless contained valuable information that 
helped RIAS to improve both its broadcasts and choice of frequency and transmitters.     
                                                 





 Not all of the polls produced the same result, and a number of factors played a 
role in listener answers.  Consistently, however, RIAS ranked first or second amongst 
those polled when asked to indicate their preferred source of information.  A February 
1953 survey taken by the United States Information Service’s International Evaluation 
Staff noted, for example, that, “[RIAS’s] news and political programs are the key 
attractions among all segments of the audience.“12  Although other stations could 
compete with RIAS’s entertainment and artistic programming, the US sponsored 
broadcaster was the preferred source for news and commentary.  Four years later, a 
survey of East German visitor interiews assembled in February of 1957 by the Frankfurt 
based media research group, the Deutsche Institut für Volksumfragen (DIVO), under the 
auspices of the US Embassy in Bonn, reiiterated the same judgment.  The survey noted 
that, “RIAS’s programs are rated very highly and judging by the results of this study, it 
can be clearly stated that RIAS has particularly gained the confidence of its East Zone 
audience for its news services.” 13  Again, news broadcasts and commentaries were the 
most popular RIAS programs and RIAS was the station of choice for listeners wishing to 
hear accurate information about major events (in this particular case the Suez and 
Hungarian Crises were cited).14  Another DIVO survey of 600 East German visitors to 
West Berlin taken in the fall of 1958 confirmed this view, but also noted that RIAS was 
the most popular source of information about conditions in the GDR itself in comparison 
                                                 
12 IEV, Country Report on Radio: East Germany, February 1953. 
13 Research Staff, Office of Public Affairs, American Embassy, East Zone Opinion of RIAS Programming, Report no. 
A-9, Series no. 3, March 6, 1957, NARA RG 306 (USIA), Office of Research, Field Research Reports 1953-1978, 






to both East German and other West German broadcasters.15  The observation was 
corroborated in another survey made in March 1960 in which the report’s author stated, 
“As a source of information on domestic as well as foreign affairs, RIAS also commands 
the confidence of the majority of all East German listeners and particularly of the RIAS 
audience.”16  The report also noted that, with the exception of 1957, (for reasons 
discussed below), RIAS audience remained above 50% of the inhabitants of East 
Germany, having reached 76% in 1960.  Even in the fall of 1957, when jamming had 
severely cut RIAS’s audience numbers, it remained the most trusted news source 
amongst Berlin’s stations, and was still preferred to any of the East German broadcasters 
as a means of obtaining information.17   
 Even when we account for different polling samples and the political motivations 
of East German individuals visiting West Berlin, the USIS and DIVO polls consistently 
produced the same result over the course of 10 years.  The virulence of the GDR’s anti-
RIAS campaign was seen as further corroboration for the station’s popularity in East 
Germany.  Throughout the 1950s RIAS was consistently one of the most popular radio 
stations in East Germany and, with a few exceptions, was consistently more popular that 
any of the East German stations.  Even in the years when there was a drop off in listeners, 
audiences went to other West German stations before they turned to East German 
broadcasters.  Consequently, RIAS was a perennially popular rival as a source for news 
                                                 
15 Research Staff, Office of Public Affairs, American Embassy, Station Popularity and Reception Conditions within 
East Germany, Report No. A-22 Series No. 3 November 17, 1958, NARA RG 306 (USIA), Research Reports on 
German Public Opinion, Entry 1005, 250/67/04/02-04, Box 11. 
16 Deutsche Institut für Volksumfragen  (DIVO), East Zone Radio Listening and TV Viewing Habits, March 1960, 
NARA RG 306 (USIA), Office of Research, Research Reports 1953-1986, Entry 1013A, 250/67/08/05-07, Box 35. 
17 Research Staff, Office of Public Affairs, American Embassy, Radio Listening in the GDR, Report No. A-18, Series 
no. 3, December 19, 1957, NARA RG 306 (USIA), Office of Research, Field Research Reports 1953-1978, Entry 





and information in foreign and domestic affairs and a constant source of competition for 
the GDR’s stations. 
 Throughout the 1950s, the GDR published brochures, pamphlets, and newspaper 
stories aimed at discouraging people from listening to RIAS.  A consistent array of 
themes shaped their general arguments.  First, RIAS, the material usually characterized 
RIAS as a foreign interloper funded by American warmongers intent on launching World 
War III.  Second, the print media and broadcasts depicted the station as a nerve center for 
anti-GDR sabotage and espionage operations.  Finally, the print media portrayed RIAS’s 
listeners as vagrants, criminals, and gullible individuals who were easily duped by the 
station’s promise of wealth in West Germany.  For the GDR propaganda campaign, RIAS 
was not just a radio station.  Nor was it merely an irritant or a minor problem.  RIAS was 
an espionage center in the middle of democratic Germany that utilized its radio 
transmissions to send coded messages to its sleeper agents through the GDR.  Thus 
listening to RIAS was not just unpatriotic or even un-German.  It was treasonous.   
 A pamphlet from 1957 entitled Ein Mann kam nach Berlin illustrates all of these 
themes.  The pamphlet was produced to mark the appointment of Laurence Dalcher as the 
new Director of RIAS.  The cover features the West Berlin Funkturm at Masurenallee 
with a large, foreboding figure in the foreground.18  Drawn in silhouette, the man wears a 
bulky trench coat and hat and is clearly meant to evoke dread and fear. The pamphlet 
describes Dalcher’s background, noting he worked for the US Information Services in 
Vienna where, the pamphlet contends, he directed the 1956 Hungarian uprising.  The 
pamphlet’s anonymous author declares:  
                                                 
18 Ein Mann kam nach Berlin, Deutsches Historiches Museum (DHM), Propagandschrift des ZK der SED gegen den 






Mr. Dalcher organized the construction of American secret 
transmitters in Hungary.  He described these as “Hungarian 
Freedom Transmitters.”  Staggered by panic, thousands fell 
victim to their lies as they fled their homeland in confusion.  
Inflamed by Mr. Dalcher’s infamous pogrom baiting, those 
behind the attempted coup in Hungary murdered in a 
bestial manner women and children, proletarian 
functionaries and other Hungarian citizens who were loyal 
to the order of the Peoples’ Democracy.19 
 
 
Alongside the lines cited above is a graphic photograph, ostensibly taken during the 
Hungarian Uprising, of a body hung by its legs and being stripped bare by a mob.  The 
implication is clear: Dalcher used radio stations to instigate a reactionary coup in 
Hungary that led to mob violence and murder.  Dalcher even instigated “pogroms,” 
language likely meant to evoke the Nazi past.  And, importantly for the pamphlet’s 
intended audience, Dalcher was now taking control of RIAS.  If Dalcher tried to 
overthrow the government of Hungary, there was every reason to believe he would try 
and do the same in, “democratic Germany.” 
 However, Dalcher and RIAS were but one participant in a much larger and more 
elaborate conspiracy arrayed against the GDR.  RIAS was, in fact, “the basic receptacle 
and information center for the American multimillionaires’ Fifth Column aimed against 
the German Democratic Republic.”20  Like all other American secret organizations, RIAS 
utilized criminals and adventurers to carry out their goals.  RIAS sought to bring the same 
                                                 
19 Ibid.  “Mr. Dalcher organisierte den Aufbau amerikanischer Geheimsender und Funkzentralen in Ungarn, die er als 
“ungarische Freiheitssender” deklarierte.  Ihren Lügen fielen Tausende Menschen zum Opfer die—in Panik versetzt—
kopflos ihre Heimat verließen.  Von Mr. Dalcher infamer Pogromhetze aufpeitscht, mordeten die Putschisten in Ungarn 
in bestialischer Weise Frauen und Kinder, Arbeitsfunktionäre und andere ungarische Staatsbürger, die true zur 
volksdemontrasichen Ordnung standen.” 
20 Ibid.  “Und RIAS—das ist ein Sammelbecken und eine Informationszentrale der 5.  Kolonne der amerikanische 





things to East Germany that Radio Free Europe brought to Hungary: “Unrest! 
Provocation! Death!”21  On a two-page spread, the “organizers” of the RIAS plots are 
laid out and presented with photographs accompanied by short glosses.  They include the 
three Dulles siblings: US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, whose state department 
funded RIAS, CIA Director Allan Dulles, in command of the US fifth column abroad, 
and US Berlin representative Eleanor Dulles.  On Eleanor’s relation with RIAS, the 
author writes, “There is no long range action carried out by this agent center that she 
herself has not contrived”22 Next is Dulles’ deputy at the State Department, Hebert 
Hoover Jr., W.B: Jackson, Chief of the Institute for Psychological Warfare, and Lucius 
Clay, former commander of the US Zone of Occupied Germany and, in the words of the 
pamphlet, the man famous for dividing Germany as well as the leader of the Committee 
Free Europe. 
 Yet, as powerful and influential as these individuals were, they were still under 
the control of the “men behind the scenes,” (“Die Hintermänner”): the Ford and 
Rockefeller families.  The pamphlet declared, “The true chiefs of RIAS are the business 
administrators of the USA.  They are also the financiers of RIAS.”23  Their means for 
achieving this control were anti-Soviet organizations such as the Ford, Carnegie, and 
Rockefeller foundations.  Next to the description of these “men behind the scenes” is a 
picture of New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller situated beneath a quotation in which 
he conveys to President Eisenhower the need for a “total” and “global” policy against the 
Soviets that includes political, economic, psychological, and military methods.  
Alongside the photograph is written the phrase, “Wirepuller Rochefeller” (Drahtzieher 
                                                 
21 Ibid.  “Unruhen! Provokations! Mord!” 
22 Ibid.  “Es gibt keine weittragenden Aktion dieser Agentzentrale, die sie nicht selbst einfädelte.” 





Rockefeller).24  The pamphlet then warns readers to take note of various RIAS officials 
working as spies: Program Director Wolfgang Schütz, Deputy Program Director Heinz 
Adolf von Heintze, and commentator Friedrich Noppert. Invoking Judas’ betrayal, the 
author condemns with the declaration, “All of these creatures have sold themselves for 
thirty pieces of silver to Dulles and Rockefeller.”25 
 A document produced by the Ministry for State Security provides an interesting 
counterpoint to the pamphlet discussed above.  The report, a general overview of RIAS 
operations, features a section on “Die Hintermännder” (sic), using the same phrase from 
the pamphlet.  Critically, many of the same names appear: Allen Dulles, Eleanor Dulles, 
Hebert Hoover Jr., W.B. Jackson, and Lucius Clay.26  The descriptions of each 
individual’s tasks are also exactly the same.  CIA Chief Dulles is the commander of the 
RIAS fifth column. Eleanor Dulles’ section again notes that, “There is no long range 
action carried out by this agent center that she herself has not contrived”27  The general 
argument of the report is the same as the pamphlet: RIAS is a US espionage center under 
the control of the US Government and financed by the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller 
foundations.   
  It is difficult to pinpoint the exact year this document was made.  “1955” is 
written on the top of it in pencil.  The latest RIAS broadcast cited in the document is from 
that year as well.  Herbert Hoover Jr. is also still listed as Deputy Secretary of State, a 
post he held until 1957.  However, the document notes that the “director” of RIAS is 
Alexander Klieforth, who was not appointed until January 1959.  To confuse matters, the 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid.  “Alle diese Kreaturen haben sich für einen Judaslohn an die Dulles und Rockefeller verkauft!” 
26 Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sector (RIAS) [1959?], Die Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des 
Staatsicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deuschen Demokratischen Republik, (BStU), Ministerium für 
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document lists Gordon Ewing as the “leader” of RIAS.  However, Ewing had left the 
station in 1957 and was no longer even residing in Germany.  Thus, most likely, the 
document was originally made during or just before 1955 and then updated by the Stasi 
in 1959 to acknowledge Klieforth’s appointment.28   
The similarities between the Stasi report and the Central Committee propaganda 
pamphlet indicate that they likely shared a common source however.  Critically, the 
striking similarities show that the Stasi report was disseminated throughout various 
ministries of the East German government and SED departments, and reveals that a 
dialogue existed amongst the various departments of government and party in East 
Germany with regards to how to approach RIAS.  The description of how the RIAS 
conspiracy worked was not just the product of propagandists in the SED, but part of a 
consistently developed analysis made by the Stasi and SED Central Committee.  Ein 
Mann kam nach Berlin was not just propaganda, but also a visual and textual depiction of 
how the SED and GDR believed RIAS actually operated.  The station was a fifth column 
geographically situated in the center of East Germany controlled by American 
imperialists, funded by American capitalists, and operated by German traitors. 
 The belief that RIAS was dangerous and threatening was a common theme of 
anti-RIAS posters and pamphlets.  Some posters evoked this idea using fairly clear 
imagery, such as a poster featuring a cityscape of Berlin with the bright yellow words, 
“Vorsicht” (“Warning”) written above it.  Underneath, colored in stars and stripes, is the 
word “RIAS.”  Below this is written in green, “Gift” (“Poison”), with the letters dripping 
raindrops that transform into bombs.29  The link between warfare and RIAS’s broadcasts 
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created by this martial image was a common motif of anti-RIAS material.30  A similar 
cartoon depicts a snake slinking up a radio tower atop a star-spangled RIAS logo.  The 
snake, depicted with swastikas all along its body, has the head of a fork-tongued, wild 
eyed man.  In his hand is a pen that he aims like a weapon.  The cartoon is titled, “Die 
Giftspritze” (“Poison Injection.”).31  In 1955, SED Central Committee member Fred 
Oelßner explained the use of poison as a symbol of RIAS using the following analogy; 
“Do you believe that cyanide is poison, or do you want to try it out first?”32  RIAS was 
poison for individual Germans, the German Democratic Republic, and world peace.  Like 
poison, one did not listen to RIAS to simply for curiosity.  It was a life-threatening act 
that should not even be contemplated. 
 Many cartoons were fairly elaborate.  Common to many of these was the image of 
a growling American soldier.  Depicted snarling and wearing sunglasses, the soldier 
looked like a caricature of Dougal MacArthur.  In his hand was usually some kind of 
weapon, (a bomb, torch, or machine gun), and he was usually depicted speaking into a 
RIAS microphone with the airwaves transforming from words into some kind of weapon.  
An example of this image is a small, three-panel cartoon featured in a 1952 edition of the 
newspaper, Espenheimer Stimme.  In it, a US soldier speaks through a microphone.  The 
second panel shows him disassembling the microphone.  In the third panel, the 
microphone has become a machine gun, the US soldier ready to fire.  Underneath is the 
phrase, “Wir schalten um!” (“We change gears!”)33  Another cartoon, from a pamphlet 
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for the fall 1954 state elections shows an American soldier speaking through a RIAS 
microphone, trampling on a roll of paper marked “Menschen Rechte” (“Human Rights”)  
In his hand is a burning torch.  The pamphlet then asks, “Who recruits Agents and 
Saboteurs in Frankfurt an der Oder?  Who wants to destroy our city?  Who imperils the 
happiness of our children?  It is RIAS!”34  The poster concludes with the following:  
 
RIAS is the enemy of every honest and upright German!  
RIAS is the mouthpiece for the child murderers of Korea, 
for the murderers of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, the 
murderers of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the murderers of 
Bitburg.  RIAS is the mouthpiece of those bankrupt 
criminal bands, which want to plunge Germany into the 
abyss of ruin in 1954.  RIAS has ready in hand the torch 
that will spark a new war for their employers, the US 
Billionaires.35   
 
 
As a consequence of these factors, the pamphlet beseeches its readers to vote for the 
National Front candidates at the forthcoming elections. 
 As with many GDR radio broadcasts, the GDR anti-RIAS campaign sought to 
draw continuities between RIAS and the propaganda of the Nazis.  A number of cartoons 
appeared featuring two grinning caricatures of Joseph Goebbels and Adolf Hitler looking 
down approvingly on a RIAS reporter.  The caricatures were identical in each cartoon.  
One cartoon features a man lying in a chair, hand in the air in a gesture reminiscent of the 
Nazi salute, cup in hand, yelling through a RIAS and NWDR microphone.  From the 
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microphone are written a number of lies the poster claims have been made by the two 
stations: that Christmas is banned in the GDR, that the Rubel will be the new form of 
currency in the eastern zone, and that there is no remilitarization in West Germany.  The 
cartoon then entreats its reader, “RIAS and NWDR are war-mongers!  Smash the lies of 
the enemies of the people!”36  The same exact caricatures of Hitler and Goebbels appear 
in another cartoon, this time behind a growling American soldier speaking into a RIAS 
microphone and carrying a bomb with a death’s head symbol on it.  The cartoon then 
declares, “RIAS Hounding is War Hounding!”37  A third example using the same 
Goebbels-Hitler caricature featured the two looking down upon an American soldier 
sitting behind a desk.  On the desk lies a plan for an invasion of the Soviet Union.  In the 
soldier’s hand is a RIAS microphone.  Emitting from the microphone is a RIAS acronym: 
“R” for “Revanchepolitik” (Revenge Policy), “I” for “Intervention,” “A” for 
“Antibolschewismus” (Anti-Bolshevism) and “S” for “Spionage Sabotage” (Sabotage 
and Espionage).  The cartoon is titled “Wem dient der RIAS?” (Who does RIAS serve?)38 
 The pamphlets, cartoons, and posters cited above were intended to evoke fear of 
RIAS.  It was not just a radio station, but also a dangerous spy center that aimed to 
plunge Germany into another war.  Yet, not all anti-RIAS propaganda was aimed at 
depicting RIAS as a terrifying institution.  Some targeted RIAS listeners, characterizing 
them as individuals whose gullibility and naiveté threatened to destroy the GDR and 
world peace.  One of the clearest depictions of this notion is see in a cartoon from the 
February 1, 1956 issue of Eulenspiegel.  It depicts a buxom woman with a bottle of milk 
                                                 
36 Cartoon, Zerschlagt die Lügen der Volksfeinde!, DRA Potsdam, Schriftgut RIAS Bestand, F 304-01-04/0004,  “Rias 
und NWDR hetzen zum Krieg!  Zerschlagt die Lügen der Volksfeinde!” 
37 Cartoon, RIAS-Hetze ist Kriegshetze!, DRA Potsdam, Schriftgut RIAS Bestand, F 304-01-04/0004. 





under one arm and a jar of honey in the other standing in the window of a cardboard 
house, with the RIAS logo overhead.  A curious man reads a sign next to her that reads, 
“Here flows milk and honey.”  Yet, it is clear it is a façade, for behind the woman is an 
army barracks and nothing else.39  RIAS’s lies only seduced the naïve and easily 
manipulated.  Another newspaper cartoon from 1952 illustrates this well.  Entitled, “Der 
RIAS Hörer,” (“The RIAS Listener”) the cartoon depicts a man about to walk off a cliff.  
At the bottom are skeletons of old soldiers wearing Wehrmacht style steel helmets 
adorned with swastikas.  The man is walking into a cloud, with “Lügen!” (“Lies”) and 
“Kriegshetze!” (“War Hounder”) written on it.40 
 This style of propaganda could also be rather elaborate, and often relied on 
extended stories aimed at ridiculing individuals for listening to RIAS.  Usually they 
involve an impressionable young man hearing a RIAS report and then falling into some 
unfortunate circumstance because he believed the story.  He is forced to bear the mark for 
his foolishness, usually in the form of donkey ears.  A 1957 pamphlet produced by the 
National Front illustrates this well.  The pamphlet includes cartoons such as a reprint of 
the 1952 depiction of a US soldier transforming his microphone into a machine gun.  It 
also includes a story, entitled, “Der RIAS und Herr Zacharias,”41 aimed at illustrating the 
consequences of listening to the station.  The story shows “Zacharias,” (the name comes 
from a joke of endearment made by East German listeners about RIAS)42 who is always 
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depicted with asses’ ears, listening to different RIAS reports and then running to fellow 
citizens to tell them what he has heard.  Three sequences are presented, with narration 
provided in sing-songy couplets.  The first depicts Zacharias entering a coalmine to tell 
workers of what RIAS has just reported only to be thrown in a mine car.  The second 
shows him heeding RIAS’s calls to stop working, only to be perplexed why he is no 
longer being paid.  The final sequence depicts Zacharias going to a department store and 
switching all the radios to RIAS.  This is rewarded with Zacharias’s donkey’s ears being 
tied in a knot and ends with him being thrown out the shop.   
 This style of propaganda attempted to isolate and ridicule RIAS listeners. Thus, 
the GDR sought to implement what Eisabeth Noelle-Neumann has described as a “spiral 
of silence,” exploiting the individual’s fear of isolation in order to silence deviant 
opinions as a means of building support for the so-called majority opinion.43  The GDR 
anti-RIAS media thus deployed peer pressure as a means of depicting RIAS listening as 
both dangerous and vagrant.  The anti-RIAS material never depicted the listener with 
anyone else as he heard station.  He (and it was usually a man) also always faced severe 
consequences whenever he tried to pass on what he had heard to fellow citizens.  The 
citizens, en mass, attempt to set him straight.  The message was clear: listening to RIAS 
was the act of a naïve, isolated individual who did not understand the true dangers the 
station poses or share the principles of justice and peace inherent to socialism.  It is 
something the vast majority of GDR citizens do not do, since the majority were loyal to a 
peaceful Republic. 
                                                 






 These longer narratives were a fairly common means for attacking the American 
station.  A two page spread presents a series of stories explaining to readers that listening 
to RIAS made one a servant of the US and big capital.  The spread proclaims with a 
couplet, “Du willst kein Ami-Söldner sein/drum schalte nicht den RIAS ein!”  (“If you 
don’t want to be an American soldier then don’t turn on RIAS!”)44  Standing behind a 
radio and RIAS microphone are two Americans, one the common growling American 
soldier, the second a man who bears a striking similarity to Franklin Roosevelt wearing a 
hat marked by a dollar sign.  In his hand is a piece of paper marked “armament action” 
and in the other a tube marked “plague.”  The spread tells three different stories 
explaining the consequences of listening to RIAS using cartoons.  The first depicts a 
“dummy” who, ensnared by “jazz” and “dance music,” is brainwashed by the American 
station into trying to destroy a bridge.  He is inevitably arrested.  The second features a 
man who is enticed by tales of “Flüchtlinge” (“refugees”) to flee to West Germany, 
where he finds himself poor, destitute, and forced to enlist in the French foreign legion 
only to be killed in battle.  The final story discusses RIAS’s use of the term “freedom,” 
noting that RIAS only cared about the freedom of war criminals (represented by 
individuals dressed in black with SS death’s head symbols on their hats), freedom for 
Krupp and Schacht, and freedom for treachery and waging war (depicted by the growling 
American soldier caricature spitting bombs from his mouth).  The story closes with a 
rhyme: “Jedoch gezählt sind schon des Rias Tage/Auch unsere Heimat drüben macht sich 
frei/In weitem Bogen fliegt die Amiplage--/Der Rias ist dann sowieso dabei.” (“However 
RIAS’s days are already numbered/Our homeland over there makes itself free/from afar 
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the Ami Scourge flees--/RIAS in any event is through.”)45  The words accompany a 
photo of a cheering mob of workers carrying signs bearing the words “Ami go home,” 
“Unity,” and “Peace,” while throwing the tube of plague and the RIAS microphone at the 
two Americans, who are now drowning. 
 Both of these pamphlets display elaborate storylines anchored to motifs deployed 
throughout the anti-RIAS campaign.  The critical themes are clear: RIAS was a 
dangerous espionage organization.  Listening to it was both an act of stupidity and 
treason.  No intelligent individual who cared about German unity and peace could listen 
to RIAS without realizing that its broadcasts were all lies.  The station shared no interests 
with Germans, but was instead the tool of capitalist financiers in the United States who 
were manipulating both the US and West German governments. 
 Newspaper and radio broadcasts continued to dwell on the theme that only fools 
listened to RIAS.  Simply switching on and listening to radio was magnified into a 
potentially dangerous act.  Modifying the famous proverb, East German radio warned its 
listeners in a February 1953 broadcast that, “The road to hell is paved with RIAS 
broadcasts,” as a means of stressing the potential danger of listening to the station.46  On 
March 11, 1952, Neues Deutschland published an editorial by Gerhard Eisler in which 
the GDR radio chief declared, “RIAS can only fulfill this role [of inciting war], however, 
because it has the help of this man who listens to RIAS beside his wide-open window.  If 
the man does this out of pure stupidity, then it is certain that he can be convinced by 
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others that he ought to desist from this undermining activity.”47  Eisler’s argumentation is 
revealing, for it shows not only the standard narrative that listeners were aiding the 
enemy, but also that, if they could easily be manipulated by RIAS, then it stood to reason 
that they could be just as easily swayed back to the GDR.   
 Attacks against RIAS listeners went beyond ridiculing listeners however, with 
many newspaper stories accusing RIAS of promoting espionage, crime, and murder.48  
Papers frequently condemned RIAS for promoting criminal activity.  In a story from 
March 24, 1952 edition of Volksstimme, the paper wrote of a farmer, refusing to rent his 
room to a woman on the orders of an SED functionary, assaulted the functionary, leading 
to her death.49  The story contended that, since he refused to listen to the radio of the 
GDR and hence be informed of the restructuring of the Republic, he was unaware that the 
functionary was in her rights.  By only listening to RIAS, the farmer had become a 
criminal and “an enemy of peace and democracy.”50 
 Naturally, the GDR’s radio stations were a common venue for launching anti-
RIAS attacks.  These broadcasts, sent out on all three major GDR stations (Berliner 
Rundfunk, Radio DDR, and Deutschlandsender) continued the general argumentation.  
Since the mediums were the same, the radio broadcasts often focused on style and 
method of delivery rather than content.  Thus, rather than engage specific RIAS claims, 
radio in the GDR aimed to attack the style and character of RIAS broadcasting by 
contrasting it to East German broadcasts.  In a June 16, 1955, a “Kommentar des Tages,” 
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sent over the GDR’s Program I and Program II,51 reporter Karl Heinz Gerstner asked his 
listeners to consider these differences: “Have we ever sent weapons, bombs, and the 
means to start fires to agents in the west?  We do not do such rascally behavior.52”  GDR 
radio, Gerstner claimed, did not cast aspersions against its enemies, and was above the 
petty attacks and tactics used by RIAS.  Yet, ironically, in his protests against RIAS, he 
was in fact making the same kinds of criticisms against RIAS that he claimed they were 
making about the GDR.  In 1956, Alfred Duchrow accused RIAS of propping up the 
corrupt West Berlin government.  Attacking the government of West Berlin’s Mayor Otto 
Suhr, Duchrow claimed that Suhr’s administration was hopelessly mired in corruption 
and afflicted by scandals involcing bribery, sex, and espionage.  RIAS, along with West 
Berlin newspapers following the station’s lead, had deliberately made efforts to discount 
the scandals and cast a favorable light upon the West Berlin government by focusing on 
Suhr’s ailing condition.53  Thus, Duchrow asserted that the station hoped to illicit concern 
for Suhr’s health from listeners.  Through the use of sentimental titles and language, 
Duchrow contended, RIAS lulled listeners into believing lies. 
 In pamphlets, newspaper stories, and radio broadcasts, the anti-RIAS media 
campaign shared a number of consistent motifs that created a cohesive argument against 
the station.  It was, first and foremost, an enemy spy center utilized by the United States 
to launch a third world war.  Listeners aided and abetted this organization and were guilty 
of treason against not only the state of East Germany, but peace and the unity of 
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Germany.  RIAS listeners were consequently criminals, vagrants, and terribly naïve and 
misguided.  The aim was to make RIAS listeners feel isolated from the rest of the 
population.   
 As early as 1950, a RIAS official summarized the station’s attitude to the East 
German attacks against the station: “For years they ignored us…and we didn’t know they 
cared until they called us, ‘A paid, stinking news-ulcer owned by foreign monopoly 
capitalists and criminal warmongers in the heart of Europe.’   
 “It was the sweetest thing they could have said.”54 
 
Harassment, the Stasi, and Trials 
 
 The anti-RIAS Campaign was not limited to articles, cartoons, and broadcasts.  
The GDR’s Ministry for State Security also took an active role in the ant-RIAS 
operations, monitoring who listened to RIAS, infiltrating the station with informers, 
attempting to kidnap at least one RIAS worker, and staging mass arrests of RIAS 
listeners and contacts throughout the GDR.   
 Arrests and harassment were the logical extensions of the SED’s general belief 
that RIAS was not a radio station but an espionage center operated by the Central 
Intelligence Agency and Army Counter Intelligence Corps.  In November 1950, less than 
a year after the Stasi was created, its state secretary wrote a memo to the ministry 
administration, noting that, “The findings establish that the radio station ‘RIAS’ is 
developing into a spy center dedicated to the exercise of subversion, espionage, and 
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sabotage in the GDR and the Democratic Sector of Berlin.”55  A decade later, the same 
language was being used by the Stasi to describe the station.  In a 1960 report entitled,  
“The Subversive and Disruptive Activities of ‘RIAS,’” the Stasi declared, “RIAS is one 
of American Imperialism’s most important means for organizing psychological warfare, 
one of the most important espionage centers for the American secret services in West 
Berlin whose goal is to prepare and execute criminal attacks against the GDR and the rest 
of the countries of the socialist camp.”56  The clearest expression of this was the, “fascist 
coup attempt” of June 1953 as RIAS sent coded transmissions over the air to 
provocateurs and saboteurs in East Germany.  These attitudes were held throughout the 
East German government.  A meeting report of the East German Supreme Court’s judges 
for example, noted the general threats facing the GDR and the need for the Supreme 
Court to take appropriate measures, noting that, “Within the context of the immediate 
preparation for war, these war incendiaries organize with their spies and agent centers 
directed by the American imperialists, especially from West Berlin, through the use of 
espionage, sabotage, and acts of terror in the German Democratic Republic.”57  The 
language of the judges, describing “war incendiaries” and “agent centers” in West Berlin 
is clearly reminiscent of the language used in the GDR’s anti-RIAS posters, and it is 
certain, although the notes do not discuss specifically discuss RIAS, that in the eyes of 
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the GDR’s legal officials, RIAS was a subversive institution sending coded transmissions 
to saboteurs and traitors within the GDR. 
 Throughout the 1950s, the Stasi waged a number of actions aimed at disrupting 
the RIAS operation and preventing East Germans listening to the station.  As with the 
media campaign, these actions focused on two targets: RIAS itself and those who either 
listened to the station or had made contact with it. The GDR harassed individuals known 
to listen to the station, infiltrated the station with informers, and at one point even 
attempted to kidnap a RIAS employee because it suspected she was an American 
spymaster.   
 Forms of intimidation ranged from harassment to intimidation.  A November 
1954 Newsweek story quoted an East German coal miner’s warning: “ ‘You even had to 
be careful about whistling…One man I know listened to the American radio station RIAS 
Berlin.  Down in the mine, he used to whistle absent-mindedly some of the catchy RIAS 
tunes.  They arrested him.”58  In 1955, a Czech newspaper, Cesta Miru, the local 
periodical of the town of Liberec, published a story describing the situation of a German 
born resident of the village Novy Bor who was sentence to life in prison for espionage.  
The cause for his subversive activities, the paper declared, was RIAS.  The man was 
described as a “zealous“ listener of RIAS as well as a servant of “American 
Imperialism.”59  Frequently, refugees fleeing the GDR would describe the consequences 
of listening to the station when interviewed by RIAS reporters.  A DIVO survey of East 
Germans visiting West Berlin during Green Week in the winter of 1960 revealed a 
                                                 
58 “In the Red Uranium Mines.” Newsweek, November 8, 1954.  Excerpted in “A Selection of Reports and Letters 
Reflecting the Impact of RIAS in the Soviet Zone of Germany,” DRA Potsdam, DRA Potsdam, RIAS Depositium, US 
Gremium (Robert Lochner), F501-00-00/0002.  
59 “Czech Military Court Sentences “Zealous” RIAS Listener,” Summary of story from Cesta Miru, April 19, 1955, 
Excerpted in “A Selection of Reports and Letters Reflecting the Impact of RIAS in the Soviet Zone of Germany,” DRA 





number of consequences one could face if they were caught listening to RIAS.  One 
visitor said his father had been fired because he listened to the station.  Another noted 
that Free German Youth Alliance (FDJ) members would often come into peoples’ 
apartments and check which station the radio dial was set to.  They were primarily 
concerned with whether or not individuals were listening to RIAS.  Said the respondent, 
“They don’t mind if we have the radio tuned to Radio London, even though there isn’t 
much difference between RIAS broadcasts and those of the BBC.”60  The GDR also 
harassed the station itself.  Station Director Gordon Ewing recalled that, “For at least two 
years running before they gave it up, I would get phone calls at my house at 1:00 am or 
3:00 am; there would be a voice from East Berlin saying, “Happy evening, Sie stehen auf 
der Liste,” you know this sort of thing.  Somewhat hard on my wife, I must say.”61  The 
threats were considered real enough for Program Director Eberhard Schütz to sleep with 
a pistol in his room.62  
One letter sent to the station on June 19, 1955 reveals an elaborate campaign 
launched by the SED to harass listeners.  RIAS officials considered the report to be a 
reference document for SED policies towards the station.  The account, written by a 
refugee on behalf of both herself and her husband, noted what occurred one night as the 
two settled in to listen to a broadcast.  “[The broadcast] was suddenly interrupted in a 
very unpleasant way (we were living in the East Zone at the time, of course), when we 
became the subject of attacks: stones were thrown through our windows; our sheds and 
stalls were broken into and tools and fuel were stolen.  Someone chalked a big death’s 
head with crossed bones on our house door and wrote under it the threat: ‘You Westlings, 
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you RIAS listeners, your number’s up.’”63  The letter writer continued, noting that 
listening became near impossible due to disruptions such as rocks being thrown at 
windows and blinds being rattled.  At one point, the listener claimed, protesters even 
attacked her cat, which was found bleeding on the veranda.  The intimidation eventually 
prompted the listener and her husband to flee to West Berlin.  It is important to note that 
a note from a RIAS official about the letter describes it as a representative document 
describing the consequences of listening to RIAS in the GDR.  The RIAS officials 
translating and submitting the letter to the station managers did not doubt the truthfulness 
of the account.64   
 The actions listed above were directed primarily at individuals listening to the 
station.  However, the Stasi was also concerned that many East Germans visited the 
station.  It is important to remember that, until 1961, the border between East and West 
Berlin was open.  Consequently, individuals could freely pass between the four sectors of 
the city.  East Germans could visit RIAS and return to their homes in the GDR that very 
day.  Of particular concern to the Stasi was the RIAS Visitors’ Office.  Throughout the 
1950s, thousands of East Germans visiting West Berlin would stop at RIAS, where 
station employees interviewed them about conditions in the GDR.  For example, between 
August 5 and August 22 1951 alone, 15,000 people visited the station during the 
Communist’s World Youth Festival, even though RIAS did not advertise the option of 
visiting.65  A report from 1952 noted that, on average, 100 people visited the station a 
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day.66  These visits became a critical source of information on conditions in East 
Germany and gave RIAS an important advantage in its broadcasts directed at the GDR.    
 The Visitor’s Office became one of the primary targets of Stasi and SED efforts 
against the station.  On October 25, 1950, the Weimar newspaper Abendpost reported that 
nine people had been arrested for visiting the station and urging boycotts of SED 
sponsored events.67  Thus, subversive activity was traced to a connection with RIAS.  
The story reported that RIAS treated visitors to coffee, cake, and cigarettes, “so that they 
were completely caught in the web of this agitation agency and became its willing 
tools.”68  Sentences ranged from 15 years penal work to 12 years in prison. 
 Making contact with RIAS was a potentially treasonable act in the eyes of the 
Stasi.  If nothing else, it immediately opened oneself up to Stasi surveillance.  Even 
writing a letter to the station could be potentially dangerous.  Nevertheless, thousands of 
East Germans took the risk.  According to a 1958 USIS briefing paper, the station 
received an average of 1,000 visitors a month. 70% of these came from East Germany.  It 
also received about 6,000 letters a month, with roughly 25% from the GDR.69  A range of 
letters from 1959-1961 reveals a variety of topics.  The majority concerned transcript 
requests, programming, and reception.  Other letters asked the station about relatives in 
West Germany, US policies, and ways one could escape the GDR.70  The letters were of 
great concern to the Stasi, as they were evidence of contact between the station and 
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potentially subversive elements in the GDR.  This can be seen in a 1952 report from Stasi 
operatives in the city of Halle.71  Letters from individuals to the station were intercepted 
and scrutinized.  These same individuals were then monitored and placed under suspicion 
as possible spies and saboteurs.  Even writing under a pseudonym was not enough to 
evade the Stasi’s eyes.  Investigation reports from 1953 and 1954 reveal that the Stasi 
enlisted experts from the Kriminaltechnischen Institut to examine and compare 
handwriting samples to determine the identity of letter writers.72  In a bureaucratic society 
like the GDR, in which letters were still predominantly written by hand, a sample of 
someone’s writing could be an incriminating fingerprint. 
 Beginning in 1952 and continuing throughout the remainder of the 1950s, the 
Stasi waged a number of campaigns against RIAS aimed at infiltrating and subverting its 
activities.  The focus of these activities was on the Visitor’s Office and its director, Lisa 
Stein.  The Stasi believed that Stein was a critical figure in the RIAS hierarchy.  
However, perceptions of Stein are widely contradictory.  Gordon Ewing recalled that she, 
“was not the brightest woman, she was very good at her job but she was not intellectually 
endowed, let’s say.”73  He went on to note that she often became far too close to those she 
interviewed.  A Central Intelligence Agency Report from 1964 that discussed the Stasi’s 
attempt to kidnap Stein in 1955 referred to her as “an interviewer with RIAS,” and gave 
no indication that she was anything more.74  Yet, her connection with East German 
visitors led many in the Stasi to assume she was a spymaster operating out of the station.  
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According to one report, Stein was connected to the US Air Force information services.  
“Both organize, with the help of other agents residing in West Berlin, a range of spy 
groups that administer their criminal activities within the German Democratic 
Republic.”75  In a collection of dossiers on RIAS employees most workers get only brief, 
cursory biographies.  Victor Klages’s file simply noted that he was a RIAS commentator.  
Stein’s entry, however, featured a long and detailed description of her appearance, what 
she frequently wore, her favorite jewelry, her address, and her daily activities.76 
Stein and the East Germans who visited her office were the primary targets of 
several Stasi actions.  The most elaborate was called “Aktion Enten,” and ended with 
mass arrests and a show trial in 1955 at which five East Germans were convicted of 
espionage and one was executed.  “Aktion Enten” began in October 1954 when the Stasi 
arrested Gerhard Beck, an East German who had been providing RIAS with information 
from his office at the Landwirtschaft Erfassungsstelle in Potsdam since 1953.  Instead of 
going to prison, the Stasi gave Beck the option of working as an informant.  On 
November 1, he obtained and copied a notebook belonging to Stein containing the names 
and addresses of a number of East Germans who had visited the station.77   
The ease with which Beck was able to steal such a critical piece of information 
from Stein belies the image of Stein being a cunning spy.  In one bizarre episode of the 
“Aktion Enten,” operations, the Stasi even launched an elaborate plot to kidnap Stein.  
Once again the Stasi used Beck.  On March 27, 1955 Stein was to meet Beck in a social 
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engagement at a cafe, at which time he would give her a box of chocolates poisoned with 
scopolamine in order to render her unconscious.  She would presumably fall unconscious 
outside the café, at which point two Stasi agents, masquerading as concerned bystanders, 
would come to help Stein and take her to a hospital in the Eastern Sector of the city.  
However, contrary to the Stasi’s expectations, Stein did not pass out until she returned 
home.  Concerned neighbors brought her immediately to the hospital.  Had they not done 
so, she would have likely died.78  This bizarre affair attests to just how concerned the 
Stasi was about Stein and the information she had obtained in her interviews.  
Deutschland Radio Kultur even made the event into a radio play broadcast as part of that 
station’s celebration of RIAS’s sixtieth anniversary in 2006.79  
Lisa Stein survived and escaped kidnapping.  The same cannot be said for those 
arrested based partly on information from Stein’s notes.  In March, 1955, the Stasi 
arrested 49 individuals believed to have had connections to the American station.  They 
were targeted based both on the information from Stein’s notebook and on constant 
surveillance of who came to the station.  The accused came from throughout the GDR 
and a variety of professional backgrounds, ranging from workers to a mayor and judicial 
officials.80  A large chart from the Stasi’s files on the operation reveals an elaborate 
network of individuals all connected in some way to either Stein or her co-worker, Franz 
Siegel, a former resident of East Germany.  The chart broke the suspects down into those 
who were certain to be agents and those whose status was unclear.  It also indicated who 
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lived in West Berlin.81  The majority of those under suspicion were workers, most of who 
were attached to a Volkseigener Betrieb (VEB) or some other industrial operation in the 
GDR.  One was a member of the Liberal Party.  According to the final report drawn up 
on the operation, all 35 individuals under suspicion were guilty of two things: visiting 
RIAS and forging a connection with either Stein or Siegel and provided either one or 
both with information on the working conditions and operations at their respective 
position.82  The Stasi accused one suspect of encouraging fellow workers to participate in 
the “coup attempt” of June 17, 1953.  The report described the man and his family as 
“asocial.”  In a similar vein, the Stasi ruled the family relations of another suspect to be 
“schlecht” and noted that his wife, “drank and smoked too much” and was known to 
entertain many male acquaintances.83  The Stasi characterized another suspect as “an 
opponent of our system,” and believed he was “an SPD Man.”84  Thus, the Stasi felt that 
weak moral character contributed to subversion and criminality.  Such individuals, it 
could be assumed, were easily duped by RIAS broadcasts.   
Of those arrested during Aktion Enten, five were put on trial in June of 1955.  As 
Manfred Rexin notes, almost all political trials in the GDR during this period cited RIAS 
as a cause contributing to the treasonous actions of the accused.85  However, these trials 
usually cited listening to RIAS as one of many causes for the traitorous act.  In this case, 
however, the five defendants were put on a public show trial in order to show the East 
German people, “that RIAS is an American Agent Center whose single purpose is to 
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divide Germany and disrupt understanding between the Germans, instigate subversion 
against the GDR, and support the imperialist’s war plans, for which West Berlin is the 
principle staging area.”86  The chief defendant, Joachim Wiebach, was a decorator 
accused of giving RIAS confidential information when he visited the station during the 
spring of 1954.  These included personnel lists and information on the SED and 
leadership of the FDGB.  As the verdict noted, “In so doing, RIAS and the American 
secret service received advance knowledge of state visits of leading individuals from 
friendly nations, of special celebrations, receptions, and the like and would be…in the 
position to even prepare, in minute detail, assassination attempts.”87  During the 
proceedings, he was also accused of revealing military secrets on troop strength and Red 
Army deployments to the US Counter Intelligence Corp (CIC).  Upon seeing the initial 
sentence of life in prison, Walter Ulbricht personally crossed out the recommendation 
and wrote, “Recommend death sentence.”88  Consequently, Wiebach was executed.  His 
four co-defendants were given lighter sentences ranging from 8 years to life in prison.  
By 1964, all four would be released. 
The Stasi’s concerns were not entirely driven by misperceptions and paranoia.  
RIAS did encourage East Germans to visit the station and give the broadcaster 
information on conditions in the GDR.  RIAS had encouraged East Germans to openly 
take to the streets and oppose the SED state on June 17, 1953.  Just days after the 
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uprising, the Eisenhower administration’s Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) proposed 
that RIAS continue to fan the flames of opposition, declaring that the protests presented 
“the most promising opportunity yet seen for effective U.S. psychological and political 
attack upon Soviet power in the area.”89  Yet, in the same memo, the PSB also 
recommended that RIAS avoid stirring up open revolt.  Furthermore, the PSB noted that 
US covert operations in East Germany were limited and insufficient to supporting an 
open revolt against the SED state.90  Thus, while RIAS was certainly an important 
weapon in the US’s arsenal for psychological warfare, it was not the vast nerve center of 
all espionage activities in East Germany.  As seen in the PSB memo cited above, the CIA 
itself did not have the capability to undertake the kind of operations the Stasi claimed 
were being coordinated by RIAS. 
The 1955 RIAS Trial and “Aktion Enten” clearly demonstrates that, in the eyes of 
the SED and Ministry for State Security, RIAS was not merely a radio station, but an 
espionage center situated in West Berlin.  Thus, although the trials and “Enten” were 
directed at the station, the Stasi was more concerned with individuals visiting the station 
than people listening to it.  The trials and undercover actions also demonstrate that the 
anti-RIAS material being broadcast and printed was not just propaganda, but reflected 
deep concerns on the part of the leadership of the East Germany.  RIAS and its 
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 Despite the persistence of propaganda pamphlets, radio broadcasts, Stasi 
operations, and trials, the most effective means for preventing GDR citizens listening to 
RIAS was frequency jamming.  Pamphlets and trials were intimidating, but they could 
not stop East Germans from secretly switching on their radios in what privacy they still 
had.  When, in the spring of 1960, East Germans visiting West Berlin were asked in a 
DIVO survey whether they still listened to RIAS, just 2% of those who responded “no” 
said it was because it was too dangerous to listen to the station.91  A report made later that 
year confirmed this finding, noting that respondents who chose not to listen to RIAS did 
so mostly because they could not receive the transmissions and not because they adhered 
to an opposing political viewpoint.92  The articles, pamphlets, and broadcasts showed 
little effect on RIAS’s popularity.  By 1960, it was still the most popular news 
broadcaster in East Germany, with three in four East Germans citing it as their preferred 
source for news.93  For the most part, despite the Stasi and fear of prosecution, East 
Germans felt they could safely (and discreetly) listen to the station.  However, as easy as 
it was to turn the radio dial to RIAS, transmission jamming could make such a move 
fruitless.  
 In 1951, RIAS listeners could chose between long wave, medium wave (AM), 
and ultra short wave (FM) frequencies.  Each wavelength had different characteristics in 
terms of quality of reception and ease of transmission, and as a result it was common for 
stations to broadcast on a diverse number of wavelengths during the 1950s.94  The GDR 
pursued efforts to jam RIAS on all of these frequencies.  Frequency jamming is a fairly 
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basic process by which disruptive noise such as half tones or engine sounds are broadcast 
at a higher power along the same wavelength as another radio station.  Such an act 
disrupts the transmissions on the prescribed frequency, rendering the station inaudible.  
Sometimes, alternative broadcasts can be transmitted over these same frequencies, but 
with greater power.  A radio station trying to combat jamming either has to broadcast on 
different frequencies or broadcasting using more powerful transmitters, with FM 
frequencies being the best means to cut through the disruption.95  Thus, the appropriation 
of equipment and a diverse number of frequencies was necessary for RIAS and other 
stations if they were to confront the GDR challenge.   
 In an interview given in 1982, former RIAS chief Gordon Ewing recalled the East 
German jamming operations:  
 
Yeah, after it became so obvious that RIAS had tremendous 
political influence in the Soviet Zone, the DDR government 
established many jammer transmitters, big and little.  
Incidentally, this is one reason we took up FM when it was 
developed because you cannot jam FM very easily.  We 
were at various times heavily jammed but we had several 
different ways of getting through, and as I say, also FM 
with an exceptionally wide range.  Yes, the DDR spent a 
lot of money trying to jam us out.96   
 
The interviewer, Brewster Chamberlin, then asked, “It was obviously never very 
successful?” to which Ewing responded, “No they weren’t.”97  Chamberlin and Ewing’s 
optimistic judgment, made twenty years after Ewing’s tenure as RIAS director obscures 
the very real concerns amongst both RIAS officials and West Germans concerning the 
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jamming of broadcasts throughout Germany and Europe.  Letters and memos exchanged 
between RIAS and officials in Washington and Bonn reveal that the jamming problem 
was of the utmost concern.   
 Since RIAS was the principle target of jamming, the GDR’s campaign threatened 
to isolate the American funded radio station from the rest of the West German stations.  
A meeting report of the Federal Committee for All-German affairs from February 1953 
notes that one participant, RIAS’s program director Eberhard Schütz, warned that unless 
new frequencies were obtained for the Federal Republic’s broadcasters, none of the West 
German stations would be audible in the Soviet Zone due to 4 to 5 jamming transmitters 
being built there.  Interestingly, Schütz made sure to point out that it would be a “fallacy” 
to presume that this was a problem only effecting RIAS.”98  In April, 1953, Schütz 
reiterated the concern to an official in the Ministry for All-German affairs, describing the 
situation as “catastrophic” and noting that RIAS had lost nearly 40% of its listeners.  He 
noted that he was willing to come to Bonn to discuss solutions to the problem.99 
 The fact that Schütz had to point out that RIAS was not the only station in danger 
of jamming indicates that at least some, if not many, West German radio officials did not 
feel their stations faced a similar threat.  By the fall of that year, the problem had become 
more acute for the American station.  The June 17 uprisings had led to a new and more 
intense wave of jamming operations, a clear indication of how the GDR believed RIAS 
had triggered the uprising.100  In September 1953, Ewing wrote a letter to USIA Director 
Theodore Streibert to inform him that, “The jamming is very bad now, beyond a doubt.  
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We will stand on our heads to get through one way or the other.”101  By the winter of 
1954, HICOG officials were informing the US press that RIAS was being jammed in 
about half of the GDR.102  By 1957, the GDR operated about 300 jamming towers.103 
 The clearest indication of the jamming’s impact came in a number of independent 
surveys made by both NWDR and the West German government over the course of the 
next three years. The first, made by NWDR’s Listener Research department in December 
1953 indicated that, for the first time since 1948, RIAS was no longer the most listened to 
general broadcaster in East Berlin.104  Of the 560 East German refugees questioned, 52% 
chose NWDR as the station they listened to most, with only 34% selecting RIAS.  
However, the survey made sure to point out that this was not due to programming 
preferences, as it concluded that RIAS programs remained just as popular as NWDR 
Berlin’s, and both broadcasters were more popular than the three GDR stations (Berlin I, 
II, and III).  The survey concluded that, “NWDR comes before RIAS as the most listened 
to Western Broadcaster in the Eastern Zone because it can evidently be received better in 
all of the parts of the Zone.”105  What is also clear is that many listeners preferred even 
partially jammed stations to the GDR stations, as the survey noted that, despite situations 
where the three GDR stations could be clearly heard, listeners still preferred Western 
broadcasters.106  While only a minority sought out the western broadcasts for purely 
political information, the survey showed that many GDR listeners were not necessarily 
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turning to the local broadcasters when the western stations were no longer an option.  The 
jamming was effectively preventing listeners from listening to RIAS, but listeners were 
not turning to the GDR stations.  Subsequent surveys taken by the Ministry for all 
German Affairs (Bundesministerium für Gesamdeutschefragen) confirmed NWDR’s 
findings from December 1953.  In May 1955, 670 refugees from East Germany were 
asked to name which station experienced the most consistent jamming.  Nearly three-
quarters listed RIAS as the most jammed western broadcaster.107  However, at this point 
the station’s listener numbers had risen, with 72% noting they regularly listened to RIAS.  
However, NWDR remained the most popular station.108   
 The surveys taken by the West German government and NWDR reveal a number 
of results, but perhaps the clearest is that frequency jamming isolated RIAS from the 
other West German stations.  While others were jammed, in particular SFB, RIAS was 
clearly the GDR’s principle target.  The changes in listener preferences further revealed 
that RIAS’s losses were West German stations’ gains, and not the gains of GDR stations.  
Finally, the surveys reveal that GDR citizens were not easily deterred from listening to 
the western stations, and were willing to accept partial jamming.  The fact that jamming 
did not occur uniformly throughout the day, with the majority of nighttime and morning 
broadcasts jammed while midday transmissions were left relatively uninterrupted, made 
such a decision possible.  Furthermore, the act of listening became a much more labored 
and involved process when listening to a jammed station.  The struggle to hear RIAS 
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through the static meant that listeners would likely pay far closer attention to the words 
being broadcast by the American station.109 
 The situation showed little sign of improvement as the decade progressed.  
Reports made by the USIA in the late 1950s stressed that listener numbers were being 
severely curtailed by jamming.  In December 1957, after a period of good reception, 
USIA officials interviewing East German visitors to West Berlin noted that in all areas 
RIAS was no longer the preferred station of GDR residents.  When asked in 1956 “To 
which stations do you usually listen?,” 57% answered RIAS.  A year later, the percentage 
was even lower, at 35%, just a little over a third.  In contrast, NDR (Nord Deutscherfunk, 
one of the two successor stations of NWDR) received 64%.  More discouraging was that 
the three GDR stations were the most popular, collectively receiving 77%.  However, 
even in this area, RIAS suffered a considerable drop in numbers, with only 28% selecting 
RIAS when asked the question, “On which stations do you mainly rely in order to obtain 
as trustworthy a picture as possible of the most important political events?”  NDR 
received 46%. 
 The quality of the reception was cited as the principle reason for the drop.  “The 
key to RIAS’s losses apparently lies in the trouble people have in hearing its programs,” 
the report declared.110  It further implored readers to “keep in mind that the reception of 
RIAS’s programs is a resultant of many factors.  The most important of these are number 
of strength of the jamming stations assigned to RIAS’s frequencies.”111  The report 
further noted that those who could hear RIAS the best were more likely to rely on it for 
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news.  Content and style of presentation was not cited as a critical reason for the listener 
numbers. 
 The situation showed little improvement a year later.  A 1958 report observed that 
the “general picture of reception conditions for RIAS programs as reported by its 
listeners is not a good one.” Of RIAS’s short wave listeners in East Germany, six out of 
ten noted, “reception is so bad that they can hardly hear anything.”112  Even FM 
broadcasts were considered too weak by listeners, and in all regards, the general opinion 
was that RIAS reception was worst than it ever had been.  In comparison, West 
Germany’s stations enjoyed superior reception on all wavelengths.  Even SFB, which 
suffered from similar frequency interruptions due to its location within Berlin, enjoyed 
somewhat better medium wave reception.113  Whereas in 1954, RIAS faced just 25 
jamming transmitters, by 1956 it confronted 250 such installations with more being built 
each year.114  By 1961, the number had reached at least 600.115 
 The reports discussed above reveal that officials in the West German government, 
West German radio stations, and the USIA all independently reached three important 
conclusions.  First, while it was not the only factor informing listener choice, reception 
was a critical influence in determining which radio stations individuals in the GDR chose 
to listen to over the course of the 1950s.  Jamming made a difference.  Second, RIAS was 
the primary target of East German frequency jamming.  Third, West Germany’s stations, 
with the exception of the West Berlin based SFB (due to its location within the GDR), 
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generally avoided transmission disruption.  The East German campaign against RIAS 
threatened to isolate the American funded station from the rest of West Germany’s 
broadcasters. 
 It is important to consider these conclusions when analyzing the debates that 
erupted when RIAS requested the use of an FM frequency from the West German 
government in 1958.  During the 1950s, RIAS had taken a number of measures to 
confront the jamming, the most important being the use of multiple channels sent on 
different frequencies, two on middle wave and one on long wave.116  However, FM was a 
much more effective means for breaking through the disruption.  According to USIA 
Public Affairs Officer Ned Nordness, FM broadcasting and technical improvements were 
the critical means for combating the East German jamming towers.117   Consequently, in 
1958 RIAS requested that the West German Federal Ministry for Post and 
Communications allow RIAS to use a FM frequency for its Hof transmitter to broadcast 
into the southern regions of East Germany.  The debates over this decision would last for 
the next three years, and would not be resolved until the summer of 1961, just weeks 
before the erection of the Berlin Wall.  The debates reveal both that RIAS was often 
isolated from the rest of the West German broadcasters and that members of the West 
German government considered RIAS a potential lighting rod in an otherwise stable 
situation with regards to broadcasting in both Germanys.  By the late 1950s, many 
officials began to consider RIAS a liability and a potential source of disruption to the 
normal operations of West Germany’s state managed radio stations. 
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 The concerns revolved around what German officials called a “Rundfunkkrieg.” 
(Literally a “Radio War”).  The term does not refer to a war of words or ideologies fought 
over the airwaves, but in fact to the use of transmitters and jamming to disrupt the 
normal, orderly operations of radio broadcasting throughout the two Germanys.  In the 
course of a “Rundfunkkrieg,” stations would be disrupted either by static noise or 
transmissions sent over rival station frequencies.  Memos drawn up between 1952 and 
1961 from the Ministry for All German Affairs and Ministry for Post reveal deep 
concerns about an “open Radio War” and the need for “Radio Provisions for the Populace 
in the Case of an Open Radio War.”118  The language connotes a chaotic and 
unpredictable situation held at bay by an uneasy truce.  Several West German officials 
feared that RIAS threatened to disrupt this peace. 
 Memos and letters exchanged between various West German Federal ministries 
certainly reveals officials’ concerns with the East German Jamming towers.  Beginning in 
January 1953, officials from the Ministries for All-German affairs, Ministry for Post and 
Communications, and from NWDR watched with concern as the GDR erected large 500 
kW towers that could disrupt northern Germany’s radio broadcasts.119  Subsequent 
meetings indicated that countermeasures were limited.  While West Berlin could be 
served by a wired broadcasting network (similar to the one utilized by RIAS in 1946), 
there was no way to guarantee broadcasts reception in the Soviet Zone.  The final concern 
was that, in the event of a “radio war” breaking out, only a third of the Federal Republic’s 
transmitters could counteract East German jamming by using FM wavelengths. 
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 A memo from the Minister for Post and Communications from 1954 illustrates 
what kind of consequences a “radio war” could have.  The disruption went beyond static 
noise being sent over the airwaves.  The memo outlines a number of possible scenarios.  
The first, as discussed, was jamming radio station broadcasts through the use of 
disruptive noise.  A powerful enough noise could even disrupt the station transmissions 
outside of the GDR, thus affecting listeners in the Federal Republic.  The second was a 
more aggressive approach that would have sent actual propaganda broadcasts over the 
airwaves of the Federal Republic’s stations, thus not only disrupting them but also 
replacing them with East German radio programming.  Another possibility included a 
process by which the disrupting broadcaster would actually share the frequency and allow 
an East German speaker to add comments and asides to West German broadcasts that 
could undermine reports and programming.  One would hear both the West German 
broadcast and the East German commentators thoughts at the same time.  Finally, there 
was the threat of a “Schwarzsender,” an illegal station sending unregulated broadcasts 
throughout the West German airwaves.120 The measures for confronting the possibility 
of a “radio war” were substantial.  They included building new long, middle, short, and 
FM transmitters, the construction of an improved “wired broadcast” network in Berlin, 
and various technical innovations, costing some 470 million marks.121   
 Thus, a “radio war” was a costly affair, and one that the West German 
government was not eager to fund.  As a result, RIAS’s request to broadcast on an FM 
frequency raised concerns that were expressed in a meeting attended by the Minister for 
All-German Affairs, the Minister for Post and Communications, various state secretaries, 
                                                 






and a representative from Bavarian Radio.122  It was the responsibility of the Minister for 
Post and Communications, Richard Stückeln, to apportion and monitor the various 
frequencies in the Federal Republic.  Since the Hof transmitter was in Bavaria, the matter 
also concerned both Bavaria’s radio station and the Bavarian government.  Supporting 
the measure was the Ministry for All-German Affairs and its leader, Ernst Lemmer. 
Responsible for building a bridge between the Federal Republic and those Germans 
living in the GDR, Lemmer and his State Secretary Theodore Thedieck were naturally 
concerned with overcoming as much of the Soviet Zone jamming as possible and 
allowing West German broadcasts to reach East Germany.    Since the late 1950s, the 
Ministry had also been subsidizing part of the station’s budget.  Beginning in 1958 the 
US Congress had cut the RIAS operating budget, feeling that other overseas media 
operations required more support.123  At the same time, RIAS operating costs were on the 
rise.  Thus, beginning in 1958, the Ministry for All-German affairs provided a subsidy of 
about $225,000 to fund programs of mutual interest to both RIAS and the Ministry, 
including the Symphony Orchestra and Chorus. 
 Both RIAS and the Ministry had ideological and economic motives for seeing the 
broadcasts break through to East Germany.  Yet, at the January 29, 1960 meeting, the 
representative from the ministry found himself alone amongst the participants in 
supporting the new frequency.   State Secretary Herzt expressed his concerns and those of 
other critics clearly, as they feared that the recent “frequency truce” between the two 
German states could be upset.  The meeting minutes noted, “Professor Herzt indicated, 
that the erection of a UKW Transmitter in Hof could possibly disrupt this frequency 
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peace and provoke a Radio War, during which, not only will our broadcasts along the 
Zone’s border be disrupted, but the reception of our broadcasts into the Soviet 
Occupation Zone could also be inhibited.”124   
 The counter argument made by the Ministry for All-German affairs was that 
allowing RIAS broadcasts through East Germany was a critical component of the Federal 
Republic’s policies of reunification and unity.  The ministry also expressed concern about 
how the refusal to grant the station an FM transmitter would look to the United States 
government: 
 
The US government could easily conclude from this 
hesitation, that the Federal Government is becoming 
fundamentally unsteady.  It has gained the impression, that 
the Federal Government is no longer pursuing its All-
German policy with full force and no longer use the means 
it has at hand.  Such a position would suggest to the United 
States that they may reexamine their own position.  The 
consequence could be a withdrawal of the United States 
government out of Berlin, at the least a heavy dismantling 
of their radio commitments, which are now happening to 
RIAS.  Yet, a withdrawal of RIAS from Berlin could again 
become a symbol for the changing of the allied position 
with regards to the West Berlin Question.125  
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The Ministry reasoned that the reluctance to support the new transmitter went beyond 
both technological concerns and security for West German broadcasting.  It threatened 
the solidarity of the US-West German alliance and jeopardized Western commitments to 
Berlin.  RIAS was a symbolic representation of the United States in West Germany.  
Consequently, its relationship to the Federal Republic was considered an indication of 
broader US relations with the West German government. 
 The dispute reached the very top of the West German Federal and State 
governments.  On February 11, 1960, the Minister President of Bavaria, Hans Erhard, 
sent a letter to Chancellor Adenauer reiterating concerns about a new “radio war.”  He 
noted that, since 1957 West German stations had been left to freely broadcast.  RIAS’s 
move would be considered a provocative action that would most likely end this peace.  
Referencing the January 29 meeting with Minister Stückeln, Ehard stressed that a 
majority of the meeting participants were against the new frequency.  However, a 
decision had been postponed due to the far-reaching consequences the final decision 
would have for the Federal Republic.126  Naturally, the United States government also 
became involved.  In March, 1961, the US ambassador to West Germany argued that, 
since RIAS had been broadcasting from Hof since 1952, the use of a new frequency 
would not change the situation, and thus would not provoke a Soviet response.127  The 
ambassador also cited the agreement signed between the Federal Republic and United 
States permitting free use of the Hof transmitter, noting that nothing had occurred to 
change the applicability of that agreement.128 
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 The Federal Government finally agreed to grant RIAS’s request, three years after 
the initial proposal was made.  A verbal note was relayed on July 25, 1961, granted the 
station the frequency of 91.2 MHZ.129 The decision, coming just weeks before East 
Germany officially sealed its border with West Berlin came at a fortunate time.  The 
debate over whether or not to grant the new frequency is an illuminating one however, for 
it reveals a number of important points about the nature of political radio in the Cold War 
and the symbolic nature of the various radio stations in Berlin.  In the various letters and 
memos drawn up on the issue, it is interesting to note that in none of them was there 
major concern expressed about what RIAS was actually broadcasting.  The same state of 
affairs marks the station’s proposals to the Ministry for All-German Affairs.  In none of 
the memos or letters was the suggestion made to ask RIAS to broadcast less provocative 
or critical reports in order not to provoke a GDR reprisal.  Thus, there was an 
acknowledgement that RIAS’s broadcasts were necessary and an important part of 
building an All-German policy for the West German government.  The concerns were 
grounded in what the reaction of the East German government would be, not with what 
RIAS would report.  It was accepted that, no matter what RIAS broadcast, it would 
provoke jamming.  The SED campaign to prevent its citizens listening to RIAS had gone 
beyond the content of the broadcasts.  The very name of RIAS and its position within 
West Berlin had become a provocative and heated element in inter-German relations.  By 




                                                 





 Throughout the 1950s, the GDR utilized a wide range of methods to discourage 
its citizens from listening to RIAS and other West German stations.  The East German 
government also undertook efforts to sever contact between East German citizens and the 
radio station.  It did this primarily for both ideological and security reasons.  RIAS was 
considered a war agitator and a threat to the creation of an appropriate socialist mentality 
amongst the citizens of the GDR.  It was also seen as a center of espionage sending coded 
broadcasts to saboteurs and hidden enemies within the GDR.  Consequently, the ability to 
hear it needed to be managed and curtailed. 
 The various methods used by the GDR had varying degrees of effectiveness.  The 
least effective, yet most elaborate in terms of presenting a counter ideological argument, 
was the use of newspaper stories, pamphlets, posters, and radio broadcasts to discourage 
listening.  This campaign presented two broad lines of argument: first RIAS was a fifth 
column within the GDR controlled by monopolist industrialists and imperialists in the 
United States that sought to provoke a war of destruction in Germany.  Second, those 
who listened to RIAS were a naïve yet troublesome minority guilty of supporting war and 
of treason.  
 As elaborate as this propaganda campaign was, it was not a particularly effective 
means of discouraging listening to RIAS.  The GDR thus pursued tactics outside of the 
studio and outside of ideological confrontation.  First, it harassed listeners, imprisoned 
them, and infiltrated RIAS with Stasi informers in an attempt to disrupt the actual station 
operations.  However, a far more effective counter-RIAS technique was jamming.  This 
method, which was perhaps the simplest, was also the most effective, for it simply 





of GDR citizens selected it as the station they listened to most, by 1957 only about a third 
of GDR residents selected RIAS as their preferred broadcaster.  Surveys made by both 
the West German and US governments as well as West German radio stations such as 
NWDR concluded these numbers were directly linked to transmitter interference.  These 
reports all indicate that jamming was a real and significant cause for audience number 
fluctuations. 
 The effectiveness of the jamming campaign had consequences that went beyond 
the radio conflict between RIAS and the GDR.  Since RIAS was the primary target of 
transmitter interference, West German stations felt a sense of security from jamming that 
was quickly challenged when RIAS requested a more effective FM frequency in order to 
better broadcast into the GDR.  Officials in Bavaria and in government organs such as the 
Ministry for Post and Communications found themselves in conflict with RIAS, the US 
government, and the Ministry for All-German Affairs.  Although the dispute was settled 
in RIAS’s favor in 1961, the debate lasted three years.  Occurring during a period when 
the West German-US alliance was perhaps at its strongest, the debate still reveals the 
uncertainties regarding the US presence in West Berlin and concerns that its goals and 
activities were not necessarily in accord with those of the West German government.  It 
also reveals the isolation of the Ministry for All-German affairs, which relied on RIAS to 
help build a bridge between the Germans living in the GDR. 
 The jamming campaign is also indicative of broader trends in East German 
politics during the 1950s.  Unable to combat RIAS either ideologically or through the use 
of Stasi informers and undercover actions, it chose to simply use jamming technology to 





Germany’s airwaves.  However, as effective as this practice was, by 1961 RIAS was 
broadcasting over enough jamming resistant FM frequencies to keep its audience 
numbers at levels equal to those of the early 1950s.  In the face of jamming, Stasi 
operations, and propaganda campaigns, RIAS’s East German audience remained resilient 
and intent on listening to the station. 
 The GDR campaign against RIAS is an excellent illustration of how an 
authoritarian state can not only control the shaping of political culture but also try and 
manage its reception.  It demonstrates that, while radio was a critical factor in the shaping 
of rhetoric, ideology, and political language, the same technology could be used to 
disrupt and hinder its dissemination.  In this regard, the GDR enjoyed far greater success 
in controlling the reception and diffusion of political culture than it did in actually 
shaping it.  The GDR was able to prevent more people from listening to RIAS by 
broadcasting static noises bereft of content rather than broadcasting reports that actually 





Chapter Six: Berlin Radio from the Secret Speech to the Construction of the Berlin Wall, 
1956-1961 
 
 By the mid 1950s, Berlin was serviced by three major radio stations as well as a 
large number of stations that broadcast from outside of Berlin, such as the BBC, the 
stations of the British and American Armed forces, Radio DDR, and Deutschland Sender.  
Throughout the decade, the three main Berlin stations: SFB and RIAS in West Berlin and 
Berliner Rundfunk in East Berlin, continued to pursue goals they had established for 
themselves at the start of the 1950s. 
 The period between 1956 and 1961 was a critical one in the course of the Cold 
War.  The death of Stalin sparked a period of transition as his successors vied for control 
over both the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet Union.  By 1956, Nikita Khruschev 
had succeeded in establishing himself as the new leader of the Soviet state.  In March, he 
shocked the world when he denounced Stalin during his secret speech before the 
Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party.  Khruschev’s new leadership seemed 
to promise a relaxation of Communist control in the Soviet Union and a thaw in relations 
with the West.  Yet, as 1956 progressed, it became apparent to the states of the Eastern 
bloc that there was a limit to how much Khruschev was willing to relax control.  In June 
of 1956, Soviet tanks violently suppressed labor riots in Poland.  Then, in the fall of 
1956, reform communists in Hungary declared that the state would be embarking upon its 
own course of socialism and would withdraw from the Warsaw Pact.  The Soviets 
responded with a brutal crackdown at the beginning of November and reinstalled a loyal 





however, by the almost simultaneous invasion of Egypt by a British, French, and Israeli 
coalition aimed at opening the Suez Canal.   
 While these events did not impact Berlin directly, they were nevertheless critical 
in the history of communism in Europe and the solidarity of the Eastern Bloc.  In 1958, 
however, Berlin once again became the focus of the Cold War as Khruschev declared that 
the Soviet Union would sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR if the Western Allies 
did not come to a settlement concerning the city, thus threatening allied rights to West 
Berlin.  Khruschev’s threat would be periodically reiterated until 1961 when, due to the 
increasing flight of East Germans to West Germany, he sanctioned the construction of the 
Berlin Wall and closed the border between the two Germanys.  The act effectively 
brought a disagreeable though diplomatically tolerable resolution to the Berlin issue, an 
issue that had dominated relations between the two superpowers since the end of World 
War II. 
 This chapter examines how Berlin’s radio stations confronted and examined the 
events between the 20th Party Congress and the erection of the Berlin Wall.  For all three 
major stations (SFB, RIAS, and Berliner Rundfunk) the period was one in which 
practices developed at the beginning of the decade continued to shape how journalists 
reported the events of the Cold War.  At the same time, the stations’ broadcasts reflected 
the changing diplomatic landscape as it became apparent to observers that there was not 
going to be an immediate solution to the German Question.  Thus, by the time the Berlin 
Wall was constructed, Berliner Rundfunk and other stations in East Germany could 
justify it as the logical solution to the security threat posed by the provocateurs living in 





expressed by much of the West German media as the realization that Germany would 
remain divided was given grotesque manifestation. 
 
1956: From the Secret Speech to the Uprising in Hungary 
 
 The complex reasons behind Khrushchev’s decision to secretly denounce Stalin 
before the members of the Soviet Communist Party in February are beyond the pervue of 
this dissertation.  The consequences of this decision nevertheless play an important part 
in the development of political culture in Europe, especially in the Communist Bloc.  The 
sudden condemnation of the former leader of the world communist movement for over 
two decades was a dramatic and unexpected act on the part of the Soviet Union’s new 
leader.1     
 The speech was particularly problematic for the SED, especially since Ulbricht 
and other leaders had sought to shape the GDR along Stalinist principles.  For West 
Berlin’s stations, it provided an opportunity to exploit divisions within the eastern bloc 
and attack the legitimacy of the Communist Party.  Yet, at the same time, it puzzled 
many, who questioned why Khrushchev had given the speech in the first place.  On 
March 28, 1956 SFB freelance commentator Richard Löwenthal presented a review of 
the speech.  Born in 1908, Löwenthal was a prominent public intellectual and journalist.  
Residing in London until 1959, (after fleeing there in 1938 due to both his left-wing 
affiliation and Jewish background), he worked as a political journalist, providing 
commentaries for both radio and newspapers on the nature of communism, democracy, 
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and the Cold War.2  His SFB broadcasts reveal how his experiences as a former member 
of the German Communist Party gave him particular insight into the nature and character 
of the Soviet Union.  On Khrushchev’s speech, he noted that, “…one must ask himself, 
why such an open, systematic critique has come to pass, a critique which can only shake 
the regime’s authority and especially the position of Stalin’s former accomplices?”3  
Noting that most the Stalinists in the Soviet Communist Party were no longer in power, 
Löwenthal cautioned listeners from assuming that cynical goals or internal party rivalries 
motivated Khrushchev’s actions.  Nor did the reasons lie in a legitimate wish to liberalize 
the Soviet system.  As Löwenthal reminded his listeners, “Was not Khrushchev one of 
the most brutal of Stalin’s associates?  Was he not the hangman of the Ukraine during the 
Great Purge of 1937/38 and the whip of the failed anti-peasant experiment of the 
agricultural cities at the beginning of the 1950s?”4  In fact, Löwenthal contended that the 
cause for Khrushchev’s destalinization lay in a Soviet Thermidorean movement. Lower 
level communists were the driving force of this reactionary movement.  With the Soviet 
state now a world power, many of these functionaries bristled at the thought of a 
repressive party.  As Löwenthal argued, “20 years of social developments and the self-
consciousness caused by victory in war has made these thermidorean tendencies greater.  
Furthermore, Khrushchev no longer has an all-powerful secret police at his disposal, a 
consequence of Khrushchev’s own decision to weaken the organization during the first 
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succession struggles.  Thus, the pressure of the army and the party bureaucracy has 
become greater.”5  Consequently, Khruschev’s actions were based on the tactical need to 
maintain his authority over the Soviet system.  Despite these limited goals, Löwenthal 
predicted the Soviet leader’s decision would have greater consequences.  “The criticism 
of Stalin and the condemnation of 20 years of Stalinism have brought the developments 
in Russia into a state of flux, in a far greater state than we would have considered 
possible in the past.”6  As he closed, Löwenthal marked the end of an era.  “The saga of 
the legend of Stalin is over.  The saga of his work’s disintegration continues.”7 
 RIAS’s reporters also used Khrushchev’s speech as an opportunity to highlight 
problems within the Soviet system.  On March 19, 1956, RIAS’s chief foreign 
commentator, Heinz Frentzel, discussed the secret speech.  Like Löwenthal, he sought to 
explain to listeners why he thought Khrushchev had felt the need to present such a 
startling denunciation.  As he opened, he stressed the dramatic rupture created by 
Khrushchev’s actions.  Recalling a photograph depicting Khrushchev, Beria, Molotov, 
Bulganin, and Malenkov before Stalin’s coffin, Frentzel noted that at one time all 
communist party leaders bowed down before “the evil, violent Georgian.”  Now this was 
no longer true.8  Drawing upon an editorial by Walter Ulbricht from Neues Deutschland, 
Frentzel noted that the criticism of Stalin was severe.  As Frentzel said, “Stalin is to be 
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damned, there can be no doubt about that.”9  Khrushchev was not saying anything the 
world outside of the Soviet Union did not know already.  Like Löwenthal, Frentzel was 
quick to remind his listeners that Khrushchev was not innocent of Stalin’s crimes, noting 
that anybody who had reached the pinnacle of the Soviet system had done so with 
Stalin’s support.  And again, like Löwenthal, Frentzel was quick not to ascribe altruistic 
motives to Khrushchev’s sudden admission of Stalin’s crimes.  However, unlike 
Löwenthal, Frentzel did not see the admission so much as a tactical move, but as an 
inevitable consequence of Stalin’s death.  “With the end Stalin’s terrible dominance, the 
truth will break out sooner or later.  It does not emerge because Khrushchev is in love 
with the truth, but because the truth cannot remain suppressed forever, because it simply 
breaks through when the almighty power begins to diminish.”10  Soon, Frentzel warned, 
Khrushchev, Premier Nikolai Bulganin, and Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan would 
pervert and distort the truth to suit their goals.  Thus, Frentzel beseeched listeners to pay 
attention to what Khrushchev’s next moves would be, as it was important to be aware of 
how the Soviet leaders would utilize the recent so-called revelation of Stalin’s crimes for 
their own foreign ambitions. 
 Neither Frentzel nor Löwenthal believed that Khrushchev had been motivated by 
the wish to have an honest and frank public discussion of the Soviet past.  For both 
commentators, it was clear that political motives and ambitions rested behind the speech.  
In Löwenthal’s SFB commentary, “Thermidorean” forces seeking a relaxation of party 
control pressured Khrushchev to denounce the dictator.  According to Frentzel’s 
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commentary, the speech was an inevitable consequence of the diminishing power of the 
Stalinist state. 
 East German radio did not address the secret speech outright.  Instead, it 
addressed the speech only after western radio stations and newspapers began running 
stories about the address.  As a result, the tone of the East German response was to focus 
on the western media and characterize its response as an overreaction.  On March 22, 
1956 Deutschlandsender broadcast a commentary from Gerhart Eisler denouncing 
western distortions of the 20th Party Congress.  Eisler accused western papers and stations 
of exploiting the criticism of Stalin as a means of disrupting and dividing the socialist 
camp.11  Eisler then cast the western media and western leaders as hypocrites.  
“Yesterday, my very esteemed brain trust gentlemen, you charged the leadership of the 
SED and the entire Party with praising Stalin uncritically; today you charge our Central 
Committee and all of us with agreeing to the criticism of Stalin’s policy, thoroughly 
proved and (documented?) at the 20th Congress of the CPSU.”12  Eisler then suggested 
that western critics were “almost horrified” by the criticism of Stalin.  The frank 
admission of Stalin’s mistakes strengthened the socialist camp, and thus presented a 
threat to the capitalist powers.  Eisler described self-criticism as a weapon that would 
only strengthen the power of Germany’s socialists and allow them to achieve victory.  
Eisler’s broadcast then began to carry a triumphant tone.  “Please note once and for all 
that you cannot beat us Socialists—either in Germany or anywhere in the world—either 
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with so-called brain trusts or with weapons.”13 He then declared that critics had failed to 
acknowledge the true accomplishments of the congress:  
 
This Party Congress—not only because of its Sixth Five Year 
Plan, not only because of its new, varying political 
conclusions, and not the least because of its criticism of the 
mistakes of Stalin and the corrections it made—this Party 
Congress has revealed the enormous strength, the enormous 
and justified self-confidence, of this revolutionary Party 
which the peoples of the Soviet Union call their Party; which 
all class-conscious workers of the world call their splendid, 
magnificent, fraternal Party.14 
 
Thus, Eisler continued to utilize a theme developed by the SED years before 
Khrushchev’s speech, namely that open and frank criticism was an expression of 
strength.  Just as Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler and Herbert Gessner had interpreted the 
introduction of the New Course in June 1953 as evidence of the superiority of the East 
German system, so too did Eisler interpret the Secret Speech as evidence of socialism’s 
inevitable victory over capitalism. 
 However, just as the New Course had helped spur the June 17 uprising, so too did 
the Secret Speech lead to upheaval in the Eastern Bloc.  In the summer and fall of 1956, 
the Warsaw Pact was rocked by open revolts in Poland and Hungary.  In Poland, the 
death of the Stalinist Boleslaw Bierut, occurring just months after the secret speech, 
prompted the removal of other Stalinists from the Polish government and to the release of 
political prisoners.  The relaxation of the state’s repressive measures sparked riots in 
Poznan in June.  By October, the Polish Communist Party brought to power Wladyslaw 
Gomulka.  A victim of Stalin’s anti-Titoist purges during the late 1940s, Gomulka was 







elected against Khrushchev’s wishes.  Flying to Warsaw to prevent the appointment, he 
was dramatically rebuffed by the Polish Communist Party and forced to acknowledge 
Gomulka’s election as the new first secretary on October 19.15   
 The Soviet Union’s recognition of Gomulka’s national communist regime in 
Warsaw seemed to portend dramatic change in the Eastern Bloc.  Since July, the Soviets 
had sanctioned a number of leadership changes in Budapest.  Concerned that the events 
in Poland could be duplicated in Hungary, they had initially forced the resignation of the 
hard-line Stalinist Mathias Rakosi, only to see him succeeded by the equally hard-line 
Erno Gero.  This did little to stem the calls for reform spreading across central Europe.  
Encouraged by the compromise reached in Poland in October, students and workers 
began to stage demonstrations and then openly rebelled against the Soviets and the 
Communist government.  In order to restore order, Khrushchev sent Soviet troops into 
Hungary on October 23.  However, unlike East Germany in 1953, the tanks were unable 
to put down the revolt.  For the next five days, fighting raged in Hungary, predominantly 
in Budapest.  The Soviets removed Gero and subsequently made the reform communist 
Imre Nagy party leader, hoping that he could reach a similar compromise to the one 
reached in Poland.   Nagy negotiated the removal of Soviet troops on October 28, 1956.  
However, many of the rebels were unwilling to accept a national communist solution like 
the one reached in Poland just days before.  Thus, Nagy began to pursue a far more 
radical path than Gomulka. Upon reintroducing a multi-party system, Nagy then 
announced that Hungary would henceforth be a neutral state on November 1, 1956.  On 
                                                 





November 4, Soviet forces invaded the country and toppled Nagy’s government.  His 
successor, Janos Kadar, subsequently reasserted communist control over the country.16 
Radio played a critical role in the Hungarian Revolution, just as it had during the 
June 17 uprising.  The comparison between RIAS’s actions on June 17 and those of the 
USIA, émigré run station Radio Free Europe is telling.  Hungarians able to hear past the 
jamming interpreted RFE Broadcasts as official statements from the United States.  
Furthermore, RFE’s programming were prone to exaggerate assertions and often failed to 
clearly delineate US policies towards Hungary and Eastern Europe, often insinuating that 
the US would intervene in support of any armed action on the part of the Hungarians.  
Thus, the active participation of RFE in the Hungarian uprising and the challenges this 
posed RFE’s staff mirrored the same problems faced by RIAS’s staff three years earlier.17  
RFE reporters actively sought to fan the flames of the revolution.  RFE programs 
vigorously encouraged Hungarians to press for more gains and overthrow the government 
of Imre Nagy.  Despite Nagy’s more moderate position, and the very real possibility of a 
Titoist solution for Hungary, RFE reporters created the impression that a complete 
overthrow of the communist system was possible and necessary.  RFE also avoided 
mention of the fact that substantial Soviet forces capable of crushing the uprising were 
present in the country.  On November 4, for example, a broadcast promised US military 
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intervention.  As historian Charles Gati noted, there can be no doubt that the broadcasts 
were inflammatory in nature.18  
It is difficult to draw a direct comparison between RIAS’s actions on June 16-17, 
1953 and RFE’s actions over the course of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956.  For one 
thing, the June 17 uprising was over almost as soon as it had begun, whereas the 
Hungarian Revolution lasted over ten days.  However, there are many parallels.  Both 
RFE and RIAS were staffed by men and women dedicated to seeing the fall of 
communism in their homelands.  Consequently, even the slightest hint that this could 
happen was cause for enthusiasm and anticipation.  It should also be recalled that 
Eberhard Schütz’s June 16th broadcast openly encouraged the demonstrators to press for 
more demands and was overly optimistic, predicting the fall of the GDR.  He also made 
no mention of the very real possibility that Soviet troops would intervene.  However, in 
hindsight, and especially when we draw a comparison with RFE’s actions in the fall of 
1956, one can see that RIAS Political Director Gordon Ewing’s decision to tone down 
RIAS’s rhetoric on June 17 was a prudent one.  Unfortunately, the reporters at RFE did 
not recognize the lessons that RIAS had learned in 1953: that radio broadcasts made in 
the name of the United States could have a tremendous and potent impact on listeners 
eager to see the overthrow of communism in their country.  The Soviets, Ewing and his 
staff realized, could easily misinterpret this potency as an expression of US aggression.  
For the Hungarian fighters of October 1956, RFE promised American intervention.  It 
was a promise, it will be recalled, that even Eberhard Schütz and Egon Bahr would not 
make on June 17. 
                                                 





The comparison between October 1956 and June 1953 is an important one to 
consider, as reporters at RIAS, SFB, and the GDR’s broadcasters all perceived the 
uprising through the lens of June 17.  This was most clearly apparent in the broadcasts 
made by the GDR’s three radio stations, Berliner Rundfunk, Deutschlandsender, and 
Radio DDR.  All three stations frequently deployed the language of “X-Day,” once again 
blaming reactionaries and fascist provocateurs for starting another east European 
uprising.  Once again, reactionaries in the west were using radio broadcasts to disrupt 
order in Hungary.  On October 28, in the midst of the revolution, Horst Sindermann, 
speaking on Deutschlandsender, condemned Hungarian capitalists and 
counterrevolutionaries, declaring, “Today the question in Hungary is: dictatorship of the 
counterrevolutionaries or rule of the workers.  In Munich the seedy greedy Hungarian 
counts and barons gather, criticize the people’s state in Hungary, and appeal for the 
intervention of imperialist armies.  And of course we do not forget that the capitalist press 
and radio are trying to dislodge the workers from their class outlook and to mislead 
them.”19  By citing the “greedy Hungarian counts” in Munich, Sindermann was clearly 
condemning the émigrés working for RFE (whose European headquarters was in 
Munich).  Sindermann then invoked Hungary’s past, noting that in 1919 the forces of 
reaction had defeated revolution.  “This and only this can be taken as the point of 
departure in a survey of the tragic events in Hungary if one wants to be properly informed 
about them.”20  Sindermann then condemned the claims being made by Hungarian 
revolutionaries that the uprising was a nationalist uprising, noting that Hungary’s dictator 
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Miklos Horthy had made the same claims.  Yet, it was the Soviet army that had liberated 
Hungary from fascist and Nazi control in 1945.   
Interestingly, although East German reporters freely condemned the uprising as a 
counterrevolutionary act, they rarely brought up the June 17 uprising in their broadcasts.  
On October 26, 1956, von Schnitzler condemned the hypocrisy of western observers who 
supported the Hungarian uprising yet did not support anti-colonial uprisings in Algeria 
and Kenya.   
 
There must be different types of risings for sympathies to 
be so unevenly distributed.  Indeed, it appears to me useful, 
especially in connection with the Hungarian example, to 
point out that in fact there are risings and risings, and that 
not every one served progress or amounts to revolution.  
There are anti-progressive, counterrevolutionary risings, 
and the German workers are well aware of this.  In 1920 
they themselves smashed one of them—the so-called Kapp 
Putsch.21 
 
Along with the Kapp putsch, von Schnitzler also cited Franco’s seizure of power in Spain 
in 1936 and the US intervention in Guatemala in 1954 as examples of 
counterrevolutionary uprisings.  He continued to use the same language GDR media 
organs had used to condemn the June 17 uprising.  “Certainly it is not the Hungarian 
workers and peasants, regardless of the fact the hired agitators behind such reactionary 
Putsch attempts always succeed in deceiving some working people about the true aims of 
the attempted rising and in inducing them to unconsidered participation.”22  Once again, 
“agitators” were “deceiving” the workers into taking action against true democrats.   
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Furthermore, von Schnitzler justified the Soviet crackdown by declaring, “For the relapse 
of a socialist country into counterrevolution would inevitably mean its return to the war 
camp, increase the danger of war, and noticeably disturb the atmosphere which today is 
characterized by the desire for an easing of tension and which dominates the whole 
world.”23  World peace and security thus depended on a Hungary firmly in the socialist 
camp. 
 Yet, the length of the uprising coupled with the Soviet Union’s oscillation 
between opposition and acceptance meant that a clear-cut approach was not readily 
apparent for the East German stations.  Between October 28 and November 3, it seemed 
as if the Soviets were willing to accept Imre Nagy’s reformist government.  
Consequently, GDR stations aimed to downplay the reformist character of the Nagy 
government.  On October 29, 1956 Gerhart Eisler characterized Nagy’s policies as being 
firmly in line with socialist and democratic principles in a commentary for Radio DDR:  
 
The aim of the program of the Nagy Government and the 
Hungarian Workers Party, and of their first measures, is 
quite clearly the grand reconciliation of al honest, patriotic 
Hungarians, a genuine strengthening of the Hungarian 
people’s power by incisive democratic, social, and 
economic measures so that the future can be built on what 
is good and lasting while everything which has proved 
untenable and useless is cleared away.24 
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Eisler’s conclusion did not provide much specific information about Nagy’s plan, 
focusing instead on general principles behind the Hungarian leader’s policies.  Indeed, 
Eisler acknowledged as much at the beginning of the broadcast, noting that, “To get an 
exact picture of the situation in Hungary, one would have to be in Hungary and talk to 
people of all walks of life.”25  Only then, asserted Eisler, would reporters be able to 
thoroughly examine events.  Later that day, Klaus-Dieter Kroeber presented a nearly 
identical overview of events.  Again, the commentator noted the scarcity of clear 
information from Hungary.26   While it was certainly true that it was difficult to acquire 
information about the situation in Budapest, the fact that leaders in Moscow were still 
unsure of how to proceed must have left communist broadcasters throughout the Eastern 
Bloc uncertain about how to interpret the actions of the Nagy government.   
 On November 2, however, East German radio was reporting that Hungarian 
fascists were moving into the country.27  Deutschlandsender commentator Richard Wolf 
reported, “Almost without intermission, planes and whole squadrons of aircraft are taking 
off from Austrian airfields for Budapest.”  The reporter noted that official reports 
indicated these planes were transporting medicine.  However, Wolf countered this 
contention, stating, “Observers have become convinced that former officers of the Horthy 
army and former Hungarian officers of Hitler’s Wehrmacht are being channeled in the 
hundreds from the West, via Austria, to Hungary.”28  Furthermore, Radio Free Europe 
was using its Salzburg transmitters to encourage Hungarians to oppose Nagy’s coalition 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 Klaus-Dieter Kröber, Report on the situation in Hungary, October 29, 1956, FBIS Daily Report: USSR and Eastern 
Europe October 30, 1956, NARA, RG 263, Records of the CIA, FBIS, 263/150/62/20/3, Box 119. 
27 Richard Wolf Kommentar, “Hungarian Fascists Move into Country,” Deutschlandsender, November 1, 1956, FBIS 
Daily Report: USSR and Eastern Europe November 2, 1956, NARA, RG 263, Records of the CIA, FBIS, 






government.29  While the Western Allies were not secretly funneling troops into 
Hungary, the last point about RFE’s broadcasts was fairly accurate.  RFE broadcasts had 
consistently taken a decidedly anti-Nagy position since the beginning of the crisis.  Its 
reporters, driven by a maximalist stance that cast all communist leaders with the same 
brush, failed to see Nagy as anything but a hard-line Soviet pawn.30  Thus, during the 
final days of October 1956, there existed the odd situation in which Communist media 
was imploring listeners to support the reformist Nagy whereas the American sponsored 
RFE was encouraging listeners to continue opposing him. 
When the Soviets ordered troops to march into Budapest in order to oust the Nagy 
government and restore communist rule, GDR stations did not need to explain the 
conciliatory commentaries about Nagy sent just days earlier.  On October 31, British, 
French, and Israeli forces invaded Egypt in order to reassert control over the Suez Canal, 
recently nationalized by Egyptian President Nasser.  The military action took the world 
by surprise and turned a great deal of attention away from the events in Hungary.31  The 
GDR’s stations immediately turned their attention to condemning the Anglo-French 
intervention. 
Somewhat striking in the Suez Crisis broadcasts was the ambivalent approach to 
Israel.  GDR stations depicted the Jewish state as both an aggressor and a pawn of 
western imperialists tricked into acting against its own interests.  This was indicative of 
trends in East German political culture from the 1950s.  Initially, the Soviet Union and 
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satellites had supported the creation of the Jewish state.32  At the time, Berliner Rundfunk 
gave the state its support in broadcasts, as can be seen in a broadcast sent in July of 1948 
in which the station blamed the British for playing both the Arabs and Israelis against one 
another by arming each side.33  The broadcast claimed that the British and US sought to 
assert the dominance of Anglo-American capital over the Middle East and were thus 
allowing their “Arab puppet-kings” to wage a war with the Jewish state while at the same 
time arming the Israelis with weapons and forcing upon them the costs of the war.34  
Berliner Rundfunk did not hesitate to characterize the Egyptians as “aggressors” or deny 
that their goal was to “annihilate” (“vernichten”) the Jewish state.35  Berliner Rundfunk’s 
approach was sympathetic to the new state, placing blame for the war on the US and 
British.   
Yet, the changing diplomatic landscape the early 1950s following the creation of 
both the GDR and the Federal Republic led East Germany to change its approach to 
Israel.  In the era of the West German Hallstein Doctrine (by which the Federal Republic 
considered any state’s recognition of the GDR to be a hostile act), East Germany had 
made concerted efforts to open alliances with Arab States currently in a state of war with 
Israel, including Syria and Egypt, as a means of breaking out of diplomatic isolation.36  
Thus, GDR radio’s approach to Israel was largely ambivalent during the Suez Crisis.  On 
October 30, in response to British Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s ultimatum to the 
Eyptian government, Deutschlandradio declared, “This statement by the British Prime 
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Minister makes it plain to the whole world that Israel has been instigated by the Western 
Powers to attack Egypt.”37  Yet, later that day, a Deutschandsender broadcast sent by 
Gerhart Leuschner expressed East Germany’s general hostility to the state.  Ignoring the 
fact that Egypt had been in a state of war with Israel since 1948, the Deutschlandsender 
reporter declared, “In short, the Israeli Government has started war against Egypt without 
a declaration of war.”38  Leuschner continued, implicating the British, French, and United 
States as the true architects of the war.   
 
For years U.S. and British monopolists have been selling 
tanks, aircrafts, and ammunition to Israel; for years these 
circles have made millions out of this deal.  And now other 
U.S. tanks, other British aircraft made in the same factories 
and yielding the same profit for their owners, are to move 
against tanks and aircraft sold to Israel.  Was there not a 
man called Krupp who did equally dirty business in the 
same dirty way, and is this man not still alive like all the 
others who do the same?39   
 
Deutschlandsender depicted Israel as a pawn.  It was characterized as militant and hostile, 
but nevertheless, GDR stations depicted it as the object of Western capitalist interests.  
“Do not these facts indicate that Washington, London, and Paris have known of the 
intended attack by Israeli troops against Egypt for some days now?  And was this attack 
perhaps not staged from these capitals?  Did they therefore not play a downright vile 
game with Israel as well?”40  Leuschner then proceeded to blame the invasion entirely on 
economic interests, citing a sudden slump in oil shares at the New York Stock Exchange 
                                                 
37 “West Instigated Israeli Attack on Egypt,” Deutschlandsender, October 30, 1956, FBIS Daily Report: USSR and 
Eastern Europe October 31, 1956, NARA, RG 263, Records of the CIA, FBIS, 263/150/62/20/3, Box 119. 
38 Gerhart Leuschner Kommentar, “Eden’s Hypocrisy,” Deutschlandsender, October 30, 1956, FBIS Daily Report: 







the day before the invasion.  Declared Leuschner, “The whole point at issue is oil and 
positions of military power.”41  Thus, the capitalists’ need to create a permanent military 
presence in the Middle East in order to reassert colonial authority over the region spurred 
the intervention.  Leuschner then closed by declaring, “Our sympathy belongs to the 
Egyptian and all other Arab peoples.”42   
 Leuschner’s interpretation of the Suez Crisis grossly mischaracterized the motives 
of the western powers.  For one thing, whereas the British and French aimed to neutralize 
Nasser’s influence in the Middle East, Israel was still in a state of war with Egypt.  Thus, 
the Suez action had more to do with the Jewish state’s own security than it did with 
perpetuating Anglo-American economic interests in the Middle East.  Furthermore, the 
United States was not even aware of the operation.  When Eisenhower did learn about it, 
he immediately declared support for the Egyptians and made it clear that the US would 
not support the Anglo-French invasion.43  Overall, the invasion was a misguided venture, 
and not a coordinated plan aimed to assert Anglo-American capitalist interests. 
The diversion of the world’s attention caused by the Anglo-French-Israeli 
intervention afforded Khrushchev and the Soviets an opportunity to take a more 
aggressive stance against Nagy and his government.  The resulting Soviet invasion led to 
the deaths of 20,000 Hungarians and 3,000 Soviet troops. 44  While it is likely that 
Moscow would have sent troops into Hungary anyway, the Anglo-French intervention 
nevertheless permitted Khrushchev a chance to take the moral high ground by 
condemning both countries as hypocrites.  At the same time, he threatened to use nuclear 
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weapons against both countries if they did not withdraw.45  The world’s attention was 
now on Suez.  GDR radio stations took advantage of this opportunity, such as when von 
Schnitzler, in a Deutschlandsender broadcast, accused the west of trying to hide the truth 
about Suez.  ‘No more talk about Egypt, all talk about Hungary’ has been the Western 
slogan from the moment the fate of the counterrevolution in Hungary was sealed.”46  Von 
Schnitzler proceeded to describe the Soviet invasion as an antifascist action, declaring 
that the Soviets were, “preventing what we did not prevent in Germany in 1933, what 
was not prevented in Spain in 1936….”47  Von Schnitzler proceeded to praise the new 
“revolutionary worker-peasant Government” that the Soviets had erected to replace 
Nagy’s regime. 
 The memory of June 17 also cast a shadow over the broadcasts of SFB and RIAS.  
For both, the lessons learned from the East German uprising helped shape the approach 
reporters took to the Hungarian revolt.  This was clearest in the reporting of SFB reporter 
Mathias Walden, who produced the lion’s share of SFB commentaries on the Hungarian 
Revolution during the last week of October and first week of November 1956.  Walden 
had been a member of RIAS and, along with Egon Bahr, had received the East Berlin 
workers delegation that had requested airtime on the evening of June 16, 1953.  Perhaps 
because of his memories of the failed uprising, Walden’s commentaries for SFB were 
cautious.  Missing from these broadcasts (as well as RIAS’s broadcasts from foreign 
correspondent Heinz Frentzel) was the anticipation for success that characterized RIAS’s 
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June 16-17, 1956 broadcasts.  A sober, measured approach replaced the triumphal tone 
and expression of hope of RIAS’s broadcasts from three years earlier.   
 A lengthy report produced by a number of SFB journalists broadcast on October 
26, 1956 demonstrates most of the central themes and assertions made by the West Berlin 
station during the crisis.  The report, part of the SFB series, Zur Politik der Gegenwart 
(“On Current Politics”), focused on two broad themes.  First, it situated the uprising 
within the context of the history of the Eastern Bloc and Soviet Union.  The first speaker, 
Peter Bender, argued that the uprising was the worst blow suffered by the Soviets since 
they occupied Eastern Europe.48  The Soviets, Bender contended, were trapped in a 
desperate situation in which they were forced to defend the deployment of troops to 
Hungary and at the same time defend the policies of destalinization.  Like Poland, 
Hungary was witnessing a “patriotic revolt.”  Also, as in Poland, the Hungarians were 
simply following Moscow’s lead.  If, as the Soviets contended, the state administration 
was responsible for provisioning the Hungarian people, and the Hungarian people were 
not adequately provisioned, then the socialist accomplishments in Hungary were no 
accomplishments at all.  Thus, by the Soviet’s own logic, the uprising was justified.49  
Bender then considered the reactions of the East German and Czechoslovak governments 
to the uprising, declaring that, “As always, the little Soviets in Pankow and Prague look 
more Soviet than the Kremlin itself.”50  Bender then reported that the Czechoslovak 
government had staged demonstrations condemning the Hungarian uprising.  At the same 
time, the SED newspaper Neues Deutschland reminded its readers that the Soviet Union 
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was the touchstone for all truly progressive individuals.51  Bender described these 
assertions from the Czechoslovak and East German governments as cynical and 
expressions of uncontrolled devotion to Stalinist principles.  Bender even cited Pravda to 
demonstrate that Neues Deutschland’s assertions were incorrect.  Although the SED 
organ had declared on October 25 that order had been restored in Budapest, the October 
26 Pravda reported that fighters were still operating in the Hungarian capital.52 
 The second theme of the broadcast, developed by Mathias Walden, was the need 
for solidarity with the Hungarian people.  Here, a certain amount of frustration persisted 
throughout the report, as Walden bemoaned the lack of international support for the 
freedom fighters.  Amongst western leaders, Walden noted that only President 
Eisenhower had declared public solidarity with the Hungarians.  Praising what he 
considered Eisenhower’s honest assessment, Walden declared, “Despite the thaw and the 
business of coexistence, he has condemned the intervention of Soviet troops and 
described their stationing in Hungary as an expression of internal insecurity.  His position 
was less tactical than honest.  In this situation, that is good.”53  Walden criticized the 
West German government’s response, disparaging a declaration by Adenauer in which he 
analyzed the uprising yet stopped short of expressing support and solidarity with the 
Hungarian people.  Members of France’s and Britain’s respective parliaments on the 
other hand had argued that the issue should be deferred to the United Nations’ Security 
Council.  Walden noted this option would not alter the situation, but was the best course 
of action:  
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Because of the Soviet veto, one cannot expect the Security 
Council to alter either the situation or prevent the Soviet 
intervention in Hungary.  But the deployment of Soviet 
battalions against the freedom loving men and farmers 
could be attacked and judged before the world forum.  Such 
a plea from the world for the rights of that struggling 
population would surely be the appropriate answer to the 
Soviet address. 
 
Walden went on to note that all Germans, especially since June 17, should feel a sense of 
solidarity with all men “who risked their bodies and lives for freedom.”54  He closed by 
stressing the grave situation the Hungarians faced as Soviet troops entered the country.  
The Hungarian freedom fighters were willing to give up their lives.  Such a fact needed to 
be acknowledged with sympathy, and not cold analysis. 
 Both Walden and Bender’s commentary situated the uprising within the context 
of destalinization.  At the same time, the shadow of June 17 could be felt, especially in 
Walden’s portion of the commentary.  His expression of frustration with the West 
German government’s failure to express solidarity with the Hungarian people was akin to 
Egon Bahr’s comments about the isolation of the East German people during the 1953 
uprising there.  At the same time, a feeling of futility permeated Walden’s portion as he 
was forced to acknowledge that there was little that could be done to stop the Soviets.  
Thus, all that was left was a firm resolve to support the people of the invaded state.  
Missing here was the triumphant language of Eberhard Schütz’s June 16 commentary on 
the demonstrations in Berlin in 1953.  Tellingly, neither Walden nor Bender suggested 
that the revolt would succeed. 
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 Yet, as events in Hungary progressed, the possibility emerged that the revolution 
would achieve some kind of success.  As the national communist Imre Nagy was 
appointed Prime Minister on October 28, it seemed likely that a partial reform akin to 
what had occurred in Poland just weeks earlier was possible.  This new hope could be 
heard in Walden’s commentaries.  On October 31, news was received from Hungarian 
radio that Soviet troops were withdrawing from Budapest.  The official Soviet position 
was that this action was being taken to preserve security in the city.  Walden discounted 
this explanation, noting in a commentary from that evening that, “The language of reality 
would leave hardly any room and time for the formulation of a triumph, especially when 
the stamped and sealed confirmation of the intense hatred for the Soviets reaches 
Moscow.”55  Those loyal to the regime had gone into hiding.  The old Hungarian parties 
were reconstituting themselves.  Walden declared that a new, democratic life was coming 
to pass.  Yet, he was careful not to declare a complete victory for the Hungarian 
revolutionaries.  “But it is too early to speak of an absolute victory for the people.  As 
long as Soviet troops continue to reside in Hungary, the basic requirements for the 
country’s freedom have not been fulfilled.”56    Yet, Walden believed that Moscow was 
not interested in using further violence to suppress the revolt.   
On November 2, Walden sent a similar broadcast.  However, this time, the 
uncertainty of the Soviet’s next course of action was a source of concern.  Walden 
reiterated the accomplishments of the revolutionaries, noting that they had reconstituted 
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democratic parties and laid the foundations for a liberal democratic order in Hungary.57  
Moscow was isolated, and would soon be forced to defend itself before the United 
Nations.  Then, Walden believed, the justification for maintaining a military presence in 
Hungary would be proven hollow.  Furthermore, there were unlikely any Soviet allies left 
in positions of authority in Hungary.  As Walden declared,  “In the Hungarian 
government, there apparently appears to be no single man who can receive Soviet 
orders.”58  Nagy’s government had worked to fulfill the demands of the Hungarian people 
and had begun the process of severing Budapest’s ties with Moscow and the Warsaw 
Pact.  The prospect that the Soviets would attempt to suppress this government was, in 
Walden’s opinion, unlikely.  “Thus, the Soviet’s path back to power must proceed from 
the collapse of this government, which it had initially respected and supported—and it 
must it must proceed through an armed extermination of the resistance, which in these 
circumstances would mean an inconceivable bloodbath.”59   
In the end, Walden remained uncertain about what the Soviet’s actions would be.  
Indeed, he surmised that it was likely the Soviets themselves were uncertain of what 
action to take.  This was not entirely unfounded.  Just weeks earlier, the Soviets had 
allowed Gomulka’s reform communist regime to remain in power in Poland, a state that 
was of greater importance to the Soviet bloc than Hungary.60  Furthermore, the Soviet 
Presidium had agreed on October 30 not to intervene in Hungary.  Although this decision 
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was immediately reversed the next day, it was made with a great deal of hesitation on the 
part of the Soviets and their allies.61   
Perhaps because his broadcasts were so confident that the Soviets would not risk 
violence in order to suppress the Hungarian uprising, he was particularly shocked and 
dismayed by the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt.  He opened his November 2 broadcast 
by citing an article from the Manchester Guardian which declared that France and 
England’s actions had condemned Hungary’s quest for freedom.62  For years, Walden 
told his listeners, morale had been low and hope nonexistent behind the Iron Curtain.  
Calls for freedom in Eastern Europe had grown weaker and weaker with the passage of 
time.  The Hungarian uprising was thus a seminal moment, an event that all seeking 
freedom in Eastern Europe had been waiting for.  Furthermore, it was a moment that 
would test the moral fortitude of the West.  However, as Walden declared, “Instead, 
France and England abandoned their place as custodians of this moral fortitude and 
instead jumped onto the political roulette table.”63  Walden condemned the Anglo-French 
attack as, “the life preserver” for the Soviet’s Hungarian policy.64  There could be no 
doubt, in Walden’s estimation that the Anglo-French action would provide the Soviets 
with the opportunity to crush the Nagy government and reassert Communist control.  The 
stakes for the Soviets were high: allowing Hungary’s decision to withdraw from the 
Warsaw Pact to stand unopposed would mean the beginning of the end of the Eastern 
Bloc.  Yet, the British and French had provided the Soviets with the opportunity they 
needed to stop the uprising.  Walden closed his evening broadcast with a sharp critique of 
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both Britain and France: “The triumph of the Communist’s propaganda is primarily 
predicated on a deep dismay with the free west since the bombs fell on Egypt.”65  
A day after the Soviet’s invaded Hungary on November 4, Walden gave an 
evening commentary describing the consequences of the intervention.  The majority of 
the commentary focused on the experiences of Hungarian refugees interviewed at the 
Traiskirchen refugee camp in Austria.  Throughout, Walden made an effort to cast a 
thoroughly unsentimental picture of the Hungarian freedom fighters.  He opened with a 
stark image of the refugees: 
 
I have seen and spoken with the Hungarian freedom 
fighters.  Freedom fighters, who, behind the gates of a 
refugee camp, are not fanatics standing in heroic poses, but 
simply men and woman of this unfortunate nation.  
Farmers, young miners, weeping mothers with screaming 
children, young people who continue to wear armbands and 
little, tattered ribbons with the Hungarian national colors.  
Poorly dressed, sunken-cheeked, and exhausted, they came 
over the border yesterday and during the previous night, a 
border that has been closed since this morning.66 
 
Walden then spoke of the invasion and how it surprised Hungarians and observers alike.  
In a graphic metaphor, he likened Hungary to a blister that had suddenly been punctured 
by Soviet tanks.  Reporting on his conversations with the refugees, Walden repeatedly 
returned to the issue of western aid and intervention.  In all of his conversations, he 
reported, he was inevitably asked why the Hungarians were forced to face the Soviets 
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alone.  Walden also told listeners about the rumors of US intervention.  Although he did 
not specifically mention the origin of these rumors, it is certain that many of them were 
spread by RFE’s broadcasts.  As Walden noted, “However, as you have surely heard, the 
myth spread about Budapest yesterday that in two hours the Americans would come.  
That was indeed the most illusory, yet understandable, hope.  The thought of aid came 
from this direction.  The Americans.  Not from the United Nations, not from diplomatic 
considerations, and surely not from the English or the French.”67  He continued by 
addressing the problems posed by nuclear weapons.  Perhaps recalling the concerns of his 
former RIAS chiefs in June of 1953, Walden noted that whenever observers, statesmen, 
and journalists considered the question of US intervention, the fear of starting World War 
III and atomic war was always brought up.  Yet, at the same, the events in Hungary had 
made diplomatis’ claim that nuclear weapons helped prevent war dubious.  Due to the 
fear of nuclear war, the Soviets were able to inflict its “medieval barbarity” upon the 
Hungarian people.68  The Soviet Union could use its armed forces throughout the Eastern 
Bloc without fear or reprisal from the west.  Referring to the 1955 Geneva summit, 
Walden claimed that, “The entire diplomatic repertoire which has ruled the world stage 
since the summer of Geneva, has been rendered useless by the events in Hungary.”69  The 
Soviets had nothing to fear from the west and were able to pursue a “politics of illusion” 
before the world at the United Nations.  Thus, the people of Hungary were victims of 
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both Soviet aggression and the inability and unwillingness of the western and non-aligned 
world to intervene.  
 The overriding tone of Walden’s broadcasts was similar to the RIAS broadcasts 
sent after the June 17 uprising.  An ambivalence and disillusion pervaded throughout.  
Like Bahr and Schütz in 1953, Walden was fully aware that an American intervention 
would likely provoke a larger scale war that would likely be fought with nuclear 
weapons.  Yet, Walden continued to express a deep frustration with the fact that there 
was little Eastern Europe (including East Germany) could do against the Soviets.  The 
entire Eastern Bloc was at the mercy of the USSR.  At the same time, Walden looked at 
the west with ambivalence.  The only arena in which the Soviets could be challenged was 
the arena of world opinion.  Thus, he praised the United States for its moral support of 
the uprising.  However, the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt had shattered the image 
of a united western bloc that could claim moral superiority over the Soviets.  By 
launching an imperialist intervention, Britain and France not only turned a blind eye to 
the events in Hungary, but had also given up any moral standing that the west could bring 
to bear against the Soviets.   
 RIAS’s broadcasts were similar, focusing on the same basic issues and following 
the same basic path from reservation to optimism to condemnation that Walden’s SFB 
commentaries took.  As in Walden’s commentaries, the shadow of June 17, 1953 loomed 
over Heinz Frentzel’s broadcasts.  In his broadcast from October 25, Frentzel drew a long 
line of continuity from June 17 through the June 28 uprisings in Poland through to the 





between freedom and self-rule or renewed dependence on Moscow.70  Like Walden, 
however, Frentzel was also fairly optimistic that Hungary would not revert to Stalinism, 
despite the continued presence of Soviet troops in the country.  He was uncertain about 
both Nagy and the national communists in Hungary.  For Frentzel, the central quandary 
for Hungary lay in the tension between orthodox Stalinists and the growing movement of 
national communists.  Although the latter were acceptable to Moscow, the popular 
uprising meant that they would be unable to govern the country without Soviet forces.  
As Frentzel noted, “The National Communists want to be independent from and be equal 
to Moscow.  The presence of Soviet troops hinders them on this account.  But without 
these troops, they would have lost power during the past forty-eight dramatic hours.”71  
Accepting the national communists, in Frentzel’s estimation, meant continued 
dependence on Moscow.   
Frentzel’s observations were marked by uncertainty.  It was difficult to determine, 
Frentzel frankly stated, where the events in Hungary would lead.  In addition, it was 
difficult to determine what effect the uprising would have throughout the rest of the 
Eastern Bloc in states such as Czechoslovakia and Romania, where Stalinists continued 
to govern.  By October 31, however, RIAS was sharing SFB’s optimistic outlook.  In his 
commentary from that day, Frentzel declared, “Disoriented and dejected, the Soviet 
divisions are being withdrawn from Budapest.  The insurgents have achieved more than 
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they themselves dared hope for at the beginning of their revolt.”72  However, a greater 
sense of optimism pervaded Frentzel’s commentary when compared to SFB’s.  Whereas 
Walden remained uncertain about which direction the Soviets would take at this point in 
the revolt, Frentzel was firm in his belief that the Soviets had chosen a policy of peaceful 
coexistence and strong antistalinism.  For the Soviets, the political repercussions of using 
force to suppress the revolt were “incalculable.”73  According to Frentzel, the Soviets had 
only one choice.  “The Soviet leaders, or those men amongst the Soviet leaders who are 
specifying the direction of Soviet policy, have chosen the second option.  They have done 
this perhaps because they believe it is the only policy which still has a future on a world 
scale.”74  The Soviets had sanctioned the Hungarian uprising, and consequently, the 
principle that all states within the socialist camp were equal and could manage their 
domestic affairs without interference from Moscow.  Frentzel also criticized those who 
believed in peaceful coexistence, noting that the events in Hungary and the revolutionary 
will of the Hungarian people had brought this principle into question.  As he noted at the 
close of the broadcast, he expressed hope that the Soviets would come to the realization 
that they could not force the Hungarian people to remain within the Soviet bloc against 
their will.  “We hope, in spite of everything, that a better awareness is reflected, namely 
the awareness, that against the hatred and bitterness of an entire people, a competitive 
coexistence is an antithesis to itself and cannot succeed.”75  Thus, like Walden, Frentzel 
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approached the Soviet leadership as logical, reasonable individuals who did not wish to 
see bloodshed.  Here, both surmised, the currents of destalinization meant that 
Khrushchev would avoid utilizing force against the Hungarians. 
 Like Walden, Frentzel condemned the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt.  On 
November 7, he noted, “The pain and disgust that has ensued as a consequence of the 
Soviet’s barbarism in Hungary is now mixed with concern about the consequences of the 
British and French attack against Egypt.”76  The United States, Frentzel argued, was the 
only one of the great powers that was acting responsibly.  He also condemned the 
Soviet’s offer to mediate the crisis in the Sinai, describing the proposal as “unparalleled 
in its cynicism.”77  The Soviets were exploiting the “tragically mistaken decisions” of the 
British and the French governments for its own purposes.  As with SFB, Frentzel saw a 
critical link between the Anglo-French Egyptian intervention and the Soviet’s repression 
in Hungary.  The Soviet Union’s public protests against Britain and France allowed it to 
divert attention from its own intervention in Hungary.  Thus, it was exploiting all of the 
diplomatic tools it could muster at the United Nations.  The British and French had given 
the Soviets the opportunity to present themselves as a bulwark against western 
imperialism.78 
 Although SFB was a German public institution funded by the West Berlin 
government and RIAS was an American funded operation, there is a striking synergy 
between their reports on the Hungarian uprising and Suez crisis.  Both their principle 
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foreign correspondents, SFB’s Mathias Walden and RIAS’s Heinz Frentzel, initially 
approached the uprising with skepticism, only to turn to optimism at the end of October 
when it appeared the Soviet Union would support the Nagy government.  Consequently, 
the Soviet’s decision to use force to crush the revolution at the beginning of November 
elicited outrage from both broadcasters.  The Anglo-French intervention in Suez was also 
strongly condemned.  By turning world attention from Hungary to Egypt, the British and 
French had given the Soviets an opening to suppress the revolt and at the same time act 
as the defender of the third world and opponent of western imperialism.  Unlike stations 
in the GDR, neither SFB nor RIAS considered Israel’s involvement.  The focus was on 
France, Britain, and the consequences their action had for Hungary. 
 An SFB broadcast produced by Richard Löwenthal and sent on November 28, 
1956 provides a sober coda to the tumultuous events of the previous two months.  
Entitled a “Changed World,” Löwenthal noted that the events in Hungary and Suez had 
brought about a dramatic change in world affairs and a fundamental change in political 
thinking.79  The Soviet Union’s control over the Eastern Bloc had been shaken and the 
effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact devalued.  At the same time, the Suez Crisis had shown 
deep fissures in the Western Alliance and had proven to be the greatest crisis to Anglo-
American relations since the end of World War II.  Both Hungary and Poland had 
demonstrated strong revolutionary potential.  Yet, at the same time, the Soviets had 
reverted to Stalinist methods over control and dominance.  Britain and France had 
isolated themselves throughout the world, and Britain’s standing in Asia and amongst the 
Commonwealth had been greatly damaged.  At the same time, the United States’ prestige 
in the Middle East had risen, due to its open and strong opposition to the Anglo-French 
                                                 





intervention.  As Löwenthal observed, “In both Egypt and Hungary we have seen 
attempts to revert back to brutal power politics—admittedly with very different results.  
Yet, the United Nations and its moral pressure played a critical role in a way it never 
before has since its creation.  It is a picture that is thrilling as much as it is bewildering.”80  
It was clear to Löwenthal that a fundamental change in world affairs had occurred.  The 
very assumptions that guided the western alliance and eastern bloc had been shaken and 
transformed.   
 
1961: The Refugee Crisis and the Construction of the Berlin Wall: East German Radio 
 
 For the reporters at RIAS and SFB, the events of 1956 had reinforced the lessons 
learned from the June 17, 1953 uprising.  With each passing year, a prompt resolution to 
the Cold War (and with German reunification) was becoming more and more unlikely.  
Between 1958 and 1961, the lack of resolution reached a crisis level, especially with 
regards to the status of Berlin.  The constant flow of East German fleeing to the Federal 
Republic was dramatically threatening the economic viability of the German Democratic 
Republic.  As long as the border between East and West Berlin remained open, citizens 
of the GDR were permitted free and open transit between the two Germanys.  Thousands 
of East Germans took advantage of this opportunity and chose to remain in the Federal 
Republic.  The numbers were staggering.  Between 1949 and 1960, about three and a half 
million East Germans had fled the GDR for West Germany.81  By the late 1950s, the 
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emigration rate had steadily increased.  The open border between East and West Berlin 
had become a debilitating ulcer for the German Democratic Republic.  As long as it 
existed, the flow of refugees from the GDR could persist unimpeded.  That the majority 
of refugees were young, skilled workers also meant that the GDR was suffering an 
incapacitating drain on resources that could not be easily replaced.  The viability of the 
Soviet backed German state was tied directly to the open border. 
 To confront this problem, both Khrushchev and SED chief Walter Ulbricht 
pursued a number of measures.  Between 1960 and 1961, the East German leader 
consistently pressured the Kremlin chief to take decisive action to settle the Berlin 
problem.82  Khrushchev, reluctant to disrupt the status quo but aware that the 
repercussions of East Germany’s collapse could be dire for the Soviets, responded by 
renewing a 1958 ultimatum to the western powers that demanded they leave West Berlin 
and recognize it as a free and open city.  If they did not withdraw, the Soviet Union 
would unilaterally sign a peace treaty with the GDR and place West Berlin under the 
authority of the East German government.83  In order to understand the often complex 
diplomatic posturing that occurred between 1958 and 1961 between the Soviets, East 
Germans, West Germans, and Western Allies, it is important to recognize the fact that the 
division of Germany and ambiguous status of Berlin were issues that had been left 
unresolved since the end of World War II.  No peace treaty had been signed between the 
four powers and Germany.  Neither the GDR nor the Federal Republic of Germany 
acknowledged the other state as a legitimate representative of the German people.  
Furthermore, the four powers occupying Berlin (the United States, Soviet Union, France, 
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and Great Britain) all upheld, in principle, the position that Berlin was a city under a joint 
occupation.  Thus, Khrushchev’s threat to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR was 
an explicit threat to the western powers’ position in West Berlin.  The GDR, which had 
claimed all of Berlin was its capital, would thus be in a position to expel the Western 
Allies from the western sectors of the city.84 
The Kennedy Administration responded with a firm declaration that the United 
States would not, under any circumstances, relinquish its access rights to West Berlin, 
even if it meant a nuclear confrontation.  Unwilling to risk nuclear war over the city, but 
nevertheless aware that a solution over Berlin needed to be reached, Khrushchev 
permitted Ulbricht to carry out what the SED chief had wanted to do since 1960: seal the 
border.  On August 13, 1961, the GDR official closed off the border between East and 
West Berlin with the construction of an “anti-fascist protective wall.”85  Both Kennedy 
and Khrushchev, relieved that the situation seemed to have been resolved without 
sparking open war between the super powers, were content with the wall.  As draconian 
as the solution was, it was acceptable to both leaders.  As Kennedy noted, “It’s not a very 
nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war.”86 
The major narratives and principles that had guided how RIAS, SFB, 
Deutschlandsender, and Berliner Rundfunk presented news for the past decade shaped 
how they confronted the refugee crisis and the construction of the Berlin Wall.  Both the 
East German stations Deutschlandsender and Berliner Rundfunk justified the wall as a 
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defensive measure.  Just as jamming towers had created a metaphorical barrier against the 
west’s subversive messages around East Germany’s airwaves, so the Berlin Wall was to 
be a physical barrier against US espionage actions.  Both RIAS and SFB on the other 
hand greeted the wall with outrage.  Despite the fact that rumors had persisted throughout 
Berlin regarding the closure of the border, the stations’ reporters nevertheless reacted to 
the wall with shock and indignation.  For them, the Wall was yet more proof that 
Germany was a powerless pawn of the superpower struggle.  Unable to assert their own 
interests, Germans were forced to watch as the Soviets and SED created a physical 
manifestation of their country’s division. 
  As was discussed in the previous chapter, the East German refugee crisis had been 
a topic of concern in many GDR radio broadcasts.  The stations approached the issue of 
“Republikflucht” (“Flight from the Republic”) in a number of ways.  In some cases, such 
as in a broadcast from March 15, 1956, the GDR denied there was a problem in the first 
place.  The commentary of the day by Theodore Schulze-Walden simply accused the 
West of exaggerating the problem as a means of destabilizing the GDR.87  Such 
statements ignored the fact that over a quarter of a million East Germans had fled the 
GDR in 1956 alone.  That year, 316,000 East Germans fled, following 270,115 in 1955, 
173,279 in 1954, and 270,440 in 1953.88  Such numbers meant that denying the refugee 
problem was simply not possible.  In response, GDR radio blamed RIAS and other 
western media for tricking individuals into fleeing the GDR.  Thus, the refugee problem 
was strongly linked to the American station.  The SED accused RIAS of casting a 
sentimental, unrealistic picture of life in West Germany.  This concept, so prevalent in 
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pamphlets, posters, and cartoons produced by the GDR, was also a central component of 
radio broadcasts.  The GDR government thus aimed to target the very popularity of the 
station by noting that the most appealing news it broadcast, namely reports about the 
freedom and prosperity in West Germany, was nothing but lies.  GDR stations accused 
RIAS of covering up the cruel reality of life in the West.  This is well illustrated in a 
broadcast made by Karl-Heinz Gerstner in 1954 entitled, “Umsiedler aus dem Westen” 
(“Repatriated From the West”).  Through the course of the commentary, Gerstner sought 
to discount the attractiveness of fleeing to West Berlin and West Germany.  The majority 
of those fleeing, he contended, were criminals.  Thus, he consigned those contemplating 
flight to the margins of society.89  An unfortunate number of these individuals had fallen 
for the illusions of the “golden west” being created by RIAS.  Upon arriving in the west, 
the majority discovered that they had been deceived.  Expecting prosperity, they instead 
faced job insecurity, poverty, and resurgent militarism.  In contrast, Gerstner contended, 
some 10,000 citizens of the Federal Republic had returned to the GDR in 1954.  Workers 
coming to the GDR expressed hatred of the West and were thankful that they did not 
have to fear for their jobs.  Considering other grounds for emigration and remigration to 
the GDR, Gerstner expressed a subtle acknowledgment that the material conditions in the 
Federal Republic were superior.  “But it is not so much the material side of life that they 
continuously underlined once again being thankful for, but rather the moral side of life in 
our state.”90  In West Germany, one cared only about money, whereas in the GDR, one 
felt a deeper sense of meaning as they worked to build a peaceful Germany.  Gerstner 
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continued to question RIAS’s contentions by accusing the station of spreading the false 
impression that, should a refugee return to the GDR, they would be incarcerated.  This 
would not happen, the commentator affirmed, and noted that refugees and workers alike 
were welcome to help build a peaceful Germany in the GDR.91 
 GDR radio did not attempt to argue that material conditions in East Germany 
were necessarily better.  Instead, the focus was on the moral imperative of living in a 
progressive state that abhorred militarism and did not exploit its workers.  West Germany 
and the United States were war-mongering states dedicated to destroying the GDR.  
Consequently, those who fled the GDR were not simply individuals seeking a better life, 
but criminals easily deceived into leaving for West Germany.  The decision to leave East 
Germany was consequently a political and moral act, not an economic one.  
Throughout the winter and spring of 1961, Ulbricht consistently pressured 
Khrushchev to sponsor some kind of radical solution to the problem.  Two solutions 
existed.  The first was to threaten French, American, and British access rights to West 
Berlin and place the three western sectors under East German sovereignty.  The second 
entailed sealing the border between East and West Berlin.  Critically, the latter solution 
was less risky, as Kennedy had affirmed during his meeting with Khrushchev at Vienna 
on June 3-4, 1961 that the US would only act if its own access rights to West Berlin were 
threatened.92  Khrushchev nevertheless repeated his 1958 demand that the Western Allies 
withdraw from the city.  GDR’s broadcasters subsequently promoted this solution.   
GDR stations characterized western critics of Khrushchev’s ultimatum as 
unreasonable and simply unwilling to face reality.  Furthermore, their stubborn insistence 
                                                 
91 Ibid. 





on maintaining the status quo (namely, the US decision to defend its access rights to West 
Berlin) was depicted by GDR stations as a dangerous act of brinkmanship.  GDR stations 
cast the leaders of the Soviet Union and East Germany as reasonable and moderate in 
their demands.  The US on the other hand was irrational and dangerous.  For example, on 
June 5, 1961, Theodor Schulz-Walden declared in a Deutschlandsender broadcast that the 
signing of a peace treaty was the only rational solution.  However, he asserted, the West 
German government had consistently rebuffed the East German and Soviet attempts to 
reach a settlement.  Once again claiming that West Germany was the successor to Hitler’s 
Third Reich, Schulz-Walden argued that, “All these suggestions were in vain.  Bonn 
rejected them all, because the Bonn militarists regarded Hitler’s capitulation only as a 
temporary state of affairs until the outcome of 1945 could be ‘corrected.’  This is why no 
peace treaty has been signed in all these years.”93  If a treaty could not be concluded 
between the two Germanys, Eisler concluded, then one needed to be drawn up between 
East Germany and the Soviets.  However, the US was making efforts to disrupt these 
efforts.  Once again invoking the specter of the Nazi past, Schulze-Walden compared 
NATO plans and exercises to the Nazi’s plans to invade the Soviet Union.  Regarding the 
publication of a NATO plan for an offensive against the GDR, Schulze-Walden noted, 
“By way of an excuse it was stated that it was merely a kind of general staff exercise like 
many others.  At the time the Barbarossa plan was only a dangerous exercise, but it 
became a horrible reality during the attack on the USSR 20 years ago.”94  The twentieth 
anniversary of the German attack on the Soviet Union was incidentally only days away. 
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 Thus, although it was Khrushchev (with Ulbricht’s prodding) who had delivered 
the ultimatum demanding an immediate resolution to the Berlin problem and an end to 
the status quo, GDR radio depicted the United States as the militant power threatening 
stability.  It was the new fascist regime preparing a second Operation Barbarossa.  
Schulze-Walden reiterated these ideas on June 16, 1961, once again asserting that a peace 
treaty was necessary if West Germany’s plans of conquest were to be defeated.  Schulze-
Walden declared:  
 
As long as the militarists on the Rhine can continue this 
game unhampered, every German is threatened with the 
danger of an incident that might start a nuclear war.  It is 
this mortal danger that the peace treaty is to avert once and 
for all, by insuring that no war can ever again be launched 
from German soil or waged thereon.  Therefore, the 
problem of the peace treaty today is the problem of 
problems, the central problem, on the solution of which 
everything else hinges.95 
 
 
Schulze-Walden again reasserted the imperative for the treaty.  It needed to be concluded 
immediately.  The choice presented to the German people was between war and peace.  
Thus, just as it had during the First Berlin Crisis of 1948-1949, GDR radio situated the 
debate as a choice between war and peace.  If the US and West Germany opposed the 
treaty, then they were, by consequence, for war.  Interestingly, the broadcasts focused 
their criticism not on the United States, but on West Germany and Konrad Adenauer.   
 Broadcasts presenting these arguments continued throughout June and July of 
1961.  On June 25, just four days after the twentieth anniversary of Operation Barbarossa, 
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Gerhart Eisler once again linked the treaty to the need for peace.  As with Schulze-
Walden’s broadcasts, Eisler invoked the image of German troops launching a war as a 
necessary incentive to producing a treaty.  “The peace treaty should also lay down the 
principle of Germany’s military neutrality, a neutrality expressly acknowledged by all the 
powers who were at war with Hitlerite Germany.  Military neutrality on the part of 
Germany means that never again will a war be unleashed from Germany and that no 
county in the world has the right to drag Germany into a foreign war.”96  Although Eisler 
did not specifically note a specific country that could, “drag Germany into a foreign war,” 
it is certain he was attempting to implicitly invoke the United States and the NATO 
alliance.  In July, Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler presented another broadcast stressing the 
need for an immediate solution.  Once again, much of the focus was on West Germany’s 
leaders.  “Konrad Adenauer and [West Berlin Mayor] Willy Brandt want everything to 
remain as it is in West Berlin.  They seriously believe that things in West Berlin can go 
on as they are...”97  However, the United States was uninterested in subscribing to the war 
demands of the West German leaders.  Thus, interestingly, von Schnitzler depicted 
Adenauer and Brandt as the warmongers.  He characterized Kennedy as reasonable and 
unwilling to support Bonn’s plans for war.  Americans demanding a stronger stand 
against the GDR were not aligned with Kennedy, but were old supporters of John Foster 
Dulles and his militant policies.  Thus, throughout the broadcast, von Schnitzler depicted 
Kennedy as reasonable and unwilling to risk war over the Berlin problem.  In contrast, 
Adenauer and Brandt sought to use the Berlin issue as an excuse to wage war against the 
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GDR.  Von Schnitzler concluded that, “There is a swelling chorus of voices of reason and 
perception in all Western countries, even in West Germany.  It proves that Bonn and 
Schoeneberg increasingly isolate themselves with their extremist, unintelligent 
attitude.”98 
 Von Schnitzler’s broadcast is interesting for the manner in which focused its 
criticism on West Germany.  Throughout, von Schnitzler argued that the transformation 
of West Berlin into a free city was the best solution.  Yet, despite the fact that this 
solution was the one that would threaten American interests in the city (as opposed to 
sealing the East Berlin border), von Schnitzler goes out of his way not to implicate the 
Kennedy administration as the chief obstacles to peace.  The dispute, von Schnitzler and 
his colleagues contended, was between East and West Germany and not between East 
Germany and the United States.   
 This distinction was not minor.  Neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev wished to see a 
war break out over Berlin.99 Yet, at the same time, neither wished to see their position in 
the city weakened.  By transferring the focus of East German hostilities to Adenauer and 
West Germany, GDR broadcasters (and with them, most likely the SED and Ulbricht) 
were indicating that East Germany was welcome to a solution that did not involve 
threatening the US position in West Berlin.  Thus, although von Schnitzler demanded that 
a peace treaty needed to be signed and the ambiguous situation in Berlin resolved, his 
focus on West Germany could have been interpreted by listeners as an indication that 
Ulbricht was welcome to a solution that did not threaten the US position.   
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It is also important to bear in mind that Ulbricht and Khrushchev had agreed in 
early July that the border between East and West Berlin would be sealed, just days before 
von Schnitzler’s broadcast.100  Only a select few, however, were aware of the decision.  
These included, alongside Ulbricht and Erich Honecker, Stasi chief Mielke, the Interior 
Minister, Defense Minister, and Transportation Minister.  A meeting of the StRK held on 
July 28, 1961 did not address the matter of sealing the border.  Instead, the focus was 
largely on perennial problems that had plagued GDR radio since the founding of the 
state: the need for stronger leadership, self-criticism, and better cooperation between the 
StRK and the SED leadership.101  During a meeting of the StRK Betriebsgruppe held on 
August 2, 1961, there was no discussion of the possibility that the border would be 
sealed.  Indeed, radio officials continued to speak of promoting a peace treaty and even 
discussed the possibility of using West Marks to pay for equipment and what to do in the 
event of a blockade of West Berlin.102   However, it is clear that listeners to 
Deutschlandsender would be aware that the GDR was planning to do something.  The 
constant declaration that something needed to be done was a part of every broadcast on 
the crisis.  The status quo was simply not permissible.   
 Despite this, the Wall took the west by surprise when GDR soldiers and 
policeman began constructing the barrier on Sunday morning, August 13, 1961.103  
Should western listeners and observers have been surprised?  An overview of the stories 
from June and July does not present any major hints that the GDR would pursue this 
policy, beyond the constant demand for an immediate solution to the Berlin problem.  
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Yet, in early August commentaries began focusing on the issue of movement between the 
two Berlins.  In a remarkable broadcast from August 4, Deutschlandsender announced 
that free movement would not be tolerated if it threatened the GDR.  The speaker, 
Wolfgang Dast, noted that the GDR was in favor of free movement throughout the city.  
However, such movement could only exist if the city was declared an open and free 
territory.  “We are in favor of free movement, just as we are in favor of self-
determination.  But we are against self-determination at our expense, at the expense of 
GDR workers.  That is why we shall no longer tolerate the ‘Grenzgaengertum’ (East 
Germans working in West Berlin).”104  The broadcast then announced that the East 
German government was going to end the practice of crossing the border to work in West 
Berlin.  Although this did not amount to sealing the border itself, it nevertheless indicated 
that a shift had occurred in the GDR’s policies towards West Berlin.   
 However, East German stations continued to present both options (closing the 
border or seizing control of West Berlin) in their broadcasts.  On August 9, less than a 
week before construction of the Berlin Wall began, Gerhart Eisler once again declared 
that the Western powers needed to find an immediate solution to the West Berlin 
question.  Eisler insisted that the GDR’s goals were peaceful and that the proposal for a 
peace treaty was neither provocative nor a threat to world stability.  Yet, critically, Eisler 
also insisted that, whatever action East Germany would take, it would not threaten West 
Berliners.  “We will do nothing in the way of force or inflicting force upon any West 
German or West Berliner.  We who are prepared to have one hair of our head touched are 
not prepared to harm the hair on the head of any West German, or West Berliner, or 
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anyone else in the world.  We will not fire a shot.”105  Eisler declared that resolving the 
West Berlin question would prevent the West’s “plundering” of the GDR.   Every state, 
Eisler affirmed, had the right to protect itself from outside threats.  Again, there was no 
firm indication that the GDR had shifted policies and was planning to abandon its claims 
to West Berlin.  Yet, the insistence that whatever action the GDR took would not threaten 
West Berlin is important, especially in light of the fact that the SED had already agreed to 
construct the wall on August 13.106   
 On Sunday, August 13 1961, the GDR’s stations broadcasts notices from the 
Warsaw Pact, the East German government, and the East Berlin City Government 
declaring that in order to preserve peace, the GDR was adopting new measures to strictly 
control border movement between East and West Berlin.107  That day, West and East 
Germans alike woke up to the site of East German police erecting barbed wire across the 
sector border and laying the foundation for a permanent barrier enclosing West Berlin.  
That evening, Gerhart Eisler sent a commentary on Deutschlandsender declaring that the 
GDR was sealing the border because there was simply no other alternative.  “Our 
patience was exhausted; this is why by decision of the GDR Council of Ministers, in 
agreement with the governments of the Warsaw treaty partners, measures have been 
instituted today designed to protect and defend the GDR, the first German worker-
peasant state.”108  Since Sunday morning, Eisler declared, it would no longer be possible 
to swindle the GDR “out of at least 1 billion deutsch marks a year.”  Furthermore, the 
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Western powers could no longer use West Berlin as a means of subverting the East 
German population or as a staging area for espionage operations against the GDR.  Eisler 
emphatically declared, “Since this morning at 0400 an end has been put to all frontier 
crossing!  Since this morning at 0400 the hopes of the West German militarists and the 
West Berlin frontline city politicians have been dashed before the whole world.”109  The 
measure was described as a “peaceful but very effective blow” against Western 
militarists.  As it had in 1948 and in 1953, East German radio evoked the image of a 
besieged East Germany under constant threat from a belligerent West.  According to 
Eisler, Western leaders had interpreted East German proposals for a peace treaty as 
evidence of weakness.  Thus, the broadcast characterized the Wall as evidence of the 
GDR’s strength and determination.  As Eisler declared, “It is a historical fact that 
whenever the West German militarists thought they could triumph, and boasted about the 
weakness and the defeats by the enemies of the German militarists, they were given a 
stunning blow.”110  Eisler contended that the West German leaders were now in a state of 
confusion.  In the course of the broadcast, Eisler almost seemed to be enjoying speaking 
about the shock created by the GDR’s action.  “Their wails and grumbles are music to 
our ears.  They are turning to the Western powers with pathetic lamentations, just as they 
are always moaning when something hits them.”111   
 Importantly, Eisler made it clear that the construction of the wall would not 
resolve the Berlin question.  The measure, he argued, would further the quest to sign a 
peace treaty between the two Germanys.  By constructing the wall, Eisler contended, the 
GDR had rendered West Berlin useless.  Since it could no longer be used by the West as 








a center for espionage and subversion against the GDR, the Western powers would now 
see that signing a peace treaty and making their sectors a free city was the next logical 
step.  Thus, the wall was a measure designed to create peace and stability.  As Eisler said 
in defense of the barrier, “Rather 100 inconveniences to defend peace successfully than 
1,000 so-called comforts only to slide subsequently into war!”  Once more, GDR 
broadcasters presented the issue to its listeners as a choice between peace and war  
 In stark contrast to Eisler’s bombastic and triumphant tone, Karl-Eduard von 
Schnitzler’s broadcasts tried to evoke calm.  His August 13 morning broadcast attempted 
to characterize the border closure as a routine and uninteresting event.  “ 
‘Unsensational’—this word probably best characterizes the measures which, in 
agreement with the other countries of the Warsaw Pact, we took during the night.”112  
The reporter then affirmed that West Berliners had the right to pass into the East Sectors 
and travel by rail into East Berlin.  Thus, he sought to downplay the disruption and 
confusion that the wall’s construction had evoked.  In the course of the broadcast, von 
Schnitzler invoked a statement made by William F. Fulbright on July 30, 1961 in which 
the Senator asked why the East German government didn’t close its border.113  As he and 
his colleagues had done on numerous occasions during the Berlin airlift, von Schnitzler 
deployed the open discussion of the US political system as a means of justifying the East 
German measure.  “The government of the German Democratic Republic, the 
governments of the Warsaw Pact countries, the Ministries of the Interior and Transport of 
the GDR, and the city government of greater Berlin, agree explicitly with what Senator 
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Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee of the U.S. House of 
Representatives said a few days ago.”114  Von Schnitzler’s failure to understand the 
distinction between the Senate and the House of Representatives notwithstanding, his 
approach was nevertheless akin to the approach taken during the late 1940s when 
Berliner Rundfunk frequently cited Henry Wallace and Walter Lippmann.  As he spoke, 
von Schnitzler stressed that East Germany had no intent to threaten West Berlin.  Instead, 
it simply wished to invoke its right to self-determination.  He closed on the same note as 
Eisler’s commentary, declaring that East Germany had simply lost patience with the 
West’s refusal to reach a settlement on the Berlin question. 
 Critically, the GDR’s broadcasts characterized the Berlin issue as a dispute 
between the two Germanys and less as a rivalry between the United States and the 
Soviets.  The stations cited Adenauer and Brandt far more frequently than John F. 
Kennedy when making arguments about Western aggression.  Broadcasters’ approach to 
Kennedy was mostly ambivalent.  He was still treated by GDR reporters as the head of an 
aggressive, capitalist state hostile to the Soviets.  However, the broadcasts tended to see 
him as a reasonable individual being pressured by militant and belligerent West German 
leaders. Despite this distinction however, East German radio nervetheless justified the 
construction of the Berlin Wall in the same way it justified the Berlin blockade, the 
repression of the June 17 Uprising, the erection of anti-RIAS jamming towers, and the 
Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.  East Germany was a state 
under siege.  West Germany, the militarist successor of Hitler’s fascist Germany, had 
dedicated itself to the destruction of the GDR and communism.  Consequently, the Wall 
was a defensive measure.  Despite the blow to the GDR’s legitimacy delivered by the 
                                                 





wall’s construction, the GDR nevertheless characterized the wall as a symbol of resolve 
and strength.  In this light, the ironic term “Antifascist Protection Barrier” sounds less 
like an opportunistic euphemism and more like an integral element from narratives that 






RIAS and the Berlin Wall 
 
 The years immediately preceding the construction of the Berlin Wall were 
troubled ones for RIAS.  When Khrushchev first announced his Berlin ultimatum in 
1958, the US government’s support of the station was brought into question as US 
diplomats considered shutting down the broadcaster in exchange for similar concessions 
from the Soviets.  The Eisenhower administration considered a number of proposals, 
including placing all radio activities in Berlin under UN oversight, reducing RIAS’s overt 
propaganda broadcasts to the GDR, or closing the station altogether.115  In March, 1958, 
The New York Times reported that “the station, which served the West well throughout 
the blockade a decade ago, has become less important with the activation of other, more 
powerful transmitters in West Germany which direct their propaganda to all the East 
European satellites.”116  Ultimately, none of these proposals came to pass.  However, 
while US officials were concerned about the effect closing the station would have on 
morale in the GDR, the prevailing opinion was that shutting down the station would 
simply not be enough to satisfy the Soviets’ demands.117   Regardless, the USIA, feeling 
it needed to strengthen support for the broadcaster, issued a series of brochures to various 
USIA posts throughout Europe in 1959.118   
At the same time, the US Congress was cutting the station’s budget and 
employees were leaving the station to work for SFB, West Berlin’s newspapers, or other 
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media positions.119  The budget problems and increasing costs were offset by budgetary 
aid from the West German Ministry for All-German Affairs.120  Thus, by 1958 the US 
station was in effect a German-American venture.  Of course, RIAS had never solely 
been an American operation, in light of the fact that with the exception of 4 US control 
officers, its entire staff was German.  However, the financial support further strengthened 
RIAS’s ties to the West German government. 
 Despite these setbacks, RIAS remained a popular source for news and information 
amongst East Germans.  The USIA’s polls of East German visitors from 1960 and 1961 
indicated that RIAS’s popularity and prestige had not diminished (at least to those 
visitors questioned) in the face of competition from SFB and GDR stations.  Most 
importantly, the station remained a trusted source for news and information on conditions 
in the GDR.  A survey taken in the spring of 1960 indicated that 76% of those polled 
indicated RIAS was their favorite station, with 64% noting it was their preferred source 
for information about the GDR and 60% noting it was their primary source for news 
about the west.121  In contrast, only 19% listed stations in the GDR and only 8% listed 
SFB.122  Listeners from East and West Germany continued to write letters to the 
broadcaster and visit the station.  In December of 1960 for example, the station received 
8,263 letters and 303 visitors.123  Letter topics ranged from programming questions to 
information about transit rights.  Letters about travel rights between the two Germanys 
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are particularly interesting, as they attest to the fact that many listeners saw RIAS as a 
representative of the United States and not as just a media outlet.  On December 27, 1960 
for example, a writer named Viktoria W asked RIAS if she and her husband could travel 
through the GDR to visit her mother in Poland, even though her husband had fled the 
GDR in 1950.  While the station recommended the letter writer forward her query to the 
West German anti-communist legal organization, the Untersuchungsausschuss 
freiheitlicher Juristen, the station also recommended that the woman not attempt any 
crossing the GDR.124  Thus, RIAS styled itself not only as a media outlet, but as a source 
for personal advice on travel rights and financial issues related to living in and fleeing the 
GDR.  In March of 1960 for example, RIAS was sent a letter from a West Berliner asking 
whether or not her parents would be paid a pension (for their respective services to the 
Deutsche Post and German army) if they fled Dresden for West Germany.  Rather than 
forward her letter to a West German financial authority, RIAS invited the letter writer to 
come to the station itself, where they could discuss the matter in detail.125 
Letter writers from the GDR often sent letters thanking the station for its reports 
and also to provide the station with information and even their own thoughts on the 
politics of the day.  A worker from Halle sent RIAS a letter dated January 6, 1961 in 
which he presented his assertions that there was no difference between Nazism and 
Communism.  In many ways, his language reflected RIAS’s own assertion that the 
ideological distinctions between the two systems was less important than their common 
quest for power and dominance.  “The same system remains.  Only the colors have 
changed,” the anonymous writer declared.  The writer declared that Ulbricht did not have 
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the workers’ support and that the only thing supporting the Soviet satellites was Red 
Army tanks.126 
RIAS remained an important institution during the years immediately preceding 
the construction of the Berlin Wall.  East Germans and West Germans alike continued to 
tune into the station for news and information.  Letter writers from both Germanys 
treated RIAS like an ersatz-US embassy in East Germany.  Listeners treated it as a source 
for basic information about transit rights between the GDR and West Germany and the 
often-complex legal problems created by the division of Germany.  This role would be 
particularly important during the days after the GDR sealed the Berlin border. 
 As with Berliner Rundfunk and Deutschland Radio, the Berlin Crisis dominated 
RIAS news and commentary during the summer of 1961.   In a Sunday commentary 
delivered on June 18, 1961, Heinz Frentzel described Khrushchev’s proposal for a peace 
treaty as pointless and declared that the Soviets, by disturbing the status quo, were in fact 
the greater threat to peace when compared to the United States and West Germany.127  
Frentzel argued that Ulbricht simply did not have the legitimacy to represent all of the 
German people.  Speaking of Germany, Frentzel was also clear that he spoke not only of 
the GDR and FRG, but also the territories annexed by Poland.  As he noted, “The 
recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line with a dozen communist signatures would be 
completely worthless in the eyes of moral and international law.”128  The peace treaty 
would also exacerbate an already tense international situation.  By changing the status 
quo and threatening the rights to West Berlin, the Soviets would embarrass the Western 
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powers and force them to strengthen their resolve and only increase tensions between the 
two sides.  Anticipating John F. Kennedy’s praise of West Berlin’s status as a frontline 
city of the Cold War in 1963, Frentzel countered the Soviet assertion that West Berlin’s 
ambiguous status was detrimental to the city’s residents.  At the same time, he was likely 
making an effort to raise the morale of what must have been a tense and anxious 
population:  “Is it really a burden, a bitter fate of power politics?  Rather, is it not the 
case, that by vouching for Berlin, the West has the unique opportunity to demonstrate to 
the Soviets, to the Neutral Powers, and most importantly to themselves, the strength and 
power of liberal self-determination seen in Berlin?”129  In reality, West Berlin represented 
the unlucky fate of the Soviets themselves.  Since June 17, 1953, a tenth of East 
Germany’s population had fled the GDR for West Berlin.  Thus, it was the Soviets, and 
not the West Berliners, who were the true victims of fate.  As Frentzel closed, he drew 
upon British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan’s 1960 “Wind of Change” speech.  “The 
great wind of change that is blowing through the southern half of the world has swept 
away the last remnants of colonialism and has let loose the right to self-determination.  It 
will not be possible for the people of our continent to remain under communist 
dominance and withhold these rights in the long run.”130 
 A month later, RIAS commentator Hanns W. Schwarze devoted the bulk of his 
Sunday commentary to the Berlin problem.  Schwarze blamed Khruschev for simplifying 
the issue and making the struggle into a simple choice between war and abandoning West 
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Berlin.  By doing so, the Soviet leader, along with Walter Ulbricht, had increased 
tensions and actually increased the threat of war.131  “They ask if Berlin’s four power 
statute is more important than world peace.  They say there is no other alternative.  But 
that is a lie, an evil and dangerous life.  Whoever believes it is already a victim of this 
war of nerves, which will become stronger in the future.”132  Schwarze acknowledged the 
power of language and rhetoric in shaping the stakes and issues of the Berlin Crisis.  
Soviet propaganda had succeeded in transforming the dispute over Berlin into a matter of 
peace and war.  In comparison, the Western insistence that it maintain its access rights to 
West Berlin would inevitably sound trivial.   
Thus, an important goal of Schwarze’s broadcast was to deconstruct the Soviet 
argument and stress the importance of the western position.  He did so by casting Berlin 
as a symbol.  Berlin was a lesson and an example to the Soviets and the West.  It was also 
a hole in the “prison of the GDR,” evidence of Communism’s limits, and an expression 
of the German peoples’ desire for unity.133  As he noted, once before the Soviets had 
made the argument that Berlin was so small and strategically insignificant that the 
Western powers would not risk war over its status.  Yet, as in 1948, the Soviets were 
forced to realize that political morality as well as strategic interests motivated the 
Western powers.  “Obligation, morality, and political conviction were the reasons Stalin’s 
1948 blockade of Berlin collapsed.  They are also the reasons for the failure of 
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Khrushchev’s frontal assault that began in 1958 and was abandoned last summer.”134  
This time, however, the tactics would be different.  Although Schwarze did not go so far 
as to suggest the construction of the Berlin Wall, he nevertheless made his listeners aware 
that, due to the presence of nuclear weapons, Stalin’s tactics of 1948 would not be 
repeated.  Instead, Khrushchev would be deploying a flanking maneuver against the 
Western powers.  Yet, Schwarze insisted that the Western powers were neither naïve nor 
weak.  The demand for a peace treaty was unrealistic and ignored the fact that West 
Germany was fully integrated into the Western Alliance.  Although the Soviets had made 
the crisis into a choice between peace and war, the choice remained in Khrushchev’s 
hands.  Khrushchev could easily abandon his flanking maneuver and rescind his 
demands. 
 Yet, it was clear that Schwarze was concerned that even if Khrushchev were to 
back off, Ulbricht could still seal the border.  Thus, about three weeks before the border 
was actually sealed, Schwarze spoke about concerns that this could very well happen.  
Thousands were fleeing East Germany, and Schwarze noted that many were motivated to 
flee due to their concerns that the path between the two Berlins would soon be obstructed.  
Closing the border, Schwarze warned, would be a breach of the law and a breach of the 
Berlin statute.135  He did not anticipate the fact that the Western powers would only 
consider sealing the border a breach of the four- power statute if they were not allowed 
access to the entire city.  Thus, although the construction of the Wall eventually came as 
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a shock, RIAS commentators were aware of the possibility and cautioning listeners about 
it weeks in advance. 
 Being aware that the construction of a Berlin Wall was a possibility did not 
assuage the sense of shock and outrage that poured forth from RIAS’s commentators 
beginning August 13, 1961.  The surprise of the Berlin Wall’s construction was palpable 
in both RIAS’s commentaries and news broadcasts.136  Reports for the days preceding 
August 13 gave little indication of what was to come.  On Friday, August 11 the station 
reported on Cosmonaut Germain Titov’s orbital flight.  On August 12, news broadcasts 
reported information on the renewal of Romanian-Soviet relations, a speech delivered by 
West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt at an SPD Party Meeting in Nuremberg, and an 
attempted coup in Argentina.  Throughout, there were also news reports on the steady 
flow of refugees crossing the sector border into West Berlin.  The last RIAS news reports 
of August 12 concerning the refugee stream noted that 1,332 individuals had registered at 
West Berlin’s Marienfelde Refugee Camp since Thursday, August 10.137 
 At 4am on August 13, RIAS began reporting that the GDR was initiating drastic 
controls for the Berlin sector border.  The initial report simply related the basic facts of 
the GDR measure.  The complete broadcast lasted only four sentences: 
 
 
During early morning Sunday, the Soviet Zone Peoples’ 
Police have begun cordoning off the Sector Border between 
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East and West Berlin.  The entire night service of the Berlin 
Urban Rail network between the two parts of the city will 
be discontinued.  With this, the East Berlin authorities have 
at once complied with the requests of the Warsaw Pact 
member states to take complete control over the border 
with West Berlin.  According to Warsaw Pact communiqué 
circulated by the Soviet Zone news agency AND, 
connections between West Berlin and the Federal Republic 
will not be affected by the new measures.138 
   
 
The manuscript on which this news report was typed is heavily edited, in stark contrast to 
broadcast transcripts from the previous day.  The majority of these are corrections, with 
almost every sentence needing some kind of edit and it is most likely the manuscript was 
written in considerable haste as news of the border closure reached the station.  More 
detailed reports followed, and by 10:20 that morning, the brief report from 4am had 
developed into a much more detailed and critical overview of the day’s events.  Broadly, 
it addressed the major elements originally broadcast earlier that morning: the GDR was 
closing the border but right of access between West Berlin and West Germany would not 
be interrupted.  However, whereas the first broadcast simply related the East German and 
Warsaw Pact press releases, the 10:20 broadcast was far more condemnatory, and 
revealed the distinctive voice of RIAS’s reporters.  “This morning, the Soviet Zone 
authorities, in a unilateral, despotic act, have broken the Four Power Agreement 
concerning freedom of movement for all Germans in the two Berlins and have barred 
East Berliners and residents of the Zone from crossing the Zone and Sector borders to 
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West Berlin.”139  More than once the RIAS report characterized the measure as 
“despotic” and “unilateral,” thus emphasizing the violation of the Four Power 
Agreement.  The report also laid the foundations for the kind of vocabulary used by RIAS 
to characterize the Wall.  “The picture on West Berlin’s sector and zonal borders is 
denoted by barbed wire, barriers, Soviet Zone tanks, scout cars, as well as a massive 
offering of Peoples’ Police and Zone soldiers.”140  The image of barbed wire would 
permeate almost all of RIAS’s early broadcasts covering the Berlin Wall, a fact that 
reminds us that initially the Berlin Wall was a series of barbed wire barriers and not the 
massive concrete blockade that has entered the popular imagination.  Indeed, shortly after 
the Wall’s construction, the station began producing a program on life behind the wall 
entitled, Bewaffnete am Stacheldraht, (Gunmen at the Barbed Wire).   
 That evening, RIAS report Hans-Peter Herz gave a commentary on the day’s 
events.  The son of RIAS and SFB commentator Hans Herz, Hans-Peter was eighteen 
when World War II ended.  He had worked for the station since 1950 in various 
departments, including Youth programming and the Eastern European news bureau.  His 
broadcast in many ways represents a synthesis of the major assertions, arguments, and 
criticisms that RIAS had leveled against East Germany since the station first turned to 
rigorous anti-communism in 1948.  It was not particularly different from the broadcasts 
sent by Victor Klages and Eugen Hartmann during the Berlin blockade.  Herz 
immediately evoked memory of those days when he declared that Ulbricht and the 
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Warsaw Pact had completed the “second division of Berlin.”141  And just as easily as 
Victor Klages proclaimed apparent Soviet successes as evidence of Communism’s 
inherent weakness, Herz condemned the construction of the Berlin Wall as evidence of 
“bankruptcy” of the East German regime.  Confronting Gerhart Eisler and Karl-Eduard 
von Schnitzler’s assertions that the Wall was an expression of the GDR’s strength and 
assertiveness, Herz noted: 
 
The Zonal Authorites may think that Berliners, the 
residents of Central Germany, and observers from around 
the world will see the weapons staring from the Sector 
border as evidence of the strength of the so-called socialist 
camp.  They may think this, yet every man in the East and 
West keenly knows that the events of the early morning of 
August 13 are evidence of a bankrupt, armed regime 
pursuing a failed political system.142 
 
 
Herz followed this assertion by invoking the memory of the Nazi past.  “Ulbricht’s 
manipulation of the situation in Berlin reminds me in many ways of the events of the 
national socialist period.”143  Throughout the remainder of his broadcast, Herz proceeded 
to transform Ulbricht into the reincarnation of Adolf Hitler.  The breech of the Four 
Power agreement and the Potsdam Agreement of 1945 was reminiscent of Hitler’s many 
violations of international agreements.  Like the Nazis, Ulbricht and his associates 
ignored the wishes and demands of the people.  Despite claims that the Wall was an 
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expression of the peoples’ demand for protection, Herz noted that, “There has been no 
such demand and there never will be such a demand.”144  The East German people had 
made their demands clear by abandoning the GDR for West Germany.  Herz 
subsequently cited the German Communist leader Rosa Luxemburg, murdered during the 
German Revolution of 1918.  Responding to claims that Ulbricht was the successor of 
Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht and that he was implementing their goals, Herz 
questioned what both leaders would have thought of the Wall.   
 
 
Rosa Luxemburg would possibly pose only one question: 
What is your position regarding the freedom of dissent?  As 
everyone knows, she wrote in one of her letters that 
freedom is the freedom to dissent.  However, we are 
leaving that.  Germany’s communists do not follow the 
path of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, they march 
on the well-tread path of the brown dictator.  They perfect 
and complete, for a portion of our people, what Hitler 
began for all of us…145 
 
 
There could be no clearer statement of the contention that Ulbricht and the SED were the 
successors of the National Socialists.  By invoking Luxemburg and Liebknecht, the 
leaders of Germany’s failed revolution who were murdered by right-wing paramilitary 
forces, Herz was attacking the very foundation of East Germany’s antifascist narratives.  
Thus, through the commentary, he assaulted the foundation of the East German state 
itself. 
                                                 
144 Ibid., 3.  “Es hat keine solchen Forderung gegeben und es wird sie nicht geben.” 
145 Ibid., 5.  “Sie hat ja bekanntlich in einem ihrer Briefe geschrieben, Freieit ist immer die Freiheit des 
Andersdenkenden.  Aber lassen wir dass.  Deutschlands Kommunisten folgen nichts dem Wege Rosa Luxemburgs und 
Karl Liebknechts, sie marschieren aus dem ausgetretenen Pfad der braunen Diktatur.  Sie vervollkommen und 





 The following Sunday’s commentary by Heinz Frentzel drew upon similar 
themes.  However, he also did more to place the struggles of the German people within 
the context of the Cold War.146  For example, he immediately compared the events of 
August 13 with the Hungarian Uprising of 1956, stating, “On the night of November 4 
five years ago, we believed we understood the pain of the Hungarians.  Now we can truly 
understand it.”147  Perhaps uncertain about the Western position in the city himself, 
Frentzel also went to great lengths to reassure his listeners that NATO and the Western 
powers had not abandoned West Berlin.  West Berlin remained protected by the NATO 
defense guarantee.  Yet, as Frentzel pointed out, NATO could not act with force unless 
the territory of a NATO state had been violated.   
Thus, Frentzel reaffirmed what must have been a troubling realization to many 
listeners: that the East German people were not protected by the Western powers.  
Frentzel stressed that the Western powers and West Germans remained in solidarity with 
the East German people.   However, Frentzel also acknowledged the misgivings and 
anxiety afflicting West Berlin.  Referring to the recent visit of US Vice President Lyndon 
Johnson and the former US military governor of Germany, Lucius Clay to West Berlin, 
Frentzel stated the visit was exactly what Berlin needed.  By visiting West Berlin, Clay 
and Johnson had affirmed the United States’ commitment to West Berlin and insured that 
Berliners knew that West Berlin and the Western powers now shared the same fate.  
Although the West could not use military force against the East Germans, the west was 
obligated to protest the Wall and the actions of the GDR.  The legitimacy of the West 
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rested not only on affirming its own political, social, and economics superiority, but also 
in affirming unity and sympathy with the needs and pain of those living behind the Iron 
Curtain.   
In line with these statements, Frentzel argued that the Western world needed to 
now take the opportunity to characterize the, “ ‘dirty victory’ of the Concentration Camp 
Regime” as a manifestation of political and human failure.148  Thus, Frentzel contributed 
to the growing discourse, begun a week earlier, about what the Wall symbolized.  
Frentzel saw the Wall as a representation of the failure of the Soviet system.  Thousands 
from the western and non-aligned world could now see the “Wall of socialist humanism.” 
Behind it, the GDR was suffocating its citizens’ freedom of conscience.  Thus, while the 
Wall was new, the ideas it represented were not.  The wall and barbed wire were Soviet 
colonialism manifest and had opened the world’s eyes to the failures of the Soviet 
system.  
Although his primary focus was on the immediate events, Frentzel, like Herz, 
used the language of the Nazi period to characterize the East German and Soviet actions.  
The RIAS commentator frequently described the East German police as “Concentration 
Camp Wardens” (“KZ-Wächtern.”)  The commentary described the GDR as a 
“Concentration Camp State” (“KZ-Staat.”).  Like Herz, Frentzel was also careful to make 
it clear that the Wall was not a Soviet victory, but a symbol of ineptitude and failure. 
Once again in response to GDR broadcasters claims of strength, Frentzel responded, 
“They take it to be a victory, a victory of peace on top of that, although it is nothing more 
than a memorial to their ineptitude, their mismanagement, and their failure.  On the 
misused black-red-gold flag of their concentration camp state, they should paste a new 
                                                 





emblem: the emblem of barbed wire.”149  Once again, the image of barbed wire was used 
to characterize the Wall. 
  The image of barbed wire became a predominant theme of Walter Gerhard’s 
August 26 commentary the following week.  Speaking ironically as a communist writer, 
Gerhard declared, “I believe in barbed wire and no longer in progress.  I no longer 
believe in the fundamentals of ideology but only in the execution of terror, in violence, 
and the power of their brutal forms.”150  Thus, Gerhard stressed the argument that RIAS 
had been making for over a decade: that the SED was uninterested in true ideology and 
socialism and was more concerned with attainment and exercise of power.  The 
commentary depicted Ulbricht and the Soviet leadership as the successors of Russia’s 
autocrats.  “Ulbricht has brought to Germany what the Russian Tsars and the Soviets 
brought to Siberia: exile and work camps.  Consequently, Ulbricht’s new order contains 
the possibility of linking so-called residence restrictions with work education.”151   
The shadow of the Berlin blockade fell upon Gerhard’s commentary as it had 
Herz’s August 13 broadcast.  Recent debates between the Western powers and the 
Soviets concerning access to the three air corridors gave Gerhard cause to be concerned 
about the possibility that the Soviets could curtail air access to the city.  Thus, Gerhard 
continued to express concern that the GDR’s main aim was to absorb all of Berlin, 
including the Western Sectors. Gerhard asserted that both Ulbricht and Khrushchev were 
completing the work begun by Stalin in 1948: the Prague Coup, the “gleichschaltung” 
                                                 
149 Ibid., 3.  “Sie nennen es einen Sieg, einen Sieg des Friedens noch dazu, obwohl es nichts ist als ein Denkmal ihrer 
Unfähigkeit, ihrer Mißwirtschaft, ihres Scheiterns.  In daß mißbrauchte Schwarze-Rot-Gold der Fahne ihres KZ-Staates 
sollten sie als neues Emblem Stacheldraht kleben.” 
150 Walter Gerhard, Sonntagsmittagskommentar, RIAS Berlin, August 26, 1961, DRA Potsdam, RIAS Depositium, B 
304-01-00/0011, 1.  “Ich glaube an den Stacheldraht, nicht mehr an den Fortschritt, nicht mehr an die Grunsätze der 
Ideologie, sondern nur an die Wirkung des Terrors, an die Gewalt, an die Macht in ihrer brutalsten Form.” 
151 Ibid., 3.  “Was die russischen Zaren und nach ihnen die Sowjets in Sibirien praktizierten, der Verbannung und die 
Einrichtung von Arbeitslagern, Ulbricht überträgt es heute nach Deutschland, denn diese neue Verordnung enthält auch 





(coordination) of the Eastern Bloc, and the division of Berlin.  Their goal remained the 
same as Stalin’s goal in 1948-49: the absorption of West Berlin into the Soviet bloc.  By 
cordoning off East Berlin, Gerhard argued, Khrushchev’s true aim was to isolate West 
Berlin and pressure the Western powers to acknowledge his demand that the West Berlin 
become a free city.  Gerhard’s interpretation was not shared by US leaders and also 
ignored the fact, as one could discern from the GDR’s own radio broadcasts, that the 
Soviet and SED leadership really did see the Wall as a defensive measure designed to 
preserve the GDR.152  However, Gerhard’s comments certainly gave expression to the 
anxiety and fear that many Berliners, including those working for RIAS’s staff, must 
have felt at the time. 
Like Frentzel and Herz earlier in the month, Gerhard characterized the wall as a 
symbolic manifestation of Communism’s failure.  Even though East German officials 
were describing the wall as a victory, it was in fact a “decisive defeat.”153   At the same 
time, his commentary expressed anger with non-aligned states that refused to 
acknowledge the situation in Berlin was not just an issue of concern to the superpowers.  
As he noted, “There are still a sufficient number of neutral and non-aligned states that 
believe that in Berlin a match is being fought between the great powers.  They do not see 
that in the middle of the twentieth century, in the middle of Europe, 16 million people are 
being impressed into a colonial status based on political-ideological and militarist 
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foundations.”154  It was the obligation of the West, and reporters like those at RIAS, to 
broadcast what conditions were like behind the “concrete wall and barbed wire.” 
Beginning with its broadcasts on August 13, RIAS made efforts to transform the 
Wall into the manifestation of the Communist system in East Germany.  In doing so, it 
drew upon the same themes and arguments developed by the station during the First 
Berlin Crisis of 1948-49.  In contrast to Soviet claims, RIAS asserted, the Berlin Wall 
was neither a victory nor a symbol of socialism’s strength.  In fact, the Wall represented 
the ineptitude, failure, and oppression of the GDR’s Communist system.  RIAS’s 
commentators characterized Walter Ulbricht as the successor of Adolf Hitler.  The SED 
leaders’ claim that he was a true socialist was merely a cynical attempt to mask his quest 
for power and control.  The massive flow of refugees over the West Berlin border was 
evidence that the East German people did not want to live in the GDR and support the 
Communist state.  RIAS subsequently declared that the GDR’s claim that the Wall was 
an expression of the peoples’ will and need for protection were spurious and unfounded.  
East Germany became synonymous with barbed wire and concrete in RIAS’s broadcasts.   
 
The Berlin Wall and New Listener Habits 
 
For West and East Germans living on either side of the Wall, RIAS continued to 
be a source of morale and information.  Both the USIA and the station continued to poll 
individuals who had escaped from East Berlin to determine the station’s effectiveness.  
The data for these surveys was far less representative of the GDR’s population as a whole 
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than during the 1950s however.  Whereas before 1961 it was relatively easy to travel 
between the two Berlins, to do so after 1961 risked arrest and even death.  Thus, those 
who escaped were both politically motivated and usually driven by a wish to reunited 
with family.  Yet, a sample of 200 escapees polled by the German organizations DIVOS 
for the USIA in May of 1962 was diverse in terms of gender, age, and social 
background.155  The majority of those surveyed were woman, at 59%.  About a quarter 
had completed High School, with 9% having attended University.  About a quarter were 
between 21 and 29, with another quarter being between 40-49.  Most were either civil 
servants (29%) or housewives (20%).  The survey indicated that RIAS remained the most 
popular station and source for news and information in the GDR.  No other station came 
close to RIAS’s popularity.156  When asked which station was the most important to them 
personally, 67% of those surveyed stated RIAS, with SFB coming in second at just 6%.  
Information on the Eastern Zone was cited as the most important element of RIAS’s 
programming.   
Interestingly, although RIAS was still the favored station, East German stations 
rose dramatically in popularity as a source for information on conditions in the GDR.  
When asked where they received most of the information after the Wall went up, 88% of 
individuals polled stated they received their news from Western stations.  However, in 
comparison to a poll of escapees who had fled to the West before the Wall was 
constructed, the number was actually smaller, with 92% stating they listened to Western 
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stations in the previous poll.157  Yet, whereas before August 1961 just 13% of escapees 
listed East German radio as a source for information on foreign events, in 1962 the 
GDR’s broadcasters received 81%.  However, this did not necessarily mean those being 
polled considered East German broadcasters important or accurate.  When asked which 
stations had become more important to East Germans as a result of the construction of the 
Berlin Wall, just 4% stated GDR stations were “more important,” with 50% stating they 
had become less important.  86% listed RIAS as being “more important,” with only 1% 
stating the USIA broadcaster had become “less important.”158  The majority stated 
RIAS’s importance was due to its link to the West and its broadcasting of accurate 
information.  When asked why they though the GDR’s stations had become less 
important, the majority of respondents answered, “Broadcasts only lies.”159 
The survey reveals a critical piece of information: the majority of those fleeing 
East Berlin after the erection of the Berlin Wall were active listeners to RIAS and saw 
RIAS as a conduit to the West and source of accurate information.  A survey from 
December 1962 using the same polling sample noted that one in three of those 
interviewed cited radio as a major influence on their decision to feel the GDR.160  The 
majority of those surveyed indicated that reuniting with their family and escaping 
political pressure were the main motivation for their fleeing the GDR.  38% stated they 
were influenced to leave by what they heard on the radio, with about 80% of those 
responding that RIAS was the station that most influenced their decision.   
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Thus, despite the Wall’s construction, for many people RIAS remained the 
preferred source for news and information about both the GDR and the world outside 
East Germany.  It remained a link to the West and a represented an accurate alternative to 




 The period between 1956 and 1961 was a tumultuous one in the history of the 
Cold War.  Khrushchev’s Secret Speech in February 1956 began a process of 
destalinization that helped lead to uprisings in Poland and Hungary and subsequently 
forced Khrushchev to adopt violent measures to maintain the solidarity of the Soviet bloc.  
At the same time, the GDR’s refugee problem continued to threaten the viability of East 
Germany as a state.  Ulbricht and Khrushchev’s strong-armed solution of erecting the 
Berlin Wall put an end to the crisis.  However, the erection of the Wall was a visible 
expression of East Germany’s instability and linked the fate of Soviet satellite to the fate 
of the barrier.  As long as the Berlin Wall remained, so would East Germany.  Once it 
disappeared (along with Soviet troops), East Germany’s legitimate claim to statehood 
would collapse. 
 For Berlin’s radio stations, these events were opportunities to both reiterate 
arguments and assertions made since the late 1940s.  Both the GDR’s radio stations and 
SFB and RIAS reported the Hungarian Uprising and the erection of the Berlin Wall using 
themes and motifs first developed during the First Berlin Crisis and the June 17, 1953 





launched by the United States in order to overthrow a Communist state.  As with June 17, 
the Hungarian Uprising was directed and managed by US saboteurs and spies through the 
use of radio broadcasts.  Likewise, the erection of the Berlin Wall was justified in the 
same language used to justify the jamming of RIAS broadcasts and the arrest of RIAS 
listeners.  GDR stations once again characterized East Germany as a state under siege and 
on the precipice of being destroyed by the United States and fascist resurgent West 
Germany.  Consequently, the Berlin Wall was justified as an antifascist, defensive 
measure designed to protect East Germany.  As scholars of the decision making process 
behind the Berlin Wall have shown, this was an opinion not only disseminated by the 
GDR’s radio stations, but one that was held by its leaders.161 
 The GDR’s stations were not alone in drawing upon old arguments and motifs to 
describe these crises.  RIAS and SFB broadcasts immediately declared solidarity with the 
Hungarian rebels and cited Germany’s experience of the 1953 uprising as a parallel.  At 
the same time, however, the realization that the uprising would fail coupled with Britain 
and France’s intervention in Egypt led both RIAS and SFB reporters to express their 
doubts that any kind of dramatic change in the Cold War status quo could be achieved.  
Thus, in contrast to the hopeful and often triumphant broadcasts that marked the June 17 
uprising, West Berlin’s broadcast journalists began to express disillusion and 
despondency at the fact that Germany’s fate (and that of the Eastern Bloc’s) was tied to 
the actions and decisions of the superpowers.  Yet, after the erection of the Berlin Wall, 
RIAS reporters went to great lengths to reaffirm the ties between West Berlin and the 
Western powers.  At the same time, RIAS broadcasts deployed the same arguments and 
language used to describe the blockade and the airlift.  Once again, ideologically 
                                                 





distinctions between Communism and Nazism were downplayed.  Instead, RIAS 
commentators depicted a continuum between Adolf Hitler’s National Socialism and 
Walter Ulbricht’s Communism.  Broadcasters characterized both ideologies as 
oppressive, manipulative doctrines with little ideological distinction or characteristics.  
Commentators characterized the GDR as a concentration camp whose foundation rested 









Throughout the 1950s, RIAS Berlin ultimately became the most popular source 
for news and information in East Germany.  Why, considering the advantages held by 
German Communists when they began broadcasting from the Haus des Rundfunks in 
1945, did a station funded by a foreign power dedicated to overtly political goals become 
more popular than any of the GDR’s local stations?  Throughout this dissertation, I have 
argued that the answer to this question lies in how RIAS negotiated the balance between 
objective news reporting and partisan journalism.  RIAS never claimed to be a neutral 
observer of events in Berlin.  However, whereas East Germany’s stations believed that 
objective journalism was counterproductive to building socialism, RIAS journalists 
believed that one could balance accurate news and partisan engagement.  This mixture 
strengthened RIAS’s popularity amongst East German listeners.  At the same time, East 
Germany’s stations quickly lost credibility as a dependable news source. 
This dissertation has sought to examine how radio stations tried to shape political 
culture in Cold War Berlin.  Throughout, I have argued that the close relationship 
between audience and broadcaster was an integral component to how stations shaped 
political language.  Previously, work on the history of European political culture has 
focused on the use of language and symbols to shape politics and build consensus.1  
However, due to the nature of the sources, historians of political ideas have rarely been 
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able to assess the critical question of how these ideas were received and understood by 
the public in general.  Works that have engaged the question of public opinion in 
totalitarian societies, notably works on the Third Reich by Robert Gellately and Ian 
Kershaw, have been able to draw on limited sources to determine mass opinion in Nazi 
Germany.2  Yet, even historians of political culture German Democratic Republic and 
Federal Republic of Germany have only recently begun to ascertain the connection 
between the transmission and reception of ideas.3  Intellectual and political historians of 
the period after 1945 are fortunate to have a wide variety of sources on public opinion 
and attitudes.  The availability of surveys, listener letters, and audience meeting reports 
means that we can no longer claim total ignorance of public attitudes, even in a 
totalitarian state like the German Democratic Republic.  
 As Michael Meyen has noted, scholars have often given audiences a subordinate 
role when studying the nature and characteristics of the mass media.4  An important goal 
of this dissertation has been to treat audiences as integral players in the development of 
broadcasting in postwar Germany.  The specific historical circumstances of Berlin during 
the early Cold War affords historians the opportunity to engage questions about reception 
and public opinion that historians have been unable to ask in the past.  While Berlin was 
divided, its radio stations nevertheless competed to win over a single audience: the 
German people, specifically those living in the German Democratic Republic.  As a 
consequence of the joint occupation of the city, the citizens of the GDR could visit West 
Berlin, providing US and West German officials an opportunity that had not existed in 
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Nazi Germany or in the Soviet Union; the chance to interview the residents of a 
totalitarian state about their radio listening habits and political attitudes.  Both the GDR’s 
State Radio Committee and the United States government went to great lengths to 
assemble data on listening habits.   Using letters, listener surveys, and audience 
assemblies, radio officials on both sides of the Iron Curtain sought to determine listener 
concerns and habits as a means of both determining effectiveness and as a means of 
crafting new programming goals.  While the sample groups for these surveys were not 
always representative, the results of these efforts had a critical effect on how both sides of 
the radio war shaped their news broadcasting and programming.  The considerable efforts 
taken on the part of the SED to attack RIAS and its audience further demonstrates that 
many East Germans frequently listened to the station.  Officials and USIA policy makers 
also believed the results of these surveys presented an accurate picture of audience 
concerns and listening habits. 
Drawing on these sources, we can make a number of conclusions about listening 
habits in East Germany.  First, with the exception of a brief period in the late 1950s, 
individuals who crossed the East-West Berlin border and were polled by both the USIS 
and DIVOS consistently chose RIAS as their preferred news source.  Second, when they 
did not list RIAS as their favorite information source in 1957 and 1958, they almost 
always cited reception difficulties and jamming as the reason they had turned to another 
station, and not any problems with the station’s programming.  Third, individuals who 
had fled East Germany to live permanently in West Germany usually listened to RIAS’s 
programs and looked to the programs as a window into the West.  Fourth, although these 





when polled they noted that their compatriots who remained behind the Iron Curtain 
listened to RIAS as a source for news.  Finally, the East German government took RIAS 
seriously, and strongly believed that its population actively listened to the American 
station.   
Radio reporters in both Berlins hoped to use radio to shape political attitudes and 
build public opinion.  In this sense, they were following, whether conscious or not, 
principles established by journalists such as Walter Lippmann, who noted in 1922 that, 
“The world that we have to deal with politically is out of reach, out of sight, our of mind.  
It has to be explored, reported, and imagined.”5  Individuals relied on the press to better 
understand the world around them.  However, Lippmann continued, individuals were not 
necessarily equipped to confront the full complexity of the world around them.  As a 
result, the public and press both pursued a process of selection and reduction aimed at 
presenting a simplified image for readers.  The press was a critical player in crafting 
stereotypes, symbols, and narratives.  Subsequently, these same symbols and narratives 
played a critical role in shaping interpretation and public consensus. 
Yet, listeners were not passive recipients of news broadcasts, blindly hearing and 
absorbing information.  They were critical thinkers who saw a radio station as a conduit 
linking listeners with the policies and ideological worldviews of a particular station’s 
government sponsor.  While most letters written to both RIAS and stations in the German 
Democratic Republic focused on programming, many concerned official government 
policies.  For example, in the late 1940s, Berliner Rundfunk listeners wrote to the station 
to inquire about the status of German POWs still incarcerated in the Soviet Union.  
Listeners expected radio stations to be aware of the policies and goals of their 
                                                 





government sponsors.  This was particular pointed with how listeners wrote to RIAS.  
The American station stood as a kind of ersatz embassy in West Berlin.  During the 
Berlin airlift, listeners wrote to the station as a way of thanking US pilots and the United 
States as a whole for its efforts on behalf of West Berlin.  Throughout the 1950s, listeners 
also came to see RIAS as a source for information on East Germany.  Listeners inquired 
about transit rights between the two Germanys, and about US policies.  The word of 
RIAS was the word of the United States itself.  East German listeners visiting West 
Berlin often visited the station to provide information of their own.  In reaction to the 
station’s popularity, the Stasi harassed listeners, intercepted letters, and arrested 
individuals because of their connections to the so-called center for espionage. 
Three broad, interconnected factors contributed to RIAS’s popularity in East 
Germany and came to shape the dynamics and character of broadcasting in Cold War 
Berlin.  First, the GDR never achieved legitimacy as a viable state.  The economic 
miracle in West Germany, coupled with the unpopularity and ineffectiveness of the 
SED’s own economic policies, led millions to flee the German Democratic Republic 
throughout the 1950s.  At the same time, the SED could never escape the impression that 
it was a puppet of the Soviet Union.  The June 17, 1953 uprising only confirmed the 
GDR’s lack of viability, as its leaders were only restored to power with the intervention 
of Soviet military forces.  RIAS’s crucial role in the uprising also demonstrated both the 
popularity of the American broadcaster and the general apathy of the East German people 
towards the GDR’s own broadcasters.  Despite the blow the event dealt to the GDR’s 
legitimacy, June 17, 1953 came to occupy a central place within the political broadcasts 





confirmed their worst fears about RIAS and American intentions in East Germany.  From 
files produced by the Stasi, it is clear that the SED believed RIAS played an active role in 
the uprising.  Thus, June 17 was evidence of American fascism’s belligerent and 
unyielding goal of destroying the GDR.  Subsequently, using radio, the press, cartoons, 
and posters, the SED promoted a siege mentality in which the GDR was persistently on 
the precipice of being destroyed by American spies and West German led reactionaries.  
RIAS was the tool of both.  Thus, a curious paradox pervaded East German broadcasts.  
Whereas on the one hand, reporters insisted that communism’s ultimate victory was 
inevitable, at the same time they spoke of constant threats to the viability of the GDR and 
depicted a socialist state infested with deviant individuals, saboteurs, counter-
revolutionaries, and fascists.  Consequently, the GDR’s broadcasters ended up 
highlighting its very fragility.  The reports on the construction of the Berlin Wall were the 
logical result of these arguments.  Commentaries by von Schnitzler and Gerhard Eisler 
trumpeted the Berlin Wall as a symbol of strength, defiance, and resolution.  By 
constructing the barrier, the GDR had demonstrated to the United States and Federal 
Republic that it could not be destroyed from within. 
The second factor contributing to RIAS’s popularity was the lack of credibility on 
the part of its competition: the East German radio stations.  The constant and pervasive 
influence of the SED’s specific interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology on 
broadcasting severely weakened the quality of news broadcasting in the GDR, and sent 
listeners away to other information sources.  When it was initially founded, the staffers at 
Berliner Rundfunk sought to forge bonds with non-communists and build an anti-fascist 





1947.  While Berliner Rundfunk openly supported the Soviet position that the US backed 
Marshall Plan and its economic policies in Germany were designed to divide the country 
and make it an imperial fief of American capitalism, the station’s Intendant Heinz 
Schmidt attempted to present a partial balance in the station’s broadcasts, hiring western 
trained journalists like Herbert Gessner and Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler to work as 
journalists for the station.  The station also frequently cited Western critics of the Truman 
Administration such as Walter Lippmann and Henry Wallace.  However, in the shadow 
of the Berlin blockade of 1948, Berliner Rundfunk’s claims that the United States was a 
war mongering state could not mask the fact that the Soviets were the ones blockading 
the city.  The success of the Berlin airlift further damaged Berliner Rundfunk’s 
credibility, especially since it had so confidently ridiculed the operation’s prospects for 
success in the summer of 1948.   
By late 1949, the SED concluded that Schmidt’s attempts to win over western 
audiences by downplaying Marxism-Leninism were counterproductive.  The SED 
leadership subsequently dismissed Schmidt from his post because of his so-called 
“objective” reporting.  Schmidt’s dismissal initiated a process that would last until 1952 
during which the SED centralized all broadcasting operations in Berlin and established 
programming designed to actively promote Marxist-Leninist doctrine and support for the 
SED and Soviet Union.  The SED’s radio schools dedicated themselves to creating 
reporters capable of elucidating Marxist-Leninist principles.  At the same time, it also 
schooled reporters in the German Communist master narratives, instructing them to 
present a world divided between the antagonistic camps of progressive socialism and 





The lack of response on the part of the GDR’s broadcasters during the June 17, 
1953 workers’ uprising made it appear out of touch and to be an unreliable news source.  
Compounding this, every time officials in the State Radio Committee concluded that 
something needed to be done to win back listeners, the SED chose to strengthen the 
ideological influence over East German broadcasting.  Many East German reporters knew 
that the propagandistic tone and character of the GDR’s news broadcasts were sending 
East German listeners to RIAS to receive information.  Yet, these efforts were always 
met with a crackdown from the ruling SED and a reassertion of state control over 
broadcasting.  Unable and not necessarily willing to make their political programming 
more appealing to a mass audience, the GDR’s State Radio Committee improved cultural 
programming as a means of drawing listeners away from RIAS.  At the same time, the 
SED Department of Agitation and GDR Ministry for State Security launched a concerted 
campaign targeting East Germans who listened to RIAS.  If the SED could not convince 
East Germans to listen to GDR radio, it could at least try and prevent them from listening 
to anything else. 
In combating the declining popularity of its news programming, the GDR 
broadcasters tried to implement what Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann has described as a 
“spiral of silence.”  Noelle-Neumann argues that individuals’ fundamentally fear 
isolation.  Since deviant and vagrant opinions often lead to isolation, individuals seek out 
the majority opinion.  As a result, the fear of isolation led individuals to publicly embrace 
what appeared to be the majority attitude and conceal any divergent attitudes they may 
have.  The act of trying to determine and assess majority attitudes, coupled with the 





opinion.  Thus, the majority opinion was actually a “spiral of silence,” as individuals’ 
fear of isolation led them to keep any divergent attitudes they may have a secret.6 
 The belief that a “spiral of silence” helped shape public political attitudes 
informed how reporters in the GDR actually presented major news stories.  The stations 
in the GDR always spoke as if they were addressing the majority, whether it was the 
people of Berlin, the German nation, or the people of the world.  In most cases, reporters 
spoke of broad, unifying interests and criticized those, whether listeners or political 
figures, who diverged from these common goals.  For the GDR’s broadcasters, the 
fundamental image was the conflict between prevailing, accepted opinion and vagrant, 
destructive worldviews.  As a consequence, East German reporters not only criticized 
divergent opinions and attitudes, but also condemned them as criminal and pro-fascist.  
East German stations characterized the emerging political rivalries in Germany as a 
conflict between the majority antifascist opinion and the deviant, pro-fascist, minority 
opinion.  Thus, when individuals such as Kurt Schumacher publicly attacked the Soviet 
backed fusion of the Social Democratic Party and the Comunist Party in the Eastern 
Zone, Berliner Rundfunk not only accused him of being a fascist and a traitor to the 
German left, but also the holder of an aberrant, abnormal opinion that was at odds with 
both the wishes and interests of the German people and nation.  This approach informed 
how journalists working for Berliner Rundfunk and its sister stations throughout the GDR 
presented the major events associated with the early Cold War, such as the announcement 
of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the Berlin blockade.  The capitalist elites 
of the United States, according to Berliner Rundfunk’s reports, aimed to reassert fascist 
                                                 






dominance over Europe.  Only the socialist camp, led by the Soviet Union, represented 
the true interests and wishes of Europe and the world.   
This approach did not just inform how reporters presented major events however.  
The belief in a “spiral of silence” also defined how East German officials and journalists 
confronted the issue of individuals listening to non-GDR stations such as RIAS.  Through 
leaflets, cartoons, posters, and news reports, East German propaganda officials and 
reporters constructed the image of the gullible RIAS listener, fooled into believing the 
American station’s false promises of prosperity.  The gullible listener had a sinister side 
as well, and East German propaganda often depicted him being manipulated into serving 
the United States as a spy and saboteur.  This image informed how the East German 
government explained the June 17, 1953 uprising.  Throughout the remainder of the 
1950s, until the construction of the Berlin Wall, the image of a criminal, subversive 
minority trying to overthrow the GDR permeated East German radio broadcasts.  
Reporters characterized the refugees streaming across the West-East Berlin border as 
either individuals easily fooled by Western lies or criminals. 
In many ways, however, the anti-RIAS propaganda campaign was evidence of the 
ultimate inability on the part of the GDR to construct a viable alternative to RIAS.  
Unable to attract listeners with a credible and popular information source, the GDR 
simply attacked people who listened to other, non-GDR stations.  Initially, East German 
reporters such as Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler and Herbert Gessner recognized that the 
GDR had failed to produce a compelling or convincing narrative to counter RIAS’s 
claims.  During the days immediately following the June 17 uprising, GDR radio stations 





German broadcasters’ failure to acknowledge and embrace the popular attitudes and 
concerns of the GDR’s population that allowed an event such as June 17 to occur.  East 
German officials quickly rejected this approach however, and soon broadcasts and 
cartoons began blaming the uprising on a malleable and deviant minority manipulated by 
RIAS into staging a counterrevolutionary coup.   
By pursuing journalism that engaged and undermined the GDR but also presented 
accurate news and information, RIAS was able to exploit the problems afflicting the 
GDR’s media organs.  The American station’s ability to take advantage of its opponent’s 
weaknesses constitutes the third reason RIAS consistently stood as the most popular news 
source in the GDR.  When RIAS was created in 1946, its founders in the US Occupation 
Government hoped that the station would serve as an example of traditional standards of 
objective reporting that stressed not only accuracy, but also impartiality and non-bias.  
However, tensions erupted within RIAS’s staff as American control officers like Gus 
Mathieu and Ruth Norden avoided open confrontation with the Soviets despite the fact 
that the Soviet backed Berliner Rundfunk attacked US policies and the democratic order 
in West Berlin.  The best means of confronting the Soviets, officials argued, was to use 
RIAS as an example of neutral, impartial journalism.  In the politically tense atmosphere 
of Berlin during the immediate postwar years, with the city’s democratic parties under 
constant attack from the SED and its Soviet sponsors, such an approach was largely 
unpopular amongst West Berlin statesmen like Ernst Reuter.   
By the fall of 1947, RIAS had ended its policy of neutrality.  With the outbreak of 
the Cold War in 1947, the US authorities in Germany deployed RIAS in a multimedia 





reporters continued to adhere to the principles of factuality and independence, news 
broadcasts were rarely balanced, unbiased, or neutral.  By 1949, RIAS’s primary mission 
was to provide an alternative news source for East German listeners and attempting to 
undermine and destabilize the GDR.  However, despite this overtly political aim, the 
station’s news staff nevertheless strictly adhered to the principle that news needed to be 
accurate and presented with little editorial coloration.  However, this had as much to do 
with providing East Germans with a clear, distinct alternative to the GDR’s broadcast as 
it did with promoting liberal-democratic broadcast journalism.  By broadcasting accurate 
information, RIAS was able to shield itself from East German claims that it presented 
false news to East German listeners.  News stories needed to appear on a number of wire 
services before the station would repeat them.  Reporters also drew on information from 
East Germans visiting the station itself.  At the same time, “objective” also denoted a 
style of presentation.  Reporters needed to make clear distinctions between their own 
ideas and those of their sources.  Thus, for RIAS’s reporters, “objective” reporting was 
neither neutral nor unbiased reporting.  It was factual reporting designed to achieve a 
political end.  By providing accurate stories about conditions both within the GDR and 
outside, RIAS appealed to listeners seeking an alternative to the GDR’s broadcasters.  By 
presenting programs focusing specifically on life in the GDR, it also forged a strong bond 
with its audience.  
Despite its pursuit of accurate reporting, RIAS nevertheless remained committed 
to disrupting the legitimacy of the German Democratic Republic.  In this regard, “the 
spiral of silence” described by Noel-Neumann was no less important to RIAS’s reporters.  





East Germany, broadcast commentators such as Victor Klages and Eugen Hartmann 
began to characterize a world divided between a totalitarian minority and a democratic 
majority.  Reporters characterized the Soviet camp as a desperate superpower that reacted 
to its increasing isolation from the world with acts of aggression.  According to RIAS, the 
Czech Coup and Berlin blockade were both launched by the Soviets because they 
realized that communism did not enjoy popular support.  Consequently, the Soviet’s 
decision to resort to non-democratic means to achieve its goals in 1948 was spurred on by 
communism’s failure to achieve a broad base with the majority of the European 
population.  The dichotomy continued to shape RIAS reports throughout the 1950s.  
RIAS broadcasts didn’t just depict Soviet and East German actions such as the 
suppression of the June 17 uprising, the Hungarian Uprising of 1956, and the 
construction of the Berlin Wall as politically oppressive acts.  The station’s reporters 
characterized the actions as crimes against humanity.   
At the same time, RIAS sought to prevent the creation of a “spiral of silence” in 
East Germany by refuting the GDR’s claims that only a deviant few listened to RIAS, 
criticized the SED, and supported West Germany.  RIAS reports focused on reassuring 
listeners that their opinions and attitudes about the SED were actually shared by their 
compatriots.  In the face of the GDR’s media monopoly, RIAS provided East German 
listeners with one of the few sources of news that diverged from the official SED 
position.  While GDR broadcasters sought to create a world divided between fascists and 
antifascists and accused those of sharing a supposedly minority opinion as vagrants and 
deviants, RIAS consciously sought to stress that a division existed between the East 





uninterested in the construction of a communist system.  Instead, they sought the 
unification of Germany and democratic rights.  Consequently, when Egon Bahr and 
Eberhard Schütz began reporting the June 17 uprising, they immediately proclaimed it 
was a peoples’ uprising and mass plea for German unity.  By linking what was at first a 
demonstration against increased work quotas to the aspirations of German unification, 
RIAS’s reporters hoped to transform the protests into a national movement.   
The selection and presentation of news stories often resulted in the simplification 
of major arguments and ideas.  For the stations in the GDR, the prevailing influence on 
broadcast reporting was the anti-fascist narrative.  East German broadcasters 
characterized the world as being divided into two antagonistic camps: the capitalist 
imperialist camp and the communist democratic camp.  The latter represented peace and 
progress, the former war and reaction.  This narrative drew upon old German Communist 
traditions that had originally asserted that Nazism was the principle fascist enemy.  With 
Nazism defeated, the United States and West Germany became the new fascist enemies.  
GDR stations developed and varied this theme in a number of ways.  During the late 
1940s, the station characterized the United States as an imperialist force attempting to 
resurrect fascism in West Germany and use the Marshall Plan to divide the German 
people.   
 Despite its stated goal of presenting accurate, “straight” news broadcasts, RIAS 
also frequently deployed explanatory narratives itself.  If the GDR saw a world divided 
between fascists and antifascists, RIAS saw it divided between totalitarian states and 
democratic states.  The German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union were 





Heinz Frentzel downplayed the ideological distinctions between Soviet communism and 
National Socialism.  Throughout the 1950s, RIAS contended that continuities existed 
from the Nazi regime to the SED regime.  Both movements were interested only in the 
acquisition and maintenance of power.  Both sought to trample the rights of its citizens 
and eliminate basic civil rights.  Journalists grounded this approach, which focused more 
on structural similarities and less on historical specificity, on both journalistic and 
ideological necessity.  Political goals and concerns often overrode the need to discuss 
historical distinctions.  As the station’s political director, Gordon Ewing, noted during 
RIAS’s 1952 campaign against the GDR’s collective contracts, it was critical that RIAS 
present itself as a champion of German worker and civil rights as not only a means of 
attacking the legitimacy of the SED, but also as a means of protecting RIAS from the 
accusation that it was simply a mouthpiece for fascism resurgent in the United States and 
West Germany.   Anti-totalitarianism was consequently a critical means of confronting 
communism without adopting the Nazi style rhetoric of anti-Bolshevism.  In this sense, 
the station adopted the anti-communist rhetoric of the West Berlin Social Democratic 
Party used by Ernst Reuter and Willy Brandt. 
 The United States and Soviet Union waged the Cold War using a wide range of 
means.  In Berlin during the 1950s, we can see how the conflict was fought using the 
mass media.  The media war as a complex conflict in which both sides struggled with 
issues such as objectivity, accuracy, and the fundamental purpose of radio broadcasting.  
At the same time, listeners looked to radio as a means of acquiring information about the 
Cold War conflict and as a window to the outside world.  As much as the two sides of the 





audiences often listened to multiple stations and were often aware when politics shaped 
broadcasts.  Thus, when we consider RIAS, it is perhaps best to remember that it not only 
tried to broadcast accurate information to the East German people, but also broadcast an 
alternative viewpoint.  Its ability to provide a narrative that countered the official 
statements of the SED meant that, as long as the station could broadcast into the German 
Democratic Republic, the communist state would also struggle to build a legitimate 
foundation.  If there is a lesson to be drawn from the Berlin radio war, it is that the mass 
media cannot just help a state develop a stable political order.  It can also create 












Image no. 1: “A Man Comes to Berlin,” (Ein Man kam nach Berlin, Cover).  (Deutsches 







Image no. 2: “These were Mr. Dalcher’s special achievements when he was in Austria,” 









Image no. 3: “These are the Organizers,” (from Ein Man kam nach Berlin, pages 6-7).  









Image no. 4: “The Men Behind the Scenes,” (from Ein Man kam nach Berlin, pages 8-9).  






 Image no. 5: “Here flows Milk and Honey.”  Cartoon from Eulenspiegel, February 1, 







Image no. 6: “RIAS Hounding is War Hounding,” Undated Cartoon.  (DRA Potsdam, 








Image no. 7: “Who solicits agents and saboteurs in Frankfurt an der Oder?  Who wants to 
destroy our cities?  Who endangers the happiness of your children?  It is RIAS!” (DRA 







Image 8: “Attention---this is RIAS: We’re switching gears,” from Espenhainer Stimme, 
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